But seriously, is any conceivable sort of theocracy a desirable ideal?

Or, to put the same question in more general terms, is it wise of Mr.

Wells to make such play with the word "God"? He himself admits that

"God trails with him a thousand misconceptions and bad associations:

his alleged infinite nature, his jealousy, his strange preferences,

his vindictive Old Testament past" (p. 8)--and, it may fairly be

added, his blood-boltered, Kultur-stained present. Is it possible to

deodorize a word which comes to us redolent of "good, thick stupefying

incense-smoke," mingled with the reek of the auto-da-fe? Can we beat

into a ploughshare the sword of St. Bartholomew, and a thousand other

deeds of horror? God has been by far the most tragic word in the whole

vocabulary of the race--a spell to conjure up all the worst fiends in

human nature: arrogance and abjectness, fanaticism, hatred and

atrocity. Religious reformers--with Jesus at their head--have time and

again tried to divest it of some, at least, of its terrors, but they

have invariably failed. Will Mr. Wells succeed any better? Is it not

apparent in the foregoing discussion that, even if the word had no

other demerits, it leads us into regions in which the mind can find no

firm foothold? I have done my best to accept Mr. Wells's definitions,

but I am sure he feels that I have constantly slipped from the strait

and narrow path. Has he himself always kept to it? I think not. And,

waiving that point, is it at all likely that people in general will be

more successful than I have been in grasping and holding fast to the

differentiating attributes of Mr. Wells's divinity? If the word is at

best a confusion and at worst a war-whoop, should we not try to

dispense with it, to avoid it, to find a substitute which should more

accurately, if less truculently, express our idea? Is it wise or kind

to seek to impose on the future an endless struggle with its sinister

ambiguities?

There are, no doubt, regions of thought from which it is extremely

difficult to exclude the word; but these, fortunately, are regions in

which it is almost necessarily divested of its historical

associations. As a term of pure philosophy, if safeguarded by careful

definition, it is a convenient piece of shorthand, obviating the

necessity for a constant recourse to cumbrous formulas. But politics

is not one of these regions of thought; and it is precisely in

politics that the intervention of God has from of old been most

disastrous. "Theocracy" has always been the synonym for a bleak and

narrow, if not a fierce and blood-stained, tyranny. Why seek to revive

and rehabilitate a word of such a dismal connotation? I suggest that

even if the Invisible King _were_ a God, it would be tactful to

pretend that he was not. As he is _not_ a God, in any generally

understood sense of the term, it seems a curious perversity to pretend

that he is.

* * * * *

Even in the region of morals it is a backward step to restore God to

the supremacy from which he has with the utmost difficulty been

deposed. I am sure Mr. Wells does not in his heart believe that any

theological sanction is required for the plain essentials of social

well-doing, or any theological stimulus for the rare sublimities of

virtue. Incalculable mischief has been wrought by the clerical

endeavour to set up a necessary association between right conduct and

orthodoxy, between heterodoxy and vice. This Mr. Wells knows as well

as I do; yet he can use such phrases as "Without God, the 'Service of

Man' is no better than a hobby or a sentimentality or a hypocrisy." No

doubt he has carefully explained that he does not mean by God or

religion what the clergy mean; but can he be sure that by imitating

their phrases he may not imperceptibly slide into their frame of mind?

