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THE
CAMPAIGN OF 1776
AROUND
NEW YORK AND BROOKLYN.
INCLUDING A NEW AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL ACCOUNT OF
THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND AND THE LOSS OF NEW YORK,
WITH A
_REVIEW OF EVENTS TO THE CLOSE OF THE YEAR_,
CONTAINING MAPS, PORTRAITS, AND ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.
BY
HENRY P. JOHNSTON.
BROOKLYN, N.Y.:
PUBLISHED BY THE LONG ISLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY.
1878.
COPYRIGHT, 1878,
BY HENRY P. JOHNSTON,
FOR THE SOCIETY.
S.W. GREEN,
PRINTER AND ELECTROTYPER,
16 and 18 Jacob Street,
NEW YORK.
[Illustration: NEW YORK and BROOKLYN WITH THEIR ENVIRONS IN 1776.
Compiled by H.P. JOHNSTON.
Steel Engr. F. von Egloffstein, N.Y.]
PREFACE.
The site now occupied by the two cities of New York and Brooklyn, and
over which they continue to spread, is pre-eminently "Revolutionary
soil." Very few of our historic places are more closely associated
with the actual scenes of that struggle. As at Boston in 1775, so here
in 1776, we had the war at our doors and all about us. In what is now
the heart of Brooklyn Revolutionary soldiers lay encamped for months,
and in the heat of a trying summer surrounded themselves with lines of
works. What have since been converted into spots of rare
beauty--Greenwood Cemetery and Prospect Park--became, with the ground
in their vicinity, a battle-field. New York, which was then taking its
place as the most flourishing city on the continent, was transformed
by the emergency into a fortified military base. Troops quartered in
Broad Street and along the North and East rivers, and on the line of
Grand Street permanent camps were established. Forts, redoubts,
batteries, and intrenchments encircled the town. The streets were
barricaded, the roads blocked, and efforts made to obstruct the
navigation of both rivers. Where we have stores and warehouses,
Washington fixed alarm and picket posts; and at points where costly
residences stand, men fought, died, and were buried. In 1776 the cause
had become general; soldiers gathered here from ten of the original
thirteen States, and the contest assumed serious proportions. It was
here around New York and Brooklyn that the War of the Revolution began
in earnest.
The record of what occurred in this vicinity at that interesting
period has much of it been preserved in our standard histories by
Gordon, Marshall, Irving, Hildreth, Lossing, Bancroft, Carrington, and
others. In the present volume it is given as a single connected
account, with many additional particulars which have but recently come
to light. This new material, gathered largely from the descendants of
officers and soldiers who participated in that campaign, is published
with other documents in Part II. of this work, and is presented as its
principal feature. What importance should be attached to it must be
left to the judgment of the reader.
The writer himself has made use of these documents in filling gaps and
correcting errors. Such documents, for example, as the orders issued
by Generals Greene and Sullivan on Long Island, with the original
letters of Generals Parsons, Scott, and other officers, go far towards
clearing up the hitherto doubtful points in regard to operations on
the Brooklyn side. There is not a little, also, that throws light on
the retreat to New York; while material of value has been unearthed
respecting events which terminated in the capture of the city by the
British. Considerable space has been devoted to the preparations made
by both sides for the campaign, but as the nature of those
preparations illustrates the very great importance attached to the
struggle that was to come, it may not appear disproportionate. The
narrative also is continued so as to include the closing incidents of
the year, without which it would hardly be complete, although they
take us beyond the limits of New York.
But for the cheerful and in many cases painstaking co-operation of
those who are in possession of the documents referred to, or who have
otherwise rendered assistance, the preparation of the work could not
have been possible. The writer finds himself especially under
obligations to Miss Harriet E. Henshaw, of Leicester, Mass.; Miss Mary
Little and Benjamin Hale, Esq., Newburyport; Charles J. Little, Esq.,
Cambridge; Mr. Francis S. Drake, Roxbury; Rev. Dr. I.N. Tarbox and
John J. Soren, Boston; Prof. George Washington Greene, East Greenwich,
R.I.; Hon. J.M. Addeman, Secretary of State of Rhode Island, and Rev.
