THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.
At length, upon the twenty-second of August, after days of expectation
and suspense in the American camp, the British moved forward.
Thoroughly informed of Washington's position, the strength of his
army, and the condition of his lines at every point,[107] Lord Howe
matured his plan of action deliberately, and decided to advance by way
of Long Island. An attack from this quarter promised the speediest
success and at the least cost, for, should he be able to force the
defences of Brooklyn, New York would be at his mercy; or, failing in
this, he could threaten Washington's flank from Hell Gate or beyond,
where part of the fleet had been sent through the Sound, and by a push
into Westchester County compel the evacuation of the city.
Preparations were accordingly made to transport the troops from Staten
Island across to the Long Island coast and debark them at Gravesend
Bay, a mile to the eastward of the Narrows. A thunder-storm of great
violence on the previous evening, which had fallen with fatal effect
on more than one of Washington's soldiers, threatened to delay the
movement, but a still atmosphere followed, and the morning of the 22d
broke favorably.[108] At dawn the three frigates Phoenix, Greyhound
and Rose, with the bomb-ketches Thunder and Carcass, took their
stations close into the Bay as covering ships for the landing, while
Sir George Collier placed the Rainbow within the Narrows, opposite De
Nyse's Ferry, now Fort Hamilton, to silence a battery supposed to be
at that point. Upon the Staten Island shore fifteen thousand British
and Hessian troops, fully equipped, and forty pieces of artillery had
been drawn up during the day and evening before, and a part of them
embarked upon transports lying near at anchor. At the beach were
moored seventy-five flat-boats, eleven batteaux, and two galleys,
built expressly for the present service, and manned by sailors from
the ships of war, which, with the rest of the naval armament, were
placed under the direction of Commodore Hotham.
[Footnote 107: The Tories gave Howe all the information he needed. One
Gilbert Forbes testified at the "Hickey Plot" examination that a
Sergeant Graham, formerly of the Royal Artillery, had told him that he
(the sergeant), at the request of Governor Tryon, had surveyed the
works around the city and on Long Island, and had concerted a plan of
attack, which he gave to the governor (_Force_, 4th Series, vol. vi.,
p. 1178). On his arrival at Staten Island, Howe wrote to Germaine,
July 7th: "I met with Governor Tryon, on board of ship at the Hook,
and many gentlemen, fast friends to government, attending him, from
whom I have had the fullest information of the state of the rebels,
who are numerous, and very advantageously posted, with strong
intrenchments, both upon Long Island and that of New York, with more
than one hundred pieces of cannon for the defence of the town towards
the sea," etc.--_Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p. 105.]
[Footnote 108: This storm, which is mentioned by Colonel Douglas,
Captain Hale, Chaplain Benedict, and others, hung over the city from
seven to ten in the evening, and is described by Pastor Shewkirk as
being more terrible than that which "struck into Trinity Church"
twenty years before. Captain Van Wyck and two lieutenants of
McDougall's regiment and a Connecticut soldier were killed by the
lightning.]
As soon as the covering frigates were in position, the brigade of
light infantry and the reserves of grenadiers and foot, forming an
advance corps four thousand strong and headed by Sir Henry Clinton and
Lord Cornwallis, entered the flotilla and were rowed in ten divisions
to the Gravesend landing, where they formed upon the plain without
opposition.[109] Then followed the remaining troops from the
transports, and before noon the fifteen thousand, with guns and
baggage, had been safely transferred to Long Island. All who witnessed
this naval spectacle that morning were the enemy themselves, a few
Dutch farmers in the vicinity, and the pickets of Hand's riflemen, who
at once reported the movement at camp.
[Footnote 109: The landing-place was at the present village of Bath.
No opposition by the Americans would have availed and none was
attempted. Washington wrote to Hancock, August 20th: "Nor will it be
possible to prevent their landing on the island, as its great extent
affords a variety of places favorable for that purpose, and the whole
of our works on it are at the end opposite to the city. However, we
shall attempt to harass them as much as possible, which will be all
that we can do." To the same effect Colonel Reed's letter of August
23d: "As there were so many landing-places, and the people of the
island generally so treacherous, we never expected to prevent the
landing." General Parsons says (_Document_ 5): "The landing of the
troops could not be prevented at the distance of six or seven miles
from our lines, in a plain under the cannon of the ships, just within
the shore." An American battery had gone down to De Nyse's, earlier in
the summer, to annoy the Asia, but there was none there at this date.
The particulars of the debarkation and of subsequent movements of the
enemy appear in the reports and letters of the two Howes and Sir
George Collier. (_Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., pp. 1255-6; and _Naval
Chronicle_, 1841.)]
The landing successfully effected, Cornwallis was immediately detached
with the reserves, Donop's corps of chasseurs and grenadiers, and six
field-pieces, to occupy the village of Flatbush, but with orders not
to attempt the "pass" beyond, if he found it held by the rebels; and
the main force encamped nearer the coast, from the Narrows to
Flatlands. As Cornwallis advanced, Colonel Hand and his two hundred
riflemen hurried down from their outpost camp above Utrecht, and,
keeping close to the enemy's front, marched part of the way "alongside
of them, in the edge of the woods," but avoided an open fight in the
field with superior numbers.[110] Captain Hamilton and twenty men of
the battalion fell back on the road in advance, burning grain and
stacks of hay, and killing cattle, which, says Lieutenant-Colonel
Chambers, he did "very cleverly." Among the inhabitants along the
coast, confusion, excitement, and distress prevailed,[111] and many
moved off their goods in great haste to find refuge in the American
lines or farther east on the island; while others remained to welcome
the enemy, for whose success they had been secretly praying from the
outset.
[Footnote 110: "On the morning of the 22d of August there were nine
thousand British troops on New Utrecht plains. The guard alarmed our
small camp, and we assembled at the flagstaff. We marched our forces,
about two hundred in number, to New Utrecht, to watch the movements of
the enemy. When we came on the hill we discovered a party of them
advancing toward us. We prepared to give them a warm reception, when
an imprudent fellow fired, and they immediately halted and turned
toward Flatbush. The main body also moved along the great road toward
the same place."--Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers, of Hand's riflemen, to
his Wife, September 3d, 1776. _Chambersburg in the Colony and the
Revolution._]
[Footnote 111: _Strong's History of Flatbush._]
The section of Long Island which the enemy now occupied was a broad
low plain, stretching northward from the coast from four to six miles,
and eastward a still further distance. Scattered over its level
surface were four villages, surrounded with farms. Nearest to the
Narrows, and nearly a mile from the coast, stood New Utrecht; another
mile south-east of this was Gravesend; north-east from Gravesend,
nearly three miles, the road led through Flatlands, and directly north
from Flatlands, and about half-way to Brooklyn Church, lay Flatbush.
Between this plain and the Brooklyn lines ran a ridge of hills, which
extended from New York Bay midway through the island to its eastern
extremity. The ridge varied in height from one hundred to one hundred
and fifty feet above the sea, and from the plain it rose somewhat
abruptly from forty to eighty feet, but fell off more gradually in its
descent on the other side. Its entire surface was covered with a dense
growth of woods and thickets, and to an enemy advancing from below it
presented a continuous barrier, a huge natural abattis, impassable to
artillery, where with proportionate numbers a successful defence could
be sustained.
The roads across the ridge passed through its natural depressions, of
which there were four within a distance of six miles from the harbor.
