March 1, 1920.
My dear Mr. Wood:
I regret that my absence from Washington has delayed this reply to
your letter of January 17th enclosing a letter of January 12th from
Major Ross.
Major Ross quotes a paragraph from a letter written by me as
published in the “Indianapolis Star” and objects to this paragraph as
unjust in so far as his battalion (2nd Battalion, 365th Infantry) is
concerned. As quoted by Major Ross the paragraph to which he objects
reads as follows:
“The 92nd Division, astride the Moselle, attacked at 7 a. m.,
November 10th and at 5 a. m., November 11th, advanced a short
distance, but the troops had retired to cover in the face of repeated
heavy fire when the commander of the attacking Brigade received
information at 7:18 a. m. that an armistice would be effective at
11 a. m. The Brigade Commander reports that he ordered all firing
stopped by 10:45 a. m. and that the firing was so stopped.”
The above quotation is incorrect. The paragraph as actually written
in my letter of November 21st was as follows:
“The 92nd Division, astride the Moselle, attacked at 7 a. m.,
November 10th and at 5 a. m., November 11th, renewed the attack. The
renewed attack started at 5 a. m., November 11th, advanced a short
distance, but the troops had retired to cover in the face of reported
heavy fire when the commander of the attacking Brigade received
information at 7:18 a. m. that an armistice would be effective at
11 a. m. The Brigade Commander reports that he ordered all firing
stopped by 10:45 a. m. and that the firing was so stopped.”
You will note that in the correct paragraph the reference to the
retirement of troops relates solely to the _renewed_ attack started
at 5 a. m., November 11th and does not concern the attack of November
10th. I think a careful examination of Major Ross’s letter shows
that his statements as to the work of his battalion do not assert
that any advance was made by the 2nd Battalion on November 11th.
Examination of the records shows that the 2nd Battalion did take
the Bois Frehaut on November 10th and that this battalion held this
position until the armistice went into effect.
The orders issued by the 183rd Brigade on the evening of November
10th for the operation of November 11th contemplated putting the 1st
Battalion of the 365th into position in the western part of Bois
Frehaut and--“the 2nd Battalion, 365th Infantry will be held in
support in its present position in the Bois Frehaut.” This clearly
shows that the 2nd Battalion, 365th Infantry, was not expected to
attack on November 11th; and taken with other evidence shows that the
2nd Battalion, 365th Infantry, held, on November 11th, the positions
which it had gained on November 10th.
The actual statements made by me in my letter of November 21st were
correct, based on the reports of the several commanders, and I think
that Major Ross will agree that there is nothing in what I have said
that reflects in any way upon the work of the 2nd Battalion, 365th
Infantry. That battalion appears to have done what was expected of
it on November 10th and on November 11th. As shown in the quotation
I have given above from the order issued November 10th for the
operation of November 11th, the 2nd Battalion was in support and was
not in the attacking line on the morning of November 11th.
I am enclosing herewith the papers enclosed with your letter of
January 17th.
Very sincerely,
(Signed) John J. Pershing.
The Honorable Will R. Wood,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.
In view of the general opinion prevailing among American forces in
France, and the impression of the American public at large relative
to the Ninety-second Division’s drive toward Metz also relative to
its experience in the Argonne as represented by the Three Hundred
and Sixty-eighth Infantry in the attacking line, it seemed to me
advisable to state what the result was of work done by attacking units,
other than the Second Battalion of the Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth
Infantry, in the advance on Metz fortifications on November 10th
and 11th. It is especially well that I mentioned them since General
Pershing says in effect (and the General knows and is regarded as an
authority) that the Second Battalion, Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth
Infantry _fully accomplished_ its mission, and also that attacks made
on the 11th “advanced a short distance, but had retired to cover....”
No doubt, before reading my lecture, _some_ were of the opinion that
the Ninety-second Division was rushing with irresistible force past
and over strong points, regardless of all defenses, sweeping all
before it and was only prevented from battering down the walls of the
city of Metz itself by the armistice. As nearly every soldier, from
General Pershing down, knows and as the final battle line as compared
with the line on November 9th clearly proves, such was not the case.
Had I indulged in glittering generalities to that effect, had I even
inferred it, or had I left an impression that all units concerned,
accomplished their missions, that is, succeeded in carrying out their
orders, I would lay myself open to serious and just criticism, for
as leader of the attack on the key position, which was the central
position, it was my business to _know_ what happened on my front and on
my flanks. I would be considered untruthful or at least an exaggerator,
and all that I have said, if it has any effect at all, would detract
from rather than add to the credit due the American colored soldier.
