CHAPTER VI

UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS REAL COMBATANTS ARE OBTAINED AND HOW THE

FIGHTING OF OUR DAYS, IN ORDER TO BE WELL DONE, REQUIRES THEM TO BE

MORE DEPENDABLE THAN IN ANCIENT COMBAT

Let us repeat now, what we said at the beginning of this study. Man

does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. He does everything

that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second. The continued

improvement of all appliances of war has no other goal than the

annihilation of the enemy. Absolute bravery, which does not refuse

battle even on unequal terms, trusting only to God or to destiny, is

not natural in man; it is the result of moral culture. It is

infinitely rare, because in the face of danger the animal sense of

self-preservation always gains the upper hand. Man calculates his

chances, with what errors we are about to see.

Now, man has a horror of death. In the bravest, a great sense of duty,

which they alone are capable of understanding and living up to, is

paramount. But the mass always cowers at sight of the phantom, death.

Discipline is for the purpose of dominating that horror by a still

greater horror, that of punishment or disgrace. But there always comes

an instant when natural horror gets an upper hand over discipline, and

the fighter flees. "Stop, stop, hold out a few minutes, an instant

more, and you are victor! You are not even wounded yet,--if you turn

your back you are dead!" He does not hear, he cannot hear any more. He

is full of fear. How many armies have sworn to conquer or perish? How

many have kept their oaths? An oath of sheep to stand up against

wolves. History shows, not armies, but firm souls who have fought unto

death, and the devotion of Thermopylae is therefore justly immortal.

Here we are again brought to the consideration of essential truths,

enunciated by many men, now forgotten or unknown.

To insure success in the rude test of conflict, it is not sufficient

to have a mass composed of valiant men like the Gauls or the Germans.

The mass needs, and we give it, leaders who have the firmness and

decision of command proceeding from habit and an entire faith in their

unquestionable right to command as established by tradition, law and

society.

We add good arms. We add methods of fighting suitable to these arms

and those of the enemy and which do not overtax the physical and moral

forces of man. We add also a rational decentralization that permits

the direction and employment of the efforts of all even to the last

man.

We animate with passion, a violent desire for independence, a

religious fanaticism, national pride, a love of glory, a madness for

possession. An iron discipline, which permits no one to escape action,

secures the greatest unity from top to bottom, between all the

elements, between the commanding officers, between the commanding

officers and men, between the soldiers.

Have we then a solid army? Not yet. Unity, that first and supreme

force of armies, is sought by enacting severe laws of discipline

supported by powerful passions. But to order discipline is not enough.

A vigilance from which no one may escape in combat should assure the

maintenance of discipline. Discipline itself depends on moral pressure

which actuates men to advance from sentiments of fear or pride. But it

depends also on surveillance, the mutual supervision of groups of men

who know each other well.

A wise organization insures that the personnel of combat groups

changes as little as possible, so that comrades in peace time

maneuvers shall be comrades in war. From living together, and obeying

the same chiefs, from commanding the same men, from sharing fatigue

and rest, from cooeperation among men who quickly understand each other

in the execution of warlike movements, may be bred brotherhood,

professional knowledge, sentiment, above all unity. The duty of

obedience, the right of imposing discipline and the impossibility of

escaping from it, would naturally follow.

And now confidence appears.

It is not that enthusiastic and thoughtless confidence of tumultous or

unprepared armies which goes up to the danger point and vanishes

rapidly, giving way to a contrary sentiment, which sees treason

everywhere. It is that intimate confidence, firm and conscious, which

does not forget itself in the heat of action and which alone makes

true combatants.

Then we have an army; and it is no longer difficult to explain how men

carried away by passions, even men who know how to die without

flinching, without turning pale, really strong in the presence of

death, but without discipline, without solid organization, are

vanquished by others individually less valiant, but firmly, jointly

and severally combined.

One loves to picture an armed mob upsetting all obstacles and carried

away by a blast of passion.

There is more imagination than truth in that picture. If the struggle

depended on individuals, the courageous, impassioned men, composing

the mob would have more chance of victory. But in any body of troops,

in front of the enemy, every one understands that the task is not the

work of one alone, that to complete it requires team work. With his

comrades in danger brought together under unknown leaders, he feels

the lack of union, and asks himself if he can count on them. A thought

of mistrust leads to hesitation. A moment of it will kill the

offensive spirit.

Unity and confidence cannot be improvised. They alone can create that

mutual trust, that feeling of force which gives courage and daring.

Courage, that is the temporary domination of will over instinct,

brings about victory.

Unity alone then produces fighters. But, as in everything, there are

degrees of unity. Let us see whether modern is in this respect less

exacting than ancient combat.

In ancient combat there was danger only at close quarters. If the

troops had enough morale (which Asiatic hordes seldom had) to meet the

enemy at broadsword's length, there was an engagement. Whoever was

that close knew that he would be killed if he turned his back;

because, as we have seen, the victors lost but few and the vanquished

were exterminated. This simple reasoning held the men and made them

fight, if it was but for an instant.

Neglecting the exceptional and very rare circumstances, which may

bring two forces together, action to-day is brought on and fought out

from afar. Danger begins at great distances, and it is necessary to

advance for a long time under fire which at each step becomes heavier.

The vanquished loses prisoners, but often, in dead and in wounded, he

does not lose more than the victor.