The main highway, or Jamaica Road--that which led up from Brooklyn
Ferry--after passing through Bedford, kept on still north of the
hills, and crossed them at the "Jamaica Pass," about four miles from
the fortified line. From this branched three roads leading to the
villages in the plain. The most direct was that to Flatbush, which cut
through the ridge a mile and a half from the works. Three quarters of
a mile to the left, towards the Jamaica Pass, a road from Bedford led
also to Flatbush; and near the coast ran the Gowanus Road to the
Narrows. Where the Red Lion Tavern stood on this road, about three
miles from Brooklyn Church, a narrow lane, known as the Martense Lane,
now marking the southern boundary of Greenwood Cemetery, diverged to
the left through a hollow in the ridge and connected with roads on the
plain. To clearly understand succeeding movements on Long Island, it
is necessary to have in mind the relative situation of these several
routes and passes.
When word of the enemy's landing reached Sullivan and Washington the
troops were immediately put under arms. The commander-in-chief had
already been prepared for the intelligence by a dispatch from Governor
Livingston, of New Jersey, the night before, to the effect that he had
certain information from the British camp that they were then
embarking troops and would move to the attack on the following
day.[112] As the report came in that the enemy intended to march at
once upon Sullivan, Washington promptly sent him a reinforcement of
six regiments, which included Miles' and Atlee's from Stirling's
brigade, Chester's and Silliman's from Wadsworth's, and probably
Lasher's and Drake's from Scott's, numbering together some eighteen
hundred men. They crossed with light spirits, and were marched to
alarm-posts. Miles' two battalions went on to the Bedford Pass;
Silliman was ordered down into "a woody hill near Red Hook, to prevent
any more troops from landing thereabout."[113] Hand's riflemen,
supported by one of the Eastern regiments, watched and annoyed the
Hessians under Donop at Flatbush, and detachments were sent to guard
the lower roads near the Red Lion.[114] Within the Brooklyn lines the
troops stood to their alarm-posts. Colonel Little, expecting that
"morning would bring us to battle," and remembering his promise to
defend Fort Greene to the last extremity, enclosed his will to his
son, and directed him in a certain event to take proper charge at
home.
[Footnote 112: Livingston sent a spy to Staten Island on the night of
the 20th, who brought word that the British were embarking, and would
attack on Long Island and up the North River. Washington received the
information during the storm on the following evening, and immediately
sent word to Heath at King's Bridge that the enemy were upon "the
point of striking the long-expected stroke." The next morning, the
22d, he wrote again instructing Heath to pick out "eight hundred or a
thousand, light, active men, and good marksmen," ready to move rapidly
wherever they were most needed; and he promised to send him some
artillery, "if," he continues, "we have not other employment upon
hand, which General Putnam, who is this instant come in, seems to
think we assuredly shall, this day, as there is a considerable
embarkation on board of the enemy's boats." (_Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll._,
volume for 1878. The Heath correspondence.) On the same date
Washington wrote to Hancock: "The falling down of several ships
yesterday evening to the Narrows, crowded with men, those succeeded by
many more this morning, and a great number of boats parading around
them, as I was just now informed, with troops, are all circumstances
indicating an attack, and it is not improbable it will be made to-day.
It could not have happened last night, by reason of a most violent
gust." (_Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p. 1110). On the 21st, Colonel
Hand at the Narrows reported three times to General Nixon that the
British transports were filling with men and moving down, and the
reports were sent to Washington. These facts show how closely the
enemy were watched. The embarkation was known at headquarters early on
the morning of the 22d, before the landing was made on Long Island.]
[Footnote 113: Washington wrote to Heath the next day: "Our first
accounts were that they intended by a forced march to surprise General
Sullivan's lines, who commands during the illness of General Greene;
whereupon I immediately reinforced that post with six regiments."
Miles, Silliman, and Chester's adjutant, Tallmadge, state that their
regiments were among the first to cross after the enemy landed.
Sullivan's orders of the 25th and other records seem to indicate that
Atlee's, Lasher's, and Drake's were the other three battalions sent
over at the same time.]
[Footnote 114: See Sullivan's orders, Silliman's letters, Miles'
Journal (Part II.), and Chambers' letter. [Transcriber's Note: The
marker in the text for this footnote is missing in the original.]]
The morning of the 23d, however, brought no battle, nor did the enemy
attempt any advance for three days. Washington made Sullivan an early
visit, saw the situation there for himself, and during the day issued
another of his fervent orders to the army. He formally announced the
landing of the British, and again reminded his troops that the moment
was approaching on which their honor and success and the safety of the
country depended. "Remember, officers and soldiers," he said, "that
you are freemen, fighting for the blessings of liberty; that slavery
will be your portion, and that of your posterity, if you do not acquit
yourselves like men. Remember how your courage and spirit have been
despised and traduced by your cruel invaders; though they have found
by dear experience at Boston, Charleston, and other places what a few
brave men, contending in their own land and in the best of causes, can
do against base hirelings and mercenaries." He urged them, too, to be
cool, but determined; not to fire at a distance, but wait for the word
from their officers; and gave express orders that if any man
attempted to skulk, lie down, or retreat, he must be instantly shot
down as an example. Those who should distinguish themselves for
gallantry and good conduct were assured that they might depend upon
being honorably noticed and suitably rewarded. Strict orders as to
other matters were also issued. The commissary-general was to have
five days' baked bread on hand for distribution; the men were to have
constantly ready with them two days' hard bread and pork, and the
officers were to see not only that they had it, but kept it. The
officers of the newly arrived militiamen were instructed also to see
that the cartridges fitted their soldiers' muskets, and that each man
had twenty-four rounds and two flints.
On the Long Island front, Sullivan was alert, and kept his division in
readiness for the attack, which was now hourly expected. He ordered
his command that afternoon, the 23d, to prepare two days' provisions
and turn out the next morning at three o'clock. For the night, he
assigned Hitchcock's and Little's regiments to guard the Flatbush
Pass, Johnston's and Martin's to the coast road, and Remsen's Long
Island militia to support Miles on the Bedford Road. They were all to
be at their posts at six o'clock, and the regiments they relieved were
to return to their encampments and, like the rest, "get two days'
provisions dressed, and be ready for action."
Meanwhile some brisk skirmishing occurred in front of Flatbush. In the
afternoon of this day, the enemy, as Sullivan reported, formed, and
attempted to pass the road by Bedford, but meeting a warm reception
from the riflemen, some "musketry" sent to their support, and two or
three of our field pieces, they fell back. "Our men," wrote Sullivan
to Washington, "followed them to the house of Judge Lefferts (where a
number of them had taken lodgings), drove them out, and burnt the
house and a number of other buildings contiguous. They think they
killed a number; and, as evidence of it, they produced three officers'
hangers, a carbine, and one dead body, with a considerable sum of
money in pocket. I have ordered a party out for prisoners
to-night."[115] The enemy returned in force, and the American
skirmishers, having but two wounded, withdrew to the hills; but their
conduct in the affair was so highly appreciated by Sullivan, that he
issued a congratulatory order in the following terms:
"The general returns his thanks to the brave officers and soldiers
who, with so much spirit and intrepidity, repulsed the enemy and
defeated their designs of taking possession of the woods near our
lines. He is now convinced that the troops he has the honor to command
will not, in point of bravery, yield to any troops in the universe.
