BOOK IX

MODERN ENGLAND

CHAPTER I

ENGLAND AND ITS EMPIRE

1760-1767

[Sidenote: The Seven Years' War.]

Never had England played so great a part in the history of mankind as in

the year 1759. It was a year of triumphs in every quarter of the world.

In September came the news of Minden, and of a victory off Lagos. In

October came tidings of the capture of Quebec. November brought word of

the French defeat at Quiberon. "We are forced to ask every morning what

victory there is," laughed Horace Walpole, "for fear of missing one."

But it was not so much in the number as in the importance of its

triumphs that the Seven Years' War stood and remains still without a

rival. It is no exaggeration to say that three of its many victories

determined for ages to come the destinies of mankind. With that of

Rossbach began the re-creation of Germany, the revival of its political

and intellectual life, the long process of its union under the

leadership of Prussia and Prussia's kings. With that of Plassey the

influence of Europe told for the first time since the days of Alexander

on the nations of the East. The world, in Burke's gorgeous phrase, "saw

one of the races of the north-west cast into the heart of Asia new

manners, new doctrines, new institutions." With the triumph of Wolfe on

the Heights of Abraham began the history of the United States. By

removing an enemy whose dread had knit the colonists to the mother

country, and by breaking through the line with which France had barred

them from the basin of the Mississippi, Pitt laid the foundation of the

great republic of the west.

[Sidenote: England a World-Power.]

Nor were these triumphs less momentous to Britain. The Seven Years' War

is in fact a turning-point in our national history, as it is a

turning-point in the history of the world. Till now the relative weight

of the European states had been drawn from their possessions within

Europe itself. Spain, Portugal, and Holland indeed had won a dominion in

other continents; and the wealth which two of these nations had derived

from their colonies had given them for a time an influence among their

fellow-states greater than that which was due to their purely European

position. But in the very years during which her rule took firm hold in

South America, Spain fell into a decay at home which prevented her

empire over sea from telling directly on the balance of power; while the

strictly commercial character of the Dutch settlements robbed them of

political weight. France in fact was the first state to discern the new

road to greatness which lay without European bounds; and the efforts of

Dupleix and Montcalm aimed at the building up of an empire which would

have lifted her high above her European rivals. The ruin of these hopes

in the Seven Years' War was the bitterest humiliation to which French

ambition has ever bowed. But it was far from being all that France had

to bear. For not only had the genius of Pitt cut her off from the chance

of rising into a world-power, and prisoned her again within the limits

of a single continent, but it had won for Britain the position that

France had lost. From the close of the Seven Years' War it mattered

little whether England counted for less or more with the nations around

her. She was no longer a mere European power; she was no longer a rival

of Germany or France. Her future action lay in a wider sphere than that

of Europe. Mistress of Northern America, the future mistress of India,

claiming as her own the empire of the seas, Britain suddenly towered

high above nations whose position in a single continent doomed them to

comparative insignificance in the after-history of the world.

[Sidenote: England in the Pacific.]

It is this that gives William Pitt so unique a position among our

statesmen. His figure in fact stands at the opening of a new epoch in

English history--in the history not of England only, but of the English

race. However dimly and imperfectly, he alone among his fellows saw that

the struggle of the Seven Years' War was a struggle of a wholly

different order from the struggles that had gone before it. He felt that

the stake he was playing for was something vaster than Britain's

standing among the powers of Europe. Even while he backed Frederick in

Germany, his eye was not on the Weser, but on the Hudson and the St.

Lawrence. "If I send an army to Germany," he replied in memorable words

to his assailants, "it is because in Germany I can conquer America!" But

greater even than Pitt's statesmanship was the conviction on which his

statesmanship rested. He believed in Englishmen, and in the might of

Englishmen. At a moment when few hoped that England could hold her own

among the nations of Europe, he called her not only to face Europe in

arms, but to claim an empire far beyond European bounds. His faith, his

daring, called the English people to a sense of the destinies that lay

before it. And once roused, the sense of these destinies could never be

lost. The war indeed was hardly ended when a consciousness of them

showed itself in the restlessness with which our seamen penetrated into

far-off seas. With England on one side and her American colonies on the

other, the Atlantic was dwindling into a mere strait within the British

Empire; but beyond it to the westward lay a reach of waters where the

British flag was almost unknown. The vast ocean which parts Asia from

America had been discovered by a Spaniard and first traversed by a

Portuguese; as early indeed as the sixteenth century Spanish settlements

spread along its eastern shore and a Spanish galleon crossed it year by

year from Acapulco to the Philippines. But no effort was made by Spain

to explore the lands that broke its wide expanse; and though Dutch

voyagers, coming from the eastward, penetrated its waters and first

noted the mighty continent that bore from that hour the name of New

Holland, no colonists followed in the track of Tasman or Van Diemen. It

was not till another century had gone by indeed that Europe again turned

her eyes to the Pacific. But in the very year which followed the Peace

of Paris, in 1764, two English ships were sent on a cruise of discovery

to the Straits of Magellan.

[Sidenote: Captain Cook.]

"Nothing," ran the instructions of their commander, Commodore Byron,

"nothing can redound more to the honour of this nation as a maritime

power, to the dignity of the Crown of Great Britain, and to the

advancement of the trade and navigation thereof, than to make

discoveries of countries hitherto unknown." Byron himself hardly sailed

beyond Cape Horn; but three years later a second English seaman, Captain

Wallis, succeeded in reaching the central island of the Pacific and in

skirting the coral-reefs of Tahiti, and in 1768 a more famous mariner

traversed the great ocean from end to end. At first a mere ship-boy on a

Whitby collier, James Cook had risen to be an officer in the royal navy,

and had piloted the boats in which Wolfe mounted the St. Lawrence to the

Heights of Abraham. On the return of Wallis he was sent in a small

vessel with a crew of some eighty men and a few naturalists to observe

the transit of Venus at Tahiti, and to explore the seas that stretched

beyond it. After a long stay at Tahiti Cook sailed past the Society

Isles into the heart of the Pacific and reached at the further limits of

that ocean the two islands, as large as his own Britain, which make up

New Zealand. Steering northward from New Zealand over a thousand miles

of sea he touched at last the coast of the great "Southern Land" or

Australia, on whose eastern shore, from some fancied likeness to the

district at home on which he had gazed as he set sail, he gave the name

of New South Wales. In two later voyages Cook traversed the same waters,

and discovered fresh island groups in their wide expanse. But his work

was more than a work of mere discovery. Wherever he touched, in New

Zealand, in Australia, he claimed the soil for the English Crown. The

records which he published of his travels not only woke the interest of

Englishmen in these far-off islands, in their mighty reaches of deep

blue waters, where lands as big as Britain die into mere specks on the

huge expanse, in the coral-reefs, the palms, the bread-fruit of Tahiti,

the tattooed warriors of New Zealand, the gum-trees and kangaroos of the

Southern Continent, but they familiarized them more and more with the

sense of possession, with the notion that this strange world of wonders

was their own, and that a new earth was open in the Pacific for the

expansion of the English race.

[Sidenote: Britain and its Empire.]

Cook in fact pointed out the fitness of New Holland for English

settlement; and projects of its occupation, and of the colonization of

the Pacific islands by English emigrants, became from that moment, in

however vague and imperfect a fashion, the policy of the English crown.

Statesmen and people alike indeed felt the change in their country's

attitude. Great as Britain seemed to Burke, it was now in itself "but

part of a great empire, extended by our virtue and our fortune to the

furthest limits of the east and the west." Its parliament no longer

looked on itself as the local legislature of England and Scotland; it

claimed, in the words of the same great political thinker, "an imperial

character, in which as from the throne of heaven she superintends all

the several inferior legislatures, and guides and controls them all,

without annihilating any." Its people, steeped in the commercial ideas

of the time, saw in the growth of such a dominion, the monopoly of

whose trade was reserved to the mother country, a source of boundless

wealth. The trade with America alone was, in 1772, within less than

half-a-million of being equal to what England carried on with the whole

world at the beginning of the century. So rapid had been its growth that

since the opening of the eighteenth century it had risen from a value of

five hundred thousand pounds to one of six millions, and whereas the

colonial trade then formed but a twelfth part of English commerce, it

had now mounted to a third. To guard and preserve so vast and lucrative

a dominion, to vindicate its integrity alike against outer foes and

inner disaffection, to strengthen its unity by drawing closer the bonds,

whether commercial or administrative, which linked its various parts to

the mother country, became from this moment not only the aim of British

statesmen, but the resolve of the British people.

[Sidenote: England and America.]

And at this moment there were grave reasons why this resolve should take

an active form. Strong as the attachment of the Americans to Britain

seemed at the close of the war, keen lookers-on like the French

minister, the Duc de Choiseul, saw in the very completeness of Pitt's

triumph a danger to their future union. The presence of the French in

Canada, their designs in the west, had thrown America for protection on

the mother country. But with the conquest of Canada all need of

protection was removed. The attitude of England towards its distant

dependency became one of simple possession; and the differences of

temper, the commercial and administrative disputes, which had long

existed as elements of severance, but had been thrown into the

background till now by the higher need for union, started into a new

prominence. Day by day indeed the American colonies found it harder to

submit to the meddling of the mother country with their self-government

and their trade. A consciousness of their destinies was stealing in upon

thoughtful men, and spread from them to the masses around them. At this

very moment the quick growth of population in America moved John Adams,

then a village schoolmaster of Massachusetts, to lofty forebodings of

the future of the great people over whom he was to be called to rule.

"Our people in another century," he wrote, "will be more numerous than

England itself. All Europe will not be able to subdue us. The only way

to keep us from setting up for ourselves is to disunite us." The sense

that such an independence was drawing nearer spread even to Europe.

