OF THE THEORETIC FACULTY AS CONCERNED WITH PLEASURES OF SENSE.
Sec. 1. Explanation of the term "theoretic."
I proceed therefore first, to examine the nature of what I have called
the Theoretic faculty, and to justify my substitution of the term
"theoretic" for aesthetic, which is the one commonly employed with
reference to it.
Now the term "aesthesis" properly signifies mere sensual perception of
the outward qualities and necessary effects of bodies, in which sense
only, if we would arrive at any accurate conclusions on this difficult
subject, it should always be used. But I wholly deny that the
impressions of beauty are in any way sensual,--they are neither sensual
nor intellectual, but moral, and for the faculty receiving them, whose
difference from mere perception I shall immediately endeavor to explain,
no term can be more accurate or convenient than that employed by the
Greeks, "theoretic," which I pray permission, therefore, always to use,
and to call the operation of the faculty itself, Theoria.
Sec. 2. Of the differences of rank in pleasures of sense.
Let us begin at the lowest point, and observe, first, what differences
of dignity may exist between different kinds of aesthetic or sensual
pleasure, properly so called.
Now it is evident that the being common to brutes, or peculiar to man,
can alone be no rational test of inferiority, or dignity in pleasures.
We must not assume that man is the nobler animal, and then deduce the
nobleness of his delights; but we must prove the nobleness of the
delights, and thence the nobleness of the animal. The dignity of
affection is no way lessened because a large measure of it may be found
in lower animals, neither is the vileness of gluttony and lust abated
because they are common to men. It is clear, therefore, that there is a
standard of dignity in the pleasures and passions themselves, by which
we also class the creatures capable of, or suffering them.
Sec. 3. Use of the terms Temperate and Intemperate.
The first great distinction, we observe, is that noted of Aristotle,
that men are called temperate and intemperate with regard to some, and
not so with respect to others, and that those, with respect to which
they are so called, are, by common consent, held to be the vilest. But
Aristotle, though exquisitely subtle in his notation of facts, does not
frequently give us satisfactory account of, or reason for them. Content
with stating the fact of these pleasures being held the lowest, he shows
not why this estimation of them is just, and confuses the reader by
observing casually respecting the higher pleasures, what is indeed true,
but appears at first opposed to his own position, namely, that "men may
be conceived, as also in these taking pleasure, either rightly, or more
or less than is right."[7] Which being so, and evident capability of
excess or defect existing in pleasures of this higher order, we ought to
have been told how it happens that men are not called intemperate when
they indulge in excess of this kind, and what is that difference in the
nature of the pleasure which diminishes the criminality of its excess.
This let us attempt to ascertain.
Sec. 4. Right use of the term "intemperate."
Men are held intemperate ([Greek: akolastoi]) only when their desires
overcome or prevent the action of their reason, and they are indeed
intemperate in the exact degree in which such prevention or interference
takes place, and so are actually [Greek: akolastoi], in many instances,
and with respect to many resolves, which lower not the world's
estimation of their temperance. For so long as it can be supposed that
the reason has acted imperfectly owing to its own imperfection, or to
the imperfection of the premises submitted to it, (as when men give an
inordinate preference to their own pursuits, because they cannot, in the
nature of things, have sufficiently experienced the goodness and benefit
of others,) and so long as it may be presumed that men have referred to
reason in what they do, and have not suffered its orders to be disobeyed
through mere impulse and desire, (though those orders may be full of
error owing to the reason's own feebleness,) so long men are not held
intemperate. But when it is palpably evident that the reason cannot have
erred but that its voice has been deadened or disobeyed, and that the
reasonable creature has been dragged dead round the walls of his own
citadel by mere passion and impulse,--then, and then only, men are of
all held intemperate. And this is evidently the case with respect to
inordinate indulgence in pleasures of touch and taste, for these, being
destructive in their continuance not only of all other pleasures, but
of the very sensibilities by which they themselves are received, and as
this penalty is actually known and experienced by those indulging in
them, so that the reason cannot but pronounce right respecting their
perilousness, there is no palliation of the wrong choice; and the man,
as utterly incapable of will,[8] is called intemperate, or [Greek:
akolastos].