Dr. Stone, Providence; Hon. Dwight Morris, Secretary of State of
Connecticut; Dr. P.W. Ellsworth and Captain John C. Kinney, Hartford;
Miss Mary L. Huntington, Norwich; Benjamin Douglas, Esq., Middletown;
Mr. Henry M. Selden, Haddam Neck; Hon. G.H. Hollister, Bridgeport;
Hon. Teunis G. Bergen, Mr. Henry E. Pierrepont, J. Carson Brevoort,
Esq., Rev. Dr. H.M. Scudder, and Mr. Gerrit H. Van Wagenen, Brooklyn;
Mr. Henry Onderdonk, Jr., Jamaica, L.I.; Frederick H. Wolcott, Esq.,
Astoria, L.I.; Hon. John Jay, Charles I. Bushnell, Esq., Miss Troup,
Mrs. Kernochan, Prof. and Mrs. O.P. Hubbard, Gen. Alex. S. Webb, Rev.
A.A. Reinke, New York City; Mr. William Kelby, New York Historical
Society; Prof. Asa Bird Gardner, West Point; Hon. W.S. Stryker,
Adjutant-General, Trenton, N.J.; Richard Randolph Parry, Esq., Hon.
Lewis A. Scott, and Mr. J. Jordan, Philadelphia; Hon. John B. Linn,
Harrisburg; Mrs. S.B. Rogers and Mr. D.M. Stauffler, Lancaster; Dr.
Dalrymple, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore; Hon. Cæsar A.
Rodney, J.R. Walter, and W.S. Boyd, Wilmington, Del.; Oswald Tilghman,
Esq., Easton, Md.; Hon. Edward McPherson, Rev. Dr. John Chester, and
Lieutenant-Colonel T. Lincoln Casey, Washington; President Andrews and
Mr. Holden, Librarian, Marietta College; and Mr. Henry E. Parsons and
Edward Welles, Ashtabula, Ohio.
The cordial and constant encouragement extended by the Rev. Dr.
Richard S. Storrs, President of the Long Island Historical Society,
and the interest taken in the work by Hon. Henry C. Murphy, Benjamin
D. Silliman, Esq., and the Librarian, Mr. George Hannah, are
gratefully acknowledged.
NEW YORK CITY, June, 1878.
CONTENTS.
PART I.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CAMPAIGN--PLANS AND PREPARATIONS 13
CHAPTER II.
FORTIFYING NEW YORK AND BROOKLYN 35
CHAPTER III.
THE TWO ARMIES 105
CHAPTER IV.
THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 139
CHAPTER V.
RETREAT TO NEW YORK 207
CHAPTER VI.
LOSS OF NEW YORK--KIP'S BAY AFFAIR--BATTLE OF HARLEM HEIGHTS 225
CHAPTER VII.
WHITE PLAINS--FORT WASHINGTON 263
CHAPTER VIII.
TRENTON--PRINCETON--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN 287
PART II.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS:
No. 1. General Greene's Orders--Camp on Long Island 5
" 2. General Sullivan's Orders--Camp on Long Island 27
" 3. General Orders 30
" 4. Washington to the Massachusetts Assembly 32
" 5. General Parsons to John Adams 33
" 6. General Scott to John Jay 36
" 7. Colonel Joseph Trumbull to his Brother 40
" 8. Colonel Trumbull to his Father 41
" 9. Colonel Moses Little to his Son 42
" 10. Lieutenant-Colonel Henshaw to his Wife 44
" 11. Deposition by Lieutenant-Colonel Henshaw 47
" 12. Colonel Edward Hand to his Wife 48
" 13. Major Edward Burd to Judge Yeates 48
" 14. Lieutenant Jasper Ewing to Judge Yeates 49
" 15. John Ewing to Judge Yeates 50
" 16. Colonel Haslet to Cæsar Rodney 51
" 17. Colonel G.S. Silliman to his Wife 52
" 18. Colonel Silliman to Rev. Mr. Fish 57
" 19. Account of the Battle of Long Island 58
" 20. Journal of Colonel Samuel Miles 60
" 21. Lieutenant-Colonel John Brodhead to ---- 63
" 22. Colonel William Douglas to his Wife 66
" 23. General Woodhull to the New York Convention 73
" 24. General Washington to Abraham Yates 74
" 25. Colonel Hitchcock to Colonel Little 75
" 26. Major Tallmadge's Account of the Battles of Long Island
and White Plains 77
" 27. Account of Events by Private Martin 81
" 28. Captain Joshua Huntington to ---- 84
" 29. Captain Tench Tilghman to his Father 85
" 30. Captain John Gooch to Thomas Fayerweather 88
" 31. Account of the Retreat from New York and Affair of
Harlem Heights, by Colonel David Humphreys 89
" 32. Testimony Respecting the Retreat from New York 92
" 33. Major Baurmeister's Narrative 95
