THE ABSOLUTE AND THE STRENUOUS LIFE [Footnote: Reprinted from the
Journal of Philosophy, etc., 1906.]
Professor W. A. Brown, in the Journal for August 15, approves my
pragmatism for allowing that a belief in the absolute may give
holidays to the spirit, but takes me to task for the narrowness of this
concession, and shows by striking examples how great a power the same
belief may have in letting loose the strenuous life.
I have no criticism whatever to make upon his excellent article, but let
me explain why 'moral holidays' were the only gift of the absolute which
I picked out for emphasis. I was primarily concerned in my lectures with
contrasting the belief that the world is still in process of making
with the belief that there is an 'eternal' edition of it ready-made
and complete. The former, or 'pluralistic' belief, was the one that my
pragmatism favored. Both beliefs confirm our strenuous moods. Pluralism
actually demands them, since it makes the world's salvation depend upon
the energizing of its several parts, among which we are. Monism permits
them, for however furious they may be, we can always justify ourselves
in advance for indulging them by the thought that they WILL HAVE BEEN
expressions of the absolute's perfect life. By escaping from your finite
perceptions to the conception of the eternal whole, you can hallow any
tendency whatever. Tho the absolute DICTATES nothing, it will SANCTION
anything and everything after the fact, for whatever is once there will
have to be regarded as an integral member of the universe's perfection.
Quietism and frenzy thus alike receive the absolute's permit to exist.
Those of us who are naturally inert may abide in our resigned passivity;
those whose energy is excessive may grow more reckless still. History
shows how easily both quietists and fanatics have drawn inspiration from
the absolutistic scheme. It suits sick souls and strenuous ones equally
well.
One cannot say thus of pluralism. Its world is always vulnerable, for
some part may go astray; and having no 'eternal' edition of it to draw
comfort from, its partisans must always feel to some degree insecure.
If, as pluralists, we grant ourselves moral holidays, they can only be
provisional breathing-spells, intended to refresh us for the morrow's
fight. This forms one permanent inferiority of pluralism from the
pragmatic point of view. It has no saving message for incurably sick
souls. Absolutism, among its other messages, has that message, and is
the only scheme that has it necessarily. That constitutes its chief
superiority and is the source of its religious power. That is why,
desiring to do it full justice, I valued its aptitude for moral-holiday
giving so highly. Its claims in that way are unique, whereas its
affinities with strenuousness are less emphatic than those of the
pluralistic scheme.
In the last lecture of my book I candidly admitted this inferiority of
pluralism. It lacks the wide indifference that absolutism shows. It
is bound to disappoint many sick souls whom absolutism can console.
It seems therefore poor tactics for absolutists to make little of this
advantage. The needs of sick souls are surely the most urgent; and
believers in the absolute should rather hold it to be great merit in
their philosophy that it can meet them so well.
The pragmatism or pluralism which I defend has to fall back on a certain
ultimate hardihood, a certain willingness to live without assurances or
guarantees. To minds thus willing to live on possibilities that are
not certainties, quietistic religion, sure of salvation ANY HOW, has a
slight flavor of fatty degeneration about it which has caused it to be
looked askance on, even in the church. Which side is right here, who can
say? Within religion, emotion is apt to be tyrannical; but philosophy
must favor the emotion that allies itself best with the whole body
and drift of all the truths in sight. I conceive this to be the more
strenuous type of emotion; but I have to admit that its inability to
let loose quietistic raptures is a serious deficiency in the pluralistic
philosophy which I profess.