THE ADVANCE OF THE GEORGIANS--THE BATTLE OF AUTOSSE.
When the call was made by General Claiborne upon Tennessee for
assistance, a similarly earnest appeal was sent to Georgia, and the
response from that State was equally prompt. The troops raised there
were under command of General Floyd, who had been superseded in the
command of the Department of the South-west by General Flournoy some
months earlier. General Floyd was an energetic soldier, and he quickly
found work to do.
It will be remembered that as soon as Red Eagle learned that he would
not be permitted to attack and burn Mobile he turned his attention to
the country north and east of the Creek Nation, and sent two bodies of
his warriors to harass the borders, one force threatening Tennessee and
the other seeking to find some vulnerable point on the Georgia frontier.
Jackson's advance with an overwhelming force and his vigorous blows at
Tallushatchee and Talladega compelled the Creeks to abandon their
designs upon Tennessee and stand upon the defensive. They saw the full
significance of his advance, and knew that he had come not merely to
garrison forts and protect settlers, but to carry the war to the heart
of the Creek Nation, and to throttle the Creek power in its stronghold.
This was what Claiborne wanted to do by a resolute movement from the
south, and there can be little doubt that if he could have had
permission to do so he would have saved the Tensaw and Tombigbee
settlements from the worst of their sufferings, by making the Creeks the
hunted rather than the hunters, precisely as Jackson saved the people of
Tennessee by an aggressive policy. The other column, which threatened
Georgia, was met in like manner by General Floyd, and with like results.
Floyd's army consisted of nine hundred and fifty militiamen and four
hundred friendly Indians, part of them being Cowetas under command of
Major McIntosh, one of the half-breeds whom High Head Jim had planned to
kill as a preparation for the war, and the rest Tookabatchas under Mad
Dragon's Son. Floyd was better equipped than Jackson had been in his
first battles, having some small pieces of artillery with him.
Having learned that a large force of the Creeks was at High Head Jim's
town, Autosse, on the south-east side of the Tallapoosa River, about
twenty miles above the point at which that stream unites with the Coosa,
General Floyd marched against them in the latter part of November.
McAfee, who is usually a very careful historian, gives the 28th of
September as the date, but this is clearly wrong. Crossing the
Ockmulgee, Flint, and Coosa rivers under the guidance of a Jewish trader
named Abram Mordecai, Floyd arrived in the neighborhood of Autosse early
in the morning on the 29th of November.
His plan of battle was precisely the same as that which Coffee had
adopted at Tallushatchee, and Jackson at Talladega--that is to say, he
planned to surround the town and destroy the fighting force within; but
in this case the scheme miscarried. In the first place, McIntosh and Mad
Dragon's Son were ordered to cross the river and cut off retreat to the
opposite shore, and they failed to do what was required of them. Whether
this was due to the unforeseen difficulties of crossing, as the Indians
alleged; or to the reluctance of the Indians to swim the river on a
cold, frosty morning, as some historians say; or to a failure of their
courage, as was charged at the time--there are now no means of
determining, and it is not important. It is enough to know that they did
not cross the river as ordered, and hence when the attack was made the
bank of the stream opposite the town was unguarded.
This was not the only way, however, in which the original plan of attack
was prevented. The real position and strength of the Indian force had
been misapprehended, and when, early in the action, this was discovered,
General Floyd was obliged to alter his disposition of troops
accordingly. The advance was made as soon as there was sufficient light,
on the morning of the 29th of November, with Booth's battalion on the
right, Watson's on the left. The flanks were guarded by riflemen, and
Thomas with his artillery accompanied Booth's battalion. Booth was
instructed to march until he could rest the head of his column upon the
little creek at the mouth of which the town stood, while Watson was to
stretch his column around to the left in a curve, resting its left flank
upon the river just below the town. If this could have been done as
intended, and the friendly Indians had occupied the opposite side of the
river, the encircling of the place would have been complete; but besides
the failure of the Indians another difficulty stood in the way. Instead
of one town there were two, the second lying about a quarter of a mile
further down the river, immediately in rear of the position to which
Watson had been ordered.
To avoid the danger of an attack in the rear of his left flank, which
might have resulted disastrously, General Floyd sent Lieutenant Hendon
with Merriweather's riflemen, three companies of infantry and two of
dragoons to attack the lower town, while he threw the remainder of the
army, now reinforced by the friendly Indians under Mad Dragon's Son and
McIntosh, against the larger upper town.
The fighting began about sunrise, and speedily became extremely severe.
The prophets had enchanted the place, making it sacred ground, and they
had assured the warriors that any white force which should attack them
would be utterly exterminated. In this belief the savages resisted the
attack with terrible determination, contesting every inch of the ground
which they believed to be sacred.
Soon after the battle began, the artillery--an arm which was
particularly dreaded by the Creeks with something of superstitious
horror--was brought forward and unlimbered. Its rapid discharges soon
turned the tide of battle, which until now had not gone against the
Indians. When the Indians began to waver before the cannon-shot, Major
Freeman with his squadron of cavalry charged and broke their lines. They
were closely pressed by the infantry, while the friendly Indians who had
now crossed the creek cut off retreat up the river, leaving the broken
and flying Creeks no road of escape except across the river. At nine
o'clock both towns were in flames, and there was no army in Floyd's
front. He was victor in the action, and his success in attacking a
sacred stronghold was certain to work great demoralization among the
superstitious Creeks; but prudence dictated a retreat nevertheless. The
country round about was populous with Indians, and the force which
fought at Autosse although broken was not destroyed. It was certain that
if the army should remain in the neighborhood it would be constantly
harassed, and perhaps beaten by the superior force which the Creeks
could speedily muster.
Besides all this, Floyd had only a scanty supply of provisions, and his
base of supplies was sixty miles away, on the Chattahoochie River. He
determined, therefore, to begin his return march as soon as he could
bury his dead and arrange for the care of his wounded, of whom he was
himself one.
The return march was perhaps hastened by the determination and spirit of
the Indians, who, notwithstanding their defeat, attacked Floyd's rear
within a mile of their burned town on the day of the battle. The attack
was made with spirit, but the numbers of the Indians were not
sufficient to enable them to maintain it long.
In this battle of Autosse Floyd lost eleven white men killed and
fifty-four wounded, besides some losses among his friendly Indians.
Coffee not being there to count the dead Creeks, the exact number of the
slain warriors of the enemy was not ascertained, but it was estimated at
about two hundred.