"Fools," said a descendant of William Penn, "are always telling their

fears that the colonies will set up for themselves." Philosophers

however were pretty much of the same mind on this subject with the

fools. "Colonies are like fruits," wrote the foreseeing Turgot, "which

cling to the tree only till they ripen. As soon as America can take

care of itself it will do what Carthage did." But from the thought of

separation almost every American turned as yet with horror. The

Colonists still looked to England as their home. They prided themselves

on their loyalty; and they regarded the difficulties which hindered

complete sympathy between the settlements and the mother country as

obstacles which time and good sense could remove. England on the other

hand looked on America as her noblest possession. It was the wealth, the

growth of this dependency which more than all the victories of her arms

was lifting her to a new greatness among the nations. It was the trade

with it which had doubled English commerce in half-a-century. Of the

right of the mother country to monopolize this trade, to deal with this

great people as its own possession, no Englishman had a doubt. England,

it was held, had planted every colony. It was to England that the

Colonists owed not their blood only, but the free institutions under

which they had grown to greatness. English arms had rescued them from

the Indians, and broken the iron barrier with which France was holding

them back from the West. In the war which was drawing to a close England

had poured out her blood and gold without stint in her children's cause.

Of the debt which was mounting to a height unknown before no small part

was due to her struggle on behalf of America. And with this sense of

obligation mingled a sense of ingratitude. It was generally held that

the wealthy Colonists should do something to lighten the load of this

debt from the shoulders of the mother country. But it was known that all

proposals for American taxation would be bitterly resisted. The monopoly

of American trade was looked on as a part of an Englishman's birthright.

Yet the Colonists not only murmured at this monopoly but evaded it in

great part by a wide system of smuggling. And behind all these

grievances lay an uneasy sense of dread at the democratic form which the

government and society of the colonies had taken. The governors sent

from England wrote back words of honest surprise and terror at the

"levelling principles" of the men about them. To statesmen at home the

temper of the colonial legislatures, their protests, their bickerings

with the governors and with the Board of Trade, the constant refusal of

supplies when their remonstrances were set aside, seemed all but

republican.

[Sidenote: George the Third.]

To check this republican spirit, to crush all dreams of severance, and

to strengthen the unity of the British Empire by drawing closer the

fiscal and administrative bonds which linked the colonies to the mother

country, was one of the chief aims with which George the Third mounted

the throne on the death of his grandfather George the Second, in 1760.

But it was far from being his only aim. For the first and last time

since the accession of the House of Hanover England saw a king who was

resolved to play a part in English politics; and the part which George

succeeded in playing was undoubtedly a memorable one. During the first

ten years of his reign he managed to reduce government to a shadow, and

to turn the loyalty of his subjects at home into disaffection. Before

twenty years were over he had forced the American colonies into revolt

and independence, and brought England to what then seemed the brink of

ruin. Work such as this has sometimes been done by very great men, and

often by very wicked and profligate men; but George was neither

profligate nor great. He had a smaller mind than any English king before

him save James the Second. He was wretchedly educated, and his natural

powers were of the meanest sort. Nor had he the capacity for using

greater minds than his own by which some sovereigns have concealed their

natural littleness. On the contrary, his only feeling towards great men

was one of jealousy and hate. He longed for the time when "decrepitude

or death" might put an end to Pitt; and even when death had freed him

from "this trumpet of sedition," he denounced the proposal for a public

monument to the great statesman as "an offensive measure to me

personally." But dull and petty as his temper was, he was clear as to

his purpose and obstinate in the pursuit of it. And his purpose was to

rule. "George," his mother, the Princess of Wales, had continually

repeated to him in youth, "George, be king." He called himself always "a

Whig of the Revolution," and he had no wish to undo the work which he

believed the Revolution to have done. But he looked on the subjection of

his two predecessors to the will of their ministers as no real part of

the work of the Revolution, but as a usurpation of that authority which

the Revolution had left to the crown. And to this usurpation he was

determined not to submit. His resolve was to govern, not to govern

against law, but simply to govern, to be freed from the dictation of

parties and ministers, and to be in effect the first minister of the

State.

[Sidenote: Importance of his action.]

How utterly incompatible such a dream was with the Parliamentary

constitution of the country as it had received its final form from

Sunderland it is easy to see; and the effort of the young king to

realize it plunged England at once into a chaos of political and social

disorder which makes the first years of his reign the most painful and

humiliating period in our history. It is with an angry disgust that we

pass from the triumphs of the Seven Years' War to the miserable strife

of Whig factions with one another or of the whole Whig party with the

king. But wearisome as the story is, it is hardly less important than

that of the rise of England into a world-power. In the strife of these

wretched years began a political revolution which is still far from

having reached its close. Side by side with the gradual developement of

the English Empire and of the English race has gone on, through the

century that has passed since the close of the Seven Years' War, the

transfer of power within England itself from a governing class to the

nation as a whole. If the effort of George failed to restore the power

of the Crown, it broke the power which impeded the advance of the people

itself to political supremacy. Whilst labouring to convert the

aristocratic monarchy of which he found himself the head into a personal

sovereignty, the irony of fate doomed him to take the first step in an

organic change which has converted that aristocratic monarchy into a

democratic republic, ruled under monarchical forms.

[Sidenote: The Revolution and the nation.]

To realize however the true character of the king's attempt we must

recall for a moment the issue of the Revolution on which he claimed to

take his stand. It had no doubt given personal and religious liberty to

England at large. But its political benefits seemed as yet to be less

equally shared. The Parliament indeed had become supreme, and in theory

the Parliament was a representative of the whole English people. But in

actual fact the bulk of the English people found itself powerless to

control the course of English government. We have seen how at the very

moment of its triumph opinion had been paralyzed by the results of the

Revolution. The sentiment of the bulk of Englishmen remained Tory, but

the existence of a Stuart Pretender forced on them a system of

government which was practically Whig. Under William and Anne they had

tried to reconcile Toryism with the Revolution; but this effort ended

with the accession of the House of Hanover, and the bulk of the landed

classes and the clergy withdrew in a sulky despair from all permanent

contact with politics. Their hatred of the system to which they bowed

showed itself in the violence of their occasional outbreaks, in riots

over the Excise Bill, in cries for a Spanish war, in the frenzy against

Walpole. Whenever it roused itself, the national will showed its old

power to destroy; but it remained impotent to create any new system of

administrative action. It could aid one clique of Whigs to destroy

another clique of Whigs, but it could do nothing to interrupt the

general course of Whig administration. Walpole and Pelham were alike the

representatives of a minority of the nation; but the minority which they

represented knew its mind and how to carry out its mind, while the

majority of the people remained helpless and distracted between their

hatred of the House of Hanover and their dread of the consequences which

would follow on a return of the Stuarts.

[Sidenote: Parliament and the nation.]

The results of such a divorce between the government and that general

mass of national sentiment on which a government can alone safely ground

itself at once made themselves felt. Robbed as it was of all practical

power, and thus stripped of the feeling of responsibility which the

consciousness of power carries with it, among the mass of Englishmen

public opinion became ignorant and indifferent to the general progress

of the age, but at the same time violent and mutinous, hostile to

Government because it was Government, disloyal to the Crown, averse from

Parliament. For the first and last time in our history Parliament was

unpopular, and its opponents secure of popularity. But the results on

the governing class were even more fatal to any right conduct of public

affairs. Not only had the mass of national sentiment been so utterly

estranged from Parliament by the withdrawal of the Tories that the

people had lost all trust in it as an expression of their will, but the

Parliament did not pretend to express it. It was conscious that for

half-a-century it had not been really a representative of the nation,

that it had represented a minority, wiser no doubt than their

fellow-countrymen, but still a minority of Englishmen. At the same time

it saw, and saw with a just pride, that its policy had as a whole been

for the nation's good, that it had given political and religious freedom

to the people in the very teeth of their political and religious

bigotry, that in spite of their narrow insularism it had made Britain

the greatest of European powers. The sense of both these aspects of

Parliament had sunk in fact so deeply into the mind of the Whigs as to

become a theory of Parliamentary government. They were never weary of

expressing their contempt for public opinion. They shrank with

instinctive dislike from Pitt's appeals to national feeling, and from

the popularity which rewarded them. They denied that members of the

Commons sate as representatives of the people, and they shrank with

actual panic from the thought of any change which could render them

representatives. To a Whig such a change meant the overthrow of the work

done in 1688, the coercion of the minority of sound political thinkers

by the mass of opinion, so brutal and unintelligent, so bigoted in its

views both of Church and State, which had been content to reap the

benefits of the Revolution while vilifying and opposing its principles.

[Sidenote: Need of Parliamentary reform.]

And yet, if representation was to be more than a name, the very relation

of Parliament to the constituencies made some change in its composition

a necessity. That changes in the distribution of seats in the House of

Commons were called for by the natural shiftings of population and

wealth which had gone on since the days of Edward the First had been

recognized as early as the Civil Wars. But the reforms of the Long

Parliament were cancelled at the Restoration; and from the time of

Charles the Second to that of George the Third not a single effort had

been made to meet the growing abuses of our parliamentary system. Great

towns like Manchester or Birmingham remained without a member, while

members still sat for boroughs which, like Old Sarum, had actually

vanished from the face of the earth. The effort of the Tudor sovereigns

to establish a Court party in the House by a profuse creation of

boroughs, most of which were mere villages then in the hands of the

Crown, had ended in the appropriation of these seats by the neighbouring

landowners, who bought and sold them as they bought and sold their own

estates. Even in towns which had a real claim to representation the

narrowing of municipal privileges ever since the fourteenth century to a

small part of the inhabitants, and in many cases the restriction of

electoral rights to the members of the governing corporation, rendered

their representation a mere name. The choice of such places hung simply

on the purse or influence of politicians. Some were "the King's

boroughs," others obediently returned nominees of the Ministry of the

day, others were "close boroughs" in the hands of jobbers like the Duke

of Newcastle, who at one time returned a third of all the borough

members in the House. The counties and the great commercial towns could

alone be said to exercise any real right of suffrage, though the

enormous expense of contesting such constituencies practically left

their representation in the hands of the great local families. But even

in the counties the suffrage was ridiculously limited and unequal. Out

of a population of eight millions of English people, only a hundred and

sixty thousand were electors at all.

