THE HOUR AND THE MEN
The acceptance of federation in the province of Canada came about with
dramatic simplicity. Political deadlock was the occasion, rather than
the cause, of this acceptance. Racial and religious differences had
bred strife and disunion, but no principle of any substance divided the
parties. The absence of large issues had encouraged a senseless
rivalry between individuals. Surveying the scene not long after,
Goldwin Smith, fresh from English conditions, cynically quoted the
proverb: 'the smaller the pit, the fiercer the rats.' The upper and
lower branches of parliament were elective, and in both bodies the
ablest men in the country held seats. In those days commerce,
manufacturing, or banking did not, as they do now, withhold men of
marked talent from public affairs. But personal antipathies, magnified
into feuds, embittered the relations of men who naturally held many
views in {31} common, and distracted the politics of a province which
needed nothing so much as peace and unity of action.
The central figures in this storm of controversy were George Brown and
John A. Macdonald, easily the first personages in their respective
parties. The two were antipathetic. Their dispositions were as wide
asunder as the poles. Brown was serious, bold, and masterful.
Macdonald concealed unrivalled powers in statecraft and in the
leadership of men behind a droll humour and convivial habits. From the
first they had been political antagonists. But the differences were
more than political. Neither liked nor trusted the other. Brown bore
a grudge for past attacks reflecting upon his integrity, while
Macdonald, despite his experience in the warfare of party, must often
have winced at the epithets of the _Globe_, Brown's newspaper. During
ten years they were not on speaking terms. But when they joined to
effect a great object, dear to both, a truce was declared. 'We acted
together,' wrote Macdonald long after of Brown, 'dined in public places
together, played euchre in crossing the Atlantic and went into society
in England together. And yet on the day after he resigned we resumed
our old positions {32} and ceased to speak.'[1] To imagine that of all
men those two should combine to carry federation seemed the wildest and
most improbable dream. Yet that is what actually happened.
[Illustration: George Brown. From a photograph in the possession of
Mrs Freeland Barbour, Edinburgh.]
In June 1864, during the session of parliament in Quebec, government by
party collapsed. In the previous three years there had been two
general elections, and four Cabinets had gone to pieces. And while the
politicians wrangled, the popular mind, swayed by influences stronger
than party interest, convinced itself that the remedy lay in the
federal system. Brown felt that Upper Canada looked to him for relief;
and as early as in 1862 he had conveyed private intimation to his
Conservative opponents that if they would ensure Upper Canada's just
preponderance in parliamentary representation, which at that date the
Liberal ministry of Sandfield Macdonald refused to do, they would
receive his countenance and approval. In 1864 he moved for a select
committee of nineteen members to consider the prospects of federal
union. It sat with closed doors. A few hours before the defeat of the
Tache-Macdonald ministry in {33} June, he, the chairman of the
committee, reported to the House that
a strong feeling was found to exist among the members of the committee
in favour of changes in the direction of a federative system, applied
either to Canada alone, or to the whole British North American
provinces, and such progress has been made as to warrant the committee
in recommending that the subject be referred to a committee at the next
session of Parliament.
Three years later, on the first Dominion Day, the _Globe_,[2] in
discussing this committee and its work, declared that 'a very free
interchange of opinion took place. In the course of the discussions it
appeared probable that a union of parties might be effected for the
purpose of grappling with the constitutional difficulties.' Macdonald
voted against the committee's report. Brown was thoroughly in earnest,
and the desperate nature of the political situation gave him an
opportunity to prove his sincerity and his unselfishness.
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On the evening of Tuesday, June 14, 1864, immediately after the defeat
of the ministry on an unimportant question, Brown spoke to two
Conservative members and promised to co-operate with any government
that would settle the constitutional difficulty. These members,
Alexander Morris and John Henry Pope, were on friendly terms with him
and became serviceable intermediaries. They were asked to communicate
this promise to Macdonald and to Galt. The next day saw the
reconciliation of the two leaders who had been estranged for ten years.
They met 'standing in the centre of the Assembly Room' (the formal
memorandum is meticulously exact in these and other particulars), that
is, neither member crossing to that side of the House led by the other.
Macdonald spoke first, mentioning the overtures made and asking if
Brown had any 'objection' to meet Galt and himself. Brown replied,
'Certainly not.' Morris arranged an interview, and the following day
Macdonald and Galt called upon Brown at the St Louis Hotel, Quebec.
