THE HOUSE OF HANOVER
1714-1760
[Sidenote: England's European position.]
The accession of George the First marked a change in the position of
England as a member of the European Commonwealth. From the age of the
Plantagenets to the age of the Revolution the country had stood apart
from more than passing contact with the fortunes of the Continent; for
if Wolsey had striven to make it an arbiter between France and the House
of Austria the strain of the Reformation withdrew Henry and his
successor from any effective interference in the strife across the
Channel; and in spite of the conflict with the Armada Elizabeth aimed at
the close as at the beginning of her reign mainly at keeping her realm
as far as might be out of the struggle of western Europe against the
ambition of Spain. Its attitude of isolation was yet more marked when
England stood aloof from the Thirty Years' War, and after a fitful
outbreak of energy under Cromwell looked idly on at the earlier efforts
of Lewis the Fourteenth to become master of Europe. But with the
Revolution this attitude became impossible. In driving out the Stuarts
William had aimed mainly at enlisting England in the league against
France; and France backed his effort by espousing the cause of the
exiled king. To prevent the undoing of all that the Revolution had done
England was forced to join the Great Alliance of the European peoples,
and reluctantly as she was drawn into it she at once found herself its
head. Political and military genius set William and Marlborough in the
forefront of the struggle; Lewis reeled beneath the shock of Blenheim
and Ramillies; and shameful as were some of its incidents the Peace of
Utrecht left England the main barrier against the ambition of the House
of Bourbon.
Nor was this a position from which any change of domestic policy could
withdraw her. So long as a Stuart pretender threatened the throne of the
Revolution, so long every adherent of the cause of the Revolution,
whether Tory or Whig, was forced to guard jealously against the
supremacy of the power which could alone bring about a Jacobite
restoration. As the one check on France lay in the maintenance of a
European concert, in her efforts to maintain this concert England was
drawn out of the narrower circle of her own home interests to watch
every movement of the nations from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. And
not only did the Revolution set England irrevocably among the powers of
Europe, but it assigned her a special place among them. The result of
the alliance and the war had been to establish what was then called a
"balance of power" between the great European states; a balance which
rested indeed not so much on any natural equilibrium of forces as on a
compromise wrung from warring nations by the exhaustion of a great
struggle; but which, once recognized and established, could be adapted
and readjusted, it was hoped, to the varying political conditions of the
time. Of this balance of power, as recognized and defined in the Treaty
of Utrecht and its successors, England became the special guardian. Her
insular position made her almost the one great state which could have no
dreams of continental aggrandizement; while the main aim of her policy,
that of guarding the throne of the Revolution, secured her fidelity to
the European settlement which offered an insuperable obstacle to a
Jacobite invasion. Her only interest lay in the maintenance of European
peace on the basis of an observance of European treaties.
[Sidenote: Its results.]
Nothing is at first sight more wearisome than the long line of
alliances, triple and quadruple, the endless negotiations, the
interminable congresses, the innumerable treaties, which make up the
history of Europe during the earlier half of the eighteenth century; nor
is it easy to follow with patience the meddlesome activity of English
diplomacy during that period, its protests and interventions, its
subsidies and guarantees, its intrigues and finessings, its bluster and
its lies. But wearisome as it all is, it succeeded in its end, and its
end was a noble one. Of the twenty-five years between the Revolution and
the Peace of Utrecht all but five were years of war, and the five were a
mere breathing-space in which the combatants on either side were girding
themselves for fresh hostilities. That the twenty-five years which
followed were for Europe as a whole a time of peace was due in great
measure to the zeal with which England watched over the settlement that
had been brought about at Utrecht. To a great extent her efforts averted
war altogether; and when war could not be averted she brought it within
as narrow limits and to as speedy an end as was possible. Diplomacy
spent its ingenuity in countless choppings and changings of the smaller
territories about the Mediterranean and elsewhere; but till the rise of
Prussia under Frederick the Great it secured Europe as a whole from any
world-wide struggle. Nor was this maintenance of European peace all the
gain which the attitude of England brought with it. The stubborn policy
of the Georgian statesmen has left its mark on our policy ever since. In
struggling for peace and for the sanctity of treaties, even though the
struggle was one of selfish interest, England took a ply which she has
never wholly lost. Warlike and imperious as is her national temper, she
has never been able to free herself from a sense that her business in
the world is to seek peace alike for herself and for the nations about
her, and that the best security for peace lies in her recognition,
amidst whatever difficulties and seductions, of the force of
international engagements and the sanctity of treaties. The sentiment
has no doubt been deepened by other convictions, by convictions of at
once a higher and a lower stamp, by a growing sense of the value of
peace to an industrial nation, as by a growing sense of the moral evil
and destructiveness of war. But strong as is the influence of both these
sentiments on the peace-loving temper of the English people, that temper
itself sprang from another source. It sprang from the sense of
responsibility for the peace of the world, as a necessary condition of
tranquillity and freedom at home, which grew into life with the earlier
years of the eighteenth century.
[Sidenote: England's intellectual influence.]
Nor was this closer political contact with Europe the only result of the
new attitude of England. Throughout the age of the Georges we find her
for the first time exercising an intellectual and moral influence on the
European world. Hitherto Italian and French impulses had told on English
letters or on English thought, but neither our literature nor our
philosophy had exercised any corresponding influence on the Continent.
It may be doubted whether a dozen Frenchmen or Italians had any notion
that a literature existed in England at all, or that her institutions
were worthy of study by any social or political inquirer. But with the
Revolution of 1688 this ignorance came to an end. William and
Marlborough carried more than English arms across the Channel; they
carried English ideas. The combination of material and military
greatness with a freedom of thought and action hardly known elsewhere,
which was revealed in the England that sprang from the Revolution of
1688, imposed on the imagination of men. For the first time in our
history we find foreigners learning English, visiting England, seeking
to understand English life and English opinion. The main curiosity that
drew them was a political curiosity, but they carried back more than
political conceptions. Religious and philosophical notions crossed the
Channel with politics. The world learned that there was an English
literature. It heard of Shakspere. It wept over Richardson. It bowed,
even in wretched translations, before the genius of Swift. France, above
all, was drawn to this study of a country so near to her, and yet so
utterly unknown. If we regard its issues, the brutal outrage which drove
Voltaire to England in 1726 was one of the most important events of the
eighteenth century. With an intelligence singularly open to new
impressions, he revelled in the freedom of social life he found about
him, in its innumerable types of character, its eccentricities, its
individualities. His "Philosophical Letters" revealed to Europe not only
a country where utterance and opinion were unfettered, but a new
literature and a new science; while his intercourse with Bolingbroke
gave the first impulse to that scepticism which was to wage its
destructive war with the faith of the Continent. From the visit of
Voltaire to the outbreak of the French Revolution, this intercourse with
England remained the chief motive power of French opinion, and told
through it on the opinion of the world. In his investigations on the
nature of government Montesquieu studied English institutions as closely
as he studied the institutions of Rome. Buffon was led by English
science into his attempt at a survey and classification of the animal
world. It was from the works of Locke that Rousseau drew the bulk of his
ideas in politics and education.
[Sidenote: The general temper of Europe.]
Such an influence could hardly have been aroused by English letters had
they not given expression to what was the general temper of Europe at
the time. The cessation of religious wars, the upgrowth of great states
with a new political and administrative organization, the rapid progress
of intelligence, showed their effect everywhere in the same
rationalizing temper, extending not only over theology but over each
department of thought, the same interest in political and social
speculation, the same drift towards physical inquiry, the same tendency
to a diffusion and popularization of knowledge. Everywhere the tone of
thought became secular, scientific, prosaic; everywhere men looked away
from the past with a certain contempt; everywhere the social fusion
which followed on the wreck of the Middle Ages was expressing itself in
a vulgarization of ideas, in an appeal from the world of learning to the
world of general intelligence, in a reliance on the "common sense" of
mankind. Nor was it only a unity of spirit which pervaded the literature
of the eighteenth century. Everywhere there was as striking an identity
of form. In poetry this showed itself in the death of the lyric, as in
the universal popularity of the rhetorical ode, in the loss of all
delight in variety of poetic measure, and in the growing restriction of
verse to the single form of the ten-syllable line. Prose too dropped
everywhere its grandeur with its obscurity; and became the same quick,
clear instrument of thought in the hands of Addison as in those of
Voltaire.
[Sidenote: Creation of a literary class.]