or at any rate tempt the weaker brethren to do so? In using such an

expression he comes perilously near the attitude adopted by the Bishop

of London in a recent address to the sailors of the Grand Fleet. His

Lordship told his hearers--we have it on his own authority--that

"there was in everyone a good man and a bad man. And I have not known

a case," he added, "where the good man conquered the bad man without

religion." Can there be any doubt that the Bishop was either

telling--well, not the truth--or shamelessly playing with words? Of

course it may be said that any man who keeps his lower instincts in

control does so by aid of a feeling that there are higher values in

life than sensual gratification or direct self-gratification of any

sort; and we may, if we are so minded, call this feeling religion. But

it is a very inconvenient meaning to attach to the word, and we cannot

take it to be the meaning the Bishop had in view. What he meant, in

all probability--what he desired his simple-minded hearers to

understand--was that he had never known a good man who did not

believe, if not in all the dogmas of the Church of England, at any

rate in the Christian Trinity, the fall of man, redemption from sin,

and the inspiration of the Scriptures. He meant that no man could be

good who did not believe that God has given us in writing a synopsis

of his plan of world-government, and has himself sojourned on earth

and submitted to an appearance of death, some two thousand years ago,

in fulfilment of the said plan. If he did _not_ mean that, he was, I

repeat, playing with words and deceiving his hearers, who would

certainly understand him to mean something to that effect; and if he

_did_ mean that, he departed very palpably from the truth. The Bishop

of London is no recluse, shut up in a monastery among men of his own

faith. He is a man of the modern world, and he must know, and know

that he knows, scores of men as good as himself who have no belief in

anything that he would recognize as religion. Perhaps he was not

directly conscious of telling a falsehood, for "faith" plays such

havoc with the intellect that men cease to attach any living meaning

to words, and come to deal habitually in those unrealized phrases

which we call cant. But whatever may have been his excuses to his

conscience, he was saying a very noxious thing to the simple, gallant

souls who heard him. Many of them must have been well aware that they

had no faith that would have satisfied the Bishop of London, and that

whatever religious ideas lurked in their minds were of very little use

to them in struggling with the temptations of a sailor's life. Where

was the sense in telling them that the ordinary motives which make for

good conduct--prudence, self-respect, loyalty, etc., etc.--are of no

avail, and that they must inevitably be bad men if they had not "found

religion"? If such talk does no positive harm, it is only because men

have learnt to discount the patter of theology. Yet here we find Mr.

Wells, after vigorously disclaiming any participation in the Bishop's

beliefs, falling into the common form of episcopal patter, and telling

me, for example--a benighted but quite well-intentioned heathen--that

I can do no good in my generation unless I believe in a God whom he

and a number of Eastern sages, Parthians, Medes, Elamites and dwellers

in Mesopotamia, have recently "synthetized" out of their inner

consciousnesses! It is not Mr. Wells's fault if I do not abandon the

steep and thorny track of austerity which I have hitherto pursued,

invest all my spare cash either in whiskey or in whiskey shares, and

go for my philosophy in future to the inspiring author of _Musings

without Method_ in "Blackwood."

It is not quite clear why Mr. Wells should accept so large a part of

the Christian ethic and yet refuse to identify his Invisible King with

Christ. One would have supposed it quite as easy to divest the

Christ-figure of any inconvenient attributes as to eliminate

omniscience and omnipotence from the God-idea. Mr. Wells constantly

allows his thoughts to run into the stereotype moulds of biblical

phraseology. We have seen how he talks of "the still small voice," of

"the light of the world," "taking the sting from death" and of God

coming "in his own time" and bringing "not rest but a sword." To those

instances may be added such phrases as "death will be swallowed up in

victory" (p. 39), "by the grace of the true God" (p. 44), "God is

Love" (p. 65), "the Son of Man" (p. 86), "I become my brother's

keeper" (p. 97), "he it is who can deliver us 'from the body of this

death'" (p. 99). But the clearest indication of Christian influence is

to be found in Mr. Wells's unhesitating and emphatic adoption of the

idea that "Salvation is indeed to lose oneself" (p. 73). "The

difference," he says, "between ... the unbeliever and the servant of

the true God is this ... that the latter has experienced a complete

turning away from self. This only difference is all the difference in

the world" (p. 84). It is curious what a fascination this turn of

phrase has exercised upon many and diverse intelligences. Mr. Bernard

Shaw, for instance, adopts it with enthusiasm. Henrik Ibsen--if it is

ever possible to tie a true dramatist down to a doctrine--preaches in

_Peer Gynt_ that "to be thyself is to slay thyself." Mr. Wells has a

cloud of witnesses to back him up; and yet it is very doubtful whether

the turn of phrase is a really helpful one--whether it does not rather

get in the way of the natural man in his quest for a sound rule of

life.