“Scott’s Official History of the American Negro in the World War,”
written and compiled by Emmett J. Scott, special assistant to the
Secretary of War, contains the general reports, less appendices and
details, of the Commander of the Ninety-second Division and of the
Commander of the One Hundred and Eighty-third Brigade relative to
operations of November 10th and 11th. For your convenience I shall cite
pages in Dr. Scott’s work.
I said something to the effect that the battalion of the white division
on the left of the 367th’s front attacked, lost about 156 men in a
few minutes and retired. I also said that the 367th Infantry on our
left--just across the Moselle failed to accomplish its mission.
Page 151, Brigade Report, “At 10:30 a. m. a message from the Division
was received that the attack of the 367th Infantry, 184th Brigade had
been repulsed (on our left), but that two companies were being sent
forward to reinforce their attack.”
Page 159, Division Report, “10 Nov. 9:30 hr.--Attack by 367th Infantry
west of Moselle not prosecuted because of failure of 56th Infantry, 7th
Division, to capture Preny. The report of the C. O., 367th Infantry at
pages 2 and 3 shows the facts and reasons.”
Page 160, Division report, “Inasmuch as the 367th Infantry west of the
Moselle made no advance due to the fact that it was necessary that
the 7th Division should first capture Preny before an advance was
practicable, no report is made here of enemy units engaged west of the
Moselle.”
That, I take it, is enough to prove that no success was achieved by
units advancing or to advance on our left. It is necessary to prove
_that_ for the benefit of only a very few, for the overwhelming
majority of Americans (owing to the effort to give all units equal
credit and imply that all concerned succeeded) are ignorant, or
seriously in doubt whether the 92nd Division or any of its units
achieved any real success _anywhere_.
Now let us see about our brigade--the 183rd, which comprised the 365th
and 366th infantry and the 350th Machine Gun Battalion. The Brigade
report says, latter part of paragraph 2 on page 149, same book, “The
object of this attack was to capture and hold the Boise Frehaut and the
Bois Voivrotte (Bois Voivrotte is the name of the small wood I spoke of
in the lecture, to our right) with the object of advancing the line of
observation of the Marbache sector to the northern boundary of these
woods.” So our brigade orders were to capture and hold these two woods,
and, as we were advancing from the south, the line we were to hold
respectively, was the _northern boundary_ of both these woods.
Page 149, paragraph 3 of Brigade report: “The attack was to be made
on the Bois Frehaut by the 2nd Bn. 365th Inf., Major Warner A. Ross,
commanding. The attack on the Bois Voivrotte was to be made by two
platoons, 2nd Bn. 366th Inf. At the zero,” etc.
At the early hour of 8:12, the report says, page 150, a message had
been relayed from Division headquarters to Brigade headquarters to the
effect that Bois Voivrotte was completely occupied. It was very small
compared to the positions the 2nd Bn. 365th Inf. was attacking. And
the next entry, as given on page 150, is: “At 9 a. m. a message was
received that sharp fighting by machine guns was going on in the Bois
Voivrotte and the Bois Frehaut.” This was the case in Bois Frehaut at
that time and at 8:30 when I sent that particular message relative to
Bois Frehaut by pigeon. Now, the fact that machine gun fighting was
going on in Bois Voivrotte means that either the 8:12 message about
it being completely occupied was premature or that machine guns had
been sent in by the enemy after the platoons of the 2nd Bn. 366th Inf.
“completely occupied” it. For if enemy machine gunners were occupying
and fighting in the wood it could not be said to be “completely
occupied” by our troops.
After the 2nd Battalion, 365th Infantry had completely occupied Bois
Frehaut and established our line along the northern boundary and also
the eastern boundary of that wood (it was much farther north than
the northern boundary of Bois Voivrotte) it became impracticable for
the enemy to send or keep troops in Bois Voivrotte unless he drove
my Battalion from Bois Frehaut. He was still at liberty, however,
to rain artillery fire upon it. But here it is officially from the
commander of the 2nd Bn. 366th Inf. On page 151, Brigade report:
“3:05 p. m. Telephone message from C. O. 2nd Bn. 366th Inf. that he
had withdrawn his lines to southern edge of Bois Voivrotte because of
heavy enemy shelling--high explosives and gas in woods.” This final
cessation of their efforts to hold Bois Voivrotte and withdrawal of
their lines to the _southern_ edge of it was _one_ reason for the
next entry on same page: “3:55 p. m. Orders received from Commanding
General 92nd Division not to launch attack as planned for 5 p. m., but
to consolidate positions gained, holding them at all costs against
possible counter attacks.” For how could the other units that were
supposed to attack through the units supposed to be holding Bois
Voivrotte advance beyond its northern boundary when as a matter of
fact according to the Battalion C. O.--directly in command--they were
only _holding_ the _southern_ boundary. Obviously it was necessary to
_recapture_ Bois Voivrotte and _hold_ it--all of it, before they could
consider capturing anything beyond, or north of it.
