You are pleasd to adduce an Instance in 1754 in Addition to that in

1747, which you say "makes it probable, that the House of

Representatives rather chose that the Court should sit elsewhere, when

a Comittee was chosen to consider of and report a proper place for a

Court House at a Distance from Boston". We beg Leave here to observe,

that both these are Instances of the House's interresting themselves

in this Affair, which your Honor now claims as a Prerogative: If the

House were in no Case to have a Voice, or be regarded, in chusing a

place to hold the Court, how could they think of building a House in a

place, to which they never had been, and probably, never would be

called.--

While the House have been from time to time, holding up to View, the

great Inconveniencys and manifest Injurys resulting from the Sitting

of the Assembly at Cambridge, and praying a Removal to Boston, it is

with Pain that they have heard your Honor, instead of pointing out any

one good Purpose which can be answerd by it, replying that your

Instructions will not permit you to remove the Court to Boston. By a

royal Grant in the Charter, in favor of the Commons of this province,

the Governor has the sole power of adjourning, proroguing and

dissolving the General Court: And the Wisdom of that Grant appears in

this, that a person residing in the province, must be a more competent

Judge, of the Fitness of the Time, and we may add, the place of

holding the Court, than any person residing in Great Britain. We do

not deny, that there may be Instances when the Comander in Chiefe,

ought to obey the Royal Instructions: And should we also admit, that

in ordinary Cases he ought to obey them, respecting the convening,

holding, proroguing, adjourning & dissolving the General Court,

notwithstanding that Grant; yet we clearly hold, that whenever

Instructions cannot by complyd with, without injuring the people, they

cease to be binding. Any other Supposition would involve this

Absurdity in it, that a Substitute by Means of Instructions from his

Principal, may have a greater Power than the Principal himself; or in

other Words, that a Representative of a King who can do no Wrong, by

means of Instructions may obtain a Right to do Wrong: for that the

Prerogative extends not to do any Injury, never has and never can be

denyd. Therefore this House are clearly of Opinion, that your Honor is

under no Obligation to hold the General Court at Cambridge, let your

Instructions be conceivd in Terms ever so peremptory, in as much as it

is inconvenient and injurious to the province.--As to your Commission,

it is certain, that no Clause containd in that, inconsistent with the

Charter can be binding: To suppose, that when a Grant is made by

Charter in favor of the people, Instructions shall supercede that

Grant, and oblige the Governor to act repugnant to it, vacating the

Charter at once, by the Breath of a Minister of State. Your Honor

thinks you may safely say, "there is not one of us, who if he was in

your Station, would venture to depart from the Instructions ." As you

had not the least Shadow of Evidence to warrant this, we are sure you

could not say it with Safety: And we leave it with your Honor to

determine, how far it is reconcileable with Delicacy to suggest it. In

what particulars the holding the General Court at Cambridge is

injurious to us and the Province, has already been declared by the

House, and must be too obvious to escape your Honors Observation. Yet

you are pleasd to tell us, that "the Inconveniences can easily be

removd, or are so inconsiderable that a very small publick Benefit

will outweigh them"--That they are not inconsiderable, every Days

Experience convinces us; nor are our Constituents insensible of them:

But how they can be easily removd, we cannot conceive, unless by

removing the Court to Boston. Can the publick Offices & Records, to

which we are under the Necessity of recurring, almost every Hour, with

any Safety or Convenience to the publick be removd to Cambridge? Will

our Constituents consent to be at the Expence of erecting a proper

House at Cambridge, for accommodating the General Court, especially

when they have no Assurance that the next Freak of a capricious

Minister will not remove the Court to some other place? Is it possible

to have that Communication with our Constituents, or to be benefited

by the Reasonings of the people without Doors here, as at Boston? We

cannot but flatter ourselves, that every judicious and impartial

Person will allow, that the holding the General Court at Cambridge, is

inconvenient and hurtful to the Province; Nor has your Honor ever yet

attempted to show a single Instance, in which the province can be

benefited by it: No good purpose which can be answerd by it, has ever

yet been suggested by any one to this House. And we have the utmost

Confidence, that our gracious Sovereign, has no Desire to hold the

General Court at any place inconvenient to its Members, or injurious

to the province; but rather, that he will frown upon those, who have

procurd its Removal to such a place, or persist in holding it there.