How strongly this had become the bent of English letters was seen in the
instance of Dryden. In the struggle of the Revolution he had struck
fiercely on the losing side, and England had answered his blows by a
change of masters which ruined and beggared him. But it was in these
later years of his life that his influence over English literature
became supreme. He is the first of the great English writers in whom
letters asserted an almost public importance. The reverence with which
men touched in after-time the hand of Pope, or listened to the voice of
Johnson, or wandered beside his lakes with Wordsworth, dates from the
days when the wits of the Revolution clustered reverently round the old
man who sate in his armchair at Will's discussing the last comedy, or
recalling his visit to the blind poet of the "Paradise Lost." It was by
no mere figure that the group called itself a republic of letters, and
honoured in Dryden the chosen chief of their republic. He had done more
than any man to create a literary class. It was his resolve to live by
his pen that first raised literature into a profession. In the stead of
gentlemen amusing a curious leisure with works of fancy, or Dependants
wringing bread by their genius from a patron's caprice, Dryden saw that
the time had come for the author, trusting for support to the world of
readers, and wielding a power over opinion which compensates for the
smallness of his gains. But he was not only the first to create a
literary class; he was the first to impress the idea of literature on
the English mind. Master as he was alike of poetry and of prose,
covering the fields both of imagination and criticism, seizing for
literary treatment all the more prominent topics of the society about
him, Dryden realized in his own personality the existence of a new
power which was thenceforth to tell steadily on the world.
[Sidenote: The new poetry.]
And to this power he gave for nearly a century its form and direction.
In its outer shape as in its inner spirit our literature obeyed the
impulse he had given it from the beginning of the eighteenth century
till near its close. His influence told especially on poetry. Dryden
remained a poet; even in his most argumentative pieces his subject
seizes him in a poetic way, and prosaic as much of his treatment may be,
he is always ready to rise into sudden bursts of imagery and fancy. But
he was a poet with a prosaic end; his aim was not simply to express
beautiful things in the most beautiful way, but to invest rational
things with such an amount of poetic expression as may make them at once
rational and poetic, to use poetry as an exquisite form for argument,
rhetoric, persuasion, to charm indeed, but primarily to convince. Poetry
no longer held itself apart in the pure world of the imagination, no
longer concerned itself simply with the beautiful in all things, or
sought for its result in the sense of pleasure which an exquisite
representation of what is beautiful in man or nature stirs in its
reader. It narrowed its sphere, and attached itself to man. But from all
that is deepest and noblest in man it was shut off by the reaction from
Puritanism, by the weariness of religious strife, by the disbelief that
had sprung from religious controversy; and it limited itself rigidly to
man's outer life, to his sensuous enjoyment, his toil and labour, his
politics, his society. The limitation, no doubt, had its good sides;
with it, if not of it, came a greater correctness and precision in the
use of words and phrases, a clearer and more perspicuous style, a new
sense of order, of just arrangement, of propriety, of good taste. But
with it came a sense of uniformity, of monotony, of dulness. In Dryden
indeed this was combated if not wholly beaten off by his amazing force;
to the last there was an animal verve and swing about the man that
conquered age. But around him and after him the dulness gathered fast.
[Sidenote: The new prose.]
Of hardly less moment than Dryden's work in poetry was his work in
prose. In continuity and grandeur indeed, as in grace and music of
phrase, the new prose of the Restoration fell far short of the prose of
Hooker or Jeremy Taylor, but its clear nervous structure, its handiness
and flexibility, its variety and ease, fitted it far better for the work
of popularization on which literature was now to enter. It fitted it for
the work of journalism, and every day journalism was playing a larger
part in the political education of Englishmen. It fitted it to express
the life of towns. With the general extension of prosperity and trade
the town was coming into greater prominence as an element of national
life; and London above all was drawing to it the wealth and culture
which had till now been diffused through the people at large. It was
natural that this tendency should be reflected in literature; from the
age of the Restoration indeed literature had been more and more becoming
an expression of the life of towns; and it was town-life which was now
giving to it its character and form. As cities ceased to be regarded
simply as centres of trade and money-getting, and became habitual homes
for the richer and more cultured; as men woke to the pleasure and
freedom of the new life which developed itself in the street and the
mall, of its quicker movement, its greater ease, its abundance of social
intercourse, its keener taste, its subtler and more delicate courtesy,
its flow of conversation, the stately and somewhat tedious prose-writer
of days gone by passed into the briefer and nimbler essayist.
[Sidenote: The Essayists.]
What ruled writer and reader alike was the new-found pleasure of talk.
The use of coffee had only come in at the close of the civil wars; but
already London and the bigger towns were crowded with coffee-houses. The
popularity of the coffee-house sprang not from its coffee, but from the
new pleasure which men found in their chat over the coffee-cup. And from
the coffee-house sprang the Essay. The talk of Addison and Steele is the
brightest and easiest talk that was ever put in print: but its literary
charm lies in this, that it is strictly talk. The essayist is a
gentleman who chats to a world of gentlemen, and whose chat is shaped
and coloured by a sense of what he owes to his company. He must interest
and entertain, he may not bore them; and so his form must be short;
essay or sketch, or tale or letter. So too his style must be simple, the
sentences clear and quotable, good sense ready packed for carriage.
Strength of phrase, intricacy of structure, height of tone were all
necessarily banished from such prose as we banish them from ordinary
conversation. There was no room for pedantry, for the ostentatious
display of learning, for pompousness, for affectation. The essayist had
to think, as a talker should think, more of good taste than of
imaginative excellence, of propriety of expression than of grandeur of
phrase. The deeper themes of the world or man were denied to him; if he
touches them it is superficially, with a decorous dulness, or on their
more humorous side with a gentle irony that shows how faint their hold
is on him. In Addison's chat the war of churches shrinks into a
puppet-show, and the strife of politics loses something of its
fictitious earnestness as the humourist views it from the standpoint of
a lady's patches. It was equally impossible to deal with the fiercer
passions and subtler emotions of man. Shakspere's humour and sublimity,
his fitful transitions from mood to mood, his wild bursts of laughter,
his passion of tears, Hamlet or Hamlet's gravedigger, Lear or Lear's
fool, would have startled the readers of the "Spectator" as they would
startle the group in a modern drawing-room.
[Sidenote: The urbanity of Literature.]
But if deeper and grander themes were denied him the essayist had still
a world of his own. He felt little of the pressure of those spiritual
problems that had weighed on the temper of his fathers, but the removal
of the pressure left him a gay, light-hearted, good-humoured observer of
the social life about him, amused and glad to be amused by it all,
looking on with a leisurely and somewhat indolent interest, a quiet
enjoyment, a quiet scepticism, a shy reserved consciousness of their
beauty and poetry, at the lives of common men and common women. It is to
the essayist that we owe our sense of the infinite variety and
picturesqueness of the human world about us; it was he who for the first
time made every street and every house teem with living people for us,
who found a subtle interest in their bigotries and prejudice, their
inconsistencies, their eccentricities, their oddities, who gave to their
very dulness a charm. In a word it was he who first opened to men the
world of modern fiction. Nor does English literature owe less to him in
its form. Humour has always been an English quality, but with the
essayist humour for the first time severed itself from farce; it was no
longer forced, riotous, extravagant; it acquired taste, gentleness,
adroitness, finesse, lightness of touch, a delicate colouring of
playful fancy. It preserved indeed its old sympathy with pity, with
passion; but it learned how to pass with more ease into pathos, into
love, into the reverence that touches us as we smile. And hand in hand
with this new developement of humour went a moderation won from humour,
whether in matters of religion, of politics, or society, a literary
courtesy and reserve, a well-bred temperance and modesty of tone and
phrase. It was in the hands of the town-bred essayist that our
literature first became urbane.
[Sidenote: The brutality of Politics.]
It is strange to contrast this urbanity of literature with the savage
ferocity which characterized political controversy in the England of the
Revolution and the Georges. Never has the strife of warring parties been
carried on with so utter an absence of truth or fairness; never has the
language of political opponents stooped to such depths of coarseness and
scurrility. From the age of Bolingbroke to the age of Burke the gravest
statesmen were not ashamed to revile one another with invective only
worthy of the fish-market. And outside the legislature the tone of
attack was even more brutal. Grub Street ransacked the whole vocabulary
of abuse to find epithets for Walpole. Gay amidst general applause set
the statesmen of his day on the public stage in the guise of highwaymen
and pickpockets. "It is difficult to determine," said the witty
playwright, "whether the fine gentlemen imitate the gentlemen of the
road, or the gentlemen of the road the fine gentlemen." Much of this
virulence sprang, no doubt, from a real contempt of the selfishness and
corruption which disgraced the politics of the time, but it was far from
being wholly due to this. In selfishness and corruption indeed the
statesmen of the Georgian era were no worse than their predecessors;
while in fidelity to principles and a desire for the public good they
stood immeasurably above them. The standard of political action had
risen with the Revolution. Cynic as was Walpole, jobber as was
Newcastle, it would be absurd to compare their conception of public
duty, their conduct of public affairs, with that of the Danbys and
Sunderlands of the Restoration.
[Sidenote: Public opinion.]
