THE BATTLE OF TALLADEGA.
Where was General Cocke with the troops from East Tennessee all this
time? It will be remembered that he was to muster twenty-five hundred
men in his half of the state, while Jackson gathered a like number in
the west, and marching southward the two were to form a junction in the
Creek country. Meantime General Cocke had undertaken to procure in East
Tennessee supplies for the whole force. The supplies, as we know, had
not come, and Jackson had marched without them. Now he expected General
Cocke daily, with his force and his supplies; but they came not, and
Jackson was greatly disappointed.
The fact was that General Cocke had been delayed by precisely the same
lack of breadstuffs that had embarrassed General Jackson. He had
collected supplies, indeed, and ordered them forward by way of the
river, but for lack of water they had not come, and at last, like
Jackson, he began his march without them. He started south from
Knoxville on the 13th of October, and after a considerable delay on the
route, abandoned all hope of receiving the supplies, and depended
thereafter upon such aid as the friendly Cherokees could give him in the
way of furnishing provisions. General White had marched separately with
his brigade, and when he joined General Cocke his men were in a starving
condition.
While marching in a column separate from Jackson's, General Cocke was an
independent commander. If he should join Jackson, whose commission was
older than his own, the East Tennessee commander must become subordinate
to the authority of Jackson. The fact that he did not form the
contemplated union of forces, but acted separately, and the additional
fact that his separate action led to a blunder which added greatly to
the horrors of the war, caused Jackson great annoyance, and subjected
General Cocke to the severest criticism. He was accused of an undue and
culpable jealousy of Jackson, of self-seeking, and of perverse
disobedience of orders. To all of this we shall come presently. The
matter is mentioned now merely because it is necessary to know this much
about it in order that we may properly understand the events to be
immediately narrated.
As soon as Coffee's command returned from the Tallushatchee expedition,
General Jackson resumed his march over a mountainous country toward the
Ten Islands. Upon arriving at that point on the Coosa River, he began
the construction of a fort as a centre of operations, and a defensive
post at which his supplies--whenever he should happen to have any
thing of that kind--could be protected by a comparatively small
force. He adopted the usual method of fortifying against Indian
assaults--inclosing a large space within a line of strong timber
pickets, and building block-houses, storehouses, and other needed
structures within. Here he was disposed to await the arrival of General
Cocke, hoping that that officer would bring provisions of some sort with
him, as the force at Fort Strother--that was the name given to the works
at the Ten Islands--was now almost destitute of food and forage.
When Cocke was within three days' march of Fort Strother, his
advance-guard, about one thousand strong, under command of General
White, was within a very short distance, and General White sent forward
a courier from Turkey Town reporting his arrival at that point, and
asking for orders.
About this time there came into Jackson's camp a messenger, who brought
news of a very important nature. He came from a little fort thirty miles
away, at the Indian town of Talladega, on the spot where the modern town
of Talladega stands. In that fort a handful of friendly Indians, about
one hundred and fifty in number, had gathered to escape butchery at the
hands of their hostile brethren. Here they were closely besieged by an
Indian force one thousand strong, who, contrary to their usual practice,
made no assault, but sought to starve out the little garrison. They
surrounded the fort and maintained an unbroken siege line, confident
that the plight and even the existence of the beleaguered fort were
unknown to the whites, and confident, therefore, that no relief could be
sent to them. They knew, too, that the supply of water, as well as of
food, in the fort was very scant, and hence they had only to await the
sure operation of starvation and thirst to do their work for them.
The messenger who came to Jackson to pray for the deliverance of the
little band from their pitiable situation is described by some writers
as an Indian, by others as a chief, and by still another he is said to
have been a Scotchman who had lived for many years among the Indians as
one of themselves. The last-named writer has evidently confused this
case with another. Whoever and whatever he was, this man had escaped
from the fort by a characteristic Indian stratagem. He had covered
himself with a swine's skin, and wandered about like a hog in search of
roots. In this way he managed to work his way at night through the lines
of the besiegers, and when once beyond them he travelled as rapidly as
possible toward Jackson's camp, and reported the state of affairs.
