This has been done in order to avoid greater ills, as in the case of the

fixing of fair rents by judicial courts in Ireland and certain districts

of the Highlands of Scotland; in others to prevent endless dispute and

loss, as in the disposal, in specified proportions, of the personal

property of those who die without a will; in a further series to prevent

a virtual monopoly from becoming tyrannous, as in the compulsion of

railway companies to run certain third-class trains, and not to charge

beyond a stated fare, or the restriction of the profits of gas companies

to 10 per cent. unless a specified reduction in price is made to the

consumers; in others, yet, for the supposed advantage of a class, as in

the custom of primogeniture, which gives all real property (that is,

land) to the eldest son of a father who dies intestate; and, in others,

for the presumed benefit of the community, at the expense of individual

efforts, as in the limitation of the duration of patents for inventions

to seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years, and of copyright in books to

forty-two years from the date of publication, or for the author's life

and seven years after, whichever of these terms may be the longer.

As to the first three points--the fixing of fair rents in Ireland and

the Highlands, the due division of the personal property of those who

die without a will, and the limitation of the power of virtual

monopolies--there is no need at this day to argue, for all are

irrevocable. As to the fourth, there is no practical disagreement among

leading politicians on both sides regarding the desirability of doing

away with the custom of primogeniture, as enforced by law. But as to the

fifth, it may be submitted that the State goes too far or not far

enough.

Our legislators have been exceedingly tender towards every description

of property except that created by certain of the highest phases of

brain-power. If a man invents a machine which may save millions to the

community, he loses all specific property in his invention after a given

period of years; if he writes a book which may elevate mankind, his

family are similarly condemned after a certain period to forfeit all

claim upon the fruits of his labour. But if, instead of putting his

brain to such uses, he merely makes a machine or lends a book for hire,

there is no law to step in and deprive him of the profits if either

machine or book lasts a century.

Why this difference? The theory appears to be that the community is

entitled to profit after a certain period by the brains of its members,

when used in the creative or inventive direction; but if the claim be

good, has not the State an equal right to profit after a similar period

by the brains of its members when used in trading ways? Why should

brains exercised in one direction be handicapped in comparison with

those exercised in another? The answer may be that the inventor or

author employs no capital, that the trader does, and that, therefore,

whatever profit the former is allowed to make is a profit upon nothing,

while in the latter case the profit is directly upon the capital

employed, which ought not to be interfered with.

But this is to adopt the fallacy that capital is necessarily the same

thing as money. The capital of an inventor or an author is his brains,

which he expends upon his invention or his book; and the community has

exactly the same right to deprive the widow and the orphan of a fortune

because it was made by a lucky speculation, for instance, forty-two

years before, as of their property in a book because it was published

that length of time previous. It is true that the State does not fully

exercise this right, and protects the family of the mere money-maker

while it despoils that of the brain-worker; but the principle is one

which contains larger possibilities than the former have yet realized.

The argument that it is for the benefit of the community that only a

certain amount of time should be given to the inventor or the author in

which to make a profit is dangerous, because it can so easily be applied

to other species of property. Why not to the body of the machine as well

as to its principle, why not to the pages of the book as well as to what

they contain? And even if it is never pushed so far, there are certain

species of property now protected by the law which will not improbably

be attacked upon this same ground of "the benefit of the community"

before very long; and it is difficult to see how they can be defended as

long as the statutes affecting copyright and patents exist.

The most striking of such kinds of property is that in minerals. A man

buys an estate for farming, grazing, or, it may be, purposes of

pleasure. Some time afterwards minerals are found beneath it, and,

though he has neither placed them there nor may assist to get them out,

he is privileged to charge "mining royalties" upon every ton that is

raised as long as there is any to be obtained. Why should not his power

in this direction be limited? He takes everything and gives nothing; the

author or inventor gives everything and takes little. It would be as

much for "the benefit of the community" to have the former's minerals

after a given period, with no reward to himself, as to have the latter's

books or machines. Why, then, should bullion be carefully protected and

brains despoiled? If it be replied that when a man has bought a plot of

ground it is his to the centre of the earth at one side and to the sky

on the other, may it not be submitted that the former portion of the

right ought to be restricted, while the latter certainly does not exist,

for the law steps in at point after point to control his use of the land

between the surface and the sky?

The State, therefore, interferes with property, as it is, in a most

material degree: instances of such interference have been scattered

through these pages, and the tendency of the future is likely to be

towards more than less interference. And there is hardly any that can be

proposed, even of the extremest kind, for which it would not be possible

to find a precedent.