Negotiations, ending in the famous coalition, began.
The memorandum read to the House related in detail every step taken to
bring about the coalition, from the opening conversation {35} which
Brown had with Morris and Pope. It was proper that a full explanation
should be given to the public of a political event so extraordinary and
so unexpected. But the narrative of minute particulars indicates the
complete lack of confidence existing between the parties to the
agreement. The relationships of social life rest upon the belief that
there is a code of honour, affecting words and actions, which is
binding upon gentlemen. The memorandum appeared to assume that in
political life these considerations did not exist, and that unless the
whole of the proceedings were set forth in chronological order, and
with amplitude of detail, some of the group would seek to repudiate the
explanation on one point or another, while the general public would
disbelieve them all. To such a pass had the extremes of partyism
brought the leading men in parliament. If, however, the memorandum is
a very human document, it is also historically most interesting and
important. The leaders began by solemnly assuring each other that
nothing but 'the extreme urgency of the present crisis' could justify
their meeting together for common political action. The idea that the
paramount interests of the nation, threatened by possible invasion and
by {36} commercial disturbance, would be ground for such a junction of
forces does not seem to have suggested itself. After the preliminary
skirmishing upon matters of party concern the negotiators at last
settled down to business.
Mr Brown asked what the Government proposed as a remedy for the
injustice complained of by Upper Canada, and as a settlement of the
sectional trouble. Mr Macdonald and Mr Galt replied that their remedy
was a Federal Union of all the British North American Provinces; local
matters being committed to local bodies, and matters common to all to a
General Legislature.[3]
Mr Brown rejoined that this would not be acceptable to the people of
Upper Canada as a remedy for existing evils. That he believed that
federation of all the provinces ought to come, and would come about ere
long, but it had not yet been thoroughly considered by the people; and
even were this otherwise, there were {37} so many parties to be
consulted that its adoption was uncertain and remote.
Mr Brown was then asked what his remedy was, when he stated that the
measure acceptable to Upper Canada would be Parliamentary Reform, based
on population, without regard to a separating line between Upper and
Lower Canada. To this both Mr Macdonald and Mr Galt stated that it was
impossible for them to accede, or for any Government to carry such a
measure, and that, unless a basis could be found on the federation
principle suggested by the report of Mr Brown's committee, it did not
appear to them likely that anything could be settled.
At this stage, then, Brown thought federation should be limited to
Canada, believing the larger scheme uncertain and remote, while the
others preferred a federal union for all the provinces. At a later
meeting Cartier joined the gathering and a confidential statement was
drawn up (the disinclination to take one another's word being still a
lively sentiment), so that Brown could consult his friends. The
ministerial promise in its final terms was as follows:
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The Government are prepared to pledge themselves to bring in a measure
next session for the purpose of removing existing difficulties by
introducing the federal principle into Canada, coupled with such
provisions as will permit the Maritime Provinces and the North-West
Territory to be incorporated into the same system of government. And
the Government will seek, by sending representatives to the Lower
Provinces and to England, to secure the assent of those interests which
are beyond the control of our own legislation to such a measure as may
enable all British North America to be united under a General
Legislature based upon the federal principle.
This basis gave satisfaction all round, and the proceedings relapsed
into the purely political diplomacy which forms the least pleasant
phase of what was otherwise a highly patriotic episode, creditable in
its results to all concerned. Brown fought hard for a representation
of four Liberals in the Cabinet, preferring to remain out of it
himself, and, when his inclusion was deemed indispensable, offering to
join as a minister without portfolio or salary. {39} Finally Macdonald
promised to confer with him upon the personnel of the Conservative
element in the Cabinet, so that the incoming Liberals would meet
colleagues with whom harmonious relations should be ensured. The fates
ordained that, since Brown had been the first to propose the sacrifice
of party to country, the arrangement arrived at was the least
advantageous to his interests. He had the satisfaction of feeling that
the Upper Canada Liberals in the House supported his action, but those
from Lower Canada, both English and French, were entirely
unsympathetic. The Lower Canada section of the ministry accordingly
remained wholly Conservative.
It does not require much depth of political experience to realize the
embarrassment of Brown's position. The terms were not easy for him.
