'THE BATTLE OF UNION'
At the dawn of 1866 the desperate plight of the cause of union called
for skilful generalship in four different arenas of political action.
In any one of them a false move would have been fatal to success; and
there was always the danger that, on so extended a front, the advocates
of union might be fighting at cross purposes and so inflicting injury
on each other instead of upon the enemy. It was necessary that the
Imperial influence should be exerted as far as the issues at stake
warranted its employment. Canada, the object of suspicion, must march
warily to avoid rousing the hostile elements elsewhere. The unionists
of New Brunswick should be given time to recover their position, while
those of Nova Scotia should stand ready for instant co-operation.
The judicious but firm attitude of the Imperial authorities was a
material factor in the {109} situation. From 1862 onwards there was no
mistaking the policy of Downing Street, as expressed by the Duke of
Newcastle in that year to the governor of Nova Scotia. Colonial
secretaries came and went and the complexion of British ministries
changed, but the principle of union stood approved. Any proposals,
however, must emanate from the colonies themselves; and, when an
agreement in whole or in part should be reached, the proper procedure
was indicated. 'The most satisfactory mode,' said the dispatch of
1862, 'of testing the opinion of the people of British North America
would probably be by means of resolution or address proposed in
legislatures of each province by its own government.' This course all
the governments had kept in mind, with the additional safeguard that
the ministers of the day had associated with themselves the leaders of
the parliamentary oppositions. Nothing could have savoured less of
partisanship than the Quebec Conference; and Mr Cardwell, the colonial
secretary, had acknowledged the resolutions of that body in handsome
terms.
The home authorities faced the difficulties with a statesmanlike front.
They had no disposition to dictate, but, once assured that a {110}
substantial majority in each consenting province supported the scheme,
it was their duty to speak plainly, no matter how vehemently a section
of opinion in England or in the provinces protested. They held the
opinion, that since the provinces desired to remain within the Empire,
they must combine. All the grounds for this belief could not be
publicly stated. It was one of those exceptional occasions when
Downing Street, by reason of its superior insight into foreign affairs
and by full comprehension of the danger then threatening, knew better
than the man on the spot. The colonial opposition might be sincere and
patriotic, but it was wrong. Heed could not be paid to the agitations
in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick because they were founded upon narrow
conceptions of statesmanship and erroneous information.
Another difficulty with which British governments, whether Liberal or
Tory, had to contend was the separatist doctrine known as that of the
Manchester School. When George Brown visited England in 1864 he was
startled into communicating with John A. Macdonald in these terms:
I am much concerned to observe--and I {111} write it to you as a thing
that must seriously be considered by all men taking a lead hereafter in
Canadian public matters--that there is a manifest desire in almost
every quarter that, ere long, the British American colonies should
shift for themselves, and in some quarters evident regret that we did
not declare at once for independence. I am very sorry to observe this;
but it arises, I hope, from the fear of invasion of Canada by the
United States, and will soon pass away with the cause that excites it.
The feeling did pass away in time. The responsible statesmen of that
period were forced to go steadily forward and ignore it, just as they
refused to be dominated by appeals from colonial reactionaries who
abhorred change and who honestly believed that in so doing they
exhibited the best form of attachment to the Empire.
Why Mr Arthur Gordon, the lieutenant-governor of New Brunswick, was at
first opposed to Confederation, when his ministers were in favour of
it, is not quite clear.[1] {112} However this may be, his punishment
was not long in coming; and, if he escaped from the storm without loss
of honour, he certainly suffered in dignity and comfort. The new
ministry which took office in New Brunswick was formed by A. J. Smith,
who afterwards as Sir Albert Smith had a useful career in the Dominion
parliament. His colleagues had taken a prominent part in the agitation
against Confederation, but it appears that they had no very settled
convictions on this question, and that they differed on many others.
At any rate, dissension soon broke out among them. The colonial
secretary pressed upon the province the desirability of the union in
terms described as 'earnest and friendly suggestions,' and which left
no doubt as to the wishes of the home government. 'You will express,'
said the colonial secretary to the lieutenant-governor, 'the strong and
deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's Government that it is an object
much to be desired that all the British North American colonies should
agree to unite in one government.' In stating {113} the reasons for
this opinion the dispatch continued:
Looking to the determination which this country has ever exhibited to
regard the defence of the colonies as a matter of Imperial concern, the
colonies must recognize a right, and even acknowledge an obligation,
incumbent on the home government to urge with earnestness and just
authority the measures which they consider to be most expedient on the
part of the colonies with a view to their own defence.
The New Brunswick frontier, as well as Canada, was disturbed by the
threatened Fenian invasion, so that the question of defence was
apposite and of vital importance.