XXXV.--OUGHT THE STATE TO FIND FOOD AND WORK FOR ALL?

The State thus interfering with both capital and labour, it is sometimes

contended that its duties ought to be so extended as to find food and

work for all. There is a captivating sound about the proposition which

has commended it to many without a due weighing of the probable results.

It is a matter upon which a hasty generalization, though springing from

the purest motives, may do vast harm, and is one, therefore, which all

ought most carefully to consider before expressing an opinion upon it.

Cardinal Manning, in an article published in the winter of 1887, carried

the theory of the public duty of feeding the hungry to its extremest

point in these words--"All men are bound by natural obligations, if they

can, to feed the hungry. But it may be said that granting the obligation

in the giver does not prove a right in the receiver. To which I answer

that the obligation to feed the hungry springs from the natural right of

every man to life, and to the food necessary for the sustenance of life.

So strict is this natural right that it prevails over all positive laws

of property. Necessity has no law, and a starving man has a natural

right to his neighbour's bread."

With all deference, the last sentence must be stated to be false, both

in logic and morals. If it were true, it would justify immediate raids

by the starving upon the nearest baker's shop, and one wonders what the

Cardinal would say if he happened to be the baker. Granting that every

one has a right to live, there is no equivalent right to live at other

people's expense. It is true that, by our Poor Law, a system has been

created by which no one need starve, but that does not justify the theft

of bread. There is a preliminary question to be put even in the case of

the starving, and that is as to why they are in that condition. If it be

because they have been idle, or drunken, or generally worthless, as in

many cases it is, the mere fact that they are starving does not entitle

them to sack a baker's shop. They will be fed by the Poor Law if they

take the necessary steps, but if they are able-bodied they will have to

work for their food; and as most human beings have to do the same, where

is the hardship?

It will be replied by some that the Poor Law works harshly towards the

deserving poor, but that is an argument for amendment, not for abolition

or indiscriminate extension. And if it be further said that the food

supplied is meagre and the lodgings rough, it must be remembered that

the poor-rate is paid by a very large number whose food is no more

plentiful and whose lodgings are certainly worse. As for the argument

that some people starve rather than "enter the house," it is not easy to

see what relief could be given by the State without infringing that

spirit.

But there is a question most intimately affecting this matter which,

though of the highest importance, cannot be discussed here as it

deserves, and that is the question of population, concerning which Mill

truly says, "Every one has a right to live. We will suppose this

granted. But no one has a right to bring creatures into life, to be

supported by other people. Whoever means to stand upon the first of

these rights must renounce all pretension to the last. If a man cannot

support even himself unless others help him, those others are entitled

to say that they do not also undertake the support of any offspring

which it is physically possible for him to summon into the world.... It

would be possible for the State to guarantee employment at ample wages

to all who are born. But if it does this, it is bound in

self-protection, and for the sake of every purpose for which government

exists, to provide that no person shall be born without its consent....

It cannot, with impunity, take the feeding upon itself and leave the

multiplying free."

And so, while the Poor Law ought to be carried out in the humanest and

most liberal fashion compatible with the interests of the poor who pay

the rates as well as the poor who benefit by them, any movement for so

extending it as to bring more persons under its operation, and thus to

further pauperize the community, would be dangerous. We had enough of

that under the system swept away by the Act of 1834, the hideous

demoralization caused by which should be studied to-day by those who are

eager for a freer dispensation of State relief.

The arguments against the State going further than at present in the

direction of giving food to all are equally good as against providing

work for all. Relief works have ever been centres of corruption and

waste of the worst type, while "national workshops" have not been so

brilliant a success in the form of dockyards and arsenals as to warrant

an extension of the system to all the trades we practise.

The theory that the State is bound to provide work for all was never

more concisely put than in the original draft of the French Republican

Constitution after the Revolution of 1848, the seventh article of which

ran thus: "The right of labour is the right which every man has to live

by his labour. It is the duty of Society, through the channels of

production and other means at its command, hereafter to be organized, to

provide work for such able-bodied men as cannot find it for themselves."

But even a Government imbued with Socialistic tendencies found this to

be much too strong, and modified it thus: "It is the duty of Society by

fraternal assistance to protect the lives of necessitous citizens,

either by finding them work as far as possible, or by providing for

those who are incapacitated for work and who have no families to support

them." Yet the modified form was not found to work well in actual

practice, and the history of the failure of the French National

Workshops of 1848 remains as an eloquent testimony to the fact that the

State ought to interfere as little as possible with industrial

enterprises and private concerns.

XXXVI.--HOW OUGHT WE TO DEAL WITH SOCIALISM?

