SOME TEXAS LAWYERS.

In 1871 I held a judgment for $50,000 which I had obtained in the El

Paso District Court against a citizen of El Paso County for having

caused my arrest and imprisonment by the Confederates in 1861, as

related in my war story. This judgment being in full force and I being

in Austin, my friend, Major De Normandie, then Clerk of the Supreme

Court, introduced me to a prominent attorney of De Witt County, Texas,

who informed me that the defendant owned property in De Witt County out

of which my judgment, or a large portion of it, could be satisfied. I

implored this attorney to act for me in De Witt County, and on my return

home I sent him, at his request, a certified copy of the judgment and

received a letter from him dated June 7th, 1871, informing me that they

had written out a levy which they would proceed with in a day or two,

and requesting me to send them some money for costs, which I did. After

long delay I wrote this attorney, asking to be informed of the result,

and he replied that the whole proceeding was a failure because he had

dated the levy _on a Sunday_, which mistake vitiated the whole

proceeding and that my rights were lost.

He stated that “strange as it might seem” he had been led to make the

mistake by an error in an almanac in his office. As this attorney did

not suggest any remedy for his own blunder or institute any further

proceeding I concluded then, and believe now, that political prejudice

or some other unworthy motive had influenced him to act in bad faith

with his client. The attorney and the defendant were both Confederates

and Democrats, while I was a Union man and a Republican, and much bitter

feeling had grown out of the suit and the acts preceding and attending

it.

I met this lawyer in Austin a year or so later, and he made no further

explanation except to affirm that it “made no difference, because the

Supreme Court had decided that my judgment was void.” As a matter of

fact, and of record, the Supreme Court had decided that the judgment was

valid. And here I will state a fact which I hope the reader will

remember when he comes to read the case following this one—_this

gentleman was later on elected a Judge of the Supreme Court of Texas_.

My judgment for $50,000 (mentioned in the preceding paragraphs) was in

1868, before the Supreme Court at Austin on writ of error or appeal, or

both, taken or claimed to have been taken from the District Court of El

Paso County by the defendant. A supersedeas bond for one hundred

thousand dollars _damages_, signed by John Hancock and Thomas J. Divine,

was filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court by the appellant’s

attorney, whom I will not name here.

When this appeal came on for trial my attorney discovered to his

amazement that the words “thousand” and “damages” had been erased on the

face of the bond and the words “costs” inserted instead of the word

damages.

It is proper to explain to the non-professional reader that this fraud

and forgery changed the nature of the bond, so that if I gained the

case—and I _did_ gain it—I could recover from the sureties, who were

both wealthy men, only one hundred dollars “_costs_,” instead of the

full amount of the judgment, namely, fifty thousand dollars “_damages_.”

The Judges were, of course, astounded, and called the Clerk, Major de

Normandie, who being sworn testified that the record had been borrowed

by appellant’s attorney when it was in its original condition, and that

when it was returned the erasures and forgery were in the handwriting of

said attorney. The guilty attorney was present, but stood mute, offering

no explanation or excuse for his acts. The Court, at some length and

with strong indignation, rendered its decision dismissing the appeal and

leaving my judgment in full force, but the wrong to me had been done, so

far as the bond was concerned.

My loss was about forty thousand dollars.

If any one questions any of the above statements he will find abundant

proof in the Reports of the Supreme Court of Texas:

Hart vs. Mills, 31st Texas, page 304, and Hart vs. Mills, 38th Texas,

pages 513 and 517.

This thing was not done in a corner. Every attorney of that Court knew

the facts exactly as I have stated them, and it was a duty they owed to

themselves and to the profession to have disbarred the attorney, but he

stood fairly well socially and had been a “good” Confederate and

Democrat and I was only a frontiersman and Republican, and so _they

elected him a Judge of the Supreme Court of Texas_, as had been done

with the lawyer in the case mentioned above. I believe there is a legal

maxim, or a legal axiom, or a legal _fiction_, that there can be no

wrong without a remedy, and I am asked why I did not pursue the remedy.

Oh, I don’t know. I suppose every man of affairs has sometimes in his

life done or neglected things which he could scarcely explain afterward,

even to himself. I was seven hundred miles away, and my attorney was

well paid in advance for looking out for my interests, and unless he

choose to act I don’t think I could have broken the combination. There

are times when even the most energetic men become discouraged and weary

of strife, and for a time at least feel like letting things drift as

they may.

In 1873 I had a suit pending in court at El Paso involving the title to

valuable real estate, and I paid an El Paso attorney $800 to attend to

it.

In my absence and without my consent this lawyer compromised me out of

court for a worthless consideration, and I lost the property. Of course,

I might have repudiated this compromise, but I was handicapped by the

fact that the property in question was held in trust for me by my

brother, E. A. Mills, and the lawyer had induced him, by claiming to

have authority from me, to re-convey the property; and the legal

machinery here at that time was such that I thought it hopeless to

litigate further.

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Forty Years at El Paso, 1858-1898 · 第 43 / 61 题