The cheerfulness with which they do their duty, and the patience with
which they undergo fatigue, evince exalted sentiments of freedom and
love of country, and gives him most satisfactory evidence that when
called upon they will prove themselves worthy of that freedom for
which they are now contending."[116]
[Footnote 115: Referring evidently to this skirmish,
Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers says: "Strong guards were maintained all
day on the flanks of the enemy, and our regiment and the Hessian
yagers kept up a severe firing, with a loss of but two wounded on our
side. We laid a few Hessians low, and made them retreat out of
Flatbush. Our people went into the town and brought the goods out of
the burning houses. The enemy liked to have lost their field-pieces.
Captain Steel acted bravely. We would certainly have had the cannon
had it not been for some foolish person calling retreat. The main body
of the foe returned to town, and when our lads came back they told of
their exploits."]
[Footnote 116: Little's Order Book, _Document_ 2. But it seems that
Remsen's Long Island militiamen were seized by a panic, either during
this skirmish or at a later hour, on the Bedford Road, and ran from
their posts. Sullivan rebuked them sharply in his orders of the 24th
(_Document_ 2), and confined them thereafter to "fatigue" duty. This
proved to be only the first of several militia panics experienced in
this campaign.]
On the 24th, Washington was still in doubt as to the intentions of the
enemy. Reports represented their numbers on Long Island at not more
than eight thousand, whereas they were double this estimate; and it
was suspected at headquarters that their landing might only be a feint
to draw off our troops to that side, while the real attack should be
made on New York. But the imprudence of running any risks on the
Brooklyn side was obvious, and Washington sent over a further
reinforcement of four regiments, which appear to have been Wyllys's,
Huntington's, and Tyler's of Parsons' brigade (his entire command was
there on the next day) together with the Pennsylvania detachments
under Lieutenant-Colonel Lutz and Major Hay. On this date
Brigadier-General Lord Stirling crossed over, where more than half his
brigade had preceded him; and Brigadier-General John Nixon, whose name
now first appears in connection with the operations on Long Island,
was detailed as field officer of the day, with orders to take command
of the outer line and post his men "in the edge of the woods next the
enemy."[117]
[Footnote 117: Sullivan's Orders, August 24th. _Document_ 2.]
But the principal event of the 24th was the change made in the chief
command on Long Island. Sullivan was superseded by Putnam. There were
now on that side the whole of Nixon's and Heard's brigades (the two
regiments on Governor's Island excepted), the larger part of
Stirling's and Parson's, and half of Scott's and Wadsworth's. As this
roster included one third of the army's effective force, the command
could properly be assigned to Putnam as the senior major-general
present; but it does not appear that the question of his rank entered
into the reasons for the change. In a letter to Governor Livingston
from Colonel Reed, the adjutant-general, dated August 30th, 1776, the
statement is made that Washington, "finding a great force going to
Long Island, sent over Putnam;" leaving the inference to be drawn
that, apart from his rank, Putnam was considered the proper officer,
or an officer competent, to command such a force. Reed states further
that some movements had been made on Long Island of which the
commander-in-chief did not entirely approve, and this also called for
a change. Sullivan, too, was wholly unacquainted with the ground;
although, as to this, Putnam's knowledge of it was not extensive, as
he had been over it only "occasionally." That Sullivan was a brave,
zealous, and active officer, his military career abundantly proves.
Appointed a brigadier-general from New Hampshire, he commanded a
brigade under Lee throughout the Boston siege, and had been sent, as
already stated, in the spring of this year to help repair the
misfortunes attending our force on the Canada border; but success was
not to be met with there, and Sullivan, finding Gates promoted to the
chief command in that quarter, returned, after visiting Congress, to
the New York army. Like most of our general officers at that date, he
as yet lacked military experience, especially in an independent
capacity, for which his ambition to succeed was not a sufficient
equivalent. How far Putnam was more competent to assume the command on
Long Island, is a point which the issue there, at least, did not
determine. His record before this was all in his favor. A veteran of
the old war, a man of known personal courage, blunt, honest,
practical, and devoted to the American cause, he had the confidence
of at least the older part of the army, with which he had been
identified from the beginning of the struggle. As he had never been
tried in a separate department, Washington could not say how he would
manage it, but he could say, from his experience with him at Boston,
that Putnam was "a most valuable man and fine executive officer,"[118]
and such he continued to prove himself through the present campaign.
He seconded Washington heartily and efficiently in all his plans and
preparations, and when he was sent to Long Island the commander-in-chief
had reason to feel that whatever directions he might give as to
operations there, Putnam would follow them out to the letter. But if
Putnam took the general command across the river, Sullivan continued
in active subordinate control, as second in command.[119]
[Footnote 118: Washington to Congress, January 30th, 1776.]
[Footnote 119: In regard to the change in the command, the
adjutant-general's statement in full is this: "On General Greene's
being sick, Sullivan took the command, who was wholly unacquainted
with the ground or country. Some movements being made which the
general did not approve entirely, and finding a great force going to
Long Island, he sent over Putnam, who had been over occasionally; this
gave some disgust, so that Putnam was directed to soothe and soften as
much as possible." (_Sedgwick's Life of Livingston_, p. 201.) What
movements were referred to, unless it was the random firing of the
skirmishers and the burning of houses at Flatbush by some of our men,
or how Putnam was to reconcile Sullivan to the change, as he was
directed (this evidently being the meaning of Reed's last phrase),
does not appear. From subsequent occurrences, the inference is
justified that Putnam did not disturb Sullivan's arrangements, but
left the disposition of the troops to him. What Sullivan himself says
is given in a note further along in the chapter. That Putnam went over
on the 24th, and in the forenoon, is evident from a letter from Reed
to his wife of that date, in which he says: "While I am writing, there
is a heavy firing and clouds of smoke rising from the wood [on Long
Island]. General Putnam was made happy by obtaining leave to go
over--the brave old man was quite miserable at being kept here."
(_Reed's Life of Reed._) This firing, as Washington wrote to Schuyler
on the same date, occurred in the morning. Putnam had been engaged
during the summer, principally, in looking after the defences in the
city and the river obstructions. He had charge, also, of the water
transportation, boats, pettiaugers, etc. His division was in the city
or close to it. Had the enemy, accordingly, attacked the city
directly, it would have fallen largely to Putnam to conduct the
defence; and this is doubtless the reason why, as Reed says, he was
"kept here." But as it now seemed certain that the British were
concentrating on Long Island, he evidently wished to be with the
troops there, where that morning there was "a heavy firing" going on,
and obtained leave to cross. Finding a change desirable, Washington,
probably at the same time, gave Putnam the command and "sent" him
over.]
On the 25th, Putnam received written instructions from Washington. He
was directed to form a proper line of defence around his encampment
and works on the most advantageous ground; to have a brigadier of the
day constantly upon the lines that he might be on the spot to command;
to have field-officers go the rounds and report the situation of the
guards; to have the guards particularly instructed in their duty; and
to compel all the men on duty to remain at their camps or quarters and
be ready to turn out at a moment's warning. The wood next to Red Hook
bordering Gowanus Creek was to be well attended to, and the woods
elsewhere secured by abattis, if necessary, to make the enemy's
progress as difficult as possible. The militia, or troops which were
least disciplined and had seen the least service, were to man the
interior lines, while the best men were "at all hazards" to prevent
the enemy's passing the woods and approaching the works. He
disapproved also of the unmeaning picket firing and the burning of
houses, and warned the general finally that when the attack came it
was certain to be "sudden and violent."[120]
[Footnote 120: Mr. Davis, in his Life of Aaron Burr, who was Putnam's
aid at this time, states that after crossing to Long Island and making
the round of the outposts, he (Burr) urged his general to beat up the
enemy's camp, but that Putnam declined, on the ground that his orders
required him to remain strictly on the defensive.]
