CLAIBORNE AND RED EAGLE.
If Weatherford was at last ready to enter upon the long-contemplated
war, so too the white people at last began to understand that their
hopes of a reconciliation of some kind with the Creeks were delusive,
and they began to take measures for their defence. Even yet, however,
they seem to have had no adequate conception of the real nature and
extent of the storm that was brewing. Their measures of defence were not
proportioned to the need, were not of the right kind, except in part,
and were carried forward lazily, listlessly, and apparently with a
deep-seated conviction that, after all, the making of preparation might
be a useless waste of labor in anticipation of a danger which might
never come.
There can be little doubt that if these people had fully understood
their own situation they could and would have saved themselves by
adopting a vigorous offensive policy from the outset. Colonel Caller's
expedition to Burnt Corn was a type and example of what they ought to
have attempted. They should have struck the first blows, and should have
followed them up as rapidly as possible. If they had understood their
own situation they would probably have done this. They would have
organized the whole population into an army, and if they had done this
they might almost certainly have conquered a peace with comparatively
small loss to themselves before Weatherford had time to bring his roving
parties together for the contest.
Instead of this, however, the only attempt that was made to meet
hostility half-way--the Burnt Corn expedition--ended in failure, and the
men who had undertaken it dispersed to their homes. It was now too late
for a policy of offensive defence. The battle of Burnt Corn was followed
by an immediate concentration of the hostile Creeks, and the most that
could be done by the whites to avert the threatened destruction was to
fortify certain central posts and send messengers for assistance.
The method of fortifying was the same in all cases, with such variations
of detail as the nature of the ground, the number of men engaged in the
construction of the works, and the other circumstances of each case
rendered necessary. In general plan the so-called forts were nearly
square, the most elaborate of them being constructed upon the plan of
Fort Mims, which is represented on another page. Whatever their form
was, they were made of timbers set on end in the ground, as close
together as possible, forming a close and high wall, pierced with
port-holes for the use of riflemen. Heavy gates were provided, and
within the inclosure strong block-houses were built, in which a stout
resistance could be made even after the outer works should be carried.
There were more than a score of these forts in different parts of the
settlements. In that part of the peninsula formed by the Alabama and
Tombigbee rivers which now constitutes Clarke County, Alabama, there
were stockades built, which were known as Fort Glass, Fort Sinquefield,
etc., each taking its name from the owner of the place fortified.
Into these forts the people now began to flock in anticipation of a
general outbreak; and they were none too soon, as Weatherford had
already collected his men in considerable numbers. The principal fort
was on the plantation of one Samuel Mims, a rich Indian or man of mixed
blood, who lived on the little lake called Tensaw, or Tensas, as it is
now sometimes spelled on the maps, which lies within about a mile of the
Alabama River, a few miles above the confluence of that river with the
Tombigbee. Mims's place was near the high-road which led to Mims's
ferry, and hence was a natural centre of the neighborhood.
Mims and his neighbors, with the help of a number of half-breed refugees
from the Creek nation, constructed there a large stockade fortress, and
the people of the surrounding country, white, black, red, and mixed,
congregated there for safety.
Meantime the appearance of a British fleet off the coast had awakened
the government to the danger in which Mobile lay, and on the 28th of
June, 1813, Brigadier-General Ferdinand L. Claiborne, a distinguished
soldier who had won a fine reputation in the Indian wars of the
North-west, was ordered, with what force he had, to march from the post
of Baton Rouge to Fort Stoddard, a military station on the Mobile River,
not far below the confluence of the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers.
Upon receiving this order General Claiborne made application for the
necessary funds and supplies, but the quartermaster could put no more
than two hundred dollars into his army chest--a sum wholly inadequate to
the purpose. But Claiborne was not a man to permit small obstacles to
interfere with affairs of importance. He borrowed the necessary funds
upon his personal credit, giving a mortgage upon his property as
security, and boldly set out with his little army. It is worth while to
note in passing that, in consequence of the loss of vouchers for his
expenditures upon the expedition, General Claiborne's patriotic act cost
him the whole amount borrowed, his property being sold after his death,
as we learn from a note in Pickett's History of Alabama, to satisfy the
mortgage.
Arriving at Fort Stoddard with his army of seven hundred men on the
thirtieth day of July, General Claiborne at once sought the fullest and
most trustworthy information to be had with respect to the condition of
the country, the forces and designs of the Indians, and the strength and
situation of the various forts.
Having thus made himself master of the conditions of the problem which
he was set to solve, he distributed his forces and the volunteers who
were at command, among the various stockade posts in such a way as to
give the best protection he could to every part of the country.
To Fort Mims he sent Major Beasley, with one hundred and seventy-five
men, who, with seventy militiamen already there, swelled the force at
that post to two hundred and forty-five fighting men. Major Beasley,
upon taking command, organized his raw troops into something resembling
a battalion, and strengthened the fort by erecting a second line of
picketing outside the original gates.