It is a commonplace that the entirely self-centred man--the Robinson

Crusoe of a desert island of egoism--is unhappy. At least if he is not

he belongs to a low intellectual and moral type: the proof being that

all development above the level of the oyster and the slug has

involved more or less surrender of the immediate claims of "number

one" to some larger unity. Progress has always consisted, and still

consists, in the widening of the ideal concept which appeals to our

loyalty. Is it not Mr. Wells's endeavour in this very book to claim

our devotion for the all-embracing and ultimate ideal--the human race?

So far, we are all at one. But when we are told that "conversion" or

"salvation" consists in a "_complete_ turning away from self," common

sense revolts. It is not true either in every-day life or in larger

matters of conduct. In every-day life the incurably "unselfish" person

is an intolerable nuisance. Here the common-sense rule is very simple:

you have no right to seek your own "salvation," or, in non-theological

terms, your own self-approval, at the cost of other people's; you have

no business to offer sacrifices which the other party ought not to

accept. It is true that in the application of this simple rule

difficult problems may arise; but a little tact will generally go a

long way towards solving them. In these matters an ounce of tact is

worth a pound of casuistry. And in our every-day England, in all

classes, it is my profound conviction that a reasonable selflessness

is very far from uncommon, very far from being confined to the

"converted" of any religion. For forty years I have watched it growing

and spreading before my very eyes. Reading the other way _The

Roundabout Papers_, I was greatly struck by the antiquated cast of the

manners therein described. Of course Thackeray, in his day, was

reputed a cynic, and supposed to have an over-partiality for studying

the seamy side of things. But even if that had been true (which I do

not believe) it would not have accounted for all the difference

between the world he saw and that in which we move to-day. I suggest,

then, that so far as the minor moralities are concerned, no new

religion is required, and we have only to let things pursue their

natural trend.

And what of the great selflessnesses? What of the ideal loyalties?

What of the long-accumulated instincts which tell a man, in tones

which brook no contradiction, that the shortest life and the cruellest

death are better than the longest life of sensual self-contempt? Here,

as it seems to me, Mr. Wells's apostolate of a new religion is very

conspicuously superfluous--much more so than it would have been five

years ago. For have not he and I been privileged to witness one of the

most beautiful sights that the world ever saw--the flocking of Young

England, in its hundreds upon hundreds of thousands, to endure the

extremity of hardship and face the high probability of a cruel death,

not for England alone, not even for England, France and Belgium, but

for what they obscurely but very potently felt to be the highest

interests of the very same ideal entity which Mr. Wells proposes to

our devotion--the human race? I am sure he would be the last to

minimize the significance of that splendid uprising. No doubt there

were other motives at work: in some, the mere love of change and

adventure; in others, the pressure of public opinion. But my own

observation assures me that, on the whole, these unideal motives

played a very small part. The young men simply felt that he who held

back was unfaithful to his fathers and unworthy of his sons; and they

"turned away from self" without a moment's hesitation, and streamed to

the colors with all the more eagerness the longer the casualty-lists

grew, and the more clearly the horrors they had to face were brought

home to them. Has there been any voluntary "slaying of self" on so

huge a scale since the world began? I have not heard of it. And Mr.

Wells will scarcely tell me that these young men went through the

experiences he describes as "conversion," and escaped from the burden

of "over-individuation" by throwing themselves into the arms of a

synthetic God! Many of them, no doubt, would have expressed their

idealism, had they expressed it at all, in terms of Christianity; but

that, we are told, is a delusion, and the only true God is the

Invisible King. If that be so, the conclusion would seem to be that,

in the present stage of the evolution of human character, no God at

all is needed to enable millions of men, in whom the blood runs high

and the joy of life is at its keenest, to achieve the conquest of self

in one of its noblest forms. Or (what comes to the same thing) any

sort of God will serve the purpose. Your God (divested of metaphysical

attributes) is simply a name for your own better instincts and

impulses. Many people, perhaps most, share Mr. Wells's tendency to

externalize, objectivate, personify these impulses; and there may be

no harm in doing so. But when it comes to asserting that your own

personification is the only true one, then--I am not so sure.