" 34. Colonel Chester to Joseph Webb 98
" 35. Colonel Glover to his Mother 99
" 36. General Greene to Colonel Knox 100
" 37. Diary of Rev. Mr. Shewkirk, Moravian Pastor, New York 101
" 38. Major Fish to Richard Varick 127
" 39. Surgeon Eustis to Dr. Townsend 129
" 40. Captain Nathan Hale to his Brother 131
" 41. Extract from a Letter from New York 132
" 42. Extracts from the _London Chronicle_ 133
" 43. Extract from the Memoirs of Colonel Rufus Putnam 136
" 44. Scattering Orders by Generals Lee, Spencer, Greene,
and Nixon 141
" 45. General Lee to Colonel Chester 145
" 46. Captain Bradford's Account of the Capture of General
Lee 146
" 47. General Oliver Wolcott to his Wife 147
" 48. Captain William Hull to Andrew Adams 151
" 49. Colonel Knox to his Wife 152
" 50. Colonel Haslet to Cæsar Rodney 156
" 51. Journal of Captain Thomas Rodney 158
" 52. Position of the British at the Close of the Campaign 162
" 53. Narrative of Lieutenant Jabez Fitch 167
" 54. Extract from the Journal of Lieutenant William
McPherson 168
" 55. Deposition of Private Foster 169
" 56. Letters from Captain Randolph, of New Jersey 170
" 57. Extract from the Journal of Captain Morris 172
" 58. British Prisoners Taken on Long Island 174
" 59. A Return of the Prisoners Taken in the Campaign 175
" 60. List of American Officers Taken Prisoners at the
Battle of Long Island 176
" 61. List of American Non-Commissioned Officers and
Soldiers Taken Prisoners, Killed, or Missing, at the
Battle of Long Island 180
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES 187
THE MAPS 193
THE PORTRAITS 195
INDEX 197
LIST OF MAPS.
1. NEW YORK, BROOKLYN, AND ENVIRONS IN 1776.
2. PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND AND THE BROOKLYN DEFENCES.
3. PRESIDENT STILES' SKETCH OF THE BROOKLYN WORKS.
4. EWING'S DRAUGHT OF THE LONG ISLAND ENGAGEMENT.
5. MAP OF NEW YORK CITY AND OF MANHATTAN ISLAND, WITH THE AMERICAN
DEFENCES.
6. FIELD OF THE HARLEM HEIGHTS "AFFAIR."
PORTRAITS.
1. JOHN LASHER, COLONEL FIRST NEW YORK CITY BATTALION.
2. EDWARD HAND, COLONEL FIRST CONTINENTAL REGIMENT, PENNSYLVANIA.
3. JOHN GLOVER, COLONEL FOURTEENTH CONTINENTAL REGIMENT,
MASSACHUSETTS.
4. JEDEDIAH HUNTINGTON, COLONEL SEVENTEENTH CONTINENTAL REGIMENT,
CONNECTICUT.
PART I.
THE CAMPAIGN.
CHAPTER I.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CAMPAIGN--PLANS AND PREPARATIONS.
"Our affairs are hastening fast to a crisis; and the approaching
campaign will, in all probability, determine forever the fate of
America."
So wrote John Hancock, President of Congress, June 4th, 1776, to the
governors and conventions of the Eastern and Middle colonies, as, in
the name of that body, he reminded them of the gravity of the struggle
on which they had entered, and urged the necessity of increasing their
exertions for the common defence. That this was no undue alarm,
published for effect, but a well-grounded and urgent warning to the
country, is confirmed by the situation at the time and the whole train
of events that followed. The campaign of 1776 did indeed prove to be a
crisis, a turning-point, in the fortunes of the Revolution. It is not
investing it with an exaggerated importance, to claim that it was the
decisive period of the war; that, whatever anxieties and fears were
subsequently experienced, this was the year in which the greatest
dangers were encountered and passed. "Should the united colonies be
able to keep their ground this campaign," continued Hancock, "I am
under no apprehensions on account of any future one." "We expect a
very bloody summer in New York and Canada," wrote Washington to his
brother John Augustine, in May; and repeatedly, through the days of
preparation, he represented to his troops what vital interests were at
stake and how much was to depend upon their discipline and courage in
the field.