For brigadier for the day, General Lord Stirling was assigned to duty
on this date.[121]
[Footnote 121: Sullivan's Orders, August 25th. _Document_ 2.]
In the skirmishing that continued from the 24th to the 26th the
Americans showed skill and bravery, although at times indulging in
desultory firing. The riflemen, supported by field-pieces, made
occasioned dashes upon the enemy and picked off their men with almost
no loss to themselves. Among the troops on picket near Flatbush, on
the 25th, were Colonel Silliman and his Connecticut battalion; and
from the colonel, who wrote from there, on a drum-head, to his wife,
we get a glimpse of the situation at that point during his tour of
duty. "I am now posted," he says, "within about half a mile from the
Regulars with my Regt. under the covert of a woody hill to stop their
passage into the country. There are a number of Regts. posted all
around the town within about the same distance and for the same
purpose. The Regulars keep up an almost constant fire from their
Cannon and Mortars at some or other of us, but neither shott nor shell
has come near my Regt. as yet and they are at too great a distance to
fire muskets at. I have a scouting party going out now to see if they
can't pick up some or get something from them.... They have wounded in
all of our men in 3 days skirmish about 8 or 9, one or two mortally,
which is not half the number that we have killed for them besides
wounded." On the 26th a considerable party with artillery attacked the
Hessians and drove them in, killing several men belonging to the Von
Lossberg regiment, which later in the day advanced in turn and
compelled our skirmishers to fall back. In this affair Colonel Ephraim
Martin, of New Jersey, was severely wounded.
On the morning of the 26th, Washington again crossed to Long Island,
where he remained until night. The records are quite silent as to how
he passed the most of his time, but judging from his letter to
Congress of this date, in which he expressed his belief that the enemy
had landed nearly all their force on that side, and that it was there
they would make their "grand push," it was doubtless a busy, watchful,
and anxious day with him. To suppose that he did not inform himself of
all the preparations made to meet the enemy, that he did not know what
number of men were posted on the hills and at what points, that he did
not study the several modes and directions of attack possible for the
enemy to adopt, and that he did not himself give personal directions,
would be to charge that at the most important moment of the campaign
he failed to exercise that care and attention to detail which he
exercised on so many occasions both before and after. Indeed, although
Putnam and Sullivan were in immediate command on Long Island,
Washington never shifted the final responsibility from his own
shoulders, and as a matter of fact was probably as well acquainted
with the ground as either of these generals. Towards evening, in
company with Putnam, Sullivan, and other officers, he rode down to the
outposts near Flatbush and examined the position of the enemy. How
long he remained, or what information he was able to gather, does not
appear; but both the other generals, Putnam and Sullivan, made a
detour of the pickets either at this time or at an earlier hour in the
day, visited Miles and Brodhead on the extreme left, took their
opinion as to the movements and intentions of the British, so far as
one could be formed by them, and then rode off to the right "to
reconnoitre the enemies lines."[122]
[Footnote 122: Several writers, Mr. Sparks among them, make the
statement that neither Washington nor Putnam went outside of the
Brooklyn lines. It would be impossible to credit this without absolute
proof of the fact. Washington always reconnoitred the position of the
enemy whenever they were near each other; in the last scenes of the
war at Yorktown he was among the first at the outposts examining the
British works. Undoubtedly he rode out to the Flatbush Pass on the
26th, as stated by the writer of the letter to the _South Carolina
Gazette_ (Document 19), who says: "The evening preceding the action,
General Washington, with a number of general officers, went down to
view the motions of the enemy, who were encamped at Flatbush." A
letter from a survivor of the Revolution, present on Long Island,
published in a newspaper several years since, well authenticated, and
preserved in one of Mr. Onderdonk's scrap-books in the Astor Library,
New York, confirms this statement. The soldier recollects that he saw
Washington and others looking at the enemy with their glasses.]
On this day also, the 26th, additional regiments were sent over. Two
of these were the remainder of Stirling's brigade--Haslet's Delaware
battalion, the largest in the army, as we have seen, and Smallwood's
Marylanders, one of the choicest and best equipped. Either on this or
one of the two previous days, Lieutenant-Colonel Kachlein's incomplete
battalion of Pennsylvania riflemen, with two or three independent
companies from Maryland, crossed; and among the last to go over were
one hundred picked men, the nucleus of the "Rangers," from Durkee's
Connecticut Continentals at Bergen, with Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas
Knowlton at their head.[123] These additions raised the force on Long
Island on the night of the 26th to a total of about seven thousand men
fit for duty.[124]
[Footnote 123: Statement of Colonel Thomas Grosvenor to the late David
P. Hall, Esq., of New York, who knew Grosvenor well, and preserved
many facts in writing in regard to his military career. Knowlton's
captains were Grosvenor and Stephen Brown, of Pomfret, Conn. The
detachment was on duty at the outposts on the night of the 26th. The
soldier whose letter is referred to in the note preceding this was one
of the "Rangers," and he states that their number was about one
hundred. That Smallwood's and Haslet's regiments crossed on the 26th,
we have from Smallwood himself.--_Force_, 5th Series, vol. ii., p.
1011.]
[Footnote 124: The regiments were Little's and Ward's, from
Massachusetts; Varnum's and Hitchcock's, from Rhode Island;
Huntington's, Wyllys's, Tyler's, Chester's, Silliman's, and Gay's, and
Knowlton's "Rangers," from Connecticut; Lasher's and Drake's, from New
York; Smith's and Remsen's, from Long Island; Martin's, Forman's,
Johnston's, Newcomb's, and Cortland's, from New Jersey; Hand's,
Miles', Atlee's, Lutz's, Kachlein's, and Hay's, detachment from
Pennsylvania; Haslet's, from Delaware; and Smallwood's, from Maryland.
Among other artillery officers on that side were Captains Newell and
Treadwell, Captain-Lieutenants John Johnston and Benajah Carpenter;
Lieutenants Lillie and "Cadet" John Callender. This list is believed
to include all the battalions and detachments on Long Island at the
time the British attacked.]
Following in turn after Nixon and Stirling, Brigadier-General Parsons
was detailed as field officer of the day[125] for the next twenty-four
hours--the day of the engagement.
[Footnote 125: Parson's own statement, letter of October 5th: "On the
day of the surprise I was on duty."--_Document_ 5.]
* * * * *
At about the time that Washington started to return to his
headquarters at New York, on this evening, Sir William Howe began to
set his columns in motion for the attack, and on the next morning, at
the passes in the hills and along their inner slopes, was fought what
is known in our Revolutionary history as the battle of Long Island.