We are not indeed sure, that the Ministry caused the Assembly to be

removd to Cambridge, in order to worry them into a Compliance with any

arbitrary Mandate, to the Ruin of our own or our Constituents

Libertys: But we know, that the General Assembly has in Times past

been treated with such Indignity and Abuse, by the Servants of the

Crown, and a wicked Ministry may attempt it again.

Your Honor observes, that "the same Exception may be made to the Use

of every other part of the prerogative, for every part is capable of

Abuse." We shall never except to the proper Use of the prerogative: We

hold it sacred as the Liberty of the Subject. But every Abuse of it,

will always be excepted to, so long as the Love of Liberty, or any

publick Virtue remains. And whenever any other part of the prerogative

shall be abusd, the House will not fail to judge for themselves of the

Grievance, nor to exert every power with which the Constitution hath

entrusted them, to check the Abuse, and redress the Grievance.

The House had expressd to your Honor their Apprehension of a fixd

Design, either to change the Seat of Government, or to harrass us, in

order to bring us into Compliance with some arbitrary Mandate: Your

Honor says, you know of no fixd Design to harrass us &c.: Upon which

we cannot but observe, that if you did not know of a fixd Design to

change the Seat of Governmt you would not have omitted so fair an

Opportunity to satisfy the Minds of the House, in a Matter of such

Importance to the Province. As to your very condescending and liberal

Professions, of exercising patience, or using Dispatch, as would be

most agreable to us, we shall be very much obligd to your Honor, for

the Exercise of those Virtues, whenever you shall see Cause to remove

us to our ancient and established Seat: But these professions can be

no Temptations to us, to give up our Privileges.

Your Honor is pleasd to say, that "we consider the Charter as a

Compact between the Crown and the People of this province" and to ask

a Question "Shall one Party to the Compact be held, and not the

other"? It is true, we consider the Charter as such a Compact, and

agree that both Parties are held. The Crown covenants, that a Great &

General Court shall be held, every last Wednesday in May for ever; The

Crown therefore, doubtless is bound by this Covenant. But we utterly

deny, that the people have covenanted to grant Money, or to do

Business, at least any other Business than chusing Officers and

Councellors to compleat the General Court, on the last Wednesday of

May, or in any other Day or Year whatever: Therefore this House, by

refusing to do Business, do not deprive the Crown of the Exercise of

the prerogative, nor fail of performing their part of the Compact.

Your Honor wd doubtless have been culpable had you refusd to call a

General Court on the last Wednesday in May: And the House might have

been equally culpable, if they had refusd to chuse a Speaker and

Clerk, or to elect Councellors, whereby to compleat the General Court;

for in Case of Omission in either part, a Question might arise,

Whether the people would have a Legislature. When the General Assembly

is thus formd, they are impowerd by the Charter, to make, ordain and

establish all Manner of wholesome and reasonable Orders, Laws,

Statutes & Ordinances, Directions and Instructions, either with

penaltys or without. But the Charter no where obliges the Genl Court,

to make any Orders, Laws, Statutes or Ordinances, unless they, at that

time judge it conducive to the publick Good to make them: Much less

does it oblige them to make any Laws &c, in any particular Session,

year or number of years, whenever they themselves shall judge them not

to be for the publick Good. Such an Obligation would leave them the

least Color of Freedom, but reduce them to a mere machine; to the

State the Parliament would have been in, if the Opinion of the two

Chiefe Justices and the three puisne Judges had prevaild in the Reign

of Richard the second "that the King hath the Governance of

Parliament, and may appoint what shall be first handled, and so

gradually what next, in all matters to be treated of in parliament,

even to the End of the parliament; and if any person shall act

contrary to the Kings pleasure made known therein, they are to be

punishd as Traitors"--for which opinion those five Judges had Judgment

as in Case of high Treason.--Your Honor will allow us to ask, Whether

the Doctrine containd in your Question viz, "If you should refuse to

do Business now you are met, would you not deprive the Crown of the

Exercise of the prerogative, and fail of performing your part of the

Compact" which implys a strong affirmation, is not in a Degree, the

very Doctrine of Chiefe Justice Tresilian and the four other Judges

just now mentiond? By convening in Obedience to his Majesty's Writ,

tested by your Honor, and again, at the time to which we are prorogud,

we have submitted to the prerogative, and performd our part of the

Compact.