The _other_ reason for the calling off by the Division Commander of
the attack scheduled to be launched from the northern boundaries of
Bois Frehaut and Bois Voivrotte at 5 p. m., on the 10th, was equally
obvious. For how could the units scheduled to attack through the
2nd Battalion of the 365th then holding the _northern_ boundary of
Bois Frehaut, be expected to advance _beyond_ us when they had never
succeeded, due to enemy artillery fire, in reaching even the _southern_
boundary of Bois Frehaut.
At the time when the attack _beyond_ Bois Voivrotte was almost due to
be launched by other units of the 366th they were _not holding_ Bois
Voivrotte but had withdrawn their line to the southern edge and were
holding what previously had been no-man’s land--very much narrower
there than in front of Ferme de Belle Aire. As can readily be seen,
this failure to hold, on their part, left me in a precarious condition
should the enemy in force attempt to envelop us through Bois Voivrotte.
This was largely the cause for the order to the artillery mentioned in
the Division Report, page 160: “11 Nov. 3:59--Artillery directed to put
down barrage on northern edge of Bois Voivrotte, this point not being
occupied by our troops.” I think, bearing in mind General Pershing’s
brief remarks relative to attacks on the 11th of November, that this
covers them all, including troops of the 7th Division attacking through
the C. R. adjoining the 367th on the left.
What does all this mean? It means that of all the battalions concerned
or engaged in attacking toward Metz during the drive that started the
morning of November 10th, the only battalion that accomplished its
mission, or in other words, the only one that was able to carry out
its orders--the only one that captured and held anything, was the 2nd
Battalion of the 365th Infantry. Had this battalion _not_ succeeded in
capturing and holding Bois Frehaut, in fact had it not succeeded in
all of its various missions at all times, and had its companies, as
companies, not succeeded in all their various missions, I would not be
publishing any book about it at all, let alone praising the battalion
as I have.
But let us see some more quotations from things included in Dr. Scott’s
History. Ralph W. Tyler, the colored war correspondent, writing,
necessarily from hearsay mostly, at a time when the confusion and
din of battle made it impossible to foresee results, could, however,
see the landscape in general and he knew who was attacking and later
who was holding Bois Frehaut. He also visited Bois Frehaut after the
armistice, so among other things he wrote, page 289: “... and so the
2nd Battalion went into action with but one white officer, the Major.
No unit in the advance had a more difficult position to take and hold
than the position assigned to the 2nd Battalion of the 365th. The Bois
Frehaut was a network of barbed-wire entanglements, and the big guns in
Metz had nothing to do but sweep the woods with a murderous fire, which
they did most effectively. French and Senegalese in turn had failed
to hold these woods, for it was worse than a hell--it had become the
sepulchre of hundreds. I (Ralph W. Tyler) was over and through these
woods; I saw the mass of barbed-wire entanglements; I saw the nests in
the trees in which Germans had camouflaged machine guns that rained a
fire upon the Allied troops.
“It is impossible to describe this scene of carnage. The order to
the colored men of the 365th was to ‘take and hold’ although it was
believed, almost to a certainty, that they could not hold it, even
if they did take it. But they did take and hold it, and these men
of the 2nd Battalion, with Spartan-like courage; with an endurance
unbelievable, would be holding the position at this writing had not the
armistice been signed or had they not received orders to retire.”
He also says that “the Major commanding stated to me that the world
had never produced gamer fighters than the colored men who made up
his battalion of the 365th infantry.” But his next three paragraphs
as quoted in “Scott’s History” are mostly erroneous as to previous
conditions. The records will show (the necessary records are not in
that book), but every one who was in the 365th Infantry and most
every one in the Division knows that the 2nd Bn. 365th held the
front line battalion sector east of the Moselle called C. R. Musson
_continuously_ for thirty-one days, then went back, occupied the
second line of defense for three days (during which time various units
marched up and engaged the enemy to ascertain his strength), returned
to Pont-a-Mousson on the 9th and attacked on the morning of the 10th.
