THE MARCH INTO THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY.
Coffee had pushed on with his cavalry brigade to Huntsville, Alabama,
thirty-two miles beyond Fayetteville, without waiting for Jackson. At
Fayetteville, Jackson found the army to whom he had issued his
proclamation, but their numbers were much smaller than he had hoped--not
exceeding a thousand men; and it would have been necessary, probably, to
wait for recruits to come in, if there had been no other cause for
waiting. Every thing had to be done, and day and night Jackson was busy
with details pertaining to the organization, the drilling, and the
disciplining of the troops; for this volunteer general knew, as few
volunteers do, how greatly discipline and drill increase the strength of
an armed force.
Luckily he had time for this, somewhat unexpectedly. He had supposed
that the victorious Creeks would march upon Mobile, and his haste was
largely due to his anxiety to attack them in rear, and thus save the
important seaport and prevent a junction of the Creeks with the British.
Soon after his arrival at Fayetteville, however, which was on the 7th of
October, Jackson received a despatch from General Coffee, saying that
instead of marching upon Mobile the Creeks were moving northward in two
columns, threatening Georgia and Tennessee.
Why Red Eagle pursued this course was long a puzzle to students of the
campaign. He was so manifestly a man of quick and accurate perceptions
in military matters, that he must have seen how entirely Mobile was
within his grasp, and how great an advantage it would be to him to
capture or destroy the town; and when he neglected such an opportunity
it was not easy to guess why he did so. The mystery was solved when a
letter was found in his own house a month or so later, dated September
29th, 1813, from Manxique, the Spanish Governor of Florida. This letter
was addressed to the chiefs of the Creek nation, and was in these words:
"GENTLEMEN: I received the letter that you wrote me in the
month of August, by which, and with great satisfaction, I was
informed of the advantages which your brave warriors obtained
over your enemies. I represented, as I promised you, to the
Captain-General of the Havana, the request which, the last time
I took you by the hand, you made me of arms and ammunitions;
but until now I cannot yet have an answer. But I am in hopes
that he will send me the effects which I requested, and as soon
as I receive them I shall inform you. I am very thankful for
your generous offers to procure to me the provisions and
warriors necessary in order to retake the port of Mobile, and
you ask me at the same time if we have given up Mobile to the
Americans: to which I answer, for the present I cannot profit
of your generous offer, not being at war with the Americans,
who did not take Mobile by force, since they purchased it from
the miserable officer, destitute of honor, who commanded there,
and delivered it without authority. By which reasons the sale
and delivery of that place is entirely void and null, and I
hope that the Americans will restore it again to us, because
nobody can dispose of thing that is not his own property; in
consequence of which the Spaniards have not lost their right to
it. And I hope you will not put in execution the project you
tell me of, to burn the town, since these houses and properties
do not belong to the Americans, but to true Spaniards. To the
bearers of your letter I have ordered some small presents to be
given, and I remain forever your good father and friend,
MANXIQUE."
It is a pleasure to reflect, that about a year later, Jackson, acting on
his own responsibility, marched to Pensacola and humiliated the
successor of this especial rascal, who wrote about honor in a letter in
which he was encouraging and planning to furnish arms and ammunition to
savages who were butchering the people of a nation with whom his own
country was at peace.
The letter explains Weatherford's course. He was acting from the first
in concert with this Spanish governor, from whom he was drawing his arms
and ammunition; and while he wanted to burn Mobile, he knew that he must
first ask Manxique's permission. Accordingly, he must have sent a letter
to that ally on the very day of the massacre at Fort Mims, or on the
next day at latest. That massacre began at noon and ended at five
o'clock on the 30th day of August; and Manxique speaks of the letter
reporting the victory as "the letter that you wrote me in the month of
August." It is thus clear that Weatherford's military instincts were
neither asleep nor at fault when he finished that bloody day's work;
that he saw both the possibility and the advantage of destroying Mobile,
and at once asked permission to do so. The letter denying that
permission to him was dated September 29th; and, as he was marching upon
Tennessee and Georgia early in October, it is apparent that he had only
waited for the arrival of the Spanish governor's reply, before renewing
his campaign. While he hoped for permission to destroy the seaport town,
he waited; the moment he knew that he must not do that, he began his
northward and eastward march, to strike his enemies in another quarter.
His failure to march upon Mobile has been cited by some writers to prove
that Weatherford was after all only an Indian, without real military
capacity; in the light of all the facts, as they are revealed by the
letter quoted, his proceedings prove precisely the reverse. We are
indebted for the sparing of Mobile, not to incompetency on Weatherford's
part, but to the greed of the Spaniard, who hesitated to permit the
destruction of property which he hoped to get possession of by other
means.