It would be well if the reader would for himself follow out this
subject, which it would be irrelevant here to pursue farther, observing
how a certain degree of intemperance is suspected and attributed to men
with respect to higher impulses; as, for instance, in the case of anger,
or any other passion criminally indulged, and yet is not so attributed,
as in the case of sensual pleasures; because in anger the reason is
supposed not to have had time to operate, and to be itself affected by
the presence of the passion, which seizes the man involuntarily and
before he is aware; whereas, in the case of the sensual pleasures, the
act is deliberate, and determined on beforehand, in direct defiance of
reason. Nevertheless, if no precaution be taken against immoderate
anger, and the passions gain upon the man, so as to be evidently wilful
and unrestrained, and admitted contrary to all reason, we begin to look
upon him as, in the real sense of the word, intemperate, or [Greek:
akolastos], and assign to him, in consequence, his place among the
beasts, as definitely as if he had yielded to the pleasurable
temptations of touch or taste.
Sec. 5. Grounds of inferiority in the pleasures which are subjects of
intemperance.
We see, then, that the primal ground of inferiority in these pleasures
is that which _proves_ their indulgence to be contrary to reason; namely
their destructiveness upon prolongation, and their incapability of
co-existing continually with other delights or perfections of the
system.
And this incapability of continuance directs us to the second cause of
their inferiority; namely, that they are given to us as subservient to
life, as instruments of our preservation--compelling us to seek the
things necessary to our being, and that, therefore, when this their
function is fully performed, they ought to have an end; and can be only
artificially, and under high penalty, prolonged. But the pleasures of
sight and hearing are given as gifts. They answer not any purposes of
mere existence, for the distinction of all that is useful or dangerous
to us might be made, and often is made, by the eye, without its
receiving the slightest pleasure of sight. We might have learned to
distinguish fruits and grain from flowers, without having any superior
pleasure in the aspect of the latter. And the ear might have learned to
distinguish the sounds that communicate ideas, or to recognize
intimations of elemental danger without perceiving either music in the
voice, or majesty in the thunder. And as these pleasures have no
function to perform, so there is no limit to their continuance in the
accomplishment of their end, for they are an end in themselves, and so
may be perpetual with all of us--being in no way destructive, but rather
increasing in exquisiteness by repetition.
Sec. 6. Evidence of higher rank in pleasures of sight and hearing.
Herein, then, we find very sufficient ground for the higher estimation
of these delights, first, in their being eternal and inexhaustible, and
secondly, in their being evidently no means or instrument of life, but
an object of life. Now in whatever is an object of life, in whatever may
be infinitely and for itself desired, we may be sure there is something
of divine, for God will not make anything an object of life to his
creatures which does not point to, or partake of, Himself. And so,
though we were to regard the pleasures of sight merely as the highest of
sensual pleasures, and though they were of rare occurrence, and, when
occurring, isolated and imperfect, there would still be a supernatural
character about them, owing to their permanence and self-sufficiency,
where no other sensual pleasures are permanent or self-sufficient. But
when, instead of being scattered, interrupted, or chance-distributed,
they are gathered together, and so arranged to enhance each other as by
chance they could not be, there is caused by them not only a feeling of
strong affection towards the object in which they exist, but a
perception of purpose and adaptation of it to our desires; a perception,
therefore, of the immediate operation of the Intelligence which so
formed us, and so feeds us.
Out of which perception arise joy, admiration, and gratitude.
Now the mere animal consciousness of the pleasantness I call aesthesis;
but the exulting, reverent, and grateful perception of it I call
theoria. For this, and this only, is the full comprehension and
contemplation of the beautiful as a gift of God, a gift not necessary to
our being, but added to, and elevating it, and twofold, first of the
desire, and secondly of the thing desired.
Sec. 7. How the lower pleasures may be elevated in rank.
And that this joyfulness and reverence are a necessary part of theoretic
pleasure is very evident when we consider that, by the presence of these
feelings, even the lower and more sensual pleasures may be rendered
theoretic. Thus Aristotle has subtly noted, that "we call not men
intemperate so much with respect to the scents of roses or herb-perfumes
as of ointments and of condiments," (though the reason that he gives for
this be futile enough.) For the fact is, that of scents artificially
prepared the extreme desire is intemperance, but of natural and
God-given scents, which take their part in the harmony and pleasantness
of creation, there can hardly be intemperance; not that there is any
absolute difference between the two kinds, but that these are likely to
be received with gratitude and joyfulness rather than those, so that we
despise the seeking of essences and unguents, but not the sowing of
violets along our garden banks. But all things may be elevated by
affection, as the spikenard of Mary, and in the Song of Solomon, the
myrrh upon the handles of the lock, and that of Isaac concerning his
son. And the general law for all these pleasures is, that when sought in
the abstract and ardently, they are foul things, but when received with
thankfulness and with reference to God's glory, they become theoretic;
and so I can find something divine in the sweetness of wild fruits, as
well as in the pleasantness of the pure air, and the tenderness of its
natural perfumes that come and go as they list.