* * * * *
Fortunately, a point so essential to the comprehension of the progress
of any engagement, the position of both armies on Long Island, just
before the attack, is now known nearly to the last detail. The record
here is clear and satisfactory. On the night of the 26th, the various
regiments and detachments on guard at the American outposts numbered
not far from twenty-eight hundred men. At the important Flatbush Pass,
supporting the two or three gun battery there, and with strong pickets
thrown out to the edge of the woods nearest the enemy, were posted
Hitchcock's and Little's Continental regiments, and Johnston's New
Jersey battalion, the two former being commanded by their
lieutenant-colonels, Cornell and Henshaw. To this point, also,
Knowlton and his rangers appear to have been sent. The battery or
redoubt here stood about where the Flatbush and narrow Port Road
united, and was apparently no more than a plain breastwork, with
felled trees in front of it, thrown up across the road, and perhaps
extending to the rising ground on the left.[126] At the coast road,
around and beyond the Red Lion, the guards consisted of Hand's
riflemen, half of Atlee's musketry, detachments of New York troops,
and part of Lutz's Pennsylvanians under Major Burd. At the Bedford
Pass, to the left of the Flatbush Road, were stationed Colonel Samuel
Wyllys's Connecticut Continentals, and Colonel Chester's regiment from
the same State, under Lieutenant-Colonel Solomon Wills, of Tolland,
who had seen service in the French war and at Havana. Still further to
the left, Colonel Miles was now encamped a short distance beyond, in
the woods. Between these several passes, sentinels were stationed at
intervals along the crest of the ridge, to keep communication open
from one end of the line to the other.[127]
[Footnote 126: The site of this breastwork is now within the limits of
Prospect Park, and it stood across what is known as "Battle Pass." Dr.
Stiles in his History of Brooklyn, and Mr. Field in vol. ii. of the
L.I. Hist. Society's _Memoirs_, put a well-constructed redoubt at this
point on a hill-top to the left of the road. The account in the _South
Carolina Gazette_ says that the Flatbush Pass guards were posted "near
a mile from the parting of the road [_i.e._, a mile from where the
Flatbush Road branched from the Jamaica Road] where an _abattis_ was
formed across the road, and a breastwork thrown up and defended by two
pieces of cannon." In the original sketch of the "engagement," made by
John Ewing, who was Hand's brother-in-law, and with him on the spot,
there is this reference: "F. Where a considerable Number of our people
were stationed with several Field-pieces & Breast-works made with
Trees felled across the Road to defend themselves when attacked."
(_Document_ 15.) Colonel Miles speaks of "a small redoubt in front of
the village [Flatbush]" (_Document_ 20.) The breastwork across the
road was doubtless the principal defence here, and this was merely
temporary.]
[Footnote 127: The number of men at each of the three passes was about
eight hundred, and on the left of these were Miles' two battalions,
with perhaps five hundred men on duty. Sullivan's orders of August
25th give the detail which was to mount for picket on the following
morning. This detail, therefore, was the one on duty on the night of
the 26th. The order runs: "Eight hundred [men] properly officered to
relieve the troops on Bedford Road to-morrow morning, six field
officers to attend with this party. The same number to relieve those
on Bush [Flatbush] Road, and an equal number those stationed towards
the Narrows. A picket of three hundred men under the command of a
Field Officer, six Captains, twelve subalterns to be posted at the
wood on the west side of the creek every night till further orders."
(See also _Documents_ 5, 18, 19.) That Miles was on the extreme left,
we well know; that Wyllys was at the Bedford Pass, appears from both
Miles' and Brodhead's accounts; that Chester's regiment was with him,
appears from an extract quoted below--Chester's lieutenant-colonel
being Solomon Wills; that Johnston was at the Flatbush Pass, appears
from the same and other authorities; that Henshaw with Little's
regiment was there, he himself states; that Cornell was also there
with Hitchcock's Rhode Islanders, appears from Captain Olney's
narrative as given in _Mrs. Williams' Life of Olney_, and from the
lists of prisoners; that Hand was at the lower road, until relieved,
and Major Burd also, the major himself and Ewing's sketch both state;
the New York detachment there was probably a part of Lasher's
regiment. The extract referred to is from the _Connecticut Courant_,
containing a letter from an officer engaged in the battle, which says:
"The night before August 27th, on the west road, were posted Colonel
Hand's regiment, a detachment from Pennsylvania and New York; next
east were posted Colonel Johnson, of Jersey, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Henshaw, of Massachusetts; next east were posted Colonel Wyllys and
Lieutenant-Colonel Wills, of Connecticut. East of all these Colonel
Miles, of Pennsylvania, was posted towards Jamaica, to watch the
motion of the enemy and give intelligence."]
As far, then, to the left as Miles' position the hills were as well
guarded as seemed possible with the limited force that could be
spared, and at the passes themselves a stout resistance could have
been offered. But it was still an attenuated line, more than four
miles long, not parallel but oblique to the line of works at Brooklyn,
and distant from it not less than one and a half, and at the farthest
posts nearly three miles. Should the enemy pierce it at any one point,
an immediate retreat would have been necessary from every other. The
line could have been defended with confidence only on the supposition
that the British would not venture to penetrate the thick woods, but
advance along the roads through the passes.
It will be noticed that in this disposition no provision was made for
holding the fourth or Jamaica Pass far over to the left. That the
enemy could approach or make a diversion by that route, must have been
well understood. But the posting of a permanent guard there would
obviously have been attended with hazard, for the distance from the
lines to this pass was four miles, and from the Bedford Pass two miles
and a half through the woods. The position was thus extremely
isolated, if the troops stationed there were expected to make the
fortified line their point of retreat. None were stationed there
during the five days since the British landed, and it nowhere appears
that any were intended or ordered to be so stationed by either
Sullivan, Putnam, or the commander-in-chief. There was but one
effective way of preventing surprise from that quarter, and that was
to have squads of cavalry or troops constantly patrolling the road,
who on the appearance of an enemy could carry the word immediately and
rapidly to the outposts and the camp. But in all Washington's army
there was not a single company of horsemen, except the few Long Island
troopers from Kings and Queens counties, and these were now engaged
miles away in driving off stock out of reach of the enemy. The duty,
accordingly, of looking after the open left flank fell, in part, upon
Colonel Miles' two battalions. Lieutenant-Colonel Brodhead leaves it
on record that it was "hard duty." The regiment sent out scouting
parties every day a distance of four or five miles; one hundred men
were mounted for guard daily, and thirty more with a lieutenant were
kept on duty on the left, evidently in the direction of the Jamaica
Road. General Parsons reports that "in the wood was placed Colonel
Miles with his Battalion to watch the motion of the Enemy on that
part, with orders to keep a party constantly reconnoitering to and
across the Jamaica road." Should he discover the enemy at any time,
it would have been expected of him to report the fact at once, oppose
them vigorously, and retreat obstinately in order to give time for the
other detachments to govern their movements accordingly.
One other circumstance is to be noticed in regard to this Jamaica
Pass. General Sullivan, subsequently referring to his connection with
this battle, claimed that while he was in sole command he paid
horsemen out of his own purse to patrol the road, and that he
predicted the approach of the enemy by that road. Whatever inferences
may be drawn from this is not now to the point; but we have the fact
that upon the evening of the 26th he exercised the same authority he
had exercised in making other details, and sent out a special patrol
of five commissioned officers to watch the Jamaica Pass. Three of
these officers belonged to Colonel Lasher's New York City
battalion--Adjutant Jeronimus Hoogland and Lieutenants Robert Troup
and Edward Dunscomb; and the other two were Lieutenant Gerrit Van
Wagenen, a detached officer of McDougall's old regiment, and a
Lieutenant Gilliland, who with Van Wagenen had crossed to Long Island,
as a volunteer. What part this patrol played in the incidents of the
following morning will presently appear.
Thus on the night of the 26th the American outposts stretched along
the hills from the harbor to the Jamaica Pass, with unguarded
intervals, a distance of more than six miles, while in the plains
below lay the enemy, nearly ten times their number, ready to fall upon
them with "a sudden and violent" shock. During the night one change
was made in the picket guard. Colonel Hand's riflemen, who had been on
almost constant duty since the arrival of the British, were relieved
at two o'clock in the morning by a detachment from the flying camp,
which may have been a part of Hay's and Kachlein's men, and returning
to the lines, dropped down to sleep.[128]
[Footnote 128: Hand's letter of August 27th: "I escaped my part by
being relieved at 2 o'clock this morning." (Document 12.) See John
Ewing's letter and sketch.]