But let the significance of the campaign be measured by the record
itself, to which the following pages are devoted. It will be found to
have been the year in which Great Britain made her most strenuous
efforts to suppress the colonial revolt, and in which both sides
mustered the largest forces raised during the war; the year in which
the issues of the contest were clearly defined and America first
fought for independence; a year, for the most part, of defeats and
losses for the colonists, and when their faith and resolution were put
to the severest test; but a year, also, which ended with a broad ray
of hope, and whose hard experiences opened the road to final success.
It was the year from which we date our national existence. A period so
interesting and, in a certain sense, momentous is deserving of
illustration with every fact and detail that can be gathered.
* * * * *
What was the occasion or necessity for this campaign; what the plans
and preparations made for it both by the mother country and the
colonies?
The opening incidents of the Revolution, to which these questions
refer us, are a familiar chapter in its history. On the morning of the
19th of April, 1775, an expedition of British regulars, moving out
from Boston, came upon a company of provincials hastily forming on
Lexington Common, twelve miles distant. The attitude of these
countrymen represented the last step to which they had been driven by
the aggressive acts of the home Parliament. Up to this moment the
controversy over colonial rights and privileges had been confined,
from the days of the Stamp Act, to argument, protest, petition, and
legislative proceedings; but these failing to convince or conciliate
either party, it only remained for Great Britain to exercise her
authority in the case with force.
The expedition in question had been organized for the purpose of
seizing the military stores belonging to the Massachusetts Colony,
then collected at Concord, and which the king's authorities regarded
as too dangerous material to be in the hands of the people at that
stage of the crisis. The provincials, on the other hand, watched them
jealously. King and Parliament might question their rights, block up
their port, ruin their trade, proscribe their leaders, and they could
bear all without offering open resistance. But the attempt to deprive
them of the means of self-defence at a time when the current of
affairs clearly indicated that, sooner or later, they would be
compelled to defend themselves, was an act to which they would not
submit, as already they had shown on more than one occasion. To no
other right did the colonist cling more tenaciously at this juncture
than to his right to his powder. The men at Lexington, therefore, drew
up on their village grounds, not defiantly, but in obedience to the
most natural impulse. Their position was a logical one. To have
remained quietly in their homes would have been a stultification of
their whole record from the beginning of the troubles; stand they
must, some time and somewhere. Under the circumstances, a collision
between the king's troops and the provincials that morning was
inevitable. The commander of the former, charged with orders to
disperse all "rebels," made the sharp demand upon the Lexington
company instantly to lay down their arms. A moment's confusion and
delay--then scattering shots--then a full volley from the
regulars--and ten men fell dead and wounded upon the green. Here was a
shock, the ultimate consequences of which few of the participants in
the scene could have forecast; but it was the alarm-gun of the
Revolution.
Events followed rapidly. The march of the British to Concord, the
destruction of the stores, the skirmish at the bridge, and, later in
the day, the famous road-fight kept up by the farmers down to
Charlestown, ending in the signal demoralization and defeat of the
expedition, combined with the Lexington episode to make the 19th of
April an historic date. The rapid spread of the news, the excitement
in New England, the uprising of the militia and their hurried march to
Boston to resist any further excursions of the regulars, were the
immediate consequence of this collision.