What had really happened was a change not in the attitude of statesmen
towards the nation, but in the attitude of the nation at large towards
the class that governed it. From the triumph of Puritanism in 1640 the
supreme, irresistible force in English politics had been national
opinion. It created the Long Parliament. It gave it its victory over the
Church and the Crown. When a strange turn of events placed Puritanism in
antagonism to it, it crushed Puritanism as easily as it had crushed
Royalty. It was national opinion which restored the Stuarts; and no
sooner did the Stuarts cross its will than it threatened their throne in
the Popish Plot and swept them from the country in the Revolution. The
stubborn purpose of William wrestled in vain with its turns of
sentiment; even the genius of Marlborough proved helpless in a contest
with it. It was indeed irresistible whenever it acted. But as yet it
acted only by spurts. It had no wish to interfere with the general
course of administration or policy; in the bulk of the nation indeed
there was neither the political knowledge nor the sustained interest in
politics which could have prompted such an interference. It was only at
critical moments, when great interests were at stake, interests which it
could understand and on which its mind was made up, that the nation
roused itself and "shook its mighty mane." The reign of the Stuarts
indeed did much to create a more general and continuous attention to
public affairs. In the strife of the Exclusion Bill and in the Popish
Plot Shaftesbury taught how to "agitate" opinion, how to rouse this
lagging attention, this dormant energy of the people at large; and his
opponents learned the art from him. The common statement that our two
great modern parties, the Whig and the Tory, date from the Petitioners
and Abhorrers of the Exclusion Bill is true only in this sense, that
then for the first time the masses of the people were stirred to a more
prolonged and organized action in co-operation with the smaller groups
of professed politicians than they had ever been stirred to before.
[Sidenote: Becomes powerless.]
The Revolution of 1688 was the crowning triumph of this public opinion.
But for the time it seemed a suicidal triumph. At the moment when the
national will claimed to be omnipotent, the nation found itself helpless
to carry out its will. In making the revolution it had meant to
vindicate English freedom and English Protestantism from the attacks of
the Crown. But it had never meant to bring about any radical change in
the system under which the Crown had governed England or under which the
Church had been supreme over English religion. The England of the
Revolution was little less Tory in feeling than the England of the
Restoration; it had no dislike whatever to a large exercise of
administrative power by the sovereign, while it was stubbornly averse
from Nonconformity or the toleration of Nonconformity. That the nation
at large remained Tory in sentiment was seen from the fact that in every
House of Commons elected after the Revolution the majority was commonly
Tory; it was only indeed when their opposition to the war and the
patriotic feeling which it aroused rendered a Tory majority impossible
that the House became Whig. And even in the height of Whig rule and
amidst the blaze of Whig victories, England rose in the Sacheverell
riots, forced Tories again into power, and ended the Whig war by what it
deemed a Tory peace. And yet every Englishman knew that from the moment
of the Revolution the whole system of government had not been Tory but
Whig. Passionate as it was for peace and for withdrawal from all
meddling in foreign affairs, England found itself involved abroad in
ever-widening warfare and drawn into a guardianship of the whole state
of Europe. At home it was drifting along a path that it hated even more.
Every year saw the Crown more helpless, and the Church becoming as
helpless as the Crown. The country hated a standing army, and the
standing army existed in spite of its hate; it revolted against debt and
taxation, and taxes and debt grew heavier and heavier in the teeth of
its revolt. Its prejudice against Nonconformists remained as fanatical
as ever, and yet Nonconformists worshipped in their chapels and served
as aldermen or mayors with perfect security. What made this the bitterer
was the fact that neither a change of ministers nor of sovereign brought
about any in the system of government. Under the Tory Anne the policy of
England remained practically as Whig as under the Whig William.
Nottingham and Harley did as little to restore the monarchy or the
Church as Somers or Godolphin.
[Sidenote: Helplessness of the Tories.]
In driving James to a foreign land, indeed, in making him dependent on a
foreign Court, the Revolution had effectually guarded itself from any
undoing of its work. So long as a Stuart Pretender existed, so long as
he remained a tool in the hands of France, every monarch that the
Revolution placed on the English throne, and every servant of such a
monarch, was forced to cling to the principles of the Revolution and to
the men who were most certain to fight for them. With a Parliament of
landed gentry and Churchmen behind him Harley could not be drawn into
measures which would effectively alienate the merchant or the Dissenter;
and if Bolingbroke's talk was more reckless, time was not given to show
whether his designs were more than talk. There was in fact but one
course open for the Tory who hated what the Revolution had done, and
that was the recall of the Stuarts. Such a recall would have brought him
much of what he wanted. But it would have brought him more that he did
not want. Tory as he might be, he was in no humour to sacrifice English
freedom and English religion to his Toryism, and to recall the Stuarts
was to sacrifice both. None of the Stuart exiles would forsake their
faith; and, promise what they might, England had learned too well what
such pledges were worth to set another Catholic on the throne. The more
earnest a Catholic he was indeed, and no one disputed the earnestness of
the Stuarts, the more impossible was it for him to reign without
striving to bring England over to Catholicism; and there was no means of
even making such an attempt save by repeating the struggle of James the
Second and by the overthrow of English liberty. It was the
consciousness that a Stuart restoration was impossible that egged
Bolingbroke to his desperate plans for forcing a Tory policy on the
monarchs of the Revolution. And it was the same consciousness that at
the crisis which followed the death of Anne made the Tory leaders deaf
to the frantic appeals of Bishop Atterbury. To submit again to Whig rule
was a bitter thing for them; but to accept a Catholic sovereign was an
impossible thing. And yet every Tory felt that with the acceptance of
the House of Hanover their struggle against the principles of the
Revolution came practically to an end. Their intrigues with the
Pretender, the strife which they had brought about between Anne and the
Electress Sophia, their hesitation if not their refusal to frankly
support the succession of her son, were known to have sown a deep
distrust of the whole Tory party in the heart of the new sovereign; and
though in the first ministry which he formed a few posts were offered to
the more moderate of their leaders, the offer was so clearly a delusive
one that they refused to take office.
[Sidenote: Withdrawal of the Tories.]
The refusal not only deepened the chasm between party and party; it
placed the Tories in open opposition to the Hanoverian kings. It did
even more, for it proclaimed a temper of despair which withdrew them as
a whole from any further meddling with political affairs. "The Tory
party," Bolingbroke wrote after Anne's death, "is gone." In the first
House of Commons indeed which was called by the new king, the Tories
hardly numbered fifty members; while a fatal division broke their
strength in the country at large. In their despair the more vehement
among them turned to the Pretender. Bolingbroke and the Duke of Ormond
fled from England to take office under the son of King James, James the
Third, as he was called by his adherents. At home Sir William Wyndham
seconded their efforts by building up a Jacobite faction out of the
wreck of the Tory party. The Jacobite secession gave little help to the
Pretender, while it dealt a fatal blow to the Tory cause. England was
still averse from a return of the Stuarts; and the suspicion of Jacobite
designs not only alienated the trading classes, who shrank from the blow
to public credit which a Jacobite repudiation of the debt would bring
about, but deadened the zeal even of the parsons and squires. The bulk
however of the Tory party were far from turning Jacobites, though they
might play at disloyalty out of hatred of the House of Hanover, and
solace themselves for the triumph of their opponents by passing the
decanter over the water-jug at the toast of "the King." What they did
was to withdraw from public affairs altogether; to hunt and farm and
appear at quarter-sessions, and to leave the work of government to the
Whigs.
[Sidenote: The Whigs and the Church.]
While the Whigs were thus freed from any effective pressure from their
political opponents they found one of their great difficulties becoming
weaker with every year that passed. Up to this time the main
stumbling-block to the Whig party had been the influence of the Church.
But predominant as that influence seemed at the close of the Revolution,
the Church was now sinking into political insignificance. In heart
indeed England remained religious. In the middle class the old Puritan
spirit lived on unchanged, and it was from this class that a religious
revival burst forth at the close of Walpole's administration which
changed after a time the whole tone of English society. But during the
fifty years which preceded this outburst we see little save a revolt
against religion and against churches in either the higher classes or
the poor. Among the wealthier and more educated Englishmen the progress
of free inquiry, the aversion from theological strife which had been
left behind them by the Civil Wars, the new political and material
channels opened to human energy were producing a general indifference to
all questions of religious speculation or religious life. In the higher
circles "every one laughs," said Montesquieu on his visit to England,
"if one talks of religion." Of the prominent statesmen of the time the
greater part were unbelievers in any form of Christianity, and
distinguished for the grossness and immorality of their lives.
Drunkenness and foul talk were thought no discredit to Walpole. A later
prime minister, the Duke of Grafton, was in the habit of appearing with
his mistress at the play. Purity and fidelity to the marriage vow were
sneered out of fashion; and Lord Chesterfield, in his letters to his
son, instructs him in the art of seduction as part of a polite
education.