[Sidenote: Pressure of opinion.]

"The value, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons," said Burke, in

noble words, "consists in its being the express image of the feelings of

the nation." But how far such a House as that which now existed was from

really representing English opinion we see from the fact that in the

height of his popularity Pitt himself could hardly find a seat in it.

Purchase was becoming more and more the means of entering Parliament;

and seats were bought and sold in the open market at a price which rose

to four thousand pounds. We can hardly wonder that a reformer could

allege without a chance of denial, "This House is not a representative

of the people of Great Britain. It is the representative of nominal

boroughs, of ruined and exterminated towns, of noble families, of

wealthy individuals, of foreign potentates." The meanest motives

naturally told on a body returned by such constituencies, cut off from

the influence of public opinion by the secrecy of Parliamentary

proceedings, and yet invested with almost boundless authority. Walpole

and Newcastle had in fact made bribery and borough-jobbing the base of

their power. But bribery and borough-jobbing were every day becoming

more offensive to the nation at large. A new moral consciousness, as we

have seen in the movement of the Wesleys, was diffusing itself through

England; and behind this moral consciousness came a general advance in

the national intelligence, which could not fail to tell vigorously on

politics.

[Sidenote: The intellectual advance.]

Ever since the expulsion of the Stuarts an intellectual revolution had

been silently going on in the people at large. The close of the

seventeenth century was marked by a sudden extension of the world of

readers. The developement of men's minds under the political and social

changes of the day, as well as the rapid increase of wealth, and the

advance in culture and refinement which accompanies an increase of

wealth, were quickening the general intelligence of the people at large;

and the wider demand for books to read that came of this quickening gave

a new extension and vigour to their sale. Addison tells us how large and

rapid was the sale of his "Spectator"; and the sale of Shakspere's works

shows the amazing effect of the new passion for literature on the

diffusion of our older authors. Four issues of his plays in folio, none

of them probably exceeding five hundred copies, had sufficed to meet the

wants of the seventeenth century. But through the eighteenth ten

editions at least followed each other in quick succession; and before

the century was over as many as thirty thousand copies of Shakspere

were dispersed throughout England. Reprints of older works however were

far from being the only need of English readers. The new demand created

an organ for its supply in the publisher, and through the publisher

literature became a profession by which men might win their bread. That

such a change was a healthy one time was to show. But in spite of such

instances as Dryden, at the moment of the change its main result seemed

the degradation of letters. The intellectual demand for the moment

outran the intellectual supply. The reader called for the writer; but

the temper of the time, the diversion of its mental energy to industrial

pursuits, the influences which tended to lower its poetic and

imaginative aspirations, were not such as to bring great writers rapidly

to the front. On the other hand, the new opening which letters afforded

for a livelihood was such as to tempt every scribbler who could handle a

pen; and authors of this sort were soon set to hack-work by the Curles

and the Tonsons who looked on book-making as a mere business. The result

was a mob of authors in garrets, of illiterate drudges as poor as they

were thriftless and debauched, selling their pen to any buyer, hawking

their flatteries and their libels from door to door, fawning on the

patron and the publisher for very bread, tagging rimes which they called

poetry, or abuse which they called criticism, vamping up compilations

and abridgements under the guise of history, or filling the journals

with empty rhetoric in the name of politics.

[Sidenote: Pope.]

It was on such a literary chaos as this that the one great poet of the

time poured scorn in his "Dunciad." Pope was a child of the Revolution;

for he was born in 1688, and he died at the moment when the spirit of

his age was passing into larger and grander forms in 1744. But from all

active contact with the world of his day he stood utterly apart. He was

the son of a Catholic linen-draper, who had withdrawn from his business

in Lombard Street to a retirement on the skirts of Windsor Forest; and

there amidst the stormy years which followed William's accession the boy

grew up in an atmosphere of poetry, buried in the study of the older

English singers, stealing to London for a peep at Dryden in his

arm-chair at Will's, himself already lisping in numbers, and busy with

an epic at the age of twelve. Pope's latter years were as secluded as

his youth. His life, as Johnson says, was "a long disease"; his puny

frame, his crooked figure, the feebleness of his health, his keen

sensitiveness to pain, whether of mind or body, cut him off from the

larger world of men, and doomed him to the faults of a morbid

temperament. To the last he remained vain, selfish, affected; he loved

small intrigues and petty lying; he was incredibly jealous and touchy;

he dwelt on the fouler aspect of things with an unhealthy pruriency; he

stung right and left with a malignant venom. But nobler qualities rose

out of this morbid undergrowth of faults. If Pope was quickly moved to

anger, he was as quickly moved to tears; though every literary gnat

could sting him to passion, he could never read the lament of Priam over

Hector without weeping. His sympathies lay indeed within a narrow range,

but within that range they were vivid and intense; he clung passionately

to the few he loved; he took their cause for his own; he flung himself

almost blindly into their enthusiasms and their hates. But loyal as he

was to his friends, he was yet more loyal to his verse. His vanity never

led him to literary self-sufficiency; no artist ever showed a truer

lowliness before the ideal of his art; no poet ever corrected so much,

or so invariably bettered his work by each correction. One of his finest

characteristics, indeed, was his high sense of literary dignity. From

the first he carried on the work of Dryden by claiming a worth and

independence for literature; and he broke with disdain through the

traditions of patronage which had degraded men of letters into

hangers-on of the great.

[Sidenote: The Dunciad.]

With aims and conceptions such as these, Pope looked bitterly out on the

phase of transition through which English letters were passing. As yet

his poetic works had shown little of the keen and ardent temper that lay

within him. The promise of his spring was not that of a satirist but of

the brightest and most genial of verse writers. When after some fanciful

preludes his genius found full utterance in 1712, it was in the "Rape of

the Lock"; and the "Rape of the Lock" was a poetic counterpart of the

work of the Essayists. If we miss in it the personal and intimate charm

of Addison, or the freshness and pathos of Steele, it passes far beyond

the work of both in the brilliancy of its wit, in the lightness and

buoyancy of its tone, in its atmosphere of fancy, its glancing colour,

its exquisite verse, its irresistible gaiety. The poem remains Pope's

masterpiece; it is impossible to read it without feeling that his

mastery lay in social and fanciful verse, and that he missed his poetic

path when he laid down the humourist for the philosopher and the critic.

But the state of letters presented an irresistible temptation to

criticism. All Pope's nobler feelings of loyalty to his art revolted

from the degradation of letters which he saw about him: and after an

interval of hack-work in a translation of Homer he revealed his terrible

power of sarcasm in his poem of the "Dunciad." The poem is disfigured by

mere outbursts of personal spleen, and in its later form by attacks on

men whose last fault was dulness. But in the main the "Dunciad" was a

noble vindication of literature from the herd of dullards and dunces

that had usurped its name, a protest against the claims of the

journalist or pamphleteer, of the compiler of facts and dates, or the

grubber among archives, to the rank of men of letters.

[Sidenote: Revival of Letters.]

That there was work and useful work for such men to do, Pope would not

have denied. It was when their pretensions threatened the very existence

of literature as an art, when the sense that the writer's work was the

work of an artist, and like an artist's work must show largeness of

design, and grace of form, and fitness of phrase, was either denied or

forgotten, it was when every rimer was claiming to be a poet, every

fault-finder a critic, every chronicler an historian, that Pope struck

at the herd of book-makers and swept them from the path of letters. Such

a protest is as true now, and perhaps as much needed now, as it was true

and needed then. But it had hardly been uttered when the chaos settled

itself, and the intellectual impulse which had as yet been felt mainly

in the demand for literature showed itself in its supply. Even before

the "Dunciad" was completed a great school of novelists was rising into

fame; and the years which elapsed between the death of Pope in 1744 and

that of George the Second in 1760 were filled with the masterpieces of

Richardson, Smollett, and Fielding. Their appearance was but a prelude

of a great literary revival which marked the closing years of the

eighteenth century. But the instant popularity of "Clarissa" and "Tom

Jones" showed the work of intellectual preparation which had been going

on through Walpole's days in the people at large; and it was inevitable

that such a quickening of intelligence should tell on English politics.

The very vulgarization of letters indeed, the broadsheets and pamphlets

and catchpenny magazines of Grub Street, were doing for the mass of the

people a work which greater writers could hardly have done. Above all

the rapid extension of journalism had begun to give opinion a new

information and consistency. In spite of the removal of the censorship

after the Revolution the press had been slow to attain any political

influence. Under the first two Georges its progress had been hindered by

the absence of great topics for discussion, the worthlessness of the

writers, and above all the lethargy of the time. But at the moment of

George the Third's accession the impulse which Pitt had given to the

national spirit, and the rise of a keener interest in politics, was fast

raising the press into an intellectual and political power. Not only was

the number of London newspapers fast increasing, but journals were being

established in almost every considerable town.

[Sidenote: Return of the Tories.]

With impulses such as these telling every day on it more powerfully,

roused as it was too into action by the larger policy of Pitt, and

emboldened at once by the sense of growing wealth and of military

triumph, it is clear that the nation must soon have passed from its old

inaction to claim its part in the direction of public affairs. The very

position of Pitt, forced as he had been into office by the sheer force

of opinion in the teeth of party obstacles, showed the rise of a new

energy in the mass of the people. It showed that a king who enlisted the

national sentiment on his side would have little trouble in dealing with

the Whigs. George indeed had no thought of such a policy. His aim was

not to control the Parliament by the force of national opinion, but

simply to win over the Parliament to his side, and through it to govern

the nation with as little regard to its opinion as of old. But, whether

he would or no, the drift of opinion aided him. Though the policy of

Walpole had ruined Jacobitism, it long remained unconscious of its ruin.