* * * * *
If we leave our outposts now upon the hills and pass into the enemy's
camp on the plain below, we shall find them on the eve of carrying out
a great plan of attack. The four days since the 22d had been given to
preparation. On the 25th, Lieutenant-General De Heister crossed from
Staten Island with the two Hessian brigades of Von Stirn and Von
Mirbach, leaving behind Von Lossberg's brigade, with some detachments
and recruits, for the security of that island. With this addition,
Howe's force on Long Island was swelled to a total of about twenty-one
thousand officers and men, fit for duty and in the best condition for
active service.[129] As disposed on the 26th, the army lay with the
Hessians and the reserves under Cornwallis at Flatbush, the main body
under Clinton and Percy massed at Flatlands, and Grant's division of
the fourth and sixth brigades nearer the Narrows.
[Footnote 129: Extract from a British officer's letter dated, _Statton
Island, August 4, 1776_: ... "We are now in expectation of attacking
the fellows very soon, and if I may be allowed to judge, there never
was an army in better spirits nor in better health, two very important
things for our present business."--_Hist. Mag._, vol. v., p. 69.]
Outnumbering the Americans three to one on the island, Howe could lay
his plans with assurance of almost absolute success. He proposed to
advance upon the "rebels" in three columns. Grant was ordered to move
up from the Narrows along the lower road, and De Heister was to engage
the attention of the Americans at the Flatbush Pass, while Clinton,
Percy, and Cornwallis, with Howe himself, were to conduct the main
body as a flanking force around the American left by way of the
Jamaica Pass. A previous reconnoissance made by Clinton and Erskine,
and information gathered from the Tories, showed the practicability of
this latter movement.[130] Grant and De Heister were simply to make a
show of an attack until they were assured by the sound of the firing
that the flanking column had accomplished its design, when their
demonstrations were to be turned into serious fighting. It was
expected that by this plan the Americans stationed at the hills and
passes would be entirely enveloped and thoroughly beaten if not
captured in a body. With what nice precision this piece of strategy
was executed, events will show.
[Footnote 130: Stedman, the British historian, who served as an
officer under Howe, says: "Sir Henry Clinton and Sir William Erskine,
having reconnoitred the position of the enemy, saw that it would not
be a difficult matter to turn their left flank, which would either
oblige them to risk an engagement or to retire under manifest
disadvantage. This intelligence being communicated to Sir William
Howe, he consented to make the attempt."]
* * * * *
The first collision was ominous. Grant's advance-guard, marching up
from the Narrows, struck the American pickets in the vicinity of the
Red Lion about two o'clock on the morning of the 27th. Whether because
they were all new troops, a part of whom had but just come upon the
ground, and were alarmed by the night attack, or because they were
surprised at their posts and put in danger of capture, or whatever the
reason, our picket guard at that point retreated before the enemy
without checking their march. There was hardly more than an exchange
of fire with Major Burd's detachment, as the major himself writes, and
in the confusion or darkness he, with many others probably, was taken
prisoner. This was an unfortunate beginning, so far as our men had
abandoned one of the very posts which it had been proposed to hold;
but otherwise, there being other positions available, it was not
necessarily fatal to the plan of defending the hills.[131]
[Footnote 131: Hardly more than a general statement can be made in
regard to the attack on the pickets at the lower road. A part of them
watched Martense Lane, where, it would appear from Ewing's sketch,
Hand's riflemen were posted before being relieved. Major Burd's
detachment, on the same authority, was probably on the direct road to
the Narrows, both parties communicating with each other at the Red
Lion Tavern, which stood near the fork of the roads. Grant's main
column advanced by the Narrows Road, and possibly a party of the enemy
came through the Martense Lane at about the same time. The skirmish
Major Burd speaks of occurred in the vicinity of Thirty-eighth and
Fortieth streets, on the Narrows Road, where former residents used to
say the Americans had a picket guard stationed. When the enemy came up
firing took place and some men were killed; and this firing "was the
first in the neighborhood." The pickets retreated, though General
Parsons was misinformed when he wrote that they did so "without firing
a gun." There was firing, but no stand made.]
Word of the attack was quickly carried to General Parsons at his
quarters and to General Putnam in camp. Parsons, as the brigadier on
duty, rode at once to the spot, and found "by fair daylight" not only
that the guards had "fled," but that the enemy were through the woods
and already on this side of the main hills. Hastily collecting some
twenty of the scattered pickets, he made a show of resistance, which
temporarily halted the enemy's column.[132] At the same time Putnam,
whose instructions were to hold the outposts "at all hazards" with his
best men, called up Stirling and directed him in person to take the
two regiments nearest at hand and march down to meet the enemy.[133]
Stirling promptly turned out Haslet's and Smallwood's battalions and
marched down. Colonel Atlee, who was also ordered forward, was on the
road before him, with that part of his regiment, about one hundred and
twenty men, not already on picket; and Huntington's Connecticut
Continentals, under Lieutenant-Colonel Clark (Huntington himself being
sick),[134] and Kachlein's Pennsylvania riflemen were soon after
started in the same direction. Meanwhile, within the lines, the
alarm-guns were fired, the whole camp roused, and the troops drawn up
at the forts and breastworks. Hand's riflemen, who had but just lain
down, "almost dead with fatigue," were turned out to take post in Fort
Putnam and the redoubt on its left.[135]
[Footnote 132: _Parsons' Letters._ Part II., Document 5.]
[Footnote 133: _Stirling to Washington, Aug. 29th:_ "About three
o'clock on the morning of the 27th I was called up, and informed by
General Putnam that the enemy were advancing," etc.--_Force_, 5th
Series, vol. i., p. 1245.]
[Footnote 134: "Col. Huntington is unwell, but I hope getting a little
better. He has a slow fever. Maj. Dyer is also unwell with a slow
fever. Gen'l Greene has been very sick but is better. Genls. Putnam,
Sullivan, Lord Sterling, Nixon, Parsons, & Heard are on Long Island
and a strong part of our army."--_Letter from Col. Trumbull, Aug.
27th, 1776._ _Document_ 7.]
[Footnote 135: See references on Ewing's sketch, Document 15: "H. Fort
Putnam where part of Colo. Hand's men commanded by Lieut C.
[Lieutenant-Colonel] Chambers were detached from the Regt. to man the
fort.--I. A small upper Fort where [I] was with the Colo the Day of
the Engagement." Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers says: "We had just got to
the fort, and I had only laid down, when the alarm-guns were fired. We
were compelled to turn out to the lines, and as soon as it was light
saw our men and theirs engaged with field-pieces." Nearly all the
accounts put Hand and his battalion at the Flatbush Pass during the
battle on the 27th. This, as we now find, is an error. The battalion
was worn out by its continued and effective skirmishing since the
landing of the enemy, and required rest; but of this it was to get
very little, even within the lines.]