Ancient combat was fought in groups close together, within a small

space, in open ground, in full view of one another, without the

deafening noise of present day arms. Men in formation marched into an

action that took place on the spot and did not carry them thousands of

feet away from the starting point. The surveillance of the leaders was

easy, individual weakness was immediately checked. General

consternation alone caused flight.

To-day fighting is done over immense spaces, along thinly drawn out

lines broken every instant by the accidents and the obstacles of the

terrain. From the time the action begins, as soon as there are rifle

shots, the men spread out as skirmishers or, lost in the inevitable

disorder of a rapid march, [28] escape the supervision of their

commanding officers. A considerable number conceal themselves; [29]

they get away from the engagement and diminish by just so much

the material and moral effect and confidence of the brave ones

who remain. This can bring about defeat.

But let us look at man himself in ancient combat and in modern. In

ancient combat:--I am strong, apt, vigorous, trained, full of

calmness, presence of mind; I have good offensive and defensive

weapons and trustworthy companions of long standing. They do not let

me be overwhelmed without aiding me. I with them, they with me, we are

invincible, even invulnerable. We have fought twenty battles and not

one of us remained on the field. It is necessary to support each other

in time; we see it clearly; we are quick to replace ourselves, to put

a fresh combatant in front of a fatigued adversary. We are the legions

of Marius, fifty thousand who have held out against the furious

avalanches of the Cimbri. We have killed one hundred and forty

thousand, taken prisoner sixty thousand, while losing but two or three

hundred of our inexperienced soldiers.

To-day, as strong, firm, trained, and courageous as I am, I can never

say; I shall return. I have no longer to do with men, whom I do not

fear, I have to do with fate in the form of iron and lead. Death is in

the air, invisible and blind, whispering, whistling. As brave, good,

trustworthy, and devoted as my companions may be, they do not shield

me. Only,--and this is abstract and less immediately intelligible to

all than the material support of ancient combat,--only I imagine that

the more numerous we are who run a dangerous risk, the greater is the

chance for each to escape therefrom. I also know that, if we have that

confidence which none of us should lack in action, we feel, and we

are, stronger. We begin more resolutely, are ready to keep up the

struggle longer, and therefore finish it more quickly.

We finish it! But in order to finish it, it is necessary to advance,

to attack the enemy, [30] and infantryman or troopers, we are naked

against iron, naked against lead, which cannot miss at close range.

Let us advance in any case, resolutely. Our adversary will not stand

at the point-blank range of our rifle, for the attack is never mutual,

we are sure of that. We have been told so a thousand times. We have

seen it. But what if matters should change now! Suppose the enemy

stands at point-blank range! What of that?

How far this is from Roman confidence!

In another place we have shown that in ancient times to retire from

action was both a difficult and perilous matter for the soldier.

To-day the temptation is much stronger, the facility greater and the

peril less.

Now, therefore, combat exacts more moral cohesion, greater unity than

previously. A last remark on the difficulty of obtaining it will

complete the demonstration.

Since the invention of fire arms, the musket, the rifle, the cannon,

the distances of mutual aid and support have increased among the

different arms. [31]

Besides, the facility of communications of all kinds permits the

assembling on a given territory of enormous forces. For these reasons,

as we have stated, battle fields have become immense.

Supervision becomes more and more difficult. Direction being more

distant tends more often to escape from the supreme commanders and the

subordinate leaders. The certain and inevitable disorder, which a body

of troops always presents in action, is with the moral effect of

modern appliances, becoming greater every day. In the midst of the

confusion and the vacillation of firing lines, men and commanding

officers often lose each other.

Troops immediately and hotly engaged, such as companies and squads,

can maintain themselves only if they are well-organized and serve as

supports or rallying points to those out of place. Battles tend to

become now, more than they have ever been, the battles of men.

This ought not to be true! Perhaps. But the fact is that it is true.

Not all troops are immediately or hotly engaged in battle. Commanding

officers always try to keep in hand, as long as possible, some troops

capable of marching, acting at any moment, in any direction. To-day,

like yesterday, like to-morrow, the decisive action is that of formed

troops. Victory belongs to the commander who has known how to keep

them in good order, to hold them, and to direct them.

That is incontrovertible.

But commanders can hold out decisive reserves only if the enemy has

been forced to commit his.

In troops which do the fighting, the men and the officers closest to

them, from corporal to battalion commander, have a more independent

action than ever. As it is alone the vigor of that action, more

independent than ever of the direction of higher commanders, which

leaves in the hands of higher commanders available forces which can be

directed at a decisive moment, that action becomes more preponderant

than ever. Battles, now more than ever, are battles of men, of

captains. They always have been in fact, since in the last analysis

the execution belongs to the man in ranks. But the influence of the

latter on the final result is greater than formerly. From that comes

the maxim of to-day: The battles of men.

Outside of the regulations on tactics and discipline, there is an

evident necessity for combating the hazardous predominance of the

action of the soldier over that of the commander. It is necessary to

delay as long as possible, that instant which modern conditions tend

to hasten--the instant when the soldier gets from under the control of

the commander.

This completes the demonstration of the truth stated before: Combat

requires to-day, in order to give the best results, a moral cohesion,

a unity more binding than at any other time. [32] It is as true as it

is clear, that, if one does not wish bonds to break, one must make

them elastic in order to strengthen them.

Battle Studies; Ancient and Modern Battle · 第 6 / 9 章