Even the considerations already put forward do not exhaust the social

question, for only in the briefest fashion have been touched the

important points which that question involves. And there is yet left to

be discussed the attitude which ought to be adopted towards that body of

opinions upon public affairs vaguely known as "Socialism."

The attitude of some is simply denunciatory, for there is a class of

politician which always imputes base motives to those with whom it

disagrees, and which is so proficient in abuse that it apparently thinks

it a waste of time to argue. That class has been painfully in evidence

in regard to the Socialists. It is considered that--so true is the old

proverb that if you give a dog a bad name you may as well hang

him--nothing more need be done respecting a new and therefore unpopular

doctrine than to so label it as to ensure its repudiation by honest but

unthinking men. And thus the name "Socialist" is applied as equivalent

to thief; and men utterly ignorant of what the words imply link

Socialist to Nihilist, Communist to Anarchist, as if each were equal to

each, and all therefore equal to one another.

This has been the favourite device of the opponents of all new

doctrines, political or social, philosophical or religious. To be

ridiculed, to be persecuted, even to be slain has been the fate of the

would-be elevators of their kind, as the roll of fame, which includes

the names of Socrates and Galileo, Luther and Savonarola, Voltaire and

Roger Bacon, Mazzini and Darwin will testify. The Socialists now are

hardly called worse names than were applied to geologists fifty years

ago, and to Evolutionists but the other day. Atheists, of course, they

have been named, for Atheist is the epithet customarily applied by

ignorant and bigoted men, who have made God in their own image, to those

more zealous in endeavouring to raise humanity.

Against any such method of dealing with public questions all fair-minded

men should strongly, and without ceasing, protest. And as Socialism is

spreading among the masses, it is in the highest degree important that

the fact should be studied calmly and without prejudice. Hard words

break no bones, and contumely tends to strengthen any cause in which

there is an atom of good.

Socialism, therefore, should be dealt with in an inquiring and not an

abusive spirit, and with the determination to accept from it whatever of

good to the community we may find it to contain. There is another method

which Prince Bismarck has been trying for years, and with the signal

lack of success that always comes from trying to stamp out an opinion by

force of law. In presumed defence of "society" and "order"--two

excellent things, but often the excuse for despots to perpetrate cruel

injustice upon the liberty-loving and the poor--he has secured law after

law for the purpose of "putting down Socialism;" men have been torn from

their homes because of their opinions; the right of public meeting has

been placed at the mercy of the police; the press has been gagged, and

every means taken to stamp out a body of opinions some of which even the

German Chancellor himself cannot help sharing. And with what result?

That, after ten years of this wretched work, the Socialists--though

prevented from public meeting, speaking, or writing--are multiplying in

Germany in an ever-growing proportion; that in Berlin, the capital of

the empire, they number tens of thousands of electors as their

adherents; and that Prince Bismarck is ever asking for extended powers

to crush a force which, in its free state, as yielding to the touch as

water, is mighty when compressed.

With an even greater power of police, and no restriction at all from the

laws, the Czar has failed as signally to extirpate Nihilism. Ideas

cannot be killed in this fashion, though their holders can be and are

rendered more dangerous. Mill certainly considered that "the dictum

that truth always triumphs over persecution is one of those pleasant

falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into

commonplaces, but which all experience refutes;" and he was of opinion

that "no reasonable person can doubt that Christianity might have been

extirpated in the Roman Empire." But it may be submitted that, when

arguing about the persecution of ideas to-day, we must not forget the

immense additional force given to them by means of printing. The secret

presses of Germany and Russia "spread the light;" and there is nothing

so certain as that the very charm which comes from the possession of

that which is prohibited aids in strengthening a movement which is under

the ban of the law.

But, it may be said, the efforts of those who would attempt to put down

Socialism are not to be considered in the light of political

persecution, and are not to be compared with religious persecution, for

they are directed solely to the suppression of "anti-social" doctrines,

the adoption of which would be fatal not only to States as they now

exist, but to society itself. A more precise definition must be asked,

however, of the doctrines thus described. Though opposed to an eight

hours' bill, to land nationalization, and to national workshops, leading

points in the Socialist programme, I cannot conceive how, if they were

all adopted within the next year, such dire results could from them

flow.

Every new body of doctrine which gives hope to the masses and threatens

the domination of the privileged among men has been described with equal

virulence by its antagonists. Read the charges upon which Christians

were condemned under the Roman Empire; read those brought against Luther

and his co-reformers when first Protestantism threatened the Church of

Rome; remember those thrown at the Puritans when they tried to secure

for Englishmen liberty of thought and action. They were in every case

that the doctrines were anti-social; that if adopted they would wreck

the then condition of society; and that they were in the highest degree

perilous to the State. For it is the fate of all preachers of a new

doctrine to be treated as rogues until their persecutors are proved to

be fools.