[Sidenote: Sloth of the clergy.]
At the other end of the social scale lay the masses of the poor. They
were ignorant and brutal to a degree which it is hard to conceive, for
the increase of population which followed on the growth of towns and the
developement of commerce had been met by no effort for their religious
or educational improvement. Not a new parish had been created. Hardly a
single new church had been built. Schools there were none, save the
grammar schools of Edward and Elizabeth. The rural peasantry, who were
fast being reduced to pauperism by the abuse of the poor-laws, were left
without much moral or religious training of any sort. "We saw but one
Bible in the parish of Cheddar," said Hannah More at a far later time,
"and that was used to prop a flower-pot." Within the towns things were
worse. There was no effective police; and in great outbreaks the mob of
London or Birmingham burnt houses, flung open prisons, and sacked and
pillaged at their will. The criminal class gathered boldness and numbers
in the face of ruthless laws which only testified to the terror of
society, laws which made it a capital crime to cut down a cherry tree,
and which strung up twenty young thieves of a morning in front of
Newgate; while the introduction of gin gave a new impetus to
drunkenness. In the streets of London gin-shops at one time invited
every passer-by to get drunk for a penny, or dead drunk for twopence.
Much of this social degradation was due without doubt to the apathy and
sloth of the priesthood. A shrewd, if prejudiced, observer, Bishop
Burnet, brands the English clergy of his day as the most lifeless in
Europe, "the most remiss of their labours in private and the least
severe of their lives." A large number of prelates were mere Whig
partizans with no higher aim than that of promotion. The levees of the
Ministers were crowded with lawn sleeves. A Welsh bishop avowed that he
had seen his diocese but once, and habitually resided at the lakes of
Westmoreland. The system of pluralities which enabled a single clergyman
to hold at the same time a number of livings turned the wealthier and
more learned of the clergy into absentees, while the bulk of them were
indolent, poor, and without social consideration.
[Sidenote: The clergy lose political power.]
Their religious inactivity told necessarily on their political
influence; but what most weakened their influence was the severance
between the bulk of the priesthood and its natural leaders. The bishops,
who were now chosen exclusively from among the small number of Whig
ecclesiastics, were left politically powerless by the estrangement and
hatred of their clergy; while the clergy themselves, drawn by their
secret tendencies to Jacobitism, stood sulkily apart from any active
interference with public affairs. The prudence of the Whig statesmen
aided to maintain this ecclesiastical immobility. The Sacheverell riots
had taught them what terrible forces of bigotry and fanaticism lay
slumbering under this thin crust of inaction, and they were careful to
avoid all that could rouse these forces into life. When the Dissenters
pressed for a repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, Walpole openly
avowed his dread of awaking the passions of religious hate by such a
measure, and satisfied them by an annual act of indemnity for any breach
of these penal statutes. By a complete abstinence from all
ecclesiastical questions no outlet was left for the bigotry of the
people at large, while a suspension of the meetings of Convocation
deprived the clergy of their natural centre of agitation and opposition.
[Sidenote: The Whigs and the Crown.]
And while the Church thus ceased to be a formidable enemy, the Crown
became a friend. Under Anne the throne had regained much of the older
influence which it lost through William's unpopularity; but under the
two sovereigns who followed Anne the power of the Crown lay absolutely
dormant. They were strangers, to whom loyalty in its personal sense was
impossible; and their character as nearly approached insignificance as
it is possible for human character to approach it. Both were honest and
straightforward men, who frankly accepted the irksome position of
constitutional kings. But neither had any qualities which could make
their honesty attractive to the people at large. The temper of George
the First was that of a gentleman usher; and his one care was to get
money for his favourites and himself. The temper of George the Second
was that of a drill-sergeant, who believed himself master of his realm
while he repeated the lessons he had learned from his wife, and which
his wife had learned from the Minister. Their Court is familiar enough
in the witty memoirs of the time; but as political figures the two
Georges are almost absent from our history. William of Orange, while
ruling in most home matters by the advice of his Ministers, had not only
used the power of rejecting bills passed by the two Houses, but had kept
in his own hands the control of foreign affairs. Anne had never yielded
even to Marlborough her exclusive right of dealing with Church
preferment, and had presided to the last at the Cabinet Councils of her
ministers. But with the accession of the Georges these reserves passed
away. No sovereign since Anne's death has appeared at a Cabinet Council,
or has ventured to refuse his assent to an Act of Parliament. As
Elector of Hanover indeed the king still dealt with Continental affairs:
but his personal interference roused an increasing jealousy, while it
affected in a very slight degree the foreign policy of his English
counsellors.
England, in short, was governed not by the king but by the Whig
Ministers. But their power was doubled by the steady support of the very
kings they displaced. The first two sovereigns of the House of Hanover
believed they owed their throne to the Whigs, and looked on the support
of the Whigs as the true basis of their monarchy. The new monarchs had
no longer to dread the spectre of republicanism which had haunted the
Stuarts and even Anne, whenever a Whig domination threatened her; for
republicanism was dead. Nor was there the older anxiety as to the
prerogative to sever the monarchy from the Whigs, for the bounds of the
prerogative were now defined by law, and the Whigs were as zealous as
any Tory could be in preserving what remained. From the accession of
George the First therefore to the death of George the Second the whole
influence of the Crown was thrown into the Whig scale; and if its direct
power was gone, its indirect influence was still powerful. It was indeed
the more powerful that the Revolution had put an end to the dread that
its influence could be used in any struggle against liberty. "The
generality of the world here," said the new Whig Chancellor, Lord
Cowper, to King George, "is so much in love with the advantages a king
of Great Britain has to bestow without the least exceeding the bounds of
law, that 'tis wholly in your majesty's power, by showing your power in
good time to one or other of them, to give which party you please a
clear majority in all succeeding parliaments."
[Sidenote: The Whigs and Parliament.]
It was no wonder therefore that in the first of the new king's
parliaments an overwhelming majority appeared in support of the Whigs.
But the continuance of that majority for more than thirty years was not
wholly due to the unswerving support which the Crown gave its Ministers
or to the secession of the Tories. In some measure it was due to the
excellent organization of the Whig party. While their adversaries were
divided by differences of principle and without leaders of real
eminence, the Whigs stood as one man on the principles of the Revolution
and produced great leaders who carried them into effect. They submitted
with admirable discipline to the guidance of a knot of great nobles, to
the houses of Bentinck, Manners, Campbell, and Cavendish, to the
Fitzroys and Lennoxes, the Russells and Grenvilles, families whose
resistance to the Stuarts, whose share in the Revolution, whose energy
in setting the line of Hanover on the throne, gave them a claim to
power. It was due yet more largely to the activity with which the Whigs
devoted themselves to the gaining and preserving an ascendency in the
House of Commons. The support of the commercial classes and of the great
towns was secured not only by a resolute maintenance of public credit,
but by the special attention which each ministry paid to questions of
trade and finance. Peace and the reduction of the land-tax conciliated
the farmers and the landowners, while the Jacobite sympathies of the
bulk of the squires, and their consequent withdrawal from all share in
politics, threw even the representation of the shires for a time into
Whig hands. Of the county members, who formed the less numerous but the
weightier part of the lower House, nine-tenths were for some years
relatives and dependents of the great Whig families. Nor were coarser
means of controlling Parliament neglected. The wealth of the Whig houses
was lavishly spent in securing a monopoly of the small and corrupt
constituencies which made up a large part of the borough representation.
It was spent yet more unscrupulously in parliamentary bribery.
Corruption was older than Walpole or the Whig Ministers, for it sprang
out of the very transfer of power to the House of Commons which had
begun with the Restoration. The transfer was complete, and the House was
supreme in the State; but while freeing itself from the control of the
Crown, it was as yet imperfectly responsible to the people. It was only
at election time that a member felt the pressure of public opinion. The
secrecy of parliamentary proceedings, which had been needful as a
safeguard against royal interference with debate, served as a safeguard
against interference on the part of constituencies. This strange union
of immense power with absolute freedom from responsibility brought about
its natural results in the bulk of members. A vote was too valuable to
be given without recompense, and parliamentary support had to be bought
by places, pensions, and bribes in hard cash.
But dexterous as was their management, and compact as was their
organization, it was to nobler qualities than these that the Whigs owed
their long rule over England. Factious and selfish as much of their
conduct proved, they were true to their principles, and their principles
were those for which England had been struggling through two hundred
years. The right to free government, to freedom of conscience, and to
freedom of speech, had been declared indeed in the Revolution of 1688.
