The Will.
The activities of the will comprise the third great class of mental
processes. Psychologists always have differed greatly in their
conception of just what constitutes these activities. Even to-day it is
difficult to obtain a dictionary definition of the will that agrees with
the best opinion on the subject. The dictionaries adhere to the old
classification and conception which regarded the will as "that faculty
of the mind or soul by which it chooses or decides." But with the growth
of the idea that the will acts according to the strongest motive, and
that the motive is supplied by the average struck between the desires of
the moment, under the supervision of the intellect, the conception of
will as the choosing and deciding faculty is passing from favor. In the
place of the older conception has come the newer one which holds that
the will is primarily concerned with _action_.
It is difficult to place the will in the category of mental processes.
But it is generally agreed that it abides in the very center of the
mental being, and is closely associated with what is called the ego, or
self. The will seems to have at least three general phases, viz.: (1)
The phase of desire, (2) the phase of deliberation or choice, and (3)
the phase of expression in action. In order to understand the will, it
is necessary to consider each of these three phases of its activities.
(1). DESIRE.
The first phase of will, which is called "desire," is in itself somewhat
complex. On its lower side it touches, and, in fact, blends into,
feeling and emotion. Its center consists of a state of _tension_, akin
to that of a coiled spring or a cat crouching ready for a spring. On its
higher side it touches, penetrates, and blends into the other phases of
the will which we have mentioned.
Desire is defined as "a feeling, emotion, or excitement of the mind
directed toward the attainment, enjoyment, or possession of some object
from which pleasure, profit, or gratification is expected." Halleck
gives us the following excellent conception of the moving spirit of
desire: "_Desire has for its object something which will bring pleasure
or get rid of pain, immediate or remote, for the individual or for some
one in whom he is interested. Aversion, or a striving away from
something, is merely the negative aspect of desire._"
In Halleck's statement, above quoted, we have the explanation of the
part played by the intellect in the activities of will. The intellect
is able to perceive the relations between present action and future
results, and is able to point the way toward the suppression of some
desires in order that other and better ones may be manifested. It also
serves its purposes in regulating the "striking of the average" between
conflicting desires. Without the intervention of the intellect, the
temporary desire of the moment would invariably be acted upon without
regard to future results or consequences to one's self and others. It
also serves to point out the course of action calculated to give the
most satisfactory expression of the desire.
While it is a fact that the action of will depends almost entirely upon
the motive force of desire, it is likewise true that desire may be
created, regulated, suppressed, and even killed by the action of the
will. The will, by giving or refusing attention to a certain class of
desires, may either cause them to grow and wax strong, or else die and
fade away. It must be remembered, however, that this use of the will
itself springs from another set of desires or feelings.
Desire is aroused by feelings or emotions rising from the subconscious
planes of the mind and seeking expression and manifestation. We have
considered the nature of the feelings and emotions in previous chapters,
which should be read in connection with the present one. It should be
remembered that the feeling or emotional side of desire arises from
either inherited race memories existing as instincts, or from the memory
of the past experiences of the individual. In some cases the feeling
first manifests in a vague unrest caused by subconscious promptings and
excitement. Then the imagination pictures the object of the feeling, or
certain memory images connected with it, and the desire thus manifests
on the plane of consciousness.
The entrance of the desire feeling into consciousness is accompanied by
that peculiar _tension_ which marks the second phase of desire. This
tension, when sufficiently strong, passes into the third phase of
desire, or that in which desire blends into will action. Desire in this
stage makes a demand upon will for expression and action. From mere
feeling, and tension of feeling, it becomes _a call to action_. But
before expression and action are given to it, the second phase of will
must manifest at least for a moment; this second phase is that known as
deliberation, or the weighing and balancing of desires.
(2). DELIBERATION.
The second phase of will, known as deliberation, is more than the purely
intellectual process which the term would indicate. The intellect plays
an important part, it is true, but there is also an almost instinctive
and automatic _weighing and balancing of desires_. There is seldom only
one desire presenting its claims upon the will at any particular moment.