This House has the same inherent Rights in this Province, as the House

of Commons has in Great Britain. It is our Duty to procure a Redress

of Grievances, and we may constitutionally refuse to grant our

Constituents money to the Crown, or to do any other Act of Government,

at any given time, that is not affixd by Charter to a certain Day,

until the Grievances of the people are redressd. We do not pretend,

that our Opinion is to prevail against his Majestys Opinion: We never

shall attempt to adjourn or prorogue or dissolve the General Court:

But we do hope, that our Opinion shall prevail, against any Opinion

whatever, of the proper time to make Laws and to do Business. And by

exerting this Power which the Constitution has given us, we hope to

convince your Honor and the Ministry of the Necessity of removing the

Court to Boston.--All judicious Men will allow that the proper time

for the House to do their part of the Business of the province, is for

the House to judge of and determine. The House think it is not, in the

present Circumstances of the province, a proper time to do this

Business, while the Court is constraind to hold their Session out of

Boston: Your Honor is of a different Opinion: We have conformd to this

Opinion as far as the Constitution requires us, And now our right of

judging commences. If your Honors or even his Majestys Opinion

concerning this Point is to prevail against the Opinion of the House,

why may not the Crown, according to the Tresilian Doctrine, as well

prescribe what Business we shall do, and in what Order.

The House is still ready to answer for all the ill Consequences which

can justly be attributed to them; nor are they sensible of any Danger

from exerting the power which the Charter has given them of doing

their part of the Business in their own time.--That the Province has

Enemies who are continually defaming it, and their Charter, is

certain; that there are Persons who are endeavoring to intimidate the

province from asserting and vindicating their just Rights and

Liberties, by Insinuations of Danger to the Constitution, is also

indisputable; But no Instance happend, even in the execrable Reign of

the worst of the Stuart Race, of a Forfeiture of a Charter, because

any one Branch of a Legislature, or even because the whole Government

under the Charter, refusd to do Business at a particular time, under

grievous Circumstances of Ignominy, Disgrace and Insult; and when

their Charter had explicitly given to that Government the sole power

of judging of the proper Season & Occasion of doing Business.

We are obligd at this time to struggle, with all the Powers with which

the Constitution hath furnishd us, in Defence of our Rights; to

prevent the most valueable of our Libertys, from being wrested from

us, by the subtle Machinations, and daring Encroachments of wicked

Ministers. We have seen of late, innumerable Encroachments on our

Charter: Courts of Admiralty extended from the high Seas, where by the

Compact in the Charter, they are confind, to numberless important

Causes upon Land: Multitudes of civil Officers, the Appointment of all

which is confind by Charter to the Governor and Council, sent here

from abroad by the Ministry: A Revenue, not granted by us, but torn

from us: Armys stationd here without our Consent; and the Streets of

our Metropolis, crimsond with the Blood of our fellow

Subjects.--These, and other Grievances and Cruelties, too many to be

here enumerated, and too melancholly to be much longer born by this

injurd People, we have seen brot upon us by the Devices of Ministers

of State. We have seen & had of late, Instructions to Governors which

threaten to destroy all the remaining Privileges of our Charter. In

June 1768, the House, by an Instruction were orderd to rescind an

excellent Resolution of a former House, on pain of Dissolution;4 they

refusd to comply with so impudent a Mandate, and were dissolvd. And

the Governor, tho' repeatedly requested, and tho' the Exigences of the

Province demanded a General Assembly, refusd to call a new one, till

the following May. In the last year, the General Court was forcd to

give Way to regular Troops, illegally quarterd in the Town of Boston,

in Consequence of Instructions to Crown Officers, and whose main Guard

was most daringly and insultingly placd at the Door of the State

house; and afterwards they were constraind to hold their Session at

Cambridge. The present year the Assembly is summond to meet, and is

still continued there in a kind of Duress, without any Reason that can

be given--any Motive whatever, that is not as great an Insult to them,

and Breach of their Privilege, as any of the foregoing.--Are these

things consistent with the Freedom of the House; or, could the General

Courts tamely submiting to such Usage, be thought to promote his

Majestys Service!