But these rights owe their definite establishment as the recognized
basis of national life and national action to the age of the Georges. It
was the long and unbroken fidelity to free principles with which the
Whig administration was conducted that made constitutional government a
part of the very life of Englishmen. It was their government of England
year after year on the principles of the Revolution that converted
these principles into national habits. Before their long rule was over
Englishmen had forgotten that it was possible to persecute for
difference of opinion, or to put down the liberty of the press, or to
tamper with the administration of justice, or to rule without a
Parliament.
[Sidenote: Robert Walpole.]
That this policy was so firmly grasped and so steadily carried out was
due above all to the genius of Robert Walpole. Walpole was born in 1676;
and he had entered Parliament two years before the death of William of
Orange as a young Norfolk landowner of fair fortune, with the tastes and
air of the class from which he sprang. His big, square figure, his
vulgar good-humoured face were those of a common country squire. And in
Walpole the squire underlay the statesman to the last. He was ignorant
of books, he "loved neither writing nor reading," and if he had a taste
for art, his real love was for the table, the bottle, and the chase. He
rode as hard as he drank. Even in moments of political peril, the first
despatch he would open was the letter from his gamekeeper. There was the
temper of the Norfolk fox-hunter in the "doggedness" which Marlborough
noted as his characteristic, in the burly self-confidence which declared
"If I had not been Prime Minister I should have been Archbishop of
Canterbury," in the stubborn courage which conquered the awkwardness of
his earlier efforts to speak or met single-handed at the last the bitter
attacks of a host of enemies. There was the same temper in the genial
good-humour which became with him a new force in politics. No man was
ever more fiercely attacked by speakers and writers, but he brought in
no "gagging Act" for the press; and though the lives of most of his
assailants were in his hands through their intrigues with the Pretender,
he made little use of his power over them.
[Sidenote: His policy.]
Where his country breeding showed itself most, however, was in the
shrewd, narrow, honest character of his mind. Though he saw very
clearly, he could not see far, and he would not believe what he could
not see. His prosaic good sense turned sceptically away from the poetic
and passionate sides of human feeling. Appeals to the loftier or purer
motives of action he laughed at as "schoolboy nights." For young members
who talked of public virtue or patriotism he had one good-natured
answer: "You will soon come off that and grow wiser." But he was
thoroughly straightforward and true to his own convictions, so far as
they went. "Robin and I are two honest men," the Jacobite Shippen owned
in later years, when contrasting him with his factious opponents: "he is
for King George and I am for King James, but those men with long cravats
only desire place either under King George or King James." What marked
him off from his fellow-Whigs however was not so much the clearness with
which Walpole saw the value of the political results which the
Revolution had won, or the fidelity with which he carried out his
"Revolution principles"; it was the sagacity with which he grasped the
conditions on which alone England could be brought to a quiet acceptance
of both of them. He never hid from himself that, weakened and broken as
it was, Toryism, lived on in the bulk of the nation as a spirit of
sullen opposition, an opposition that could not rise into active revolt
so long as the Pretender remained a Catholic, but which fed itself with
hopes of a Stuart who would at last befriend English religion and
English liberty, and which in the meanwhile lay ready to give force and
virulence to any outbreak of strife at home. On a temper such as this
argument was wasted. The only agency that could deal with it was the
agency of time, the slow wearing away of prejudice, the slow upgrowth of
new ideas, the gradual conviction that a Stuart restoration was
hopeless, the as gradual recognition of the benefits which had been won
by the Revolution, and which were secured by the maintenance of the
House of Hanover upon the throne.
[Sidenote: The Townshend Ministry.]
Such a transition would be hindered or delayed by every outbreak of
political or religious controversy that changes or reforms, however wise
in themselves, must necessarily bring with them; and Walpole held that
no reform was as important to the country at large as a national
reunion and settlement. Not less keen and steady was his sense of the
necessity of external peace. To provoke or to suffer new struggles on
the Continent was not only to rouse fresh resentment in a people who
still longed to withdraw from all part in foreign wars; it was to give
fresh force to the Pretender by forcing France to use him as a tool
against England, and to give fresh life to Jacobitism by stirring fresh
hopes of the Pretender's return. It was for this reason that Walpole
clung steadily to a policy of peace. But it was not at once that he
could force such a policy either on the Whig party or on the king.
Though his vigour in the cause of his party had earned him the bitter
hostility of the Tories in the later years of Anne, and a trumped-up
charge of peculation had served in 1712 as a pretext for expelling him
from the House and committing him to the Tower, at the accession of
George the First Walpole was far from holding the commanding position he
was soon to assume. The stage indeed was partly cleared for him by the
jealousy with which the new sovereign regarded the men who had till now
served as chiefs of the Whigs. Though the first Hanoverian Ministry was
drawn wholly from the Whig party, its leaders and Marlborough found
themselves alike set aside. But even had they regained their old power,
time must soon have removed them; for Wharton and Halifax died in 1715,
and 1716 saw the death of Somers and the imbecility of Marlborough. The
man to whom the king entrusted the direction of affairs was the new
Secretary of State, Lord Townshend. His merit with George the First lay
in his having negotiated a Barrier Treaty with Holland in 1709 by which
the Dutch were secured in the possession of a greater number of
fortresses in the Netherlands than they had garrisoned before the war,
on condition of their guaranteeing the succession of the House of
Hanover. The king had always looked on this treaty as the great support
of his cause, and on its negotiation as representing that union of
Holland, Hanover, and the Whigs, to which he owed his throne.
Townshend's fellow Secretary was General Stanhope, who had won fame both
as a soldier and a politician, and who was now raised to the peerage. It
was as Townshend's brother-in-law, rather than from a sense of his
actual ability, that Walpole successively occupied the posts of
Paymaster of the Forces, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and First Lord of
the Treasury, in the new administration.
[Sidenote: The rising of 1715.]
The first work of the new Ministry was to meet a desperate attempt of
the Pretender to gain the throne. There was no real hope of success, for
the active Jacobites in England were few, and the Tories were broken and
dispirited by the fall of their leaders. The policy of Bolingbroke, as
Secretary of State to the Pretender, was to defer action till he had
secured help from Charles the Twelfth of Sweden, and had induced Lewis
the Fourteenth to lend a few thousand men to aid a Jacobite rising. But
at the moment of action the death of Lewis ruined all hope of aid from
France; the hope of Swedish aid proved as fruitless; and in spite of
Bolingbroke's counsels James Stuart resolved to act alone. Without
informing his new Minister, he ordered the Earl of Mar to give the
signal for revolt in the North. In Scotland the triumph of the Whigs
meant the continuance of the House of Argyle in power; and the rival
Highland clans were as ready to fight the Campbells under Mar as they
had been ready to fight them under Dundee or Montrose. But Mar was a
leader of a different stamp from these. In September 1715 six thousand
Highlanders joined him at Perth, but his cowardice or want of conduct
kept his army idle till the Duke of Argyle had gathered forces to meet
it in an indecisive engagement at Sheriffmuir. The Pretender, who
arrived too late for the action, proved a yet more sluggish and
incapable leader than Mar: and at the close of the year an advance of
six thousand men under General Carpenter drove James over-sea again and
dispersed the clans to their hills. In England the danger passed away
like a dream. The accession of the new king had been followed by some
outbreaks of riotous discontent; but at the talk of Highland risings
and French invasions Tories and Whigs alike rallied round the throne;
while the army, which had bitterly resented the interruption of its
victories by the treachery of St. John, and hailed with delight the
restoration of Marlborough to its command, went hotly for King George.
The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, and the arrest of their leader,
Sir William Wyndham, cowed the Jacobites; and not a man stirred in the
west when Ormond appeared off the coast of Devon and called on his party
to rise. Oxford alone, where the University was a hotbed of Jacobitism,
showed itself restless; and a few of the Catholic gentry rose in
Northumberland, under Lord Derwentwater and Mr. Forster. The arrival of
two thousand Highlanders who had been sent to join them by Mar spurred
these insurgents to march into Lancashire, where the Catholic party was
strongest; but they were soon cooped up in Preston, and driven to a
surrender.
[Sidenote: England and France.]