It is true that occasionally there arises an emotional desire of such
dominant power and strength that it crowds out every other claimant at
the bar of deliberation. But such instances are rare, and as a rule
there are a host of rival claimants, each insisting upon its rights in
the matter at issue. In the man of weak or undeveloped and untrained
intellect, the struggle is usually little more than a brief combat
between several desires, in which _the strongest at the moment wins_.
But with the development of intellect new factors arise and new forces
are felt. Moreover, the more complex one's emotional nature, and the
greater the development of the higher forms of feeling, the more intense
is the struggle of deliberation or the fight of the desires.
We see, in Halleck's definition, that desire has not only the object of
"bringing pleasure or getting rid of pain" for the individual, but that
the additional element of the welfare of "some one in whom he is
interested" is added, which element is often the deciding factor. This
element, of course, arises from the development and cultivation of one's
emotional nature. In the same way we also see that it is not merely the
_immediate_ welfare of one's self or those in whom one is interested
that speaks before the bar, but also the more _remote_ welfare. This
consideration of future welfare depends upon the intellect and
cultivated imagination under its control. Moreover, the trained
intellect is able to discover possible greater satisfaction in some
course of action other than in the one prompted by the clamoring desire
of the moment. This explains why the judgment and action of an
intelligent man, as a rule, are far different from those of the
unintelligent one; and also why a man of culture tends toward different
action from that of the uncultured; and likewise, why the man of broad
sympathies and high ideals acts in a different way from one of the
opposite type. But the principle is ever the same--the feelings manifest
in desire, the greatest ultimate satisfaction apparent at the moment is
sought, and the strongest set of desires wins the day.
Halleck's comment on this point is interesting. He says: "Desire is not
always proportional to the idea of one's own selfish pleasure. Many
persons, after forming an idea of the vast amount of earthly distress,
desire to relieve it, and the desire goes out in action, as the
benevolent societies in every city testify. Here the individual pleasure
is none the less, but it is secondary, coming from the pleasure of
others. The desire of the _near_ often raises a stronger desire than the
_remote_. A child frequently prefers a thing immediately if it is only
one tenth as good as something he might have a year hence. A student
often desires more the leisure of to-day than the success of future
years. Though admonished to study, he wastes his time and thus loses
incomparably greater future pleasure when he is tossed to the rear in
the struggle for existence."
The result of this weighing and balancing of the desire is, or should
be, _decision and choice_, which then passes into action. But many
persons seem unable to "make up their own mind," and require a push or
urge from without before they will act. Others decide, without proper
use of the intellect, upon what they call "impulse," but which is merely
impatience. Some are like the fabled donkey which starved to death when
placed at an equal distance between two equally attractive haystacks and
was unable to decide towards which to move. Others follow the example of
Jeppe, in the comedy, who, when given a coin with which to buy a piece
of soap for his wife, stood on the corner deliberating whether to obey
orders or to buy a drink with the money. He wants the drink, but
realizes that his wife will beat him if he returns without the soap. "My
stomach says drink; my back says soap," says Jeppe. "But," finally he
remarks, "is not a man's stomach more to him than his back? Yes, says
I."
The final decision depends upon the striking a balance between the
desires,--the weighing of desire for and desire against,--desire for
this and desire for something else. The strength of the several desires
depends upon nearness and present interest arising from attention, as
applied to the feelings and emotions arising from heredity, environment,
experience, and education, which constitute character; and also upon the
degree of intellectual clearness and power in forming correct judgments
between the desires.
It must be remembered, however, that the intellect appears not as an
opponent of the principle of the satisfaction of desire, but merely as
an instrument of the ego in determining which course of action will
result in the greatest ultimate satisfaction, direct or indirect,
present or future. For, _at the last, every individual acts so as to
bring himself the greatest satisfaction, immediate or future, direct or
indirect, either personal or through the welfare of others, as this may
appear to him at the particular moment of deliberation_. We always act
in the direction of that which will greater "content our spirit." This
will be found to be the spirit of all decisions, although the motive is
often hidden and difficult to find even by the individual himself, many
of the strongest motives having their origin in the subconscious planes
of mentality.