He arrived on the 7th of November, and Jackson at once began casting
about for ways and means. He scarcely dared to march with his scanty
supplies of food, and he scarcely dared to leave his post with an
insufficient force to defend it; but he must rescue that band of
friendly Indians at all hazards and at any cost. Their hard situation
appealed to his pity; the cruelty of their foes appealed to the stronger
stuff in his composition, arousing his anger and his disposition to
wreak a righteous vengeance. There were reasons of polity, too, to move
him to activity in their behalf. If they should be left to their fate,
the discouragement of the friendly Indians everywhere would be great,
and might be calamitous.
Jackson quickly considered all of these things and formed his
resolution. General White was at Turkey Town at the head of about a
thousand men. Jackson resolved to order him to march immediately upon
Fort Strother, and to hold the place while the main army should be
absent. There was great danger in leaving the post unguarded even for a
brief time, but the occasion was so pressing that the resolute commander
determined to take the risk, hoping that White would arrive in time to
prevent disaster at the fort.
Having sent his order to White, he began his preparations for an
immediate march with the whole effective force at the post.
Between midnight and one o'clock the next morning, November 8th, the
column began its march, two thousand strong, eight hundred being mounted
men. The task of fording the Coosa occupied the hours until the dawn of
day, the horses of the cavalrymen being used for the transportation of
the infantry across the stream.
A march of twenty-four miles consumed the day, and not long before dark
General Jackson halted his men within six miles of the enemy, in order
that they might rest. It was his purpose to resume the march after
midnight, and attack the enemy early in the morning.
Thus far all had gone well, but here something like calamity overtook
the commander in the shape of extremely bad news. A courier arrived
bringing a despatch from General White, in which that officer informed
Jackson that he could not obey the order given him to advance and
protect Fort Strother, because of positive orders from his immediate
superior, General Cocke, commanding him to return and rejoin the East
Tennessee division of the army.
The state of facts which now confronted Jackson was most appalling. He
was a long day's march from his fortified camp, with an impending battle
on his hands; while his camp, to which alone he could retire when his
present task should be done, was lying open and helpless, at the mercy
of any band of Indians which might choose to attack it! Worse still,
Jackson knew that the food supplies at the camp were exhausted, and as
General White was not to come up with the provisions which he had
promised to bring with him, Jackson saw that after fighting the Indians
in his front he should be obliged to march his exhausted and hungry army
back to a post where there was nothing for them to eat. His was a
terrible dilemma, neither horn of which offered him hope. He expressed
his anger with General Cocke and General White in forcible terms; but
that did him no good, and the offending officers were not present to
profit by the rebuke.
The Indians in his front probably had some provisions, enough at least
for a meal, and Jackson determined to secure these at any rate, and at
the same time to accomplish the purpose of his expedition.
Putting his army in motion very early in the morning he approached the
Talladega town. When within half a mile of the foe he formed his line of
battle, dividing the cavalry and placing half of it upon each wing. The
advance was made slowly in the centre, so that the wings might gradually
encircle the enemy, a movement much more difficult here than it had been
at Tallushatchee, because of the greater numbers of the enemy, and
because of their distribution over a wider area. For these reasons the
plan of battle was less perfectly carried out on this occasion than on
the former one, but it proved effective notwithstanding the difficulties
which prevented its perfect execution.
At the proper moment a small body of troops was thrown forward from the
centre to bring on the action. This force made a spirited attack, firing
several successive volleys into the ranks of the surprised Indians,
before a determined resistance was made to their attack. Then the Creeks
charged upon them in force, and in accordance with the instructions they
had received, the officers commanding the advance withdrew toward the
main line, falling back in good order and at a moderate speed. We cannot
do better than let General Jackson tell the rest of the story. In his
report of the affair he said:
"The enemy pursued, and the front line was now ordered to advance and
meet him; but, owing to some misunderstanding, a few companies of
militia, who composed part of it, commenced a retreat. At this moment a
corps of cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Dyer, which I had kept
as a reserve, was ordered to dismount and fill up the vacancy occasioned
by the retreat. This order was executed with a great deal of promptitude
and effect. The militia seeing this, speedily rallied; and the fire
became general along the front line, and on that part of the wings which
was contiguous. The enemy, unable to stand it, began to retreat, but
were met at every turn and repulsed in every direction. The right wing
chased them, with a most destructive fire, to the mountains, a distance
of about three miles, and, had I not been compelled, by the _faux pas_
of the militia in the outset of the battle, to dismount my reserve, I
believe not a man of them would have escaped. The victory, however, was
very decisive: two hundred and ninety of the enemy were left dead, and
there can be no doubt but many more were killed who were not found.