Nor was the alarm confined to the Eastern colonies, then chiefly
affected. A courier delivered the news in New York three days later,
on Sunday noon, and the liberty party at once seized the public
military stores, and prevented vessels loaded with supplies for the
British in Boston from leaving port. Soon came fuller accounts of the
expedition and its rout. Expresses carried them southward, and their
course can be followed for nearly a thousand miles along the coast. On
the 23d and 24th they passed through Connecticut, where at Wallingford
the dispatches quaintly describe the turning out of the militiamen:
"The country beyond here are all gone." They reached New York at two
o'clock on the 25th, and Isaac Low countersigns. Relays taking them up
in New Jersey, report at Princeton on the 26th, at "3.30 A.M." They
are at Philadelphia at noon, and "forwarded at the same time." We
find them at New Castle, Delaware, at nine in the evening; at
Baltimore at ten on the following night; at Alexandria, Virginia, at
sunset on the 29th; at Williamsburg, May 2d; and at Edenton, North
Carolina, on the 4th, with directions to the next Committee of Safety:
"Disperse the material passages [of the accounts] through all your
parts." Down through the deep pine regions, stopping at Bath and
Newbern, ride the horsemen, reaching Wilmington at 4 P.M. on the 8th.
"Forward it by night and day," say the committee. At Brunswick at nine
the indorsement is entered: "Pray don't neglect a moment in
forwarding." At Georgetown, South Carolina, where the dispatches
arrive at 6.30 P.M. on the 10th, the committee address a note to their
Charleston brethren: "We send you by express a letter and newspapers
with momentous intelligence this instant arrived." The news reaching
Savannah, a party of citizens immediately took possession of the
government powder.
The wave of excitement which follows the signal of a coming struggle
was thus borne by its own force throughout the length of the colonies.
And from the coast the intelligence spread inland as far as settlers
had found their way. In distant Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, men
heard it, and began to organize and drill. At Charlotte, North
Carolina, they sounded the first note for independence. From many
points brave and sympathetic words were sent to the people of
Massachusetts Bay, and in all quarters people discussed the probable
effect of the startling turn matters had taken in that colony. The
likelihood of a general rupture with the mother country now came to be
seriously entertained.
Meanwhile the situation to the eastward assumed more and more a
military aspect. On the 10th of May occurred the surprise and
capture, by Ethan Allen and his party, of the important post of
Ticonderoga, where during the summer the provincials organized a force
to march upon and, if possible, secure the Canadas. The Continental
Congress at Philadelphia, after resolving that the issue had been
forced upon them by Great Britain, voted to prepare for self-defence.
They adopted the New England troops, gathered around Boston, as a
Continental force, and appointed Washington to the chief command. Then
on the 17th of June Bunker Hill was fought, that first regular action
of the war, with its far-reaching moral effect; and following it came
the siege of Boston, or the hemming in of the British by the
Americans, until the former were finally compelled to evacuate the
city.
* * * * *
It is here in these culminating events of the spring and summer of
1775 that we find the occasion for the preparations made by Great
Britain for the campaign of 1776. Little appreciating the genius of
the colonists, underrating their resources and capacity for
resistance, mistaking also their motives, King George and his party
imagined that on the first display of England's power all disturbance
and attempts at rebellion across the sea would instantly cease. But
the sudden transition from peace to war, and the complete mastery of
the situation which the colonists appeared to hold, convinced the home
government that "the American business" was no trifling trouble, to be
readily settled by a few British regiments. As the season advanced,
they began to realize the fact that General Gage, and then Howe
succeeding him, with their force of ten thousand choice troops, were
helplessly pent up in Boston; that Montreal and Quebec were
threatened; that colonists in the undisturbed sections were arming;
and that Congress was supplanting the authority of Parliament. A more
rigorous treatment of the revolt had become necessary; and as the time
had passed to effect any thing on a grand scale during the present
year, measures were proposed to crush all opposition in the next
campaign. Follow, briefly, the course of the British Government at
this crisis.