During this time the 1st and 3rd Battalions took turns holding the C.
R. on our right--C. R. Les Menils. I had not read Dr. Scott’s book at
the time I made my lecture. During the Division’s occupancy of the St.
Die sector this battalion held a front line sector continuously. In the
Argonne it did road work as close to the advanced line as any of the
battalions. The Division was praised by General Pershing for its work
in facilitating traffic during the Argonne Meuse drive, that is, the
early part of that drive. Elements of the 368th Infantry were in the
attacking line for a short time. Early in October the entire Division
was moved out of the Argonne-Meuse section and to the Marbache sector.
No battalion of the 368th Infantry ever held a front line position in
the Marbache sector.
To show you how Mr. Tyler was impressed with Bois Frehaut I will quote
from his writings again. Page 286, Dr. Scott’s book: “The armistice
stopped their advance into Berlin, but they did reach the nearest point
to the German city of Metz in what was designed as a victorious march
to Berlin, and the valor they displayed, their courageous, heroic
fighting all along that advance, won for our men in the 92nd Division
high praise from superior officers, including the corps and division
commanders, for they never wavered an instant, not even in that awful
hell, the Frehaut Woods, upon which the big guns of Metz constantly
played, which the Senegalese were unable to hold, but which our colored
soldiers from America did take and did hold, until the signal came
announcing the cessation of hostilities.”
I shall now give a few more extracts from the Brigade Commander’s
report. On page 150, same book: “At 10 a. m. (Nov. 10th) a runner
message was received from the Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn., 365th Inf.,
to the effect that they were being heavily shelled in the Bois Frehaut
by enemy artillery, and requesting counter battery fire; it was also
stated that their advance had almost reached the northern edge of Bois
Frehaut. Heavy artillery was asked to counter-fire on enemy artillery,
which they promptly did.” I sent this message about 9 o’clock.
On page 151, Brigade report: “At 11:15 a. m. a message from the C.
O. 2nd Bn. 365th Inf. to the effect that Bois Frehaut was completely
occupied, that Boches were shelling woods with gas and high explosives,
and requesting counter battery fire.” This was the message spoken
of in the lecture that I sent at 10 o’clock by pigeon to Division
Headquarters. It was read there and relayed to Brigade Headquarters
(situated in another village).
Page 152, Brigade report: “Our advance was for a depth of about three
and one-half kilometers. When this Brigade took over the sector just
east of the Moselle river there was a deep re-entrant next to the
river, due to the St. Mihiel drive which advanced the line several
kilometers on the west bank of the Moselle river, while the line on the
east bank remained in place.”
The reason it “remained in place” was that neither French, Americans
nor Senegalese troops had succeeded in getting into it (Bois Frehaut)
very far--let alone taking and holding it.
Page 153, Brigade report: “Full use was made of auxiliary arms,
machine guns, 37 millimeter guns, Stokes mortars and rifle grenades.
All of these weapons, except Stokes mortars were brought into play in
the heavy fighting in the Bois Frehaut to combat enemy machine gun
nests. 37 mm. guns were pushed well to the front when direct fire at
enemy machine gun positions could be obtained. It was to the extensive
use of these weapons that the rapid advance through Bois Frehaut was
due. Machine guns were used frequently to cover the flanks of the
attacking infantry. They aided materially in protecting the N. E.
corner of the Bois Frehaut from an enemy counter attack from Bouxières.
Trench mortars were placed in position after the Frehaut woods were
taken, to cover the new front.”
Page 154, Brigade report: “The lines held by the Germans were unusually
strong, being the result of four years of stabilization in that
sector. Their artillery was most active, as unquestionably during
these years they had registered on every point of importance in the
sector. Furthermore, their positions were the first line of defense of
Metz. The troops occupying them were young, efficient men and not old
soldiers from a rest sector.”
I wish to state here that our Division artillery rendered excellent
service. This is especially true when we consider that it had been in
the line only a few days.