Wherever they ran they left behind traces of blood, and it is believed
that very few will return to their villages in as sound a condition as
they left them.
"In the engagement we lost fifteen killed and eighty-five wounded; two
of them have since died. All the officers acted with the utmost bravery,
and so did all the privates, except that part of the militia who
retreated at the commencement of the battle; and they hastened to atone
for their error. Taking the whole together, they have realized the high
expectations I had formed of them, and have fairly entitled themselves
to the gratitude of their country."
Jackson's loss in wounded included General Pillow, Colonel Lauderdale,
Major Boyd, and Lieutenant Barton; but of these only Lieutenant Barton
died of his wounds. The friendly Indians rescued numbered one hundred
and sixty men, with their women and children.
In writing that two hundred and ninety of the enemy were found dead,
General Jackson dealt in round numbers. General Coffee, who seemed
always to have an exacting curiosity in such matters, said in a letter
which was written soon after the battle: "We have counted two hundred
and ninety-nine Indians dead on the ground, and it is believed that many
have not been found that were killed dead; but the battle-ground was so
very large we had not time to hunt them up. It is believed that very few
got clear without a wound."
General Coffee said also in this letter, which is preserved in the
archives of the Tennessee Historical Society, that "the force of the
enemy was a little upwards of one thousand warriors, picked men, sent
forward to destroy our army." By dint of adding to the numbers of
Indians known to have been killed in the two battles thus far fought as
many more as he believed to have been killed, and assuming that the
wounded equalled the killed in numbers, General Coffee arrived at the
conclusion that the battles of Tallushatchee and Talladega had left the
fighting force of the Creeks "a thousand men weaker" than when the
campaign began. The calculation was scarcely a fair one, however;
assumptions respecting dead men not found are necessarily unsafe, and as
there were no wounded men at all left alive at Tallushatchee, the
calculation respecting wounded men was of course founded upon an
erroneous assumption, to say nothing of the fact that the only men
wounded and not killed at Talladega were so slightly wounded that they
succeeded in getting away, and hence could scarcely be accounted lost to
the Creeks.
It is easy to pardon the enthusiastic general his slight overestimate of
the damage inflicted upon the enemy, whom he was so earnestly anxious
to defeat. The damage was great, certainly, and the success thus far
attained had been secured at small cost in the matter of the lives of
the white troops.
The object for which Jackson had marched from Fort Strother to Talladega
was fully accomplished. The hostile Creeks in that quarter had been
routed with heavy loss, and the little band of beleaguered friendly
Indians were released from their dangerous and trying situation; but
Jackson's army was hungry, and there was a prospect that actual
starvation would presently overtake it. The little food that was found
at Talladega was distributed among the men, sufficing to satisfy their
immediate needs.
The pressing necessity of the hour now was to return with all possible
haste to Fort Strother, which must not be left in its defenceless state
a moment longer than was absolutely necessary; but an instantaneous
beginning of the return march was wholly out of the question. The men
had begun their toilsome journey at midnight between the 7th and 8th of
November, had marched all day on the 8th, and, after a few hours' rest,
had begun to march again a little after midnight, to go into battle
early on the morning of the 9th. Now that the battle was done, they were
utterly worn out, and must rest. Accordingly, the army went into camp
for the night, after they had buried their dead comrades. The next day
the return march was begun, and on the 11th of November the weary army
arrived at their encampment.
The fort was unharmed, but it was destitute of provisions, and for a
time it was with great difficulty that Jackson prevented a mutiny among
the troops, whose only food was the meagre supply gleaned from the
surrounding wilderness.