But when a Jacobite prince stood in the heart of the realm, and not a

Jacobite answered his call, the spell of Jacobitism was broken; and the

later degradation of Charles Edward's life wore finally away the thin

coating of disloyalty which clung to the clergy and the squires. They

were ready again to take part in politics; and in the accession of a

king who unlike his two predecessors was no stranger but an Englishman,

who had been born in England and spoke English, they found the

opportunity they desired. From the opening of the reign Tories gradually

appeared again at court.

[Sidenote: The King's friends.]

It was only slowly indeed that the party as a whole swung round to a

steady support of the Government; and in the nation at large the old

Toryism was still for some years to show itself in opposition to the

Crown. But from the first the Tory nobles and gentry came in one by one;

and their action told at once on the complexion of English politics.

Their withdrawal from public affairs had left them untouched by the

progress of political ideas since the Revolution of 1688, and when they

returned to political life it was to invest the new sovereign with all

the reverence which they had bestowed on the Stuarts. In this return of

the Tories therefore a "King's party" was ready made to his hand; but

George was able to strengthen it by a vigorous exertion of the power and

influence which was still left to the Crown. All promotion in the

Church, all advancement in the army, a great number of places in the

civil administration and about the court, were still at the king's

disposal. If this vast mass of patronage had been practically usurped by

the ministers of his predecessors, it was resumed and firmly held by

George the Third; and the character of the House of Commons made

patronage a powerful engine in its management. George had one of

Walpole's weapons in his hands, and he used it with unscrupulous energy

to break up the party which Walpole had held so long together. The Whigs

were still indeed a great power. "Long possession of government, vast

property, obligations of favours given and received, connexion of

office, ties of blood, of alliance, of friendship, the name of Whigs

dear to the majority of the people, the zeal early begun and steadily

continued to the royal family, all these together," says Burke justly,

"formed a body of power in the nation." But George the Third saw that

the Whigs were divided among themselves by the factious spirit which

springs from a long hold of office, and that they were weakened by the

rising contempt with which the country at large regarded the selfishness

and corruption of its representatives.

[Sidenote: Pitt and the Whigs.]

More than thirty years before, the statesmen of the day had figured on

the stage as highwaymen and pickpockets. And now that statesmen were

represented by hoary jobbers such as Newcastle, the public contempt was

fiercer than ever, and men turned sickened from the intrigues and

corruption of party to a young sovereign who aired himself in a

character which Bolingbroke had invented, as a Patriot King. Had Pitt

and Newcastle held together indeed, supported as the one was by the

commercial classes, the other by the Whig families and the whole

machinery of Parliamentary management, George must have struggled in

vain. But the ministry was already disunited. The bulk of the party drew

day by day further from Pitt. Attached as they were to peace by the

traditions of Walpole, dismayed at the enormous expenditure, and haughty

with the pride of a ruling oligarchy, the Whigs were in silent revolt

against the war and the supremacy of the Great Commoner. It was against

their will that he rejected proposals of peace from France which would

have secured to England all her conquests on the terms of a desertion of

Prussia, and that his steady support enabled Frederick still to hold out

against the terrible exhaustion of an unequal struggle. The campaign of

1760 indeed was one of the grandest efforts of Frederick's genius.

Foiled in an attempt on Dresden, he again saved Silesia by a victory at

Liegnitz and hurled back an advance of Daun by a victory at Torgau:

while Ferdinand of Brunswick held his ground as of old along the Weser.

But even victories drained Frederick's strength. Men and money alike

failed him. It was impossible for him to strike another great blow, and

the ring of enemies again closed slowly round him. His one remaining

hope lay in the support of Pitt, and triumphant as his policy had been,

Pitt was tottering to his fall.

[Sidenote: Pitt resigns.]

The envy and resentment of the minister's colleagues at his undisguised

supremacy gave the young king an easy means of realizing his schemes.

George had hardly mounted the throne when he made his influence felt in

the ministry by forcing it to accept a Court favourite, the Earl of

Bute, as Secretary of State. Bute had long been his counsellor, and

though his temper and abilities were those of a gentleman usher, he was

forced into the Cabinet. The new drift of affairs was seen in the

instant desertion from Pitt of the two ablest of his adherents, George

Grenville and Charles Townshend, who attached themselves from this

moment to the rising favourite. It was seen yet more when Bute pressed

for peace. As Bute was known to be his master's mouthpiece, a peace

party at once appeared in the Cabinet itself, and it was only a majority

of one that approved Pitt's refusal to negotiate with France. "He is

madder than ever," was Bute's comment on this refusal in his

correspondence with the king; "he has no thought of abandoning the

Continent." Conscious indeed as he was of the king's temper and of the

temper of his colleagues, Pitt showed no signs of giving way. So far was

he from any thought of peace that he proposed at this moment a vast

extension of the war. In 1761 he learned the signature of a treaty which

brought into force the Family Compact between the Courts of Paris and

Madrid, and of a special convention which bound the last to declare war

on England at the close of the year. Pitt proposed to anticipate the

blow by an instant seizure of the treasure fleet which was on its way

from the Indies to Cadiz, and for whose safe arrival alone the Spanish

Court was deferring its action. He would have followed up the blow by

occupying the Isthmus of Panama, and by an attack on the Spanish

dominions in the New World. It was almost with exultation that he saw

the danger which had threatened her ever since the Peace of Utrecht

break at last upon England. His proud sense of the national strength

never let him doubt for a moment of her triumph over the foes that had

leagued against her. "This is the moment," he exclaimed to his

colleagues, "for humbling the whole House of Bourbon." But the Cabinet

shrank from plans so vast and daring; and the Duke of Newcastle, who had

never forgiven Pitt for forcing himself into power and for excluding him

from the real control of affairs, was backed in his resistance by the

bulk of the Whigs. The king openly supported them, and Pitt with his

brother-in-law Lord Temple found themselves alone. Pitt did not blind

himself to the real character of the struggle. The question, as he felt,

was not merely one of peace or war, it was whether the new force of

opinion which had borne him into office and kept him there was to govern

England or no. It was this which made him stake all on the decision of

the Cabinet. "If I cannot in this instance prevail," he ended his

appeal, "this shall be the last time I will sit in the Council. Called

to office by the voice of the people, to whom I conceive myself

accountable for my conduct, I will not remain in a situation which

renders me responsible for measures I am no longer allowed to guide."

His proposals were rejected; and the resignation of his post, which

followed in October 1761, changed the face of European affairs.

[Sidenote: George breaks with the Whigs.]

"Pitt disgraced!" wrote a French philosopher, "it is worth two victories

to us!" Frederick on the other hand was almost driven to despair. But

George saw in the removal of his powerful minister an opening for the

realization of his long-cherished plans. The Whigs had looked on Pitt's

retirement as the restoration of their rule, unbroken by the popular

forces to which it had been driven during his ministry to bow. His

declaration that he had been "called to office by the voice of the

people, to whom I conceive myself accountable," had been met with

indignant scorn by his fellow-ministers. "When the gentleman talks of

being responsible to the people," retorted Lord Granville, the Lord

Carteret of earlier days, "he talks the language of the House of

Commons, and forgets that at this board he is only responsible to the

King." But his appeal was heard by the people at large. When the

dismissed statesman went to Guildhall the Londoners hung on his

carriage-wheels, hugged his footmen, and even kissed his horses. Their

break with Pitt was in fact the death-blow of the Whigs. In betraying

him to the king they had only put themselves in George's power; and so

great was the unpopularity of the ministry that the king was able to

deliver his longed-for stroke at a party that he hated even more than

Pitt. Newcastle found he had freed himself from the great statesman only

to be driven from office by a series of studied mortifications from his

young master; and the more powerful of his Whig colleagues followed him

into retirement. George saw himself triumphant over the two great

forces which had hampered the free action of the Crown, "the power which

arose," in Burke's words, "from popularity, and the power which arose

from political connexion"; and the rise of Lord Bute to the post of

First Minister marked the triumph of the king.

[Sidenote: The Peace.]

Bute took office simply as an agent of the king's will; and the first

resolve of George the Third was to end the war. In the spring of 1762

Frederick, who still held his ground stubbornly against fate, was

brought to the brink of ruin by a withdrawal of the English subsidies;

it was in fact only his dogged resolution and a sudden change in the

policy of Russia, which followed on the death of his enemy the Czarina

Elizabeth, that enabled him at last to retire from the struggle in the

Treaty of Hubertsberg without the loss of an inch of territory. George

and Lord Bute had already purchased peace at a very different price.

With a shameless indifference to the national honour they not only

deserted Frederick but they offered to negotiate a peace for him on the

basis of a cession of Silesia to Maria Theresa and East Prussia to the

Czarina. The issue of the strife with Spain saved England from

humiliation such as this. Pitt's policy of instant attack had been

justified by a Spanish declaration of war three weeks after his fall;

and the year 1762 saw triumphs which vindicated his confidence in the

issue of the new struggle. Martinico, the strongest and wealthiest of

the French West Indian possessions, was conquered at the opening of the

year, and its conquest was followed by those of Grenada, St. Lucia, and

St. Vincent. In the summer the reduction of Havana brought with it the

gain of the rich Spanish colony of Cuba. The Philippines, the wealthiest

of the Spanish colonies in the Pacific, yielded to a British fleet. It

was these losses that brought about the Peace of Paris in February 1763.

So eager was Bute to end the war that he bought peace by restoring all

that the last year's triumphs had given him. In Europe he contented

himself with the recovery of Minorca, while he restored Martinico to

France, and Cuba and the Philippines to Spain. The real gains of Britain

were in India and America. In the first the French abandoned all right

to any military settlement. From the second they wholly withdrew. To

England they gave up Canada, Nova Scotia, and Louisiana as far as the

Mississippi, while they resigned the rest of that province to Spain, in

compensation for its surrender of Florida to the British Crown.

[Sidenote: George and the Parliament.]

We have already seen how mighty a change in the aspect of the world, and

above all in the aspect of Britain, was marked by this momentous treaty.