When Stirling reached a point within half a mile of the Red Lion he
found, as Parsons had before him, that the enemy had met with little
opposition or delay at the outposts on that road, and were now on the
full march towards the Brooklyn lines. As there were still good
positions which he could occupy, he immediately made a disposition of
his force to offer resistance. The road here ran in a winding course
along the line of the present Third Avenue, but a short distance from
the bay, with here and there a dwelling which together constituted the
Gowanus village or settlement. Where the present Twenty-third Street
intersects the avenue there was a small bridge on the old road which
crossed a ditch or creek setting up from the bay to a low and marshy
piece of ground on the left, looking south; and just the other side of
the bridge, the land rose to quite a bluff at the water's edge, which
was known among the Dutch villagers as "Blockje's Bergh." From the
bluff the low hill fell gradually to the marsh or morass just
mentioned, the road continuing along between them.[136] Right here,
therefore, the approach by the road was narrow, and at the corner of
Twenty-third Street was confined to the crossing at the bridge.
[Footnote 136: The writer is indebted to the Hon. Teunis G. Bergen, of
Bay Ridge, L.I., for an accurate description and sketch of the Gowanus
Road, as it lay at the time of the battle. His survey is followed in
the "Map of the Brooklyn Defences," etc., Title, Maps. Part II.]
[Illustration: [signature: Jed Huntington]
COLONEL SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT (CONN.) BRIGADIER GENERAL 1777.
Steel Engr. F. von Egloffstein N.Y.]
According to his own account, and from our present knowledge of the
topography, Stirling evidently came to a halt on or just this side of
"Blockje's Bergh." Seeing the British not far in his front, and taking
in the situation at a glance, he ordered Atlee to post his men on the
left of the road and wait the enemy's coming up, while he himself
retired with Smallwood's and Haslet's to form line on a piece of "very
advantageous ground" further back. Atlee reports this preliminary move
as follows: "I received orders from Lord Stirling to advance with my
battalion and oppose the enemy's passing a morass or swamp at the foot
of a fine rising ground, upon which they were first discovered, and
thereby give time to our brigade to form upon the heights. This order
I immediately obeyed, notwithstanding we must be exposed without any
kind of cover to the great fire of the enemy's musketry and
field-pieces, charged with round and grapeshot, and finely situated
upon the eminence above mentioned, having entire command of the ground
I was ordered to occupy. My battalion, although new and never before
having the opportunity of facing an enemy, sustained their fire until
the brigade had formed; but finding we could not possibly prevent
their crossing the swamp, I ordered my detachment to file off to the
left and take post in a wood upon the left of the brigade."[137]
General Parsons says: "We took possession of a hill about two miles
from camp, and detached Colonel Atlee to meet them further on the
road; in about sixty rods he drew up and received the enemy's fire and
gave them a well-directed fire from his regiment, which did great
execution, and then retreated to the hill."
[Footnote 137: _Atlee's Journal._ _Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p.
1251.]
This advantageous site, where Stirling had now drawn up his brigade to
dispute Grant's progress, was the crest of the slope which rose
northerly from the marsh and low ground around "Blockje's Bergh," and
which to-day is represented by about the line of Twentieth
Street.[138] Here was an elevation or ridge favorable for defence,
and here Stirling proposed to make a stand. On the right, next to the
road, he posted Smallwood's battalion, under Major Gist; further along
up the hillside were the Delawares, under Major MacDonough;[139] and
on their left, in the woods above, Atlee's men formed after falling
back from their attempt to stop the enemy.
[Footnote 138: Probably the earliest of modern attempts to identify
the site where Stirling formed his line was that made in 1839 by Maj.
D.B. Douglass, formerly of the United States Army. Greenwood Cemetery,
says Mr. Cleveland in his history of _Greenwood_, owes its present
beautiful appearance largely to this officer's "energy and taste,"
Douglass having been one of the first surveyors of the ground. He
located Stirling's position on what was then known as Wyckoff's hill,
between Eighteenth and Twentieth streets; and tradition and all the
original documents confirm this selection. This was a lower elevation
in the general slope from the main ridge towards the bay. Stirling
simply drew his men up in a straight line from the road towards the
hill-tops, and beyond him on the same line or more in advance, was
Parsons. The map in Sparks' _Washington_ putting Stirling down near
the Narrows is erroneous.]
[Footnote 139: The colonels and lieutenant-colonels of both these
regiments were detained at New York as members of the court-martial
which tried Lieutenant-colonel Zedwitz, of MacDougall's regiment,
charged with treasonable correspondence with the enemy. They joined
their regiments after the battle.]
When Kachlein's[140] riflemen came up, the general stationed part of
them along hedges near the foot of the hill in front of the
Marylanders, and part in front of the woods near Atlee. The line had
hardly been formed before it was observed that the enemy threatened to
overlap it on the left, and Parsons was accordingly ordered to take
Atlee's and Huntington's regiments and move still further into the
woods to defeat the designs on that flank.
[Footnote 140: This name appears in other accounts as Kichline or
Keichline. It is properly Kachlein, being so spelled by other members
of this officer's family.]
Finding Stirling thus thrown across their path, the British also drew
up in line and disposed their force as if intending to attack him at
once. About opposite to the Marylanders, possibly on Blockje's Bergh,
Grant posted the sixth brigade in two lines, while the fourth brigade
was extended in a single line from the low ground to the top of the
hills in Greenwood Cemetery.
Here, then, was a regular battle formation--Grant and Stirling
opposing each other--and we may regard it with interest not only as
the only line of battle preserved, on the American side at least,
during this day's struggle, but as being the first instance in the
Revolution where we met the British in the open field. Before this it
had been fighting under different conditions--the regulars mowed down
at Bunker Hill, Montgomery attempting to storm Quebec, or Moultrie
bravely holding a fort against a fleet; now the soldiers on either
side stood face to face, and the opportunity seemed at hand to fairly
test their native courage. Greatly disproportionate, however, was the
strength of these two lines. Stirling's, all told, contained not more
than sixteen hundred men; while Grant's, which besides the two
brigades included the Forty-second Highlanders and two companies of
American loyalists, was little less than seven thousand strong. But if
we find here a threatening attitude, let us not expect any desperate
fighting. It was not Grant's object to bring on an engagement at this
early hour, now seven o'clock in the morning, for he wished to keep
Stirling where he was until the other movements of the day were
developed. He contented himself with appearing to be on the point of
attack, and Stirling could do no more than prepare for a stubborn
defence of his ground.
The first move of the British was to send forward a small body of
light troops from their left, which advanced to within one hundred and
fifty yards of Stirling's right. This would bring them not far from
the little bridge on the road, where, from behind hedges and
apple-trees, they opened fire on our advanced riflemen, who replied
with spirit.
In the mean time, Stirling was reinforced by a two-gun battery from
Knox's artillery, under Captain-Lieutenant Benajah Carpenter, of
Providence, R.I., which was at once placed on the hillside to command
the road, and, according to Stirling, "the only approach for some
hundred yards," which must have been that part of the road running
over the bridge. The skirmishing was kept up at a lively rate for
about two hours, and occasionally, it would appear, our entire line
engaged in the fire. Of the particular incidents which occurred at
this point we have almost nothing; but perhaps, from one or two mere
references that have been preserved, the whole scene can be imagined.
"The enemy," writes one of the Maryland soldiers, "advanced towards
us, upon which Lord Stirling, who commanded, drew up in a line and
offered them battle in true English taste. The British then advanced
within about 200 yards of us, and began a heavy fire from their cannon
and mortars, for both the Balls and Shells flew very fast, now and
then taking off a head. Our men stood it amazingly well; not even one
of them shewed a Disposition to shrink. Our orders were not to fire
until the Enemy came within fifty yards of us, but when they perceived
we stood their fire so cooly and resolutely they declined coming any
nearer, altho' treble our number."[141] Colonel Haslet, although not
with his regiment, reported to his friend Cæsar Rodney that "the
Delawares drew up on the side of a hill, and stood upwards of four
hours, with a firm, determined countenance, in close array, their
colors flying, the enemy's artillery playing on them all the while,
not daring to advance and attack them;"[142] and his ensign, Stephens,
pointed with pride to the standard "torn with shot" while held in his
hands.