Should these Struggles of the House prove unfortunate and ineffectual,

this Province will submit, with pious Resignation to the Will of

Providence; but it would be a kind of Suicide, of which we have the

utmost Horror, thus to be made the Instruments of our Servitude.

We beg leave before we conclude, to make one Remark on what you say,

that "our Compliance can be of no Benefit to our Sovereign, any

farther than as he interests himself in the Happiness of his

Subjects." We are apprehensive that the World may take this for an

Insinuation, very much to our Dishonor: As if the Benefit of our

Sovereign were a Motive in our Minds, against a Compliance. But as

this Imputation would be extremely unjust, so we hope it was not

intended by your Honor. We are however obligd in Justice to our selves

and our Constituents to declare that if we had Reason to believe, that

a Compliance would by any, the least Benefit to our Sovereign, it

would be a very powerful Argument with us; But we are on the Contrary,

fully perswaded, that a Compliance at present, would be very injurious

and detrimental to his Majestys Service.

1From this point the manuscript is wholly in the handwriting of Adams.

2Massachusetts State Papers, pp. 237-240.

3Inaccurately quoted from T. Hutchinson, History of the Province of

Massachusetts Bay, vol. ii., p. 317.

4See Vol. I., p. 230.

ARTICLE SIGNED "A CHATTERER."1

[Boston Gazette, August 13, 1770.]

Messieurs EDES & GILL,

"What availed the good Qualites of Galba? He who should not have

employed bad Men, or at least should have restrained or punished them,

incurred the same Censure as if he himself had done it!--It is the

common Craft of corrupt Ministers to represent their Cause as the

Cause of their Prince."

His Honor the Lieutenant Governor, in his late Reply2 to the House of

Representatives, tells them, that "a Secretary of State has by Virtue

of his Office free Access" to the King; & "receives the Signification

of his Majesty's pleasure"; from whence he concludes that "he will

give no directions but what he knows to be agreable thereto", and

therefore "every order coming from a Minister of State, must be

suppos'd to come immediately from the Crown"--This is reasoning

plausibly enough; but before I can give my full Assent to the

Conclusion, I must have good Grounds to believe this same Secretary to

be a Man of Wisdom and Integrity; a Character, which however

requisite, does not always belong to a Minister of State. If he is

deficient in both or either of these, we can have no Assurance, that

every Order coming from him is declaratory of the Pleasure of the

Sovereign: His want of Wisdom may render him altogether incapable of

understanding the Mind of his royal Master; or, failing in point of

Integrity he may maliciously and traiterously pervert his benevolent

Intentions for the Good of his Subjects. Whenever Orders are given by

a Secretary of State, that are evidently calculated to injure the

Publick, we are by no Means to suppose them to come immediately from

the Crown, for the King can do no Wrong: Will his Honor have us

believe that the King can do a weak & foolish, or a malevolent and

wicked Act? If not, such Instructions are to be look'd upon as the

acts of the Minister and not of the King. Ministers of state were

formerly shields to the persons of Kings from such kind of

imputations; but it is much to be feared, if care is not taken to

prevent it, the idle whimsies of Ministers, their weakness and folly,

or their daring and impudent attempts to destroy the Liberties of the

People, will be attributed to a Cause which no one, to be sure at

present, will chuse to mention.--I hope his Honor's reasoning, and his

correspondent Conduct, does not lead to this--The House of

Representatives seem to be aware of the Danger of such Doctrine, when

they expressly say, "They presume not to call in question the Wisdom

of their Sovereign or the rectitude of his Intentions"; at the same

time that they speak with a manly Freedom, of certain Instructions

that have come from Ministers of State, and even treat them with

Indignity and Contempt. His Honor presumes "they would not have done

this, if they had known it to be an Order from his Majesty." I believe

they would not; they saw reason to think that the Mandate to rescind

in June 1768, was the mere act of a weak Minister; and as his Honor

does not give the least Intimation, that he either knows or believes

to the Contrary, I must beg leave to say, that in my poor Opinion, the

Epithet given to it by the House, is neither "coarse" nor "indecent."