(3). ACTION.
The third and final phase of will is that known as action--the act of
volition by which the desire-idea is expressed in physical or mental
activity. The old conception of the will held that the decisive phase of
the will was its characteristic and final phase, ignoring the fact that
the very essence or spirit of will is bound up with _action_. Even those
familiar with the newer conception frequently assume that the act of
decision is the final phase of will, ignoring the fact that we
frequently _decide_ to do a thing and yet may never carry out the
intention and decision. The act of willing is not complete unless action
is expressed. There must be the manifestation of the motor element or
phase of will, else the will process is incomplete.
A weakness of this last phase of will affects the entire will and
renders its processes ineffective. The world is filled with persons who
are able to _decide_ what is best to do, and what should be done, but
who never actually _act_ upon the decision. The few persons who promptly
follow up the decision with vigorous action are those who accomplish the
world's work. Without the full manifestation of this third phase of will
the other two phases are useless.
TYPES OF WILL.
So far we have considered merely the highest type of will--that which
is accompanied by conscious deliberation, in which the intellect takes
an active part. In this process, not only do the conflicting feelings
push themselves forward with opposing claims for recognition, but the
intellect is active in examining the case and offering valuable
testimony as to the comparative merits of the various claimants and the
effect of certain courses of action upon the individual. There are,
however, several lower forms of will manifestation which we should
briefly consider in passing.
_Reflex Action._--The will is moved to action by the reflex activities
of the nervous system which have been mentioned in the earlier chapters
of this book. In this general type we find unconscious reflex action,
such as that manifested when a sleeper is touched and moves away, or
when the frog's leg twitches when the nerve end is excited. We also find
conscious reflex action, such as that manifested by the winking of the
eye, or the performance of habitual physical motion, such as the
movement in walking, operating the sewing machine or typewriter, playing
the piano, etc.
_Impulsive Action._--The will is often moved to action by a dim idea or
faint perception of purpose or impulse. The action is almost
instinctive, although there is a vague perception of purpose. For
instance, we feel an impulse to turn toward the source of a strange
sound or sight, or other source of interest or curiosity. Or we may
feel an impulse arising from the subconscious plane of our mind, causing
a dimly-conscious idea of movement or action to relieve the tension. For
instance, one may feel a desire to exercise, or to seek fresh air or
green fields, although he had not been thinking of these things at the
time. These impulses arise from a subconscious feeling of fatigue or
desire for change, which, added to a fleeting idea, produces the
impulse. Unless an impulse is inhibited by the will activities inspired
by other desires, habits, ideas, or ideals, we act upon it in precisely
the same way that a young child or animal does. Hoffding says of this
type of action: "The psychological condition of the impulse is, that
with the momentary feeling and sensation should be combined a more or
less clear idea of something which may augment the pleasure or diminish
the pain of the moment."
_Instinctive Action._--The will is frequently moved to action by an
instinctive stimulus. This form of will activity closely resembles the
last mentioned form, and often it is impossible to distinguish between
the two. The activities of the bee in building its comb and storing its
honey, the work of the silkworm and caterpillar in building their
resting places, are examples of this form of action. Indeed, even the
building of the nest of the bird may be so classed. In these cases there
is an intelligent action toward a definite end, but the animal is
unconscious of that end. The experiences of the remote ancestors of
these creatures recorded their impressions upon the subconscious mind of
the species, and they are transmitted in some way to all of that
species. The nervous system of every living thing is a record cylinder
of the experiences of its early ancestors, and these cylinders tend to
reproduce these impressions upon appropriate occasions. In preceding
chapters we have shown that even man is under the influence of instinct
to a greater extent than he imagines himself to be.