Sec. 8. Ideas of beauty how essentially moral.
It will be understood why I formerly said in the chapter respecting
ideas of beauty, that those ideas were the subject of moral and not of
intellectual, nor altogether of sensual perception; and why I spoke of
the pleasures connected with them as derived from "those material
sources which are agreeable to our moral nature in its purity and
perfection." For, as it is necessary to the existence of an idea of
beauty, that the sensual pleasure which may be its basis, should be
accompanied first with joy, then with love of the object, then with the
perception of kindness in a superior Intelligence, finally with
thankfulness and veneration towards that Intelligence itself, and as no
idea can be at all considered as in any way an idea of beauty, until it
be made up of these emotions, any more than we can be said to have an
idea of a letter of which we perceive the perfume and the fair writing,
without understanding the contents of it, or intent of it; and as these
emotions are in no way resultant from, nor obtainable by, any operation
of the intellect, it is evident that the sensation of beauty is not
sensual on the one hand, nor is it intellectual on the other, but is
dependent on a pure, right, and open state of the heart, both for its
truth and for its intensity, insomuch that even the right after action
of the intellect upon facts of beauty so apprehended, is dependent on
the acuteness of the heart feeling about them; and thus the Apostolic
words come true, in this minor respect as in all others, that men are
alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them,
having the understanding darkened because of the hardness of their
hearts, and so being past feeling, give themselves up to lasciviousness;
for we do indeed see constantly that men having naturally acute
perceptions of the beautiful, yet not receiving it with a pure heart,
nor into their hearts at all, never comprehend it, nor receive good from
it, but make it a mere minister to their desires, and accompaniment and
seasoning of lower sensual pleasures, until all their emotions take the
same earthly stamp, and the sense of beauty sinks into the servant of
lust.
Sec. 9. How degraded by heartless reception.
Sec. 10. How exalted by affection.
Nor is what the world commonly understands by the cultivation of taste,
anything more or better than this, at least in times of corrupt and
over-pampered civilization, when men build palaces and plant groves and
gather luxuries, that they and their devices may hang in the corners of
the world like fine-spun cobwebs, with greedy, puffed-up, spider-like
lusts in the middle. And this, which in Christian times is the abuse and
corruption of the sense of beauty, was in that Pagan life of which St.
Paul speaks, little less than the essence of it, and the best they had;
for I know not that of the expressions of affection towards external
nature to be found among Heathen writers, there are any of which the
balance and leading thought cleaves not towards the sensual parts of
her. Her beneficence they sought, and her power they shunned, her
teaching through both, they understood never. The pleasant influences of
soft winds and ringing streamlets, and shady coverts; of the violet
couch, and plane-tree shade,[9] they received, perhaps, in a more noble
way than we, but they found not anything except fear, upon the bare
mountain, or in the ghostly glen. The Hybla heather they loved more for
its sweet hives than its purple hues. But the Christian theoria seeks
not, though it accepts, and touches with its own purity, what the
Epicurean sought, but finds its food and the objects of its love
everywhere, in what is harsh and fearful, as well as what is kind, nay,
even in all that seems coarse and commonplace; seizing that which is
good, and delighting more sometimes at finding its table spread in
strange places, and in the presence of its enemies, and its honey coming
out of the rock, than if all were harmonized into a less wondrous
pleasure; hating only what is self-sighted and insolent of men's work,
despising all that is not of God, unless reminding it of God, yet able
to find evidence of him still, where all seems forgetful of him, and to
turn that into a witness of his working which was meant to obscure it,
and so with clear and unoffended sight beholding him forever, according
to the written promise,--Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall
see God.
FOOTNOTES
[7] [Greek: hos dei, kai kath' hyperbolen kai elleipsin.]
[8] Comp. Hooker, Eccl. Pol. Book i. chap. 8.
[9] Plato, Phaedrus, Sec. 9.