Presently a change of sentiment began to show itself in the province,
and the shaky Cabinet began to totter from resignations and
disagreements. By-elections followed and supporters of federation were
returned. The legislature met early in March. In the
lieutenant-governor's speech from the throne, a reference to the
colonial secretary's dispatch implied that Gordon had changed his views
and was now favourable to union. He {114} afterwards explained that
the first minister and several of his colleagues had privately
intimated to him their concurrence, but felt unable at the time to
explain their altered attitude to the legislature. The next step
involved proceedings still more unusual, if not actually
unconstitutional: the address of the Legislative Council in reply to
the speech from the throne contained a vigorous endorsement of union;
and the lieutenant-governor accepted it, without consulting his
advisers, and in language which left them no recourse but to resign. A
new ministry was formed on the 18th of April, and the House was
dissolved. The ensuing elections resulted in a complete victory for
federation. On the 21st of June the legislature met, fresh from the
people, and adopted, by a vote of thirty to eight, a resolution
appointing delegates to arrange with the Imperial authorities a scheme
of union that would secure 'the just rights and interests of New
Brunswick.' The battle was won.
Meanwhile, like the mariner who keeps a vigilant eye upon the weather,
the Tupper government in Nova Scotia observed the proceedings in New
Brunswick with a view to action at the proper moment. The agitation
throughout the province had not affected the {115} position of parties
in the legislature which met in February. The government continued to
treat federation as a non-contentious subject. No reference to it was
made in the governor's speech, and the legislature occupied itself with
other business. The agitation in the country, with Howe leading it,
and William Annand, member for East Halifax and editor of the
_Chronicle_, as his chief associate, went on. Then the debacle of the
anti-confederate party in New Brunswick began to attract attention and
give rise to speculations on what would be the action of the Tupper
government. This was soon to be disclosed. In April, a few days
before the fall of the Smith ministry in New Brunswick, William Miller,
member for Richmond, made a speech in the House which was destined to
produce a momentous effect. His proposal was to appoint delegates to
frame a scheme in consultation with the Imperial authorities, and thus
ignore the Quebec resolutions. To these resolutions Miller had been
strongly opposed. He had borne a leading part with Howe and Annand in
the agitation, although he was always favourable to union in the
abstract and careful on all occasions to say so. Now, however, his
speech provided a means of enabling Nova Scotia to enter the {116}
union with the consent of the legislature, and Tupper was quick to
seize the opportunity by putting it in the form of a motion before the
House. An extremely bitter debate followed; vigorous epithets were
exchanged with much freedom, and Tupper's condemnation of Joseph Howe
omitted nothing essential to the record. But at length, at midnight of
the 10th of April, the legislature, by a vote of thirty-one to
nineteen, adopted the motion which cleared the way for bringing Nova
Scotia into the Dominion.
Miller's late allies never forgave his action on this occasion. He was
accused of having been bribed to desert them. When he was appointed to
the Senate in 1867 the charge was repeated, and many years afterwards
was revived in an offensive form. Finally, Miller entered suit for
libel against the Halifax _Chronicle_, and in the witness-box Sir
Charles Tupper bore testimony to the propriety of Miller's conduct in
1866. Notwithstanding the hostility between Howe and Tupper, they
afterwards resumed friendly relations and sat comfortably together in
the Dominion Cabinet. In politics hard words can be soon forgotten.
The doughty Tupper had won his province for the union and could afford
to forget.
[Illustration: Sir Charles Tupper, Bart. From a photograph by Elliott
and Fry, London.]
{117}
The tactics pursued in Canada during these exciting months in the
Maritime Provinces were those defined by a great historian, in dealing
with a different convulsion, as 'masterly inactivity.' In that
memorable speech of years afterwards when Macdonald, about to be
overwhelmed by the Pacific Railway charges, appealed to his countrymen
in words that came straight from the heart, he declared: 'I have fought
the battle of union.' The events of 1866 are the key to this
utterance. Parliament was not summoned until June; and meanwhile
ministers said nothing. That this line of policy was deliberate, is
set forth in a private letter from Macdonald to Tilley:
Had we met early in the year and before your elections, the greatest
embarrassment and your probable defeat at the polls would have ensued.
We should have been pressed by the Opposition to declare whether we
adhered to the Quebec resolutions or not. Had we answered in the
affirmative, you would have been defeated, as you were never in a
position to go to the polls on those resolutions. Had we replied in
the negative, and stated that it was an {118} open question and that
the resolutions were liable to alteration, Lower Canada would have
arisen as one man, and good-bye to federation.
Thus was the situation saved; and, although the delegates from the
Maritime Provinces were obliged to wait in London for some months for
their Canadian colleagues, owing to the Fenian invasion of Canada and
to a change of ministry in England, the body of delegates assembled in
December at the Westminster Palace Hotel, in London, and sat down to
frame the details of the bill for the union of British North America.
[1] Gordon's dispatches to the colonial secretary indicate that from
the first he distrusted the Quebec scheme and that the overthrow of his
ministers owing to it occasioned him no great grief. James Hannay, the
historian, attributes his conduct to chagrin at the pushing aside of
maritime union, as he had hoped to be the first governor of the smaller
union.
{119}