But no sense of its great issues influenced the young king in pressing

for its conclusion. His eye was fixed not so much on Europe or the

British Empire as on the petty game of politics which he was playing

with the Whigs. The anxiety which he showed for peace abroad sprang

mainly from his belief that peace was needful for success in his

struggle for power at home. So long as the war lasted Pitt's return to

office and the union of the Whigs under his guidance was an hourly

danger. But with peace the king's hands were free. He could count on the

dissensions of the Whigs, on the new-born loyalty of the Tories, on the

influence of the Crown patronage which he had taken into his own hands.

But what he counted on most of all was the character of the House of

Commons. So long as matters went quietly, so long as no gust of popular

passion or enthusiasm forced its members to bow for a while to outer

opinion, he saw that "management" could make the House a mere organ of

his will. George had discovered--to use Lord Bute's words--"that the

forms of a free and the ends of an arbitrary government were things not

altogether incompatible." At a time when it had become all-powerful in

the State, the House of Commons had ceased in any real and effective

sense to be a representative body at all; and its isolation from the

general opinion of the country left it at ordinary moments amenable only

to selfish influences. The Whigs had managed it by bribery and

borough-jobbing, and George in his turn seized bribery and

borough-jobbing as a base of the power he proposed to give to the

Crown. The royal revenue was employed to buy seats and to buy votes.

Day by day the young sovereign scrutinized the voting-list of the two

Houses, and distributed rewards and punishments as members voted

according to his will or no. Promotion in the civil service, preferment

in the Church, rank in the army, were reserved for "the king's friends."

Pensions and court places were used to influence debates. Bribery was

employed on a scale never known before. Under Bute's ministry an office

was opened at the Treasury for the purchase of members, and twenty-five

thousand pounds are said to have been spent in a single day.

[Sidenote: George III. and America.]

The result of these measures was soon seen in the tone of the

Parliament. Till now it had bowed beneath the greatness of Pitt; but in

the teeth of his denunciation the provisions of the Peace of Paris were

approved by a majority of five to one. It was seen still more in the

vigour with which George and his minister prepared to carry out the

plans over which they had brooded for the regulation of America. The

American question was indeed forced on them, as they pleaded, by the

state of the revenue. Pitt had waged war with characteristic profusion,

and he had defrayed the cost of the war by enormous loans. The public

debt now stood at a hundred and forty millions. The first need therefore

which met Bute after the conclusion of the Peace of Paris was that of

making provision for the new burthens which the nation had incurred,

and as these had been partly incurred in the defence of the American

Colonies it was the general opinion of Englishmen that the Colonies

should bear a share of them. In this opinion Bute and the king

concurred. But their plans went further than mere taxation. The amount

indeed which was expected to be raised as revenue by these changes, at

most two hundred thousand pounds, was far too small to give much relief

to the financial pressure at home. But this revenue furnished an easy

pretext for wider changes. Plans for the regulation of the government of

the Colonies had been suggested from time to time by subordinate

ministers, but they had been set aside alike by the prudence of Walpole

and the generosity of Pitt. The appointment of Charles Townshend to the

Presidency of the Board of Trade however was a sign that Bute had

adopted a policy not only of taxation, but of restraint. The new

minister declared himself resolved on a rigorous execution of the

Navigation laws, laws by which a monopoly of American trade was secured

to the mother country, on the raising of a revenue within the Colonies

for the discharge of the debt, and above all on impressing upon the

colonists a sense of their dependence upon Britain. The direct trade

between America and the French or Spanish West Indian Islands had

hitherto been fettered by prohibitory duties, but these had been easily

evaded by a general system of smuggling. The duties were now reduced,

but the reduced duties were rigorously exacted, and a considerable naval

force was despatched to the American coast by Grenville, who stood at

the head of the Admiralty Board, with a view of suppressing the

clandestine trade with the foreigner. The revenue which was expected

from this measure was to be supplemented by an internal Stamp Tax, a tax

on all legal documents issued within the Colonies, the plan of which

seems to have originated with Bute's secretary, Jenkinson, afterwards

the first Lord Liverpool. That resistance was expected was seen in a

significant step which was taken by the ministry at the end of the war.

Though the defeat of the French had left the Colonies without an enemy

save the Indians, a force of ten thousand men was still kept quartered

on their inhabitants, and a scheme was broached for an extension of the

province of Canada over the district round the Lakes, which would have

turned the western lands into a military settlement, governed at the

will of the Crown, and have furnished a base of warlike operations, if

such were needed, against the settled Colonies on the Atlantic.

Had Bute's power lasted it is probable that these measures would have

brought about the struggle between England and America long before it

actually began. Fortunately for the two countries the minister found

himself from the first the object of a sudden and universal hatred. The

great majority which had rejected Pitt's motion against the Peace had

filled the court with exultation. "Now indeed," cried the Princess

Dowager, "my son is king." But the victory was hardly won when king and

minister found themselves battling with a storm of popular ill-will such

as never since the overthrow of the Stuarts assailed the throne. Violent

and reckless as it was, the storm only marked a fresh advance in the

reawakening of public opinion. The bulk of the higher classes who had

till now stood apart from government were coming gradually in to the

side of the Crown. But the mass of the people was only puzzled and

galled by the turn of events. It felt itself called again to political

activity, but it saw nothing to change its hatred and distrust of

Parliament and the Crown. On the contrary it saw them in greater union

than of old. The House of Commons was more corrupt than ever, and it was

the slave of the king. The king still called himself a Whig, yet he was

reviving a system of absolutism which Whiggism, to do it justice, had

long made impossible. His minister was a mere favourite and in

Englishmen's eyes a foreigner. The masses saw all this, but they saw no

way of mending it. They knew little of their own strength, and they had

no means of influencing the Government they hated save by sheer

violence. They came therefore to the front with their old national and

religious bigotry, their long-nursed dislike of the Hanoverian Court,

their long-nursed habits of violence and faction, their long-nursed

hatred of Parliament, but with no means of expressing them save riot and

uproar.

[Sidenote: Wilkes.]

It was this temper of the masses which was seized and turned to his

purpose by John Wilkes. Wilkes was a worthless profligate; but he had a

remarkable faculty of enlisting popular sympathy on his side; and by a

singular irony of fortune he became in the end the chief instrument in

bringing about three of the greatest advances which our Constitution has

made. He woke the nation to a sense of the need for Parliamentary reform

by his defence of the rights of constituencies against the despotism of

the House of Commons. He took the lead in a struggle which put an end to

the secrecy of Parliamentary proceedings. He was the first to establish

the right of the press to discuss public affairs. But in his attack upon

the Ministry of Lord Bute he served simply as an organ of the general

excitement and discontent. The bulk of the Tories were on fire to

gratify their old grudge against the Crown and its Ministers. The body

of the Whigs, and the commercial classes who backed them, were startled

and angered by the dismissal of Pitt, and by the revolt of the Crown

against the Whig system. The nation as a whole was uneasy and alarmed at

the sudden break-up of political tranquillity, and by the sense of a

coming struggle between opponents of whom as yet neither had fully its

sympathies. There were mobs, riots, bonfires in the streets, and

disturbances which culminated--in a rough spirit of punning upon the

name of the minister--in the solemn burning of a jack-boot. The

journals, which were now becoming numerous, made themselves organs for

this outburst of popular hatred; and it was in the _North-Briton_ that

Wilkes took a lead in the movement by denouncing the Cabinet and the

peace with peculiar bitterness, by playing on the popular jealousy of

foreigners and Scotchmen, and by venturing to denounce the hated

minister by name.

[Sidenote: Bute's fall.]

Ignorant and brutal as was the movement which Wilkes headed, it was a

revival of public opinion; and though the time was to come when the

influence of opinion would be exercised more wisely, even now it told

for good. It was the attack of Wilkes which more than all else

determined Bute to withdraw from office in 1763 as a means of allaying

the storm of popular indignation. But the king was made of more stubborn

stuff than his minister. If he suffered his favourite to resign he still

regarded him as the real head of administration; for the ministry which

Bute left behind him consisted simply of the more courtly of his

colleagues, and was in fact formed under his direction. George Grenville

was its nominal chief, but the measures of the Cabinet were still

secretly dictated by the favourite. The formation of the Grenville

ministry indeed was laughed at as a joke. Charles Townshend and the Duke

of Bedford, the two ablest of the Whigs who had remained with Bute after

Newcastle's dismissal, refused to join it; and its one man of ability

was Lord Shelburne, a young Irishman, who had served with credit at

Minden, and had been rewarded by a post at Court which brought him into

terms of intimacy with the young sovereign and Bute. Dislike of the Whig

oligarchy and of the war had thrown Shelburne strongly into the

opposition to Pitt, and his diplomatic talents were of service in

securing recruits for his party, as his eloquence had been useful in

advocating the peace; but it was not till he himself retired from office

that Bute obtained for his supporter the Presidency of the Board of

Trade. As yet however Shelburne's powers were little known, and he added

nothing to the strength of the ministry. It was in fact only the

disunion of its opponents which allowed it to hold its ground. Townshend

and Bedford remained apart from the main body of the Whigs, and both

sections held aloof from Pitt. George had counted on the divisions of

the opposition in forming such a ministry; and he counted on the

weakness of the ministry to make it the creature of his will.

[Sidenote: George Grenville.]

But Grenville had no mind to be a puppet either of the king or of Bute.

Narrow and pedantic as he was, severed by sheer jealousy and ambition

from his kinsman Pitt and the bulk of the Whigs, his temper was too

proud to stoop to the position which George designed for him. The

conflicts between the king and his minister soon became so bitter that

in August 1763 George appealed in despair to Pitt to form a ministry.

Never had Pitt shown a nobler patriotism or a grander self-command than

in the reception he gave to this appeal. He set aside all resentment at

his own expulsion from office by Newcastle and the Whigs, and made the

return to office of the whole party, with the exception of Bedford, a

condition of his own. His aim, in other words, was to restore

constitutional government by a reconstruction of the ministry which had

won the triumphs of the Seven Years' War. But it was the destruction of

this ministry and the erection of a kingly government in its place on

which George prided himself most. To restore it was, in his belief, to

restore the tyranny under which the Whigs had so long held the Crown.

