At this moment our Domestic Relations all hinge upon one question: _How
to treat, the Rebel States?_ No patriot citizen doubts the triumph of
our arms in the suppression of the Rebellion. Early or late, this
triumph is inevitable. It may be by a sudden collapse of the bloody
imposture, or it may be by a slower and more gradual surrender. For
ourselves, we are prepared for either alternative, and shall not be
disappointed, if we are constrained to wait yet a little longer. But
when the day of triumph comes, political duties will take the place of
military. The victory won by our soldiers must be assuredly wise
counsels, so that its hard-earned fruits may not be lost.
The relations of the States to the National Government must be carefully
considered,--not too boldly, not too timidly,--in order to see in what
way, or by what process, _the transition from Rebel forms may be most
surely accomplished_. If I do not greatly err, it will be found that the
powers of Congress, which have thus far been so effective in raising
armies and in supplying moneys, will be important, if not essential, in
fixing the conditions of perpetual peace. But there is one point on
which there can be no question. The dogma and delusion of State Rights,
which did so much for the Rebellion, must not be allowed to neutralize
all that our arms have gained.
Already, in a remarkable instance, the President has treated the
pretension of State Rights with proper indifference. Quietly and without
much discussion, he has constituted military governments in the Rebel
States, with governors nominated by himself,--all of which testifies
against the old pretension. Strange will it be, if this extraordinary
power, amply conceded to the President, is denied to Congress.
Practically the whole question with which I began is opened here.
Therefore to this aspect of it I ask your first attention.
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT _vs._. MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
Four military governors have been already appointed: one for Tennessee,
one for South Carolina, one for North Carolina, and the other for
Louisiana. So far as is known, the appointment of each was by a simple
letter from the Secretary of War. But if this can be done in four
States, where is the limit? It may be done in every Rebel State, and if
not in every other State of the Union, it will be simply because the
existence of a valid State government excludes the exercise of this
extraordinary power. But assuming, that, as our arms prevail, it will be
done in every Rebel State, we shall then have _eleven_ military
governors, all deriving their authority from one source, ruling a
population amounting to upwards of nine millions. And this imperatorial
dominion, indefinite in extent, will also be indefinite in duration; for
if, under the Constitution and laws, it be proper to constitute such
governors, it is clear that they may be continued without regard to
time,--for years, if you please, as well as for weeks,--and the whole
region which they are called to sway will be a military empire, with all
powers, executive, legislative, and even judicial, derived from one man
in Washington. Talk of the "one-man power." Here it is with a vengeance.
Talk of military rule. Here it is, in the name of a republic.
The bare statement of this case may put us on our guard. We may well
hesitate to organize a single State under a military government, when we
see where such a step will lead. If you approve one, you must approve
all, and the National Government may crystallize into a military
despotism.
In appointing military governors of States, we follow an approved
example in certain cases beyond the jurisdiction of our Constitution, as
in California and Mexico after their conquest and before peace. It is
evident that in these cases there was no constraint from the
Constitution, and we were perfectly free to act according to the assumed
exigency. It may be proper to set up military governors for a conquered
country beyond our civil jurisdiction, and yet it may be questionable if
we should undertake to set up such governors in States which we all
claim to be within our civil jurisdiction. At all events, the two cases
are different, so that it is not easy to argue from one to the other.
In Jefferson's Inaugural Address, where he develops what he calls "the
essential principles of our government, and consequently those which
ought to shape its administration," he mentions "_the supremacy of the
civil over the military authority_" as one of these "essential
principles," and then says:--
"These should be the creed of our political faith,--the text of civil
instruction,--the touchstone by which to try the services of those we
trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or alarm, let
us hasten to retrace our steps, and to regain the road which alone leads
to peace, liberty, and safety."
In undertaking to create military governors of States, we reverse the
policy of the republic, as solemnly declared by Jefferson, and subject
the civil to the military authority. If this has been done, in patriotic
ardor, without due consideration, in a moment of error or alarm, it only
remains, that, according to Jefferson, we should "hasten to retrace our
steps, and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and
safety."
There is nothing new under the sun, and the military governors whom we
are beginning to appoint find a prototype in the Protectorate of Oliver
Cromwell. After the execution of the King and the establishment of the
Commonwealth, the Protector conceived the idea of parcelling the kingdom
into military districts, of which there were _eleven_,--being precisely
the number which it is now proposed, under the favor of success, to
establish among us. Of this system a great authority, Mr. Hallam, in his
"Constitutional History of England," speaks thus:--
"To govern according to law may sometimes be an usurper's wish, but can
seldom be in his power. The Protector abandoned all thought of it.
Dividing the kingdom into districts, he placed at the head of each a
major-general, as _a sort of military magistrate_, responsible for the
subjection of his prefecture. These were _eleven in number_, men
bitterly hostile to the Royalist party, and insolent towards all civil
authority."[8]
Carlyle, in his "Life of Cromwell," gives the following glimpse of this
military government:--
"The beginning of a universal scheme of major-generals: the
Lord-Protector and his Council of State having well considered and found
it the feasiblest,--'if not _good_, yet best.' 'It is an arbitrary
government,' murmur many. Yes, arbitrary, but beneficial. _These are
powers unknown to the English Constitution, I believe; but they are very
necessary for the Puritan English nation at this time._"[9]
Perhaps no better words could be found in explanation of the Cromwellian
policy adopted by our President.
A contemporary Royalist, Colonel Ludlow, whose "Memoirs" add to our
authentic history of those interesting times, characterizes these
military magistrates as so many "bashaws." Here are some of his words:--
"The major-generals carried things with unheard-of insolence in their
several precincts, decimating to extremity whom they pleased, and
interrupting the proceedings at law upon petitions of those who
pretended themselves aggrieved, _threatening such as would not yield a
manly submission to their orders with transportation to Jamaica or some
other plantation in the West Indies_."[10]