Admittedly there are some theories advanced by men calling themselves

Socialists which, if adopted, would seriously conflict with the existing

order of society; but to condemn every proposal put forward as Socialist

because there are Socialists who have said strange, and sometimes

stupid, things would be monstrous. It is a controversial trick of a

peculiarly poor order to attempt to hold the leaders of any movement

responsible for the hare-brained ideas of some of their followers. Not

to repudiate them is not to signify agreement, or our party leaders

would possess some of the most extravagant doctrines ever conceived by

man.

Besides, one must always sever the conventional beliefs from the real.

No sensible person considers Christianity untrue because even the

churches would regard him as a madman who literally adopted the

injunction to sell all that he had to give to the poor. In any body of

doctrines there are always some which its adherents hold, but do not

stand by.

And, therefore, charity as well as common sense demands that the tall

talk on both sides--for there is not a great deal to choose between them

in this respect--should cease; but the trick is too easily learned to be

quickly dropped. The idea of the well-to-do that all would go smoothly

if it were not for "agitators" and "mob-orators" is as absurd as the

contention of the Socialist that most of our ills are due to the

"profit-monger." Your "agitator" or your "mob-orator" would have not the

least influence if he did not voice the feelings, the longings, and the

hopes of his silent friends. And as for the "profit-monger," is not the

workman who is better off than the poorest among his fellows deserving

the name?

Let us have fair play all round to ideas as well as to men. If, in the

supposed interests of society, every movement designed to upraise the

poor is suppressed, the tendency must be to force men towards Anarchism

and Nihilism, by causing them to wish to destroy that order of things

which to them acts so unjustly. Despair is a fatal counsellor, and those

who would identify the welfare of the State with that of the mere

money-getter are its frequent cause. It is easier to raise the devil

than to lay him, and appeals to the merely animal instinct in

man--whether to protect his own property or to take that of others,

with a complete ignoring of his duties as well as his rights--must end

in ruin and shame.

"There is among the English working classes," once observed Sir Robert

Peel, "too much suffering and too much perplexity. It is a disgrace and

a danger to our civilization. It is absolutely necessary that we should

render the condition of the manual labourer less hard and less

precarious. We cannot do everything, but something may be effected, and

something ought to be done." Though nearly forty years have passed since

that statesman's death, we are still groping blindly for the something

which ought to be done for the poor; and such strength as Socialism

possesses is derived from the general spread of the feeling which Peel

put into words, and which no politician--much more no statesman--can

afford to neglect.

And that is why the politics of the future will be largely affected by

the social questions now coming to the front. From the opinions of many

who are pressing them forward one may profoundly differ, but justice

demands that all they advance should be examined without prejudice, and

with the determination to accept that which is good, from whatever

quarter it may come.

XXXVII.--WHAT SHOULD BE THE LIBERAL PROGRAMME?

While the social problem, however, is developing, we have the political

problem to face; and, therefore, the immediate programme of the Liberal

party now demands consideration. In some detail have been presented the

arguments from a Liberal point upon all the great public questions which

are either ripe or ripening for settlement. It has not been possible to

go minutely into every point involved; a broad outline of each subject

has had to suffice; but it may be trusted that each has been

sufficiently explained for us now to consider which should occupy the

forefront in the Liberal platform.

Mr. Bright observed, in days not long since, when he was honoured by

every man in the party as one of its most trusted leaders, that he

disliked programmes. What he preferred, it was evident, was that when

some great question--such as the repeal of the Corn Laws or the

extension of the suffrage, with both of which his name will be ever

identified--should thrust itself to the front by force of circumstances,

it should be faced by the Liberal party and dealt with on its merits;

and what he opposed, it was equally evident, was the formulation of any

cut-and-dried programme, containing a number of points to be accepted as

a shibboleth by every man calling himself Liberal or Radical, and by its

hide-bound propensity tending to retard real progress.

The Irish question is one of those great matters which has thrust itself

to the front by force of circumstances, which should be faced by the

Liberal party and dealt with on its merits, and which, until it is so

faced and dealt with, will stand in the path of any real reforms. The

evil effects of the discontent of four millions of people at our very

doors are not to be got rid of by shutting our eyes to them; and the

intensification of those evil effects which is to-day going on is a

matter which must engage the attention of every Liberal.

Practical Politics; or, the Liberalism of To-day · 第 15 / 17 段