"Rather than submit," he cried, "to the terms proposed by Mr. Pitt, I

would die in the room I now stand in." The result left Grenville as

powerful as he had been weak. Bute retired into the country and ceased

to exercise any political influence. Shelburne, the one statesman in the

ministry, and who had borne a chief part in the negotiations for the

formation of a new Cabinet, resigned to follow Pitt. On the other hand,

Bedford, irritated by Pitt's exclusion of him from his proposed

ministry, joined Grenville with his whole party, and the ministry thus

became strong and compact.

[Sidenote: Grenville and Wilkes.]

Grenville himself was ploddingly industrious and not without financial

ability. But his mind was narrow and pedantic in its tone; and, honest

as was his belief in his own Whig creed, he saw nothing beyond legal

forms. He was resolute to withstand the people as he had withstood the

Crown. His one standard of conduct was the approval of Parliament; his

one aim to enforce the supremacy of Parliament over subject as over

king. With such an aim as this, it was inevitable that Grenville should

strike fiercely at the new force of opinion which had just shown its

power in the fall of Bute. He was resolved to see public opinion only in

the voice of Parliament; and his resolve led at once to a contest with

Wilkes as with the press. It was in the press that the nation was

finding a court of appeal from the Houses of Parliament. The popularity

of the _North-Briton_ made Wilkes the representative of the new

journalism, as he was the representative of that mass of general

sentiment of which it was beginning to be the mouthpiece; and the fall

of Bute had shown how real a power lay behind the agitator's diatribes.

But Grenville was of stouter stuff than the court favourite, and his

administration was hardly reformed when he struck at the growing

opposition to Parliament by a blow at its leader. In "Number 45" of the

_North-Briton_ Wilkes had censured the speech from the throne at the

opening of Parliament, and a "general warrant" by the Secretary of State

was issued against the "authors, printers, and publishers of this

seditious libel." Under this warrant forty-nine persons were seized for

a time; and in spite of his privilege as a member of Parliament Wilkes

himself was sent to the Tower. The arrest however was so utterly illegal

that he was at once released by the Court of Common Pleas; but he was

immediately prosecuted for libel. The national indignation at the

harshness of these proceedings passed into graver disapproval when

Parliament took advantage of the case to set itself up as a judicial

tribunal for the trial of its own assailant. While the paper which

formed the subject for prosecution was still before the courts of

justice it was condemned by the House of Commons as a "false,

scandalous, and seditious libel." The House of Lords at the same time

voted a pamphlet found among Wilkes's papers to be blasphemous, and

advised a prosecution. Though Pitt at once denounced the course of the

two Houses as unconstitutional, his protest, like that of Shelburne in

the Lords, proved utterly ineffectual; and Wilkes, who fled in terror to

France, was expelled at the opening of 1764 from the House of Commons.

Rapid and successful blows such as these seem to have shown to how

frivolous an assailant Bute had yielded. But if Wilkes fled over the

Channel, Grenville found he had still England to deal with. The

assumption of an arbitrary judicial power by both Houses, and the system

of terror which the Minister put in force against the Press by issuing

two hundred injunctions against different journals, roused a storm of

indignation throughout the country. Every street resounded with cries of

"Wilkes and Liberty!" Every shutter through the town was chalked with

"No. 45"; the old bonfires and tumults broke out with fresh violence:

and the Common Council of London refused to thank the sheriffs for

dispersing the mob. It was soon clear that opinion had been embittered

rather than silenced by the blow at Wilkes.

[Sidenote: Grenville and the Colonies.]

The same narrowness of view, the same honesty of purpose, the same

obstinacy of temper, were shown by Grenville in a yet more important

struggle, a struggle with the American Colonies. The plans of Bute for

their taxation and restraint had fallen to the ground on his retirement

and that of Townshend from office. Lord Shelburne succeeded Townshend at

the Board of Trade, and young as he was, Shelburne was too sound a

statesman to suffer these plans to be revived. But the resignation of

Shelburne in 1763, after the failure of Pitt to form a united ministry,

again reopened the question. Grenville had fully concurred in a part at

least of Bute's designs; and now that he found himself at the head of a

strong administration he again turned his attention to the Colonies. On

one important side his policy wholly differed from that of Townshend or

Bute. With Bute as with the king the question of deriving a revenue from

America was chiefly important as one which would bring the claims of

independent taxation and legislation put forward by the colonies to an

issue, and in the end--as it was hoped--bring about a reconstruction of

their democratic institutions and a closer union of the colonies under

British rule. Grenville's aim was strictly financial. His conservative

and constitutional temper made him averse from any sweeping changes in

the institutions of the Colonies. He put aside as roughly as Shelburne

the projects which had been suggested for the suppression of colonial

charters, the giving power in the Colonies to military officers, or the

payment of Crown officers in America by the English treasury. All he

desired was that the colonies should contribute what he looked on as

their just share towards the relief of the burthens left by the war; and

it was with a view to this that he proceeded to carry out the financial

plans which had been devised for the purpose of raising both an external

and an internal revenue from America.

[Sidenote: The Colonies and the Stamp Act.]

If such a policy was more honest, it was at the same time more absurd

than that of Bute. Bute had at any rate aimed at a great revolution in

the whole system of colonial government. Grenville aimed simply at

collecting a couple of hundred thousand pounds, and he knew that even

this wretched sum must be immensely lessened unless his plans were

cordially accepted by the colonists. He knew too that there was small

hope of such an acceptance. On the contrary, they at once met with a

dogged opposition; and though the shape which that opposition took was a

legal and technical one, it really opened up the whole question of the

relation of the Colonies to the mother country. Proud as England was of

her imperial position, she had as yet failed to grasp the difference

between an empire and a nation. A nation is an aggregate of individual

citizens, bound together in a common and equal relation to the state

which they form. An empire is an aggregate of political bodies, bound

together by a common relation to a central state, but whose relations to

it may vary from the closest dependency to the loosest adhesion. To

Grenville and the bulk of his fellow-countrymen the Colonies were as

completely English soil as England itself, nor did they see any

difference in political rights or in their relation to the Imperial

legislature between an Englishman of Massachusetts and a man of Kent.

What rights their charters gave the Colonies they looked on as not

strictly political but municipal rights; they were not states but

corporations; and, as corporate bodies, whatever privileges might have

been given them, they were as completely the creatures and subjects of

the English Crown as the corporate body of a borough or of a trading

company. Their very existence in fact rested in a like way on the will

of the Crown; on a breach of the conditions under which they were

granted their charters were revocable and their privileges ceased, their

legislatures and the rights of their legislatures came to an end as

completely as the common council of a borough that had forfeited its

franchise or the rights of that common council. It was true that save in

matters of trade and navigation the Imperial Parliament or the Imperial

Crown had as yet left them mainly to their own self-government; above

all that it had not subjected them to the burthen of taxation which was

borne by other Englishmen at home. But it had more than once asserted

its right to tax the colonies; it had again and again refused assent to

acts of their legislatures which denied such a right; and from the very

nature of things they held it impossible that such a right could exist.

No bounds could be fixed for the supremacy of the king in Parliament

over every subject of the Crown, and the colonist of America was as

absolutely a subject as the ordinary Englishman. On mere grounds of law

Grenville was undoubtedly right in his assertion of such a view as this;

for the law had grown up under purely national conditions, and without

a consciousness of the new political world to which it was now to be

applied. What the colonists had to urge against it was really the fact

of such a world. They were Englishmen, but they were Englishmen parted

from England by three thousand miles of sea. They could not, if they

would, share the common political life of men at home; nature had

imposed on them their own political life; what charters had done was not

to create but to recognize a state of things which sprang from the very

circumstances under which the Colonies had originated and grown into

being. Nor could any cancelling of charters cancel those circumstances.

No Act of Parliament could annihilate the Atlantic. The political status

of the man of Massachusetts could not be identical with that of the man

of Kent, because that of the Kentish man rested on his right of being

represented in Parliament and thus sharing in the work of

self-government, while the other from sheer distance could not exercise

such a right. The pretence of equality was in effect the assertion of

inequality; for it was to subject the colonist to the burthens of

Englishmen without giving him any effective share in the right of

self-government which Englishmen purchased by supporting those burthens.

But the wrong was even greater than this. The Kentish man really took

his share in governing through his representative in Parliament the

Empire to which the colonist belonged. If the colonist had no such

share he became the subject of the Kentish man. The pretence of

political identity had ended in the establishment not only of serfdom

but of the most odious form of serfdom, a subjection to one's

fellow-subjects.

[Sidenote: The theory of the colonists.]

The only alternative for so impossible a relation was the recognition of

such relations as actually existed. While its laws remained national,

England had grown from a nation into an empire. Whatever theorists might

allege, the Colonies were in fact political bodies with a distinct life

of their own, whose connexion with the mother country had in the last

hundred years taken a definite and peculiar form. Their administration

in its higher parts was in the hands of the mother country. Their

legislation on all internal affairs, though lightly supervised by the

mother country, was practically in their own hands. They exercised

without interference the right of self-taxation, while the mother

country exercised with as little interference the right of monopolizing

their trade. Against this monopoly of their trade not a voice was as yet

raised among the colonists. They justly looked on it as an enormous

contribution to the wealth of Britain, which might fairly be taken in

place of any direct supplies, and which while it asserted the

sovereignty of the mother country, left their local freedom untouched.