The Ministry availed itself of their triumph to gratify the
Nonconformists by a repeal of the Schism and Occasional Conformity Acts,
and to venture on a great constitutional change. Under the Triennial
Bill in William's reign the duration of a Parliament was limited to
three years. Now that the House of Commons however was become the ruling
power in the State, a change was absolutely required to secure
steadiness and fixity of political action; and in 1716 this necessity
coincided with the desire of the Whigs to maintain in power a thoroughly
Whig Parliament. The duration of Parliament was therefore extended to
seven years by the Septennial Bill. But while the Jacobite rising
produced these important changes at home, it brought about a yet more
momentous change in English policy abroad. The foresight of William the
Third in his attempt to secure European peace by an alliance of the
three Western powers, France, Holland, and England, was justified by the
realization of his policy under George the First. The new triple
alliance was brought about by the practical advantages which it directly
offered to the rulers in both England and France, as well as by the
actual position of European politics. The landing of James in Scotland
had quickened the anxiety of King George for his removal to a more
distant refuge than Lorraine, and for the entire detachment of France
from his cause. In France on the other hand a political revolution had
been caused by the death of Lewis the Fourteenth, which took place in
September 1715, at the very hour of the Jacobite outbreak. From that
moment the country had been ruled by the Duke of Orleans as Regent for
the young King Lewis the Fifteenth. The boy's health was weak; and the
Duke stood next to him in the succession to the crown, if Philip of
Spain observed the renunciation of his rights which he had made in the
Treaty of Utrecht. It was well known however that Philip had no notion
of observing this renunciation, and that he was already intriguing with
a strong party in France against the hopes as well as the actual power
of the Duke. Nor was Spain more inclined to adhere to its own
renunciations in the Treaty than its king. The constant dream of every
Spaniard was to recover all that Spain had given up, to win back her
Italian dependencies, to win back Gibraltar where the English flag waved
upon Spanish soil, to win back, above all, that monopoly of commerce
with her dominions in America which England was now entitled to break in
upon by the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht.
[Sidenote: Their alliance against Spain.]
To attempt such a recovery was to defy Europe; for if the Treaty had
stripped Spain of its fairest dependencies, it had enriched almost every
European state with its spoils. Savoy had gained Sicily; the Emperor
held the Netherlands, with Naples and the Milanese; Holland looked on
the Barrier fortresses as vital to its own security; England, if as yet
indifferent to the value of Gibraltar, clung tenaciously to the American
Trade. But the boldness of Cardinal Alberoni, who was now the Spanish
Minister, accepted the risk; and while his master was intriguing against
the Regent in France, Alberoni promised aid to the Jacobite cause as a
means of preventing the interference of England with his designs. In
spite of failure in both countries he resolved boldly on an attempt to
recover the Italian provinces which Philip had lost. He selected the
Duke of Savoy as the weakest of his opponents; and armaments greater
than Spain had seen for a century put to sea in 1717, and reduced the
island of Sardinia. The blow however was hardly needed to draw England
and France together. The Abbe Dubois, a confidant of the Regent, had
already met the English King with his Secretary, Lord Stanhope, at the
Hague; and entered into a compact, by which France guaranteed the
Hanoverian line in England, and England the succession of the house of
Orleans should Lewis the Fifteenth die without heirs. The two powers
were joined, though unwillingly, by Holland in an alliance, which was
concluded on the basis of this compact; and, as in William's time, the
existence of this alliance told on the whole aspect of European
politics. Though in the summer of 1718 a strong Spanish force landed in
Sicily, and made itself master of the island, the appearance of an
English squadron in the Straits of Messina was followed by an engagement
in which the Spanish fleet was all but destroyed. Alberoni strove to
avenge the blow by fitting out an armament of five thousand men, which
the Duke of Ormond was to command, for a revival of the Jacobite rising
in Scotland. But the ships were wrecked in the Bay of Biscay; and the
accession of Austria with Savoy to the Triple Alliance, with the death
of the king of Sweden, left Spain alone in the face of Europe. The
progress of the French armies in the north of Spain forced Philip at
last to give way. Alberoni was dismissed; and the Spanish forces were
withdrawn from Sardinia and Sicily. The last of these islands now passed
to the Emperor, Savoy being compensated for its loss by the acquisition
of Sardinia, from which its Duke took the title of King; while the work
of the Treaty of Utrecht was completed by the Emperor's renunciation of
his claims on the crown of Spain, and Philip's renunciation of his
claims on the Milanese and the Two Sicilies.
[Sidenote: Resignation of Townshend.]
Successful as the Ministry had been in its work of peace, the struggle
had disclosed the difficulties which the double position of its new
sovereign was to bring upon England. George was not only King of
England; he was Elector of Hanover; and in his own mind he cared far
more for the interests of his Electorate than for the interests of his
kingdom. His first aim was to use the power of his new monarchy to
strengthen his position in North Germany. At this moment that position
was mainly threatened by the hostility of the king of Sweden. Denmark
had taken advantage of the defeat and absence of Charles the Twelfth to
annex Bremen and Verden with Schleswig and Holstein to its dominions;
but in its dread of the Swedish king's return it secured the help of
Hanover by ceding the first two towns to the Electorate on a promise of
alliance in the war against him. The despatch of a British fleet into
the Baltic with the purpose of overawing Sweden identified England with
the policy of Hanover; and Charles, who from the moment of his return
bent his whole energies to regain what he had lost, retorted by joining
in the schemes of Alberoni, and by concluding an alliance with the
Russian Czar, Peter the Great, who for other reasons was hostile to the
court of Hanover, for a restoration of the Stuarts. Luckily for the new
dynasty his plans were brought to an end at the close of 1718 by his
death at the siege of Frederickshall; but the policy which provoked them
had already brought about the dissolution of the Whig Ministry. When
George pressed on his cabinet a treaty of alliance by which England
shielded Hanover and its acquisitions from any efforts of the Swedish
King, Townshend and Walpole gave a reluctant assent to a measure which
they regarded as sacrificing English interests to that of the
Electorate, and as entangling the country yet more in the affairs of the
Continent. For the moment indeed they yielded to the fact that Bremen
and Verden were not only of the highest importance to Hanover, which was
brought by them in contact with the sea, but of hardly less value to
England itself, as they placed the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser, the
chief inlets for British commerce into Germany, in the hands of a
friendly state. But they refused to take any further steps in carrying
out a Hanoverian policy; and they successfully withstood an attempt of
the king to involve England in a war with the Czar, when Russian troops
entered Mecklenburg. The resentment of George the First was seconded by
intrigues among their fellow-ministers; and in 1717 Townshend and
Walpole were forced to resign their posts.
[Sidenote: The Stanhope Ministry.]
The want of their good sense soon made itself felt. In the reconstituted
cabinet Lords Sunderland and Stanhope remained supreme; and their first
aim was to secure the maintenance of the Whig power by a constitutional
change. Firm as was the hold of the Whigs over the Commons, it might be
shaken by a revulsion of popular feeling, it might be ruined, as it was
destined to be ruined afterwards, by a change in the temper of the king.
Sunderland sought a permanence of public policy which neither popular
nor royal government could give in the changelessness of a fixed
aristocracy with its centre in the Lords. Harley's creation of twelve
peers to ensure the sanction of the Lords to the Treaty of Utrecht
showed that the Crown possessed a power of swamping the majority and
changing the balance of opinion in the House of Peers. In 1720 therefore
the Ministry introduced a bill, suggested as was believed by Lord
Sunderland, which professed to secure the liberty of the Upper House by
limiting the power of the Crown in the creation of fresh Peers. The
number of Peers was permanently fixed at the number then sitting in the
House; and creations could only be made when vacancies occurred.
Twenty-five hereditary Scotch Peers were substituted for the sixteen
elected Peers for Scotland. The bill however was strenuously opposed by
Robert Walpole. Not only was it a measure which broke the political
quiet which he looked on as a necessity for the new government, but it
jarred on his good sense as a statesman. It would in fact have rendered
representative government impossible. For representative government was
now coming day by day more completely to mean government by the will of
the House of Commons, carried out by a Ministry which served as the
mouthpiece of that will. But it was only through the prerogative of the
Crown, as exercised under the advice of such a Ministry, that the Peers
could be forced to bow to the will of the Lower House in matters where
their opinion was adverse to that of the Commons; and the proposal of
Sunderland would have brought legislation and government to a dead lock.
[Sidenote: South Sea Bubble.]
It was to Walpole's opposition that the Peerage Bill owed its defeat;
and this success forced his rivals again to admit him, with Townshend,
to a share in the Ministry, though they occupied subordinate offices.
But this arrangement was soon to yield to a more natural one. The sudden
increase of English commerce begot at this moment the mania of
speculation. Ever since the age of Elizabeth the unknown wealth of
Spanish America had acted like a spell upon the imagination of
Englishmen, and Harley gave countenance to a South Sea Company, which
promised a reduction of the public debt as the price of a monopoly of
the Spanish trade. Spain however clung jealously to her old prohibitions
of all foreign commerce; and the Treaty of Utrecht only won for England
the right of engaging in the negro slave-trade with its dominions and of
despatching a single ship to the coast of Spanish America. But in spite
of all this, the Company again came forward, offering in exchange for
new privileges to pay off national burdens which amounted to nearly a
million a year. It was in vain that Walpole warned the Ministry and the
country against this "dream." Both went mad; and in 1720 bubble Company
followed bubble Company, till the inevitable reaction brought a general
ruin in its train. The crash brought Stanhope to the grave. Of his
colleagues, many were found to have received bribes from the South Sea
Company to back its frauds. Craggs, the Secretary of State, died of
terror at the investigation; Aislabie, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
was sent to the Tower; and in the general wreck of his rivals Robert
Walpole mounted again into power. In 1721 he became First Lord of the
Treasury, while his brother-in-law, Lord Townshend, returned to his
post of Secretary of State. But their relative position was now
reversed. Townshend had been the head in the earlier administration: in
this Walpole was resolved, to use his own characteristic phrase, that
"the firm should be Walpole and Townshend and not Townshend and
Walpole."