Believing the post to be strong enough to spare a part of the force
under his command, Major Beasley sent detachments to various other and
weaker posts, acting upon the principle of protecting all points, which
had governed General Claiborne.
Besides the troops, who were simply all the men in the fort, every man
capable of shooting a gun being enrolled as a soldier, there were women
and children at Fort Mims, who had fled thither from the country for
protection, so that the total number of persons there exceeded five
hundred; the exact number is differently stated by different writers,
but the most trustworthy account, drawn from several original sources,
places the population of the place at five hundred and fifty-three
souls. The lives of all these people were committed to the keeping of
Major Beasley, who was clothed with ample authority, and free from
embarrassing dictation or interference of any kind. His fort was a
strong one, and in sending away some of his men to assist the garrisons
of other posts he himself testified that the force which remained was
sufficient for the need. His failure to use these means effectually for
the protection of the lives over which he was set as guardian was
clearly inexcusable, and although he bravely sacrificed his own life in
an attempt to retrieve his fault, he could do nothing to undo its
terrible consequences. His fault was not cowardice, but a lack of
caution, an utter and inexcusable lack of that prudence and foresight
which are as indispensable in a commander as personal courage itself.
It appears that alarms were frequent in the fort, as was to be expected
in a place full of women and children, credulous negroes, and excited
militiamen. These alarms Beasley reported to General Claiborne, and in
doing so he probably gave that capable and experienced officer some hint
of his own lack of prudence. At any rate, General Claiborne thought it
necessary to issue a general order to Major Beasley, directing him to
strengthen his works, use caution in the conduct of affairs, and neglect
no means of making the safety of the fort certain. The order ended with
this significant sentence: "To respect an enemy and prepare in the best
possible way to meet him, is the certain means to insure success." All
the work done by Major Beasley to strengthen the works was done in
obedience to special orders from Claiborne, and even what he
specifically ordered done appears to have been done only in part. He
directed Major Beasley, for one thing, to build two additional
block-houses, but that officer contented himself with beginning to build
one, which was never finished.
With matters in Fort Mims, and the results of Major Beasley's management
there, we shall have to do in another chapter. We have first to look at
the general situation of affairs as they stood during August, 1813,
before Weatherford--for by that name, rather than Red Eagle, he is known
to the history of what followed--struck his first tremendous blow.
Weatherford had collected his men in the upper towns, and was now moving
down the river, managing his advance very skilfully, after the manner of
regularly educated military men. In small affairs the Indian general
followed the tactics of his race, depending upon cunning and silent
creeping for the concealment of his movements, but he was too able an
officer to fall into the mistake of supposing that an army could be
advanced in this way for a long distance in secret. He knew that his
movements would be watched very closely and promptly reported. He
therefore resorted to strategy--or rather to sound methods of grand
tactics--as a means of concealing, not the fact that he was advancing,
but the real direction and objective point of his advance. He moved
southward, taking care to make demonstrations upon his flank which were
calculated to deceive his enemy. He threatened the settlements in the
peninsula, and constantly kept up a front of observation in a direction
different from that in which his main body was actually moving. In this
way he managed to advance to McGirth's plantation, on the Alabama River,
in the neighborhood of the place where the town of Claiborne now stands,
without revealing the purpose of his advance, and as this halting point
was one at which his presence seemed to threaten an attack upon Fort
Glass, Fort Sinquefield, and the other posts in what is now Clarke
County, his real purpose was still effectually concealed.
Meantime General Claiborne was not disposed to lie still and permit his
wily adversary to determine the course of the campaign. We said in the
beginning of this chapter that by a timely resort to offensive measures
the settlers might have averted a general war. It was now General
Claiborne's opinion that with the troops at command a policy of this
kind offered even yet the best prospect of success. Even before he had
finished his defensive preparations he planned an offensive campaign,
which he was confident of his ability to execute, while he was equally
confident that its execution would save a very much severer effort in
future.
On the 2d of August, 1813, he wrote to his commanding general,
explaining the situation, and adding these words:
"If you will authorize my entering the Creek nation, I will do so in ten
days after the junction of the Seventh Regiment, and if I am not
disappointed, will give to our frontiers peace, and to the government
any portion of the Creek country they please. Some force ought to enter
the nation before they systematize and are fully prepared for war. With
one thousand men and your authority to march immediately, I pledge
myself to burn any town in the Creek nation. Three months hence it might
be difficult for three thousand to effect what can be done with a third
of the number at present. They gain strength, and their munitions of war
enlarge every day."
How accurately General Claiborne estimated the difficulties which delay
would produce will be abundantly seen as we follow the course of the
campaign. There can be little reasonable doubt that the blow which this
gallant and enterprising officer wished to strike then would have saved
many hundreds of lives on both sides, if he had been permitted to carry
his plan into effect; but there was a difficulty in the way--the Creeks
had not yet openly attacked the white settlements beyond their border,
and until they did so the commanding general had no authority to permit
his troops to invade the nation.
[Illustration: FORT MIMS.]