But a very apparent inconsistency appears in the Brigade report and
is embodied in the Division report, page 161: “The attack was renewed
on the morning of the 11th, the lines being advanced to the northern
edge of the Bois Frehaut a distance of three and one-half km. from an
original line.” The _Division_ report says, as you notice, that the
line was advanced on the 11th to the northern edge of Bois Frehaut, the
Division commander well knowing that the line never was advanced beyond
the northern edge of Bois Frehaut, for the next paragraph refers to
the final battle line, which the co-ordinates show _was_ the northern
edge of Bois Frehaut, but the Brigade report upon which this part of
the Division report is based by a Division commander who took command
just after the armistice says, page 152: “The attack on the morning of
Nov. 10, by units of the Brigade wiped out this re-entrant by advancing
our lines on the east bank of the Moselle river a distance of two and
one-quarter km. The advance thus made was held against heavy artillery
and machine gun fire and high concentration of gas. The attack was
renewed on the morning of Nov. 11, lines being advanced a distance of
three and one-quarter km. an original line.”
That would indicate an advance of one km. on Nov. 11th. I don’t care
to discuss that further than to say that it is _incorrect_. The final
battle line shows as the northern edge of Bois Frehaut. The Division
report says, “the attack was renewed on the morning of the 11th the
lines being advanced to the northern edge of Bois Frehaut, a distance
of three and one-half km. from an original line.” Since, as clearly
shown, the line was never advanced beyond the northern edge of Bois
Frehaut _where_ was _that_ advance made? Speaking of this mysterious
advance of the 11th the Brigade report says, “Our liaison with troops
west of the river was thereby greatly improved,” indicating that the
said unexplainable and vague “advance” was near the river--hence on my
front.
General Pershing says that “examination of the records shows that the
2nd Battalion did take the Bois Frehaut on November 10th and that this
battalion held this position until the armistice went into effect.” How
could he say that we took the Bois Frehaut on Nov. 10th if there was a
km. (which is almost a mile) remaining of it to be taken on Nov. 11th?
Of the advance of the 11th he says, “advanced a short distance but _had
retired_ to cover.”
This same Brigade report shows that at 10 a. m., Nov. 10th, a message
was received showing that the 2nd Bn. 365th Inf. had almost reached the
northern edge of Bois Frehaut, and that at 11:15, Nov. 10th a message
was received showing the Bois Frehaut was _completely occupied_. The
quotation above from the same report says that the re-entrant was
wiped out by advancing our lines on the east bank of the Moselle on
November 10th and that the advance thus made _was held_ against heavy
artillery and machine gun fire, etc. The Brigade order for the attack
on November 11th--the order from which Gen. Pershing quoted, plainly
shows that that attack was to be launched from the northern edge of
Bois Frehaut--our front line.
It is too bad to have to spend time correcting such a discrepancy as
that, but that’s the way it reads in Dr. Scott’s book and I have no
reason to think that the Brigade and Division reports are erroneously
printed in that book. It _might_ give a wrong impression to a casual
reader. Some might not take the trouble to _see_ that _no_ advance was
made and held on the 11th of November. The line was advanced to the
northern edge of Bois Frehaut on November 10th and never receded so
much as one foot for a single instant. Few enough colored battalions
had the opportunity to prove their true worth. I do not propose to
leave a single cloud on the record of the glorious _success_ and
_achievements_ of _one_ colored battalion. This does not in the least
detract from the glory of other units but will _add greatly_ to the
prestige and standing of colored soldiers as a whole.
In another place the report of the general commanding our Brigade says,
page 154, Dr. Scott’s book: “The commanding officers of units making
the attack, and also of the artillery, were constantly stating that
they were hurried into these movements without proper preparation.
Had they been familiar with such operations, the time allowed would
have been sufficient.” The Major General, commanding the 92nd Division
who made the Division report on the operations of November 10th and
11th says, page 162, same book: “The attack was made on very brief
preparation, too brief in view of the strength of the enemy positions,
which were very strongly held.”
I told in the lecture what the Second Battalion of the Three Hundred
and Sixth-fifth Infantry had undergone in the Marbache Sector and how
we worked all of the night preceding the attack on things that _had to
be done_ regardless of familiarity with anything. I do not remember
that I made any complaints about the shortness of time for preparation.
Possibly I did, for I was at all times doing anything and everything to
insure success against the enemy. But whether the time was too short or
too long I again call your attention to the fact that _this_ battalion
accomplished its mission, fully, completely, magnificently, under the
guns of Metz.