[Sidenote: Walpole's Ministry.]
But it was no mere chance or good luck which maintained Walpole at the
head of affairs for more than twenty years. If no Minister has fared
worse at the hand of poets or historians, there are few whose greatness
has been more impartially recognized by practical statesmen. His
qualities indeed were such as a practical statesman can alone do full
justice to. There is nothing to charm in the outer aspect of the man;
nor is there anything picturesque in the work which he set himself to
do, or in the means by which he succeeded in doing it. But picturesque
or no, the work of keeping England quiet, and of giving quiet to Europe,
was in itself a noble one; and it is the temper with which he carried on
this work, the sagacity with which he discerned the means by which alone
it could be done, and the stubborn, indomitable will with which he faced
every difficulty in the doing it, which gives Walpole his place among
English statesmen. He was the first and he was the most successful of
our Peace Ministers. "The most pernicious circumstances," he said, "in
which this country can be are those of war; as we must be losers while
it lasts, and cannot be great gainers when it ends." It was not that the
honour or influence of England suffered in Walpole's hands, for he won
victories by the firmness of his policy and the skill of his
negotiations as effectual as any that are won by arms. But up to the
very end of his Ministry, when the frenzy of the nation at last forced
his hand, in spite of every varying complication of foreign affairs, and
a never-ceasing pressure alike from the Opposition and the Court, it is
the glory of Walpole that he resolutely kept England at peace. And as he
was the first of our Peace Ministers, so he was the first of our
Financiers. He was far indeed from discerning the powers which later
statesmen have shown to exist in a sound finance, powers of producing
both national developement and international amity; but he had the sense
to see, what no minister till then had seen, that the only help a
statesman can give to industry or commerce is to remove all obstacles in
the way of their natural growth, and that beyond this the best course he
can take in presence of a great increase in national energy and national
wealth is to look quietly on and to let it alone. At the outset of his
rule he declared in a speech from the Throne that nothing would more
conduce to the extension of commerce "than to make the exportation of
our own manufactures, and the importation of the commodities used in the
manufacturing of them, as practicable and easy as may be."
[Sidenote: Walpole's finance.]
The first act of his financial administration was to take off the duties
from more than a hundred British exports, and nearly forty articles of
importation. In 1730 he broke in the same enlightened spirit through the
prejudice which restricted the commerce of the Colonies to the mother
country alone, by allowing Georgia and the Carolinas to export their
rice directly to any part of Europe. The result was that the rice of
America soon drove that of Italy and Egypt from the market. His Excise
Bill, defective as it was, was the first measure in which an English
Minister showed any real grasp of the principles of taxation. The wisdom
of Walpole was rewarded by a quick upgrowth of prosperity. The material
progress of the country was such as England had never seen before. Our
exports, which were only six millions in value at the beginning of the
century, had reached the value of twelve millions by the middle of it.
It was above all the trade with the Colonies which began to give England
a new wealth. The whole Colonial trade at the time of the battle of
Blenheim was no greater than the trade with the single isle of Jamaica
at the opening of the American war. At the accession of George the
Second the exports to Pennsylvania were valued at L15,000. At his death
they reached half-a-million. In the middle of the eighteenth century
the profits of Great Britain from the trade with the Colonies were
estimated at two millions a year. And with the growth of wealth came a
quick growth in population. That of Manchester and Birmingham, whose
manufactures were now becoming of importance, doubled in thirty years.
Bristol, the chief seat of the West Indian trade, rose into new
prosperity. Liverpool, which owes its creation to the new trade with the
West, sprang up from a little country town into the third port in the
kingdom. With peace and security, and the wealth that they brought with
them, the value of land, and with it the rental of every country
gentleman, rose fast. "Estates which were rented at two thousand a year
threescore years ago," said Burke in 1766, "are at three thousand at
present."
[Sidenote: His policy of inaction.]
Nothing shows more clearly the soundness of his political intellect than
the fact that this upgrowth of wealth around him never made Walpole
swerve from a rigid economy, from a steady reduction of the debt, or a
diminution of fiscal duties. Even before the death of George the First
the public burdens were reduced by twenty millions. It was indeed in
economy alone that his best work could be done. In finance as in other
fields of statesmanship Walpole was forbidden from taking more than
tentative steps towards a wiser system by the needs of the work he had
specially to do. To this work everything gave way. He withdrew his
Excise Bill rather than suffer the agitation it roused to break the
quiet which was reconciling the country to the system of the Revolution.
His hatred of religious intolerance or the support he hoped for from the
Dissenters never swayed him to rouse the spirit of popular bigotry,
which he knew to be ready to burst out at the slightest challenge, by
any effort to repeal the laws against Nonconformity. His temper was
naturally vigorous and active; and yet the years of his power are years
without parallel in our annals for political stagnation. His long
administration indeed is almost without a history. All legislative and
political action seemed to cease with his entry into office. Year after
year passed by without a change. In the third year of Walpole's ministry
there was but one division in the House of Commons. Such an inaction
gives little scope for the historian; but it fell in with the temper of
the nation at large. It was popular with the class which commonly
presses for political activity. The energy of the trading class was
absorbed for the time in the rapid extension of commerce and
accumulation of wealth. So long as the country was justly and
temperately governed the merchant and shopkeeper were content to leave
government in the hands that held it. All they asked was to be let alone
to enjoy their new freedom and develope their new industries. And
Walpole let them alone. On the other hand, the forces which opposed the
Revolution lost year by year somewhat of their energy. The fervour
which breeds revolt died down among the Jacobites as their swords rusted
idly in their scabbards. The Tories sulked in their country houses; but
their wrath against the House of Hanover ebbed away for want of
opportunities of exerting itself. And meanwhile on opponents as on
friends the freedom which the Revolution had brought with it was doing
its work. It was to the patient influence of this freedom that Walpole
trusted; and it was the special mark of his administration that in spite
of every temptation he gave it full play. Though he dared not touch the
laws that oppressed the Catholic or the Dissenter, he took care that
they should remain inoperative. Catholic worship went on unhindered.
Yearly bills of indemnity exempted the Nonconformists from the
consequences of their infringement of the Test Act. There was no
tampering with public justice or with personal liberty. Thought and
action were alike left free. No Minister was ever more foully slandered
by journalists and pamphleteers; but Walpole never meddled with the
press.
[Sidenote: Fresh efforts of Spain.]
Abroad as well as at home the difficulties in the way of his policy were
enormous. Peace was still hard to maintain. Defeated as her first
attempt had been, Spain remained resolute to regain her lost provinces,
to recover Gibraltar and Minorca, and to restore her old monopoly of
trade with her American colonies. She had learned that she could do
this only by breaking the alliance of the Four Powers, which left her
isolated in Europe; and she saw at last a chance of breaking this league
in the difficulties of the House of Austria. The Emperor Charles the
Sixth was without a son. He had issued a Pragmatic Sanction by which he
provided that his hereditary dominions should descend unbroken to his
daughter, Maria Theresa, but no European state had as yet consented to
guarantee her succession. Spain seized on this opportunity of detaching
the Emperor from the Western powers. She promised to support the
Pragmatic Sanction in return for a pledge on the part of Charles to aid
in wresting Gibraltar and Minorca from England, and in securing to a
Spanish prince the succession to Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany. A grant
of the highest trading privileges in her American dominions to a
commercial company which the Emperor had established at Ostend, in
defiance of the Treaty of Westphalia and the remonstrances of England
and Holland, revealed this secret alliance; and there were fears of the
adhesion of Russia, which still remained hostile to England through the
quarrel with Hanover. The danger was met for a while by an alliance of
England, France, and Prussia, in 1725; but the withdrawal of the last
Power again gave courage to the confederates, and in 1727 the Spaniards
besieged Gibraltar while Charles threatened an invasion of Holland. The
moderation of Walpole alone averted a European war. While sending
British squadrons to the Baltic, the Spanish coast, and America, he
succeeded by diplomatic pressure in again forcing the Emperor to
inaction; after weary negotiations Spain was brought in 1729 to sign the
Treaty of Seville and to content herself with the promise of a
succession of a Spanish prince to the Duchies of Parma and Tuscany; and
the discontent of Charles the Sixth at this concession was allayed in
1731 by giving the guarantee of England to the Pragmatic Sanction.
[Sidenote: George the Second.]