Finally there arises the question whether the personification of the

Invisible King can really, in any comprehensible sense, and for any

considerable number of normal human beings, rob death of its sting,

the grave of its victory? On this point discussion cannot possibly be

conclusive, for the ultimate test is necessarily a personal one. If

any sane and sincere person tells me that a certain idea, or emotion,

or habit of mind, or even any rite or incantation, has deprived death

of its terrors for him, I can only congratulate him, even if I have to

confess that my own experience gives me no clue to his meaning. It is

not even very profitable to enquire whether a man can be confident of

his own attitude towards death unless he has either come very close to

its brink himself, or known what it means to witness the extinction of

a life on which his whole joy in the present and hope for the future

depended. All one can do is to try to ascertain as nearly as possible

what the contemner of death really means, and to consider whether his

individual experience or feeling is, or is likely to become, typical.

One thing we must plainly realize, and that is that, for the purposes

of his present argument, Mr. Wells conceives death to be a real

extinction of the individual consciousness. He does not formally

commit himself to a denial of personal immortality, but it is a

contingency which he declines to take into account. Oddly enough, in

trying to acclimatize our minds to the idea of such an absolutely

incorporeal and immaterial, yet really existent, being as his

Invisible King, he comes near to clearing away the one great obstacle

to belief in survival after death. "From the earliest ages," he says,

"man's mind has found little or no difficulty in the idea of something

essential to the personality, a soul or a spirit or both, existing

apart from the body and continuing after the destruction of the body,

and being still a person and an individual" (p. 59). He does not

actually say that there _is_ no difficulty about this conception: he

only says that, as a matter of history, the great mass of men have

found it easy and natural to believe in ghosts. But it is hard to see

any force in his argument at this point unless he means to imply that

he himself finds "little or no difficulty" in conceiving the continued

existence of a spiritual consciousness and individuality after the

dissolution of the body to which it has been attached; and if he does

mean this, it is hard to see why he does not take his stand beside Sir

Oliver Lodge on the spiritist platform. To many of us, the extreme

difficulty of such a conception is the one great barrier to the

acceptance of the spiritist theory, for which remarkable evidence can

certainly be adduced. This, however, is a digression. So far as _God

the Invisible King_ is concerned, Mr. Wells must be taken as ignoring,

if not rejecting, the idea of personal immortality.

The victory over death, then, which the Invisible King is said to

achieve, does not consist in its abolition. It may probably be best

defined as the perfect reconcilement of the believer to the extinction

of his individual consciousness. And what are the grounds of that

reconcilement? Let us search the scriptures. Where the steps are

described by which the catechumen approaches the full realization of

God, it is said that at that stage he feels that "if there were such a

being he would supply the needed consolation and direction, his

continuing purpose would knit together the scattered effort of life,

_his immortality would take the sting from death_" (p. 21-22). A

little further on, the idea is elaborated in a high strain of

mysticism. God, who "captains us but does not coddle us" (p. 42), will

by no means undertake to hold the believer scatheless among the

pitfalls and perils that beset our earthly pilgrimage. "But God will

be with you nevertheless. In the reeling aeroplane, or the dark

ice-cave, God will be your courage. Though you suffer or are killed,

it is not an end. He will be with you as you face death; he will die

with you as he has died already countless myriads of brave deaths. He

will come so close to you that at the last you will not know whether

it is you or he who dies, and the present death will be swallowed up

in his victory" (p. 39). The passage has already been quoted in which

it is written that, at the end of the fight for God's Kingdom, "we are

altogether taken up into his being" (p. 68). In a discussion of "the

religion of atheists" we are told that unregenerate man is "acutely

aware of himself as an individual and unawakened to himself as a

species," wherefore he "finds death frustration." His mistake is in

not seeing that his own frustration "may be the success and triumph of

his kind" (p. 72). At the point where we are told that "the first

purpose of God is the attainment of clear knowledge," we are further

informed that "he will apprehend more fully as time goes on" the

purpose to which this knowledge is to be applied. But already it is

possible to define "the broad outlines" of his purpose. "It is the

conquest of death; first the overcoming of death in the individual _by

the incorporation of the motives of his life into an undying purpose_"

(p. 99), and then, as we saw before, the defeat of the threatened

extinction of life through the cooling of the planet. These, I think,

are the chief texts bearing directly on this particular matter; but

there is one other remark which must not be overlooked. "A convicted

criminal, frankly penitent," we are told, "... may still die well and

bravely on the gallows, to the glory of God. He may step straight from

that death into the immortal being of God."