In a ministry of twelve members he and two colleagues would be the only
Liberals. The leadership of Upper Canada, and in fact the real
premiership, because Tache was frail and past his prime, would rest
with Macdonald. The presidency of the Executive Council, which was
offered him, unless joined to the office of prime minister, was of no
real importance. Some party friends throughout the country {40} would
misunderstand, and more would scoff. He had parted company with his
loyal personal friends Dorion and Holton. If, as Disraeli said,
England does not love coalitions, neither does Canada. For the time
being, and, as events proved, for a considerable time, the Liberal
party would be divided and helpless, because the pledge of Brown
pledged also the fighting strength of the party. Although the union
issue dwarfed all others, questions would arise, awkward questions like
that of patronage, old questions with a new face, on which there had
been vehement differences. For two of his new colleagues, Macdonald
and Galt, Brown entertained feelings far from cordial. Cautious
advisers like Alexander Mackenzie and Oliver Mowat counselled against a
coalition, suggesting that the party should support the government, but
should not take a share in it. All this had to be weighed and a
decision reached quickly. But Brown had put his hand to the plough and
would not turn back. With the dash and determination that
distinguished him, he accepted the proposal, became president of the
Executive Council, with Sir Etienne Tache as prime minister, and
selected William McDougall and Oliver Mowat as his Liberal colleagues.
Amazement and {41} consternation ran like wildfire throughout Upper
Canada when the news arrived from Quebec that Brown and Macdonald were
members of the same government. At the outset Brown had feared that
'the public mind would be shocked,' and he was not wrong. But the
sober second thought of the country in both parties applauded the act,
and the desire for union found free vent. Posterity has endorsed the
course taken by Brown and justly honours his memory for having, at the
critical hour and on terms that would have made the ordinary politician
quail, rendered Confederation possible. There is evidence that the
Conservative members of the coalition played the game fairly and
redeemed their promise to put union in the forefront of their policy.
On this issue complete concord reigned in the Cabinet. The natural
divergences of opinion on minor points in the scheme were arranged
without internal discord. This was fortunate, because grave obstacles
were soon to be encountered.
If George Brown of Upper Canada was the hero of the hour, George
Cartier of Lower Canada played a role equally courageous and
honourable. The hostile forces to be encountered by the
French-Canadian leader were {42} formidable. Able men of his own race,
like Dorion, Letellier, and Fournier, prepared to fight tooth and nail.
The Rouges, as the Liberals there were termed, opposed him to a man.
The idea of British American union had in the past been almost
invariably put forward as a means of destroying the influence of the
French. Influential representatives, too, of the English minority in
Lower Canada, like Dunkin, Holton, and Huntington, opposed it. Joly de
Lotbiniere, the French Protestant, warned the Catholics and the French
that federation would endanger their rights. The Rouge resistance was
not a passive parliamentary resistance only, because, later on, the
earnest protests of the dissentients were carried to the foot of the
throne. But all these influences the intrepid Cartier faced
undismayed; and Brown, in announcing his intention to enter the
coalition, paid a warm tribute to Cartier for his frank and manly
attitude. This was the burial of another hatchet, and the amusing
incident related by Cartwright illustrates how it was received.
[Illustration: Sir George Cartier. From a painting in the Chateau de
Ramezay.]
In that memorable afternoon when Mr Brown, not without emotion, made
his {43} statement to a hushed and expectant House, and declared that
he was about to ally himself with Sir George Cartier and his friends,
for the purpose of carrying out Confederation, I saw an excitable,
elderly little French member rush across the floor, climb up on Mr
Brown, who, as you remember, was of a stature approaching the gigantic,
fling his arms about his neck, and hang several seconds there
suspended, to the visible consternation of Mr Brown and to the infinite
joy of all beholders, pit, box, and gallery included.
At last statesmanship had taken the place of party bickering, and, as
James Ferrier of Montreal, a member of the Legislative Council,
remarked in the debates of 1865, the legislators 'all thought, in fact,
that a political millennium had arrived.'
[1] _Memoirs of Sir John Macdonald_, by Sir Joseph Pope, vol. i, p. 265.
[2] This portion of the lengthy survey of the new Dominion in the
_Globe_ of July 1, 1867, is said to have been written by George Brown
himself.
[3] Sir Joseph Pope states that in the printed copy of this memorandum
which Sir John Macdonald preserved there appears, immediately following
the word 'Legislature' at the end of this paragraph, in the handwriting
of Mr Brown, these words: 'Constituted on the well-understood
principles of federal gov.'
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