Lieutenant Colonel A. E. Deitsch, a veteran of the Regular Army, who
was my immediate superior and was in command of our Regiment during
that drive, and who, before coming to our Regiment, had served in other
Divisions in the battle line, said in a letter to me: “The handling
of your battalion during the ninth, tenth and morning of November
eleventh, 1918, (which lead to the capture of Bois Frehaut) could not,
I believe, have been conducted any better. As you well know the capture
of this position is credited to you and your battalion.”
On page 154, same book, the Brigade report, speaking of the work of the
Brigade as a whole, says: “There is no doubt that some details of the
operation were not carried out as well as might have been done by more
experienced troops. These were the results of mistaken judgment due to
lack of experience rather than to lack of offensive spirit.”
This is true of the Brigade as a whole and the report from which it is
copied is a very general statement of the work of the _entire_ Brigade
in that series of operations. I say and have shown and am ready to
prove more exhaustively if necessary that the above statement does not
concern _one_ of the six infantry battalions of that Brigade, namely,
the Second Battalion, Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth.
Suppose I should admit or should say that the battalion that captured
this seemingly impregnable position and held it continuously under the
defenses of Metz, was only a very mediocre battalion, or suppose I
should admit or should say, “Oh, yes, the men were anxious enough and
after they got going fought savagely with razors or knives or bayonets,
but the colored officers had no judgment and could not handle their
men and it was a pretty poor battalion.” What then could be said, what
would _have_ to be said of the _other_ units of the Ninety-second
Division and of units engaged of the Seventh Division that _failed_
utterly to accomplish their missions during the same attack?
The truth is that those other battalions and units that failed to
advance and hold against the world’s strongest position--Metz--were
excellent troops and in many instances did most heroic work. They were
fully equal on the average to battalions and units of the foremost
American Divisions. The truth is equally clear to every one who knows
or _wants_ to know that the Second Battalion of the Three Hundred and
Sixty-fifth Infantry was a most _exceptional_, a most _wonderful_
battalion, fully equal in _all_ respects to the very finest battalions
in the American Army or any army that fought in the Great World War. I
challenge any one to disprove this statement.
They _were_ wonderful fighters with the trench knife and bayonet, but
they were equally efficient and energetic with all other infantry arms.
Take the other extreme from fighting--paper work. The paper work that
had to be done in a company of our army was staggering. It required
ceaseless work and absolute accuracy. The companies of this battalion
were unsurpassed. “H” Company, for instance, as is well known, did and
turned in paper work that was practically perfect at all times. Then
there was march or road discipline. Some of the marches made were very
trying. As an example, the Second Battalion of the Three Hundred and
Sixty-fifth Infantry marched from Camp d’Italien in the Argonne Forest
to Camp Cabaud north east of Les Isilett during the night, through mud
and through the confusion and blockade of traffic you have all heard
about, just preceding the Argonne Offensive, and _arrived_ with every
man who started. _Not one straggler._ I furnished signed certificates
before it could be believed by my superiors. I have already referred
to the very significant fact that no officers were ever placed under
arrest or sent before efficiency boards. Every statement I have made
and every inference I have drawn is based on a personal knowledge of
_facts_.
My efforts to make that Battalion a real success were due solely to the
fact that it was an American Battalion engaged in the fight against
our Nation’s enemies. My enlisted men were colored and they wore the
American uniform. My Officers were colored and they were commissioned,
_not by me, but by the United States Government_. If you are colored or
if perchance you are white and care to do some thinking about me and
about my Battalion and about many things in general, read on pages 433
and 438 of the book I have been referring to. By the way, the Battalion
Commander there referred to relieved me (he was then a Lieutenant
Colonel) of the command of the Regiment (Three Hundred and Sixty-fifth
Infantry) the second day after the Armistice took effect.
It is my idea of justice that the race--namely the American Negro--that
produced men who served their country so loyally, so bravely, so
capably both as officers and as enlisted men under my command, should
_know the truth_ about my battalion. It would matter little whether the
outfit were a division, a brigade or a battalion. It happens to have
been a battalion. And it matters little _what_ colored battalion it
was, but it does matter a great deal and mean a great deal to Colored
Americans that one of the very finest and greatest battalions in the
American Army and in the world was an American _colored_ battalion.
If what I have said about my Colored Battalion shall in any way aid,
or shall inspire and stimulate Colored Americans in their struggle for
advancement and for the attainment of Righteousness that “Exalteth a
nation,” I shall be gratified.
The following is the _testimonial_ I referred to. It substantiates some
things spoken of in the lecture.