The patience and even temper which Walpole showed in this business were
the more remarkable that in the course of it his power received what
seemed a fatal shock from the death of the king. George the First died
on a journey to Hanover in 1727; and his successor, George the Second,
was known to have hated his father's Minister hardly less than he had
hated his father. But hate Walpole as he might, the new king was
absolutely guided by the adroitness of his wife, Caroline of Anspach;
and Caroline had resolved that there should be no change in the
Ministry. After a few days of withdrawal therefore Walpole again
returned to office; and the years which followed were those in which his
power reached its height. He gained as great an influence over George
the Second as he had gained over his father: and in spite of the steady
increase of his opponents in the House of Commons, his hold over it
remained unshaken. The country was tranquil and prosperous. The
prejudices of the landed gentry were met by a steady effort to reduce
the land-tax, whose pressure was half the secret of their hostility to
the Revolution that produced it. The Church was quiet. The Jacobites
were too hopeless to stir. A few trade measures and social reforms crept
quietly through the Houses. An inquiry into the state of the gaols
showed that social thought was not utterly dead. A bill of great value
enacted that all proceedings in courts of justice should henceforth be
in the English tongue.
[Sidenote: Excise Bill.]
Only once did Walpole break this tranquillity by an attempt at a great
measure of statesmanship; and the result of his attempt proved how wise
was the inactivity of his general policy. No tax had from the first
moment of its introduction been more unpopular than the Excise. Its
origin was due to Pym and the Long Parliament, who imposed duties on
beer, cyder, and perry, which at the Restoration produced an annual
income of more than six hundred thousand pounds. The war with France at
the Revolution brought with it the imposition of a malt-tax and
additional duties on spirits, wine, tobacco, and other articles. So
great had been the increase in the public wealth that the return from
the Excise amounted at the death of George the First to nearly two
millions and a half a year. But its unpopularity remained unabated, and
even philosophers like Locke contended that the whole public revenue
should be drawn from direct taxes upon the land. Walpole, on the other
hand, saw in the growth of indirect taxation a means of winning over the
country gentry to the new dynasty of the Revolution by freeing the land
from all burdens whatever. He saw too a means of diminishing the loss
suffered by the revenue from the Customs through smuggling and fraud.
These losses were immense; that on tobacco alone amounted to a third of
the whole duty. In 1733 therefore he introduced an Excise Bill, which
met this evil by the establishment of bonded warehouses, and by the
collection of the duties from the inland dealers in the form of Excise
and not of Customs. The first measure would have made London a free
port, and doubled English trade. The second would have so largely
increased the revenue, without any loss to the consumer, as to enable
Walpole to repeal the land-tax. In the case of tea and coffee alone, the
change in the mode of levying the duty was estimated to bring in an
additional hundred thousand pounds a year. The necessaries of life and
the raw materials of manufacture were in Walpole's plan to remain
absolutely untaxed. The scheme was in effect an anticipation of the
principles which have guided English finance since the triumph of free
trade, and every part of it has now been carried into effect. But in
1733 Walpole stood ahead of his time. The violence of his opponents was
hacked by an outburst of popular prejudice; riots almost grew into
revolt; and in spite of the Queen's wish to put down resistance by
force, Walpole withdrew the bill. "I will not be the Minister," he said
with noble self-command, "to enforce taxes at the expense of blood."
[Sidenote: The Patriots.]
What had fanned popular prejudice into a flame during the uproar over
the Excise Bill was the violence of the so-called "Patriots." In the
absence of a strong opposition and of great impulses to enthusiasm a
party breaks readily into factions; and the weakness of the Tories
joined with the stagnation of public affairs to breed faction among the
Whigs. Walpole too was jealous of power; and as his jealousy drove
colleague after colleague out of office they became leaders of a party
whose sole aim was to thrust him from his post. Greed of power indeed
was the one passion which mastered his robust common sense. Townshend
was turned out of office in 1730, Lord Chesterfield in 1733; and though
he started with the ablest administration the country had known, Walpole
was left after twenty years of supremacy with but one man of ability in
his cabinet, the Chancellor, Lord Hardwicke. With the single exception
of Townshend, the colleagues whom his jealousy dismissed plunged into an
opposition more factious and unprincipled than has ever disgraced
English politics. The "Patriots," as they called themselves, owned
Pulteney, a brilliant speaker and unscrupulous intriguer, as their head;
they were reinforced by a band of younger Whigs--the "Boys," as Walpole
named them--whose temper revolted alike against the inaction and
cynicism of his policy, and whose fiery spokesman was a young cornet of
horse, William Pitt; and they rallied to these the fragment of the Tory
party which still took part in politics, a fragment inconsiderable in
numbers but of far greater weight as representing a large part of the
nation, and which was guided for a while by the virulent ability of
Bolingbroke, whom Walpole had suffered to return from exile, but to whom
he had refused the restoration of his seat in the House of Lords. Inside
Parliament indeed the invectives of the "Patriots" fell dead before
Walpole's majorities and his good-humoured contempt; so far were their
attacks from shaking his power that Bolingbroke abandoned the struggle
in despair to return again into exile, while Pulteney with his party
could only take refuge in a silly secession from Parliament. But on the
nation at large their speeches and pamphlets, with the brilliant
sarcasms of their literary allies, such as Pope or Johnson, did more
effective work. Unjust indeed as their outcry was, the growing response
to it told that the political inactivity of the country was drawing to
an end. It was the very success of Walpole's policy which was to bring
about his downfall; for it was the gradual closing of the chasm which
had all but broken England into two warring peoples that allowed the
political energy of the country to return to its natural channels and to
give a new vehemence to political strife. Vague too and hollow as much
of the "high talk" of the Patriots was, it showed that the age of
political cynicism, of that unbelief in high sentiment and noble
aspirations which had followed on the crash of Puritanism, was drawing
to an end. Rant about ministerial corruption would have fallen flat on
the public ear had not new moral forces, a new sense of social virtue, a
new sense of religion been stirring, however blindly, in the minds of
Englishmen.
[Sidenote: The Methodists.]
The stir showed itself markedly in a religious revival which dates from
the later years of Walpole's ministry; and which began in a small knot
of Oxford students, whose revolt against the religious deadness of their
times expressed itself in ascetic observances, an enthusiastic devotion,
and a methodical regularity of life which gained them the nickname of
"Methodists." Three figures detached themselves from the group as soon
as, on its transfer to London in 1738, it attracted public attention by
the fervour and even extravagance of its piety; and each found his
special work in the task to which the instinct of the new movement led
it from the first, that of carrying religion and morality to the vast
masses of population which lay concentrated in the towns or around the
mines and collieries of Cornwall and the north. Whitefield, a servitor
of Pembroke College, was above all the preacher of the revival. Speech
was governing English politics; and the religious power of speech was
shown when a dread of "enthusiasm" closed against the new apostles the
pulpits of the Established Church, and forced them to preach in the
fields. Their voice was soon heard in the wildest and most barbarous
corners of the land, among the bleak moors of Northumberland, or in the
dens of London, or in the long galleries where in the pauses of his
labour the Cornish miner listens to the sobbing of the sea. Whitefield's
preaching was such as England had never heard before, theatrical,
extravagant, often commonplace, but hushing all criticism by its intense
reality, its earnestness of belief, its deep tremulous sympathy with the
sin and sorrow of mankind. It was no common enthusiast who could wring
gold from the close-fisted Franklin and admiration from the fastidious
Horace Walpole, or who could look down from the top of a green knoll at
Kingswood on twenty thousand colliers, grimy from the Bristol coal-pits,
and see as he preached the tears "making white channels down their
blackened cheeks."
[Sidenote: The religious revival.]
On the rough and ignorant masses to whom they spoke the effect of
Whitefield and his fellow Methodists was mighty both for good and ill.
Their preaching stirred a passionate hatred in their opponents. Their
lives were often in danger, they were mobbed, they were ducked, they
were stoned, they were smothered with filth. But the enthusiasm they
aroused was equally passionate. Women fell down in convulsions; strong
men were smitten suddenly to the earth; the preacher was interrupted by
bursts of hysteric laughter or of hysteric sobbing. All the phenomena of
strong spiritual excitement, so familiar now, but at that time strange
and unknown, followed on their sermons; and the terrible sense of a
conviction of sin, a new dread of hell, a new hope of heaven, took forms
at once grotesque and sublime. Charles Wesley, a Christ Church student,
came to add sweetness to this sudden and startling light. He was the
"sweet singer" of the movement. His hymns expressed the fiery conviction
of its converts in lines so chaste and beautiful that its more
extravagant features disappeared. The wild throes of hysteric enthusiasm
passed into a passion for hymn-singing, and a new musical impulse was
aroused in the people which gradually changed the face of public
devotion throughout England.
[Sidenote: John Wesley.]