[Footnote 141: _Extracts from the Stiles Diary_ in vol. ii., p. 488,
of the Long Island Historical Society's _Memoirs_.]
[Footnote 142: _Haslet to Rodney._ _Force_, 5th Series, vol. ii., p.
881.]
Galled perhaps by the fire of Carpenter's battery, the British light
troops retired to their main line, and the firing from this time was
continued chiefly by the artillery. On their left they advanced one
howitzer to within three hundred yards of Stirling's right, and in
front of his left they opened with another piece at a distance of six
hundred yards, and until about eleven o'clock the cannonading was
vigorously sustained. Here was an engagement begun, and for four hours
Stirling's men were encouraged with the belief that they were holding
back the invaders. Their general inspired them with his own resolution
and bravery, both by word and example; and their good conduct in this
their first experience under fire, exposed without cover to cannon and
musket shot, indicated that Grant could not have pushed them back
without suffering severely. The casualties had not been large, but the
nerves of the men were none the less tested by the ordeal. Among the
Marylanders, Captain Edward Veazey, who commanded one of the
independent companies, doing duty with Smallwood's regiment, fell
"early in the engagement;" and either here, or on the retreat at a
later hour, also fell Captain Carpenter, whose battery had been doing
good work on Stirling's line. Of the Delawares, Major MacDonough and
Lieutenants Anderson and Course were slightly wounded. Accounts agree
that few of the men in either Smallwood's, Haslet's, or Kachlein's
battalions were killed or wounded while holding this position.
The three regiments immediately under Stirling thus not only appeared
to be doing well, but had actually proved themselves the best of
soldiers, both by keeping an unwavering line when the British light
troops advanced, as if to be followed by the main column, and in
maintaining their ranks and discipline when subjected to the
subsequent fire of the artillery.
Nor were these the only men who did themselves credit. That little
party composed of Atlee's and Huntington's battalions, under General
Parsons, which had gone into the woods to protect Stirling's left,
must not be forgotten. Our published accounts heretofore fail to
particularize the service it did; but it was of no small account, as
Parson's and Atlee's independent testimony and the returns of the
British losses clearly show. The party, not much over three hundred
strong, filed off to the left, and soon came in sight of "a hill of
clear ground" about three hundred yards distant, which was judged to
be the proper situation from which to watch the enemy.[143] The
direction Parsons' men took, the distances mentioned, and the fact
that tradition associates the site with part of the fighting on that
day, can leave no doubt but that the hill referred to here was one of
the two or three distinct elevations in the north-western section of
Greenwood Cemetery, and to one of which has since been given the
commemorative title of "Battle Hill." A spot fitly named, for around
it some brave work was done! As the detachment neared the hill, the
British flanking troops were also observed to be marching to seize it.
Atlee seeing this hurried his men to reach it first, but the enemy
were there before him and poured a volley into his battalion.
Fortunately, not being well aimed, this did trifling damage, but under
the shock a part of his men, with two companies from the Delaware
regiment, which had been ordered to join them, wavered. Rallying the
most of them, Atlee soon ordered an advance up the hill, telling the
men at the same time "to preserve their fire and aim aright;" and they
all pushed forward with so much resolution, and apparently with such
an effective discharge of their pieces, that the enemy fell back,
leaving behind them twelve killed and a lieutenant and four privates
wounded. In this encounter Atlee lost his "worthy friend" and
lieutenant-colonel, Caleb Parry, who fell dead upon the field without
a groan, while cheering on the battalion. Ordering four soldiers to
take the remains of "the hero" back into the Brooklyn lines, Atlee
halted his "brave fellows" on the hill, and all Parsons' command here
took post to await the further movements of the British on this flank.
The force they had met and repulsed consisted of the Twenty-third and
Forty-fourth and a part of the Seventeenth regiments, by whom they
were soon to be attacked again. In half an hour after the first affair
the enemy formed for another effort to seize the hill, but again
Atlee's and Huntington's men opened upon them, and for a second time
compelled their retreat, with the loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, a
brave and valued field-officer of the Fortieth Regiment, whose fall
gave ground for the report, credited for some days after in the
American army, that Major-General Grant, the division commander, was
among the enemy's killed in the battle of Long Island. Parsons' men by
this time had fired away all their ammunition (Atlee says that his
battalion, at least, had entirely emptied their cartridge-boxes), and
had used what charges could be got from the enemy's dead and wounded,
when Huntington's ammunition cart "very luckily" came on the ground,
and the men were re-supplied for still a third attack, which was
threatened with the assistance of the Forty-second Highlanders; but
the British this time kept a safe distance, and Parsons and Atlee
remained on the hill, where they collected the enemy's dead and placed
their wounded under the shelter of the trees. Thus bravely and
effectively had this small body of Americans protected Stirling's
flank and dealt the enemy the severest blows they suffered at any one
point during the day, and this, as in the case of Stirling's men, with
but small loss to themselves. From behind fences and trees, and, if
tradition is correct, from the tops of trees as well, and from open
ground on the hill, they kept up their destructive fire and
successfully accomplished what they had been called upon to do.[144]
That the British did not intend at this hour to drive Parsons and
Atlee from their post is no detraction from the spirited fight made by
these officers and their men, who knew nothing of the enemy's
intentions, and who actually won the field from the troops they met.
All along this front, from Stirling holding the road on the right to
Parsons holding the left, with a long gap between them, the fighting
thus far had resulted most favorably to the American side. The main
line, as already stated, had lost not more than two officers killed
and three or four wounded, with a small number of men; while Parsons
and Atlee both report that in addition to the death of Lieutenant-Colonel
Parry they lost only one or two men wounded. But, on the part of the
British, Grant's two brigades, with the Forty-second Highlanders and
the two companies of New York loyalists, lost, according to Howe's
official report, two officers killed and four wounded, and among the
men twenty-five killed and ninety-nine wounded. The four regiments
alone which at different times encountered Parsons--the Seventeenth,
Twenty-third, Forty-fourth, and Forty-second--lost in the aggregate
eighty-six officers and men killed and wounded.
[Footnote 143: _Atlee's Journal._ _Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p.
1251.]
[Footnote 144: Parsons' reference to this affair at or near "Battle
Hill" in Greenwood is as follows: "I was ordered with Col. Atlee and
part of his Reg't, and Lt. Col. Clark with Col. Huntington's Reg't to
cover the left flank of our main body. This we executed though our
number did at no time exceed 300 men and we were attacked three
several times by two regiments, ye 44th and 23d and repulsed
them in every attack with considerable loss. The number of dead we had
collected together and the heap the enemy had made we supposed
amounted to about 60. We had 12 or 14 wounded prisoners who we caused
to be dressed and their wounds put in the best state our situation
would admit."--_Document_ 5.
See Colonel Atlee's journal in _Force's Archives_ for a full account
of the part his battalion took in this fighting.]
* * * * *
While, now, Stirling and Parsons seemed to be effectually blocking the
advance of the British by the lower road and the Greenwood hills, what
was the situation at the other passes?