SUGGESTIONS OF ARCHITECTS AND OTHER EXPERTS AS TO AVOIDING LIKE
CALAMITIES.
Robert S. Lindstrom, a well known Chicago architect, makes the following
suggestions: "It is earnestly requested that the following suggestions be
published for the benefit and warning of patrons of public places, also as
an aid to city officials, architects and builders, as a possible means of
averting another horror such as has been witnessed in the Iroquois theater
fire.
"Every theater in Chicago is virtually a death trap set for patrons even
under ordinary conditions. Barring fires and panics, the playhouses are
not amply provided with exits, and are unsafe on account of overcrowding.
Thereby each person attending a performance in any of Chicago's theaters
does so at a risk of his own life. This also applies to all halls that are
hurriedly arranged for public meetings and especially during the election
campaign work and convention gatherings.
"A theater may be absolutely fire-proof, but when the seating capacity of
the house has been overcrowded by reducing sizes of stairs, aisles and
exits the building is really worse than a non-fire-proof building, for in
the latter the smoke would have a chance to escape.
"The following suggestions will partially avert such a horror as has been
witnessed at the Iroquois, which was advertised as the safest fire-proof
theater in Chicago:
"All seats throughout the house should be placed far enough apart from
back to back so that an open passageway running from aisle to aisle shall
be large enough to allow a person to get out without disturbing all the
people seated in the section. In the Iroquois the seats in the gallery are
so closely spaced from back to back that one cannot sit in a comfortable
position at any time. All seats should be made of iron framework, with
seats fixed so that danger of catching clothing on upturned edges may be
averted, which in the present theater seats causes very much delay in a
rush. The upholstering should be done with asbestos wool and all covering
done with asbestos fire-resisting cloth.
"An aisle should be left between the orchestra and the front row of seats.
Main aisles should be made so that they connect with the aisle in front,
also the aisle in rear, without any obstructions, and an exit door placed
at end of each aisle leading directly to the vestibule. The present system
is one large door at the center so that people from the side aisles
collide with those from the center aisles and no one can get out. It is
also very important that the door opening, with doors open, is a trifle
larger than the aisle; all seats that face on aisles to be plain to
prevent clothing from catching on same.
"Carpets should be prohibited in all halls and aisles and replaced by
interlocking rubber tile or some similar covering to prevent slipping in a
rush.
"All steps should have safety treads, composed of steel and lead, in place
of slate or marble, which becomes slippery and dangerous. Stairs to be
straight without winds or turns and at every ten feet from the sidewalk
there should be a landing twice as long as the width of the stairs and
doors at the foot of the stairs should be a trifle larger than the stair
opening.
"All balconies and galleries above the first floor should have a metal
hand rail back of each row of seats securely fastened to the floor
construction.
"Doors should swing out; in addition to door handle threshold to have an
automatic opening device so as to throw doors open in case of fire or
accident. Also at each fire exit there should be in view of the audience a
box containing saw and tools and plainly marked for use in case of fire,
providing locks on doors fail to work. In addition an attendant should be
placed at each fire exit and remain there until the house is vacated
during every performance.
"Fire escapes should be made of regular stair pattern with treads eleven
inches and rises seven inches, and treads provided with steel and lead
composition covering and risers closed.
"Instead of sloping the ceiling toward the stage it should be made level
with a cone shape toward the center and there connect with a down draft
ventilator and an emergency damper controlled by a three-way switch from
stage, box office and each balcony, made large enough to form a smoke flue
in case of fire. Wires controlling this ventilator should run in conduit
fireproofed and in addition to switch an electric emergency switch
weighted with a fused link to make a contact when link breaks. Same to
apply to stage, halls and stairways, except that fireproof ducts will
connect halls and stairs with outer air. In addition to the ventilator
every part of the house should be equipped with a system of sprinklers
operated automatically by a gravity system. A large glass chandelier such
as used at the Iroquois should be prohibited.
"Emergency lights in case of fire and accidents during the performance to
light up the house should be placed on ceiling of main auditorium,
balconies, halls and stairs and built of fire-proof boxes with wired
plate-glass face. These lights should be operated on a separate system and
run in fireproof conduits, and controlled from the street front, also to
have a fusible weighted switch on stage.
"Fire doors should be constructed of steel with wired plate-glass panels
so that fire can be prevented from outside sources, but if in case of
accident the lock should fail to work from the inside, the glass panel can
be broken with tools that should be placed in reach and plainly marked.
"Calcium lights should be prohibited anywhere in the auditorium. The place
is generally on the gallery. In the Iroquois the scenic lights were placed
at the extreme top of the upper gallery, with a supporting framework that
rested on the aisle floor and obstructed aisle to audience.