When Coffee's report of the advance of the Creeks came, the news greatly
relieved Jackson of anxiety. It freed him from apprehension concerning
Mobile; it promised to save him from a long and wearying march through a
wilderness, and to enable him to meet the enemy sooner than would
otherwise have been possible; and his chief desire now was to hurl his
army with crushing force against the Creeks, to make unceasing war upon
them, and to break their power as speedily as possible. He was so elated
at the prospect of an early encounter with them, that he wrote in a
playful vein to Coffee, saying: "It is surely high gratification to
learn that the Creeks are so attentive to my situation as to save me the
pain of travelling. I must not be outdone in politeness, and will
therefore endeavor to meet them on middle ground."[2]
[Footnote 2: Parton's "Life of Jackson."]
A good deal remained to be done, and arrangements were not yet complete
for the procuring of provisions. Coffee was at Huntsville, and was
watching for the enemy. On the 11th of October, Coffee reported the
Indian advance, and Jackson marched on the instant, arriving at
Huntsville that evening. At Huntsville it was necessary to await the
arrival of provisions for the army. Supplies from East Tennessee had
been sent down the river, but a failure of water in the shallow stream
detained them on the way. Jackson marched to Ditto's landing to await
their coming; but they came not, and relief seemed to be impossible.
Jackson was in a sore strait. He wanted to advance, but was without
provisions or an immediate prospect of getting any. He ordered Coffee
with his cavalry to scour the Indian country for supplies, while with
the main army he made a toilsome march, over a mountainous country, to
Thompson's Creek, about twenty miles higher up the river, for the double
purpose of meeting the expected provisions there, and of putting himself
in the way of marching the more quickly to the relief of a body of
friendly Indians who occupied a fort at the Ten Islands, on the Coosa
River.
Meantime, Jackson sent messengers in every direction, urging everybody
in any sort of authority to hurry the supplies forward. At Thompson's
Creek he built a fort, as a base of supplies for the campaign. His
plight was desperate, but he would not stay where he was or fall back.
With food or without it, he meant to march into the Indian country and
dare starvation as he braved the other perils of war. It is related of
him that at one time during the campaign, when the men were without
provisions, one of them saw him eating something, and mutinously
demanded a share of the food.
"Certainly," replied Jackson, thrusting his hand into his pocket and
offering the man some acorns. He was literally living on acorns while
marching and fighting night and day.
The state of affairs when Jackson was about leaving Fort Deposit, on
Thompson's Creek, where he tarried but a single day, may be inferred
from a letter written by Major John Reid, of the general's staff, from
which we copy some passages. The whole letter is printed in Parton's
Life of Jackson.
"At this place we have remained a day for the purpose of establishing a
depot for provisions; but where these provisions are to come from God
Almighty only knows. We had expected supplies from East Tennessee, but
they have not arrived, and I am fearful never will. I speak seriously
when I declare I expect we shall soon have to eat our horses, and
perhaps this is the best use we can put a great many of them to.
"The hostile Creeks, as we learnt yesterday from the Path Killer, are
assembling in great numbers within fifteen miles from Turkey Town.
Chenully, who is posted with the friendly Creeks in the neighborhood of
that place, it is feared will be destroyed before we can arrive to their
relief. In three days we shall probably have a fight. The general swears
he will neither sound a retreat nor survive a defeat.... We shall leave
this place with less than two days' provisions."
It seems almost incredible that a general should venture to advance into
an enemy's country, beginning the march with only provisions enough to
last his force for a day or two, and with no assurance, scarcely even a
hope, that provisions were likely to follow him; but this is what
Jackson did.
Coffee joined him on the march, bringing with him a few hundreds of
bushels of corn, and reporting that he had destroyed some Indian towns,
but had encountered none of the Indians. The corn was a mere handful
among the men and horses of the army, but cries for help were coming
every hour from the friendly Indians, whose situation at the Ten Islands
was desperate, and Jackson marched forward, trusting to chance for
supplies. He meant to fight first and find something to eat afterward.
As has been said, the army remained but one day at Fort Deposit, and
during that day constructed a fortress; but Jackson found time in which
to write an address to his men, whom he was now about to lead upon a
campaign in which they would encounter famine and hardships of the
sorest kind, as well as the savage enemy. They needed all the courage
that enthusiasm in the cause could give them, and the address was
designed to key them up, so to speak, to the pitch of their commander's
temper. The address read as follows:
"You have, fellow-soldiers, at length penetrated the country of your
enemies. It is not to be believed that they will abandon the soil that
embosoms the bones of their forefathers without furnishing you an
opportunity of signalizing your valor. Wise men do not expect, brave men
will not desire it. It was not to travel unmolested through a barren
wilderness that you quitted your families and homes, and submitted to so
many privations: it was to revenge the cruelties committed upon your
defenceless frontiers by the inhuman Creeks, instigated by their no less
inhuman allies; you shall not be disappointed.