The harshness of such a monopoly had indeed been somewhat mitigated by

a system of contraband trade which had grown up between American ports

and the adjacent Spanish islands, a trade so necessary for the Colonies,

and in the end so beneficial to British commerce itself, that statesmen

like Walpole had winked at its developement. The pedantry of Grenville

however saw in it only an infringement of British monopoly; and one of

his first steps was to suppress this contraband trade by a rigid

enforcement of the navigation laws. Harsh and unwise as these measures

seemed, the colonists owned their legality; and their resentment only

showed itself in a pledge to use no British manufactures till the

restrictions were relaxed. But such a stroke was a mere measure of

retaliation, whose pressure was pretty sure in the end to effect its

aim; and even in their moment of irritation the colonists uttered no

protest against the monopoly of their trade. Their position indeed was

strictly conservative; what they claimed was a continuance of the

existing connexion; and had their claim been admitted, they would

probably have drifted quietly into such a relation to the crown as that

of our actual colonies in Canada and Australasia.

[Sidenote: The Stamp Act passed.]

What the issue of such a policy might have been as America grew to a

population and wealth beyond those of the mother country, it is hard to

guess. But no such policy was to be tried. The next scheme of the

Minister--his proposal to introduce internal taxation within the bounds

of the Colonies themselves by reviving the project of an excise or stamp

duty, which Walpole's good sense had rejected--was of another order from

his schemes for suppressing the contraband traffic. Unlike the system of

the Navigation Acts, it was a gigantic change in the whole actual

relations of England and its colonies. They met it therefore in another

spirit. Taxation and representation, they asserted, went hand in hand.

America had no representatives in the British Parliament. The

representatives of the colonists met in their own colonial assemblies,

and these were willing to grant supplies of a larger amount than a

stamp-tax would produce. Massachusetts--first as ever in her

protest--marked accurately the position she took. "Prohibitions of trade

are neither equitable nor just; but the power of taxing is the grand

banner of British liberty. If that is once broken down, all is lost."

The distinction was accepted by the assembly of every colony; and it was

with their protest and offer that they despatched Benjamin Franklin, who

had risen from his position of a working printer in Philadelphia to high

repute among scientific discoverers, as their agent to England. In

England Franklin found few who recognized the distinction which the

colonists had drawn; it was indeed incompatible with the universal

belief in the omnipotence of the Imperial Parliament. But there were

many who held that such taxation was unadvisable, that the control of

trade was what a country really gained from its colonies, that it was no

work of a statesman to introduce radical changes into relations so

delicate as those of a mother country and its dependencies, and that,

boundless as was the power of Parliament in theory, "it should

voluntarily set bounds to the exercise of its power." It had the right

to tax Ireland but it never used it. The same self-restraint might be

extended to America, and the more that the colonists were in the main

willing to tax themselves for the general defence. Unluckily Franklin

could give no assurance as to a union for the purpose of such taxation,

and without such an assurance Grenville had no mind to change his plans.

In February 1765 the Stamp Act was passed through both Houses with less

opposition than a turnpike bill.

At this critical moment Pitt was absent from the House of Commons. "When

the resolution was taken to tax America, I was ill and in bed," he said

a few months later. "If I could have endured to be carried in my bed, so

great was the agitation of my mind for the consequences, I would have

solicited some kind hand to have laid me down on this floor, to have

borne my testimony against it." He was soon however called to a position

where his protest might have been turned to action. The Stamp Act was

hardly passed when an insult offered to the Princess Dowager, by the

exclusion of her name from a Regency Act, brought to a head the quarrel

which had long been growing between the ministry and the king. George

again offered power to William Pitt, and so great was his anxiety to

free himself from Grenville's dictation that he consented absolutely to

Pitt's terms. He waived his objection to that general return of the

whole Whig party to office which Pitt had laid down in 1763 as a

condition of his own. He consented to his demands for a change of policy

in America, for the abolition of general warrants, and the formation of

a Protestant system of German alliances as a means of counteracting the

family compact of the house of Bourbon. The formation of the new

ministry seemed secured, when the refusal of Earl Temple to join it

brought Pitt's efforts abruptly to an end. Temple was Pitt's

brother-in-law, and Pitt was not only bound to him by strong family

ties, but he found in him his only Parliamentary support. The Great

Commoner had not a single follower of his own in the House of Commons,

nor a single seat in it at his disposal. What following he seemed to

have was simply that of the Grenvilles; and it was the support of his

brothers-in-law, Lord Temple and George Grenville, which had enabled him

in great part to hold his own against the Whig connexion in the Ministry

of 1757. But George Grenville had parted from him at its close, and now

Lord Temple drew to his brother rather than to Pitt. His refusal to

join the Cabinet left Pitt absolutely alone so far as Parliamentary

strength went, and he felt himself too weak, when thus deserted, to hold

his ground in any ministerial combination with the Whigs. Disappointed

in two successive efforts to form a ministry by the same obstacle, he

returned to his seat in Somersetshire, while the king turned for help to

the main body of the Whigs.

[Sidenote: The Rockingham Ministry.]

The age and incapacity of the Duke of Newcastle had placed the Marquis

of Rockingham at the head of this section of the party, after it had

been driven from office to make way for the supremacy of Bute. Thinned

as it was by the desertion of Grenville and Townshend, as well as of the

Bedford faction, it still claimed an exclusive right to the name of the

Whigs. Rockingham was honest of purpose, he was free from all taint of

the corruption of men like Newcastle, and he was inclined to a pure and

lofty view of the nature and end of government. But he was young, timid,

and of small abilities, and he shared to the full the dislike of the

great Whig nobles to Pitt and the popular sympathies on which Pitt's

power rested. The weakness of the ministry which he formed in July 1765

was seen in its slowness to deal with American affairs. Rockingham

looked on the Stamp Act as inexpedient; but he held firmly against Pitt

and Shelburne the right of Parliament to tax and legislate for the

Colonies, and it was probably through this difference of sentiment that

Pitt refused to join his ministry on its formation. For six months he

made no effort to repeal the obnoxious Acts, and in fact suffered

preparations to go on for enforcing them. News however soon came from

America which made this attitude impossible. Vigorously as he had

struggled against the Acts, Franklin had seen no other course for the

Colonies, when they were passed, but that of submission. But submission

was the last thing the colonists dreamed of. Everywhere through New

England riots broke out on the news of the arrival of the stamped paper;

and the frightened collectors resigned their posts. Northern and

Southern States were drawn together by the new danger. "Virginia," it

was proudly said afterwards, "rang the alarm bell"; its assembly was the

first to formally deny the right of the British Parliament to meddle

with internal taxation, and to demand the repeal of the Acts.

Massachusetts not only adopted the denial and the demand as its own, but

proposed a Congress of delegates from all the colonial assemblies to

provide for common and united action; and in October 1765 this Congress

met to repeat the protest and petition of Virginia.

[Sidenote: Pitt and America.]

The Congress was the beginning of American union. "There ought to be no

New Englandman, no New Yorker known on this continent," said one of its

members, "but all of us Americans." The news of its assembly reached

England at the end of the year and perplexed the ministry, two of whose

members now declared themselves in favour of repealing the Acts. But

Rockingham would promise at most no more than suspension; and when the

Houses met in the spring of 1766 no voice but Shelburne's was raised in

the Peers for repeal. In the Commons however the news at once called

Pitt to the front. As a minister he had long since rejected a similar

scheme for taxing the Colonies. He had been ill and absent from

Parliament when the Stamp Act was passed. But he adopted to the full the

constitutional claim of America. He gloried in a resistance, which was

denounced in Parliament as rebellion. "In my opinion," he said, "this

kingdom has no right to lay a tax on the Colonies.... America is

obstinate! America is almost in open rebellion! Sir, I rejoice that

America has resisted. Three millions of people so dead to all the

feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves would have

been fit instruments to make slaves of the rest." "He spoke," said a

looker-on, "like a man inspired," and he ended by a demand for the

absolute, total, and immediate repeal of the Acts. It is from this

moment that the bitter hatred of George the Third to Pitt may be dated.

In an outburst of resentment the king called him a trumpet of sedition,

and openly wished for his death. But the general desire that he should

return to office was quickened by the sense of power which spoke in his

words, and now that the first bitterness of finding himself alone had

passed away, Pitt was willing to join the Whigs. Negotiations were

opened for this purpose; but they at once broke down. Weak as they felt

themselves, Rockingham and his colleagues now shrank from Pitt, as on

the formation of their ministry Pitt had shrunk from them. Personal

feeling no doubt played its part; for in any united administration Pitt

must necessarily take the lead, and Rockingham was in no mood to give up

his supremacy. But graver political reasons, as we have seen,

co-operated with this jealousy and distrust; and the blind sense which

the Whigs had long had of a radical difference between their policy and

that of Pitt was now defined for them by the keenest political thinker

of the day.

[Sidenote: Edmund Burke.]

At this moment Rockingham was in great measure guided by the counsels of

his secretary, Edmund Burke. Burke had come to London in 1750 as a poor

and unknown Irish adventurer. But the learning which at once won him the

friendship of Johnson, and the imaginative power which enabled him to

give his learning a living shape, soon promised him a philosophical and

literary career. Instinct however drew Burke not to literature but to

politics. He became secretary to Lord Rockingham, and in 1765 entered

Parliament under his patronage. His speech on the repeal of the Stamp

Acts at once lifted him into fame. The heavy Quaker-like figure, the

scratch wig, the round spectacles, the cumbrous roll of paper which

loaded Burke's pocket, gave little promise of a great orator and less of

the characteristics of his oratory--its passionate ardour, its poetic

fancy, its amazing prodigality of resources; the dazzling succession in

which irony, pathos, invective, tenderness, the most brilliant

word-pictures, the coolest argument followed each other. It was an

eloquence indeed of a wholly new order in English experience. Walpole's

clearness of statement, Pitt's appeals to emotion, were exchanged for

the impassioned expression of a distinct philosophy of politics. "I have

learned more from him than from all the books I ever read," Fox cried at

a later time, with a burst of generous admiration. The philosophical

cast of Burke's reasoning was unaccompanied by any philosophical

coldness of tone or phrase. The groundwork indeed of his nature was

poetic. His ideas, if conceived by the reason, took shape and colour

from the splendour and fire of his imagination. A nation was to him a

great living society, so complex in its relations, and whose

institutions were so interwoven with glorious events in the past, that

to touch it rudely was a sacrilege. Its constitution was no artificial

scheme of government, but an exquisite balance of social forces which

was in itself a natural outcome of its history and developement. His

temper was in this way conservative, but his conservatism sprang not

from a love of inaction but from a sense of the value of social order,

and from an imaginative reverence for all that existed. Every

institution was hallowed to him by the clear insight with which he

discerned its relations to the past and its subtle connexion with the

social fabric around it. To touch even an anomaly seemed to Burke to be

risking the ruin of a complex structure of national order which it had

cost centuries to build up. "The equilibrium of the constitution," he

said, "has something so delicate about it, that the least displacement

may destroy it." "It is a difficult and dangerous matter even to touch

so complicated a machine."