"Counter-weights of curtain should be made in sections with fusible link
connections so that in case of fire curtain will drop of its own weight.
"Curtain should be constructed of steel framework and made rigid and run
in steel guides of sufficient size to allow for expansion in case of fire.
Stage floor should be four inches thick, solid, laid on concrete bed.
"A special waiting room with a special exit, entrance to same to be from
main foyer, should be used especially for patrons using carriages so as to
prevent the present system of blocking exits and vestibule with people
waiting for carriages and preventing exit of crowd.
"On stage of every theater there should be a fire plug, also a hose long
enough to reach any part of the house, to run on a reel.
"A loss of life in a panic cannot be entirely prevented, but some of the
above suggestions if carried out will, at least, prevent a wholesale loss
of human life.
"All theaters should be thoroughly investigated and where the slightest
detail is found to conflict with the law and the safety of an audience
the city officials should prevent the use of such house until it has been
properly constructed."
THE ARCHITECT SPEAKS.
Benjamin H. Marshall, architect of the theater, received the news of the
disaster in Pittsburg, Pa., and at once started for Chicago. He was
stunned by the intelligence, and, speaking of it, said:
"This seems to be a calamity that has no precedent, and I can not
understand how so many people were caught in the balconies unless they
were stunned by the shock of an explosion. There were ample fire exits and
they were available. The house could have been emptied in less than five
minutes if they were all utilized. The fact that so many people were
caught in the balconies would prove that they were stunned and
panic-stricken by the report rather than by the fear of a fire. It is
difficult for me at this time to even guess as to the cause for the great
loss of life.
"I am completely upset by this disaster, more so because I have built many
theaters and have studied every playhouse disaster in history to avoid
errors."
EXAMINATION BY ARCHITECTURAL EDITOR.
Robert Craik McLean, editor of the _Inland Architect_, who spent some time
investigating the claim that the theater was equipped with an asbestos
fire curtain, said: "After a careful investigation, I am convinced that
the theater was not equipped with a curtain such as is demanded by the
city ordinances.
"I visited the damaged theater, but there was no sign of an asbestos
curtain. Fire will not destroy asbestos, and if there was a curtain there
when the holocaust occurred it had been removed, and an investigation
should be made to learn what became of it. If no curtain had been removed,
as is claimed, I cannot understand how the claim can be set up that the
theater had a fire curtain. No one denies that there was a curtain there,
but had it been made of asbestos, as required by the ordinance, it would
not have been destroyed by the draft of air, as is claimed by the
management of the house. An asbestos curtain must have a foundation of
wire or some other material, and had the Iroquois been equipped with such
a drop the wire screen, at least, would be there to prove it."
"Mr. Samuel Frankenstein of the Frankenstein Calcium Light company, made
the statement to me that he had had a conversation with the stage manager
of the Iroquois regarding the fire drop. Mr. Frankenstein said that the
stage manager told him that the Iroquois stage was not equipped with a
true fire curtain. According to Mr. Frankenstein, the stage manager went
further than this, and declared that there were only three theaters in
Chicago equipped with real asbestos drops."
PROPOSED PRECAUTIONS FOR NEW YORK THEATERS.
Charles H. Israels of the firm of Israels & Harder, architects of the new
Hudson theater, and several of the large hotels, suggested a number of
precautions which might be adopted in New York theaters. Among other
things he advocated an ordinance requiring all the theater emergency exits
to be used after each performance.
"Nearly every modern theater in this city," Mr. Israels said, "is
adequately provided with exits, with which the audience are not familiar,
and which are used so seldom that the employes are unused to having the
audience pass out through them. Besides the one exit ordinarily in use
there are four emergency exits, and the law requires them to open either
on a brick enclosed alley at the side of the theater or directly into the
street.
"The people in the gallery, who are in the place of the greatest danger,
would undoubtedly become thoroughly accustomed to using these outside
stairways.
"The main advantage to be gained by this suggestion over all others is
that it could be put into immediate operation without the spending of a
single cent on the part of the owners of most of New York's playhouses.
"In a few of the theaters it might be argued that the stairways at the
emergency exits were not sufficiently inclosed to allow the crowds to pass
down in safety. The law now requires the stairways to be covered at the
top, and covering the outside rail with heavy wire mesh raised about two
feet above its present level would prevent any one from falling over the
side.
"Fireproof scenery or scenery which will at least not flame, is a
practical possibility now. The building code should compel the use of
scenery on frames of light metal covered with canvas that has been
saturated in a fireproof solution. Fireproof paint is compulsory on the
woodwork behind the proscenium wall, but in painting scenery combustible
paint may be used.
"The law should be most strictly enforced as to the cleaning out of
rubbish beneath the stage. In a number of the theaters of New York this is
done only occasionally."