"If the enemy flee before us we will overtake and chastise him; we will
teach him how dreadful, when once aroused, is the resentment of freemen.
But it is not by boasting that punishment is to be inflicted or victory
obtained. The same resolution that prompted us to take up arms must
inspire us in battle. Men thus animated and thus resolved, barbarians
can never conquer; and it is an enemy barbarous in the extreme that we
have now to face. Their reliance will be on the damage they can do you
while you are asleep and unprepared for action; their hopes shall fail
them in the hour of experiment. Soldiers who know their duty and are
ambitious to perform it are not to be taken by surprise. Our sentinels
will never sleep, nor our soldiers be unprepared for action; yet while
it is enjoined upon the sentinels vigilantly to watch the approach of
the foe, they are at the same time commanded not to fire at shadows.
Imaginary dangers must not deprive them of entire self-possession. Our
soldiers will lie with their arms in their hands; and the moment an
alarm is given they will move to their respective positions without
noise and without confusion. They will thus be enabled to hear the
orders of their officers, and to obey them with promptitude.
"Great reliance will be placed by the enemy, on the consternation they
may be able to spread through our ranks by the hideous yells with which
they commence their battles; but brave men will laugh at such efforts to
alarm them. It is not by bellowings and screams that the wounds of death
are inflicted. You will teach these noisy assailants how weak are their
weapons of warfare, by opposing them with the bayonet. What Indian ever
withstood its charge? What army of any nation ever withstood it long?
"Yes, soldiers, the order for a charge will be the signal for victory.
In that moment your enemy will be seen flying in every direction before
you. But in the moment of action coolness and deliberation must be
regarded; your fire made with precision and aim; and when ordered to
charge with the bayonet you must proceed to the assault with a quick and
firm step, without trepidation or alarm. Then shall you behold the
completion of your hopes, in the discomfiture of your enemy. Your
general, whose duty as well as inclination is to watch over your safety,
will not, to gratify any wishes of his own, rush you unnecessarily into
danger. He knows, however, that it is not in assailing an enemy that men
are destroyed; it is when retreating and in confusion. Aware of this, he
will be prompted as much by a regard for your lives as your honor. He
laments that he has been compelled, even incidentally, to hint at a
retreat when speaking to freemen and to soldiers. Never until you forget
all that is due to yourselves and your country will you have any
practical understanding of that word. Shall an enemy wholly unacquainted
with military evolutions, and who rely more for victory on their grim
visages and hideous yells than upon their bravery or their
weapons--shall such an enemy ever drive before them the well-trained
youths of our country, whose bosoms pant for glory, and a desire to
avenge the wrongs they have received? Your general will not live to
behold such a spectacle; rather would he rush into the thickest of the
enemy and submit himself to their scalping-knives. But he has no fears
of such a result. He knows the valor of the men he commands, and how
certainly that valor, regulated as it will be, will lead to victory.
With his soldiers he will face all dangers, and with them participate in
the glory of conquest."
Nothing could have been better fitted than this address was to serve the
end for which it was designed. Jackson knew his Tennesseeans, both in
their temper and in their habits; and he adroitly managed to warn them
against the consequences of those faults which were most prominent in
their characters, while seeming merely to appeal in a stimulating
fashion to their pride of courage. He knew, as they did not, how trying
the hardships of a campaign in a wilderness with insufficient supplies
are; he knew how prone raw troops are to fall into confusion and panic
in the excitement of a sudden attack; and against all these things he
did what could be done to brace them by an adroit appeal to their pride
of race and of personal courage. If some of his expressions seem to
suggest any thing like contempt of the Creeks as foes, they were meant
merely to arouse the pride of his own men, and indicated no disposition
on his part not to "respect his enemy," as Claiborne said. On the
contrary, he showed the profoundest respect for his enemy by his extreme
solicitude about the condition and the conduct of his own men.
The marching was now as nearly continuous as was possible in the
circumstances. Frequent pauses had to be made, in order that provisions
might be gathered from the surrounding country, but as soon as there was
food in camp the march was resumed.
On the 28th of October, a detachment under command of Colonel Dyer left
the main body, and the next day attacked the Indian village of
Littefutchee, surprising it before daylight in the morning, destroying
it, and bringing in twenty-nine prisoners as the first-fruits of the
campaign.
This was the beginning of a series of battles which followed each other
in as rapid succession as the starving condition of the army permitted.
Jackson was now in the enemy's country, and within striking distance of
his strategic points. How vigorously and persistently he struck, we
shall see in the chapters which follow.