To what, now, does all this amount? Is there any more substantial

solace in it than in the "Oh, may I join the Choir Invisible"

aspiration of mid-nineteenth-century positivism? Far be it from me to

speak contemptuously of that aspiration. It gives a new orientation

and consistency to thought and effort during life; and to the man who

feels that his little note will melt into the world-harmony that is to

be, that thought may impart a certain serenity under the shadow of the

end. It is certainly better to feel at night, "I have done a fair

day's work," than to lie down with the confession, "My day has been

wasted, and worse." No one wants, I suppose, to say with Peer Gynt:--

Thou beautiful earth, be not angry with me,

That I trampled thy grasses to no avail;

Thou beautiful sun, thou hast squandered away

Thy glory of light in an empty hut.

Beautiful sun and beautiful earth,

You were foolish to bear and give light to my mother.

But there is also another side to the question. The more surely you

believe that "through the ages one increasing purpose runs"--the more

intimately you have merged your individual will in what Mr. Wells

would call the will of the Invisible King--the less do you relish the

thought that you can never see that will worked out. The intenser your

interest in the play, the greater your disinclination to leave the

theatre just as the plot is thickening. Nor does it afford much

consolation to know that the Producer is just (as it were) getting

into his stride, and that, if the house should become too cold for

comfort, arrangements will be made for the transference of the

production to another theatre, with a better heating-apparatus.

Is there any real escape from the fact that for each of us the one

thing that actually exists is our individual consciousness? It is our

universe; and if its trembling flame is blown out, that particular

universe is no more. If its limits of "individuation" are

irrecoverably lost, what avails it to tell us that the flame is

absorbed into the light of the world or the dayspring on high? Is it

possible to imagine that the rain-drop which falls in the Atlantic

thrills with a great rapture as its molecules disperse in the moment

of coalescence, because it is now part of an infinite and immortal

entity? Yes, it is possible to imagine it rejoicing that its "chagrins

of egotism," as an individual drop, are now over; in fact, this is

precisely the sort of thing that some poets love to imagine; but has

it any real relevance to our sublunary lot? Can it minister any

substantial comfort or fortification to the normal man in the moment

of peril or agony? I ask; I do not answer. Can Mr. Wells put in the

witness-box any flight-lieutenant who will swear that in his reeling

aeroplane, as death seemed on the point of engulfing him, he felt

uncertain whether it was God or he that was about to die, and

gloriously certain that in any case he was about to "step straight

into the immortal being of God"? And even if, in the excitement of

violent action, such hallucinations do mean something to a peculiar

type of mind, has any one dying of pneumonia or Bright's disease been

known to declare that, though his mortal spark was on the point of

extinction, he felt that "by the incorporation of the motives of his

life into an undying purpose" he had triumphed over death and the

grave? The simple soul who says "We shall meet in Heaven" no doubt

enjoys such a triumph--and even if he fails to keep the appointment,

no one is any the worse. But where are the men and women who feel the

immortality of God, however we define or construct him, a rich

compensation for their own mortality?

It may be said that I am applying shockingly terrestrial tests to Mr.

Wells's soaring transcendentalisms. I am simply asking: "Will they

work?" A world-religion cannot be what I have called a luxury for the

intellectually wealthy. It must be within the reach of plain men and

women; and plain men and women cannot, as the French say, "pay

themselves with words." Take them all round, they do not make too much

of death. With or without the aid of religion, they generally meet it

with tolerable fortitude. But it will be hard to persuade them that

annihilation is a thing to be faced with rapture, because a synthetic

God is indestructible; or that death is not death because other people

will be alive a hundred or a thousand years hence. Even if you cannot

offer them another life, you may tell them of the grave as a place

where the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest, and

they will understand. But will they understand if you tell them that

we triumph over the grave because God dies with us and yet never dies?

I fear it will need something clearer and more credible than this to

make the undertaker a popular functionary.

God and Mr. Wells: A Critical Examination of 'God the Invisible King' · 第 4 / 6 段