IV

There is, of course, some reason for believing that Carlyle's ideas

resemble those of which the German policy is the expression, but there

is none if we look beyond his superficial meaning. One reason for

branding him as an advocate of German practices is his exaltation of

Frederick the Great. Frederick began his first war by seizing Silesia,

very much as Wilhelm II began the present war by seizing Belgium. As

Carlyle justified the seizing of Silesia, many people cannot see why

that does not warrant the conclusion that he would also justify the

seizure of Belgium. Such people, however, forget that the Prussia of

1740 was not even the Prussia of 1914, to say nothing of the German

Empire or the Teutonic Alliance. Carlyle would detect in Prussia a

change in spirit, but even if this cannot be established, there is

certainly no parallel between Frederick's seizure of Silesia and

Germany's attack on Belgium. In 1740, Prussia was one of the small

countries of Europe. Its population was about half that of Belgium in

1914, and its political importance was not much greater. It was situated

between militaristic France and imperialistic Austria; and its immediate

neighbors: Saxony, Bavaria, Poland, and the Scandinavian kingdoms, were

ready at any moment to profit by its misfortunes. Prussia's seizure of

Silesia was, therefore, very much as if Belgium, learning in advance of

Germany's plan of invasion, had seized German territory adjacent to its

frontiers, and used it as a buffer to defend itself. It was the case of

a small state preserving itself from the aggressions of a big neighbor

aiming at world dominion. The methods employed may not have been

technically legal, but they were justified; therefore Carlyle endorsed

them. He believed that Frederick, cynic and materialist though he admits

him to have been, nevertheless proved himself the valiant defender of

his country's right to self government. He also regarded Frederick as

the man who did most in the eighteenth century to preserve Europe from

being dominated by a lawless imperialism. The rulers of Austria, because

of their almost uninterrupted possession of the office of Holy Roman

Emperor, openly aimed at universal dominion, and never lost an

opportunity of trying to realize it by force of intrigue. France, too,

was striving for the domination of Europe, and Russia was just becoming

conspicuous for the brutality and unscrupulousness of its political

methods quite as much as for the vastness of the power it had suddenly

developed. When these facts are considered, Frederick's action must be

admitted to have been, if not in the interests of democracy, at least in

support of the principle of self-determination for which the Allies

claim to be fighting against Germany; and Carlyle's endorsement of it at

least creates the presumption that he would not sympathize with Germany,

which today, greatly extended, is playing the part of the bullying

nations he commended Frederick for thwarting.

He seems, however, to advocate autocracy, and to deride democracy, and

this would appear to put him in agreement with the kaiser and his

professorial prompters. It is true that he did deride the notion that

the decision of the majority is always right. He likewise insisted that

all the constitutionality and legality conceivable will not ensure good

government or justify incompetence or unrighteousness in power; and

that, conversely, no formal or technical irregularity disqualifies a

government which is beneficent and capable. He ridiculed the idea that

political equality is synonymous with justice, but this does not mean

that he believed in caste rule. His opposition to political equality was

inspired by no respect for inherited authority or the sanctity of

property, but was the result of a conviction that it is a crude and

materialistic way of trying to solve an immensely complicated problem by

a simple mechanical process. Not external equality, but _equity_, must

be achieved to make government effective and successful, was his

contention. Making men equal in political power, in his opinion, ensured

that the government would be dominated by the ignorance and selfishness

of the mass of men, rather than by the enlightenment and integrity of

the relatively small portion of mankind whom nature fits for leadership

by endowing them with superior moral and intellectual powers. He

believed no man entitled to authority except on the basis of character

and ability, and he was as bitterly opposed to the German scheme of

class rule as he was to the quantitative methods of the radicals. It is

entirely wrong to think that, because he denied that universal suffrage

will guarantee justice and humanity, he endorsed injustice and

oppression. He didn't care how a government was organized or what it

claimed to do, but he only inquired what it had succeeded in doing, and

by this he judged it. The results of the German policy have been

disaster for the world as well as for Germany, and he would condemn the

German government for this, without being at all concerned about its

form. He attached no importance to a government's form; all he judged by

was its spirit. He believed that a government is inevitably the

expression of the intelligence and morality of the people it represents,

and that any form is capable of proving either good or bad in operation.

Germany may be an autocracy in form, but the German people almost

unanimously endorsed the war and its enormities; so what we have is an

exhibition of the fallibility of popular judgment more than a display of

the evils of autocracy. On this point Carlyle's position is clear, while

that of the critics who accuse him of having endorsed German practices,

because he denied that the majority is always right, is much more

susceptible of being considered a justification of Kultur.

According to his interpretation of history, the case of Germany is

perfectly plain. It is simply an instance of the degeneracy that, he

claimed, inevitably follows the adoption of selfish or materialistic

ambitions. The patient industry and the steady pursuit of the practical

instead of the spectacular brought Germany to greatness, and placed vast

power in the hands of her rulers. Then those rulers were tempted to

misuse that power, and they fell. They decided to corrupt the people and

make them the instrument by which world dominion could be achieved. They

therefore cultivated the baser passions of the populace, and with

infinite thoroughness and resource, they used every agency of the

government to secure public endorsement for a policy of aggression, and

for a swash-buckling and bombastic procedure that appealed only to the

shallow and the reckless. They found this the easier because

circumstances worked with them. The Franco-Prussian War inflamed German

chauvinism and inflated German conceit to an incredible extent. The

success of the war was more the result of France's weakness than

Germany's strength, but it filled the German nation with extravagant

enthusiasm, and inspired it with blind faith in its own invincibility.

Then Germany changed from a country largely agricultural to one mainly

industrial, and wealth came to kindle in a naturally gross and sensual

people a passion for luxury, and to impart to a naturally arrogant one

the insolence of material power. The effect of the first of these things

is shown in the famous night-life of Berlin, which, before the war, was

more gross and lavish than that of any other city in the world; while

the overbearing character of the average German abroad shows how general

was the influence of the second. Thus a change has been effected in the

spirit of Germany. From a nation dull but honest, rude but sincere and

kindly, it has been transformed by bad leadership and sudden prosperity

into a people whose dominant characteristics are brutality and

mendacity. Therefore the Germany that Carlyle praised is not the Germany

that perpetrated the present war, and there is no doubt that his

attitude towards the apostles of Kultur would be the direct opposite of

what it was towards Frederick the Great and Bismarck.

The Unpopular Review, Number 19 July-December 1918 · 第 16 / 33 题