We seem, Messrs. Printers, to be drawing very near the time, when some

people will be hardy enough to dispute, whether we are to be governed

according to the rule of the Constitution, the building of which has

been the Work of Ages, or to use the words of the House, by the

"breath of a Minister of State."--Instructions, form'd by a set of

Ministers, calculated for certain purposes and sent over to a

Governor, who to avoid their high Displeasure and the terrible Effects

of it, must implicitly believe, or say he believes them, to come

immediately from the King; and the House of Representatives must by no

means controvert them, lest, as Bernard once impudently told them,

they should be chargeable with "oppugnation against the King's

authority."3

There is a sort of Impropriety, as I take it, in saying that every

Order from a Minister of State comes immediately from the Crown.

However, little Inaccuracies in diction are not to be regarded in a

performance fraught with reason and sound argument: It is rather to be

wondered at that we meet with so few Imperfections, since we are

assured by his Honor that he had taken "one Day only for his Reply" to

an Answer which he intimates cost a Committee of the House full Eight

Days hard Labor.4 Some men are said to have intuitive knowledge; and

such have nothing to do but write down pages of unanswerable reasons

as fast as the Ink can flow.

It was doubtless from this opinion that "every Order from a Secretary

of State comes immediately from the King," or as his Honor elsewhere

more properly expresses it, is a 'Signification of his Majesty's

pleasure,' that he concludes it to be his Majesty's pleasure that he

should not communicate them; for such a prohibitory order is said to

come from the Secretary. But the House seemed to think it impossible

that our gracious King, should hold his Subjects to a blind obedience

to Orders which they were not permitted to see; and therefore

concluded, and as I humbly conceive very justly, that this order in a

particular manner, was to be suppos'd to be an Act of the Minister and

not of the King--His Honor indeed speaks of it with great Veneration;

and tells them that "the restraint he is under appears to him to be

founded upon wise Reasons." But from this alone, he could not with

certainty conclude that the Order came immediately from the King; for

it is undoubtedly his Honor's opinion, that the present set of

Ministers are very wise men, tho' not so wise as his Majesty; and

therefore he might take it for granted, the Order was founded on wise

reasons if it had come from them only. But as in these times of Light

and Liberty, every man chuses to see and judge for himself, especially

in all matters which are prescribed to him as rules of faith and

practice; it is pity his Honor did not condescend to communicate those

wise reasons, that the House and the People without Doors, here and

there "a transient Person" who may have a common share of

understanding, might judge whether they appeared to them to be reasons

becoming the Wisdom of a King, or only as the House somewhere express

it, "the freaks of a capricious Minister of State."

If I have leisure I shall write you again. In the mean Time, I am,

Your's,

A CHATTERER.

1The succeeding articles of this series were attributed to Adams by

George Bancroft. This is confirmed by apparently contemporaneous

annotations in the file of the Gazette owned by Harbottle Dorr, at one

time a selectman of Boston. At the trial of Capt. Preston in November,

1770, he was drawn as a juror and "challenged for cause." An

advertisement of his business appears in the Boston Gazette, October

1, 1770.

2August 3, 1770, Massachusetts State Papers, pp.249-254.

3May 29, 1766 Massachusetts State Papers, p. 75.

4Massachusetts State Papers, p. 254.

ARTICLE SIGNED "A CHATTERER."

[Boston Gazette, August 20, 1770.]

"One of the greatest indications of Wisdom that a Prince can show, is

to converse with and have about him virtuous and wise Men: But Princes

are liable to be deceived; Fraudum sedes aula, was the saying of a

Philosopher who understood Courts well.--A good Prince may suffer by

employing bad Ministers and Servants."

MESSIEURS PRINTERS,

The Writings of Samuel Adams - Volume 2 · 第 2 / 30 段