[Sidenote: Burke and politics.]

Perhaps the readiest refutation of such a theory was to be found in its

influence on Burke's practical dealing with politics. In the great

question indeed which fronted him as he entered Parliament, it served

him well. No man has ever seen with deeper insight the working of those

natural forces which build up communities, or which group communities

into empires; and in the actual state of the American Colonies, in their

actual relation to the mother country, he saw a result of such forces

which only madmen and pedants would disturb. To enter upon "grounds of

Government," to remodel this great structure of empire on a theoretical

basis, seemed to him a work for "metaphysicians," and not for

statesmen. What statesmen had to do was to take this structure as it

was, and by cautious and delicate adjustment to accommodate from time to

time its general shape and the relations of its various parts to the

varying circumstances of their natural developement. Nothing, in other

words, could be truer than Burke's political philosophy when the actual

state of things was good in itself, and its preservation a recognition

of the harmony of political institutions with political facts. But

nothing could be more unwise than his philosophy when he applied it to a

state of things which in itself was evil, and which was in fact a

defiance of the natural growth and adjustment of political power. It was

thus that he applied it to politics at home. He looked on the Revolution

of 1688 as the final establishment of English institutions. His aim was

to keep England as the Revolution had left it, and under the rule of the

great nobles who were faithful to the Revolution. Such a conviction left

him hostile to all movement whatever. He gave his passionate adhesion to

the inaction of the Whigs. He made an idol of Lord Rockingham, an honest

man, but the weakest of party leaders. He strove to check the corruption

of Parliament by a bill for civil retrenchment, but he took the lead in

defeating all plans for its reform. Though he was one of the few men in

England who understood the value of free industry, he struggled bitterly

against all proposals to give freedom to Irish trade, and against the

Commercial Treaty which the younger Pitt concluded with France. His work

seemed to be that of investing with a gorgeous poetry the policy of

timid content which the Whigs believed they inherited from Sir Robert

Walpole; and the very intensity of his trust in the natural developement

of a people rendered him incapable of understanding the good that might

come from particular or from special reforms.

It was this temper of Burke's mind which estranged him from Pitt. His

political sagacity had discerned that the true basis of the Whig party

must henceforth be formed in a combination of that "power drawn from

popularity" which was embodied in Pitt with the power which the Whig

families drew from political "connexion." But with Pitt's popular

tendencies Burke had no real sympathy. He looked on his eloquence as

mere rant; he believed his character to be hollow, selfish, and

insincere. Above all he saw in him with a true foreboding the

representative of forces before which the actual method of government

must go down. The popularity of Pitt in face of his Parliamentary

isolation was a sign that the House of Commons was no real

representative of the English people. Burke foresaw that Pitt was

drifting inevitably to a demand for a reform of the House which should

make it representative in fact as in name. The full issues of such a

reform, the changes which it would bring with it, the displacement of

political power which it would involve, Burke alone of the men of his

day understood. But he understood them only to shrink from them with

horror, and to shrink with almost as great a horror from the man who was

leading England on in the path of change.

[Sidenote: Repeal of the Stamp Act.]

At this crisis then the temper of Burke squared with the temper of the

Whig party and of Rockingham; and the difference between Pitt's

tendencies and their own came to the front on the question of dealing

with the troubles in America. Pitt was not only for a repeal of the

Stamp Acts, but for an open and ungrudging acknowledgement of the claim

to a partial independence which had been made by the colonists. His

genius saw that, whatever were the legal rights of the mother country,

the time had come when the union between England and its children across

the Atlantic must rest rather on sentiment than on law. Such a view was

wholly unintelligible to the mass of the Whigs or the ministry. They

were willing, rather than heighten American discontent, to repeal the

Stamp Acts; but they looked on the supremacy of England and of the

English Parliament over all English dependencies as a principle

absolutely beyond question. From the union, therefore, which Pitt

offered Rockingham and his fellow-ministers stood aloof. They were

driven, whether they would or no, to a practical acknowledgement of the

policy which he demanded; but they resolved that the repeal of the Stamp

Acts should be accompanied by a formal repudiation of the principles of

colonial freedom which Pitt had laid down. A declaratory act was first

brought in, which asserted the supreme power of Parliament over the

Colonies "in all cases whatsoever." The declaration was intended no

doubt to reassure the followers of the ministry as well as their

opponents, for in the assertion of the omnipotence of the two Houses to

which they belonged Whig and Tory were at one. But it served also as a

public declaration of the difference which severed the Whigs from the

Great Commoner. In a full house Pitt found but two supporters in his

fierce attack upon the declaratory bill, which was supported by Burke in

a speech which at once gave him rank as an orator; while Pitt's

lieutenant, Shelburne, found but four supporters in a similar attack in

the Lords. The passing of the declaratory act was followed by the

introduction of a bill for the repeal of the Stamp Acts; and in spite of

the resistance of the king's friends, a resistance instigated by George

himself, the bill was carried in February 1766 by a large majority.

[Sidenote: The Chatham Ministry.]

As the members left the House of Commons, George Grenville, whose

resistance had been fierce and dogged, was hooted by the crowd which

waited to learn the issue without. Before Pitt the multitude reverently

uncovered their heads and followed him home with blessings. It was the

noblest hour of his life. For the moment indeed he had "saved England"

more truly than even at the crisis of the Seven Years' War. His voice

had forced on the ministry and the king a measure which averted, though

but for a while, the fatal struggle between England and her Colonies.

Lonely as he was, the ministry which had rejected his offers of aid

found itself unable to stand against the general sense that the first

man in the country should be its ruler; and bitter as was the king's

hatred of him, Rockingham's resignation in the summer of 1766 forced

George to call Pitt into office. His acceptance of the king's call and

the measures which he took to construct a ministry showed a new resolve

in the great statesman. He had determined to break finally with the

political tradition which hampered him, and to set aside even the dread

of Parliamentary weakness which had fettered him three years before.

Temple's refusal of aid, save on terms of equality which were wholly

inadmissible, was passed by, though it left Pitt without a party in the

House of Commons. In the same temper he set at defiance the merely

Parliamentary organization of the Whigs by excluding Newcastle, while he

showed his wish to unite the party as a whole by his offer of posts to

nearly all the members of the late administration. Though Rockingham

stood coldly aside, some of his fellow-ministers accepted Pitt's

offers, and they were reinforced by Lords Shelburne and Camden, the

young Duke of Grafton, and the few friends who still clung to the Great

Commoner. Such a ministry however rested for power not on Parliament but

on public opinion. It was in effect an appeal from Parliament to the

people; and it was an appeal which made such a reform in Parliament as

would bring it into unison with public opinion a mere question of time.

Whatever may have been Pitt's ultimate designs, however, no word of such

a reform was uttered by any one. On the contrary, Pitt stooped to

strengthen his Parliamentary support by admitting some even of the

"king's friends" to a share in the administration. But its life lay

really in Pitt himself, in his immense popularity, and in the command

which his eloquence gave him over the House of Commons. His popularity

indeed was soon roughly shaken; for the ministry was hardly formed when

it was announced that its leader had accepted the earldom of Chatham.

The step removed him to the House of Lords, and for a while ruined the

public confidence which his reputation for unselfishness had aided him

to win. But it was from no vulgar ambition that Pitt laid down his title

of the Great Commoner. The nervous disorganization which had shown

itself three years before in his despair upon Temple's desertion had

never ceased to hang around him, and it had been only at rare intervals

that he had forced himself from his retirement to appear in the House of

Commons. It was the consciousness of coming weakness that made him shun

the storms of debate. But in the Cabinet he showed all his old energy.

The most jealous of his fellow-ministers owned his supremacy. At the

close of one of his earliest councils Charles Townshend acknowledged to

a colleague "Lord Chatham has just shown to us what inferior animals we

are!" Plans were at once set on foot for the better government of

Ireland, for the transfer of India from the Company to the Crown, and

for the formation of an alliance with Prussia and Russia to balance the

Family Compact of the House of Bourbon. The alliance was foiled for the

moment by the coldness of Frederick of Prussia. The first steps towards

Indian reform were only taken by the ministry under severe pressure from

Pitt. Petty jealousies, too, brought about the withdrawal of some of the

Whigs, and the hostility of Rockingham was shown by the fierce attacks

of Burke in the House of Commons. But secession and invective had little

effect on the ministry. "The session," wrote Horace Walpole to a friend

at the close of 1766, "has ended triumphantly for the Great Earl"; and

when Chatham withdrew to Bath to mature his plans for the coming year

his power remained unshaken.

END OF VOL. VII.

* * * * * *

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES

Variations in spelling have been left as in the original. Examples

include the following:

council Councils Councillor Councillors

counsel counsels counselled counsellor counsellors

ascendant ascendency

burdens burthens

Luxembourg Luxemburg

recognised recognized

Variations in hyphenation have been left as in the original. Examples

include the following:

arm-chair armchair

re-organization reorganization

The following corrections have been made to the text:

Page 35: success or defeat must be{original has by} equally

fatal

Page 155: or dependents{original has dependants} wringing

bread

History of the English People, Volume VII The Revolution, 1683-1760; Modern England, 1760-1767 · 第 6 / 6 章