Parliament convened on the 26th day of October. The king's speech,
with which it opened, was necessarily devoted to the American
question, and it declared his policy clearly and boldly. His
rebellious subjects must be brought to terms. "They have raised
troops," he said, "and are collecting a naval force; they have seized
the public revenue, and assumed to themselves legislative, executive,
and judicial powers, which they already exercise, in the most
arbitrary manner, over the persons and properties of their fellow
subjects: and although many of these unhappy people may still retain
their loyalty, and may be too wise not to see the fatal consequence of
this usurpation and wish to resist it, yet the torrent of violence has
been strong enough to compel their acquiescence, till a sufficient
force shall appear to support them. The authors and promoters of this
desperate conspiracy have, in the conduct of it, derived great
advantage from the difference of our intentions and theirs. They meant
only to amuse by vague expressions of attachment to the parent state,
and the strongest protestations of loyalty to me, whilst they were
preparing for a general revolt. On our part, though it was declared in
your last session that a rebellion existed within the province of the
Massachusetts' Bay, yet even that province we wished rather to reclaim
than to subdue.... The rebellious war now levied is become more
general, and is manifestly carried on for the purpose of establishing
an independent empire. I need not dwell upon the fatal effects of the
success of such a plan.... It is now become the part of wisdom, and
(in its effects) of clemency, to put a speedy end to these disorders,
by the most decisive exertions. For this purpose, I have increased my
naval establishment, and greatly augmented my land forces, but in such
a manner as may be the least burthensome to my kingdoms. I have also
the satisfaction to inform you, that I have received the most friendly
offers of foreign assistance, and if I shall make any treaties in
consequence thereof, they shall be laid before you."
A stranger in Parliament, knowing nothing of the merits of the
controversy, would have assumed from the tone of this speech that the
home government had been grossly wronged by the American colonists, or
at least a powerful faction among them, and that their suppression was
a matter of national honor as well as necessity. But the speech was
inexcusably unjust to the colonists. The charge of design and
double-dealing could not be laid against them, for the ground of their
grievances had been the same from the outset, and their conduct
consistent with single motives; and if independence had been mentioned
at all as yet, it was only as an ulterior resort, and not as an aim or
ambition. The king and the Ministry, on the other hand, were wedded to
strict notions of authority in the central government, and measured a
citizen's fidelity by the readiness with which he submitted to its
policy and legislation. Protests and discussion about "charters" and
"liberties" were distasteful to them, and whoever disputed Parliament
in any case was denounced as strong-headed and factious. The king's
speech, therefore, was no more than what was expected from him. It
reflected the sentiments of the ruling party.
As usual, motions were made in both houses that an humble address in
reply be presented to his Majesty, professing loyalty to his person,
and supporting his views and measures. The mover in the Commons was
Thomas Ackland, who, in the course of his speech at the time, strongly
urged the policy of coercion, and emphasized his approval of it by
declaring that it would have been better for his country that America
had never been known than that "a great consolidated western empire"
should exist independent of Britain. Lyttleton, who seconded the
motion, was equally uncompromising. He objected to making the
Americans any further conciliatory offers, and insisted that they
ought to be conquered first before mercy was shown them.
The issue thus fairly stated by and for the government immediately
roused the old opposition, that "ardent and powerful opposition," as
Gibbon, who sat in the Commons, describes it; and again the House
echoed to attack and invective. Burke, Fox, Conway, Barré, Dunning,
and others, who on former occasions had cheered America with their
stout defence of her rights, were present at this session to resist
any further attempt to impair them. Of the leading spirits, Chatham,
now disabled from public service, alone was absent.
Lord John Cavendish led the way on this side, by moving a substitute
for Ackland's address which breathed a more moderate spirit, and in
effect suggested to his Majesty that the House review the whole of the
late proceedings in the colonies, and apply, in its own way, the most
effectual means of restoring order and confidence there. Of course
this meant concession to America, and it became the signal for the
opening of an impassioned debate. Wilkes, Lord Mayor of London, poured
out a torrent of remonstrances against the conduct of the Ministry,
who had precipitated the nation into "an unjust, ruinous, felonious,
and murderous war." Sir Adam Fergusson, speaking less vehemently and
with more show of sense, defended the government. Whatever causes may
have brought on the troubles, the present concern with him was how to
treat them as they then existed. There was but one choice, in his
estimation--either to support the authority of Great Britain with
vigor, or abandon America altogether. And who, he asked, would be bold
enough to advise abandonment? The employment of force, therefore, was
the only alternative; and, said the speaker, prudence and humanity
required that the army sent out should be such a one as would carry
its point and override opposition in every quarter--not merely beat
the colonists, but "deprive them of all idea of resistance." Gov.
Johnstone, rising in reply, reviewed the old questions at length, and
in the course of his speech took occasion to eulogize the bravery of
the provincials at Bunker Hill. It was this engagement, more than any
incident of the war thus far, that had shown the determination of the
"rebels" to fight for their rights; and their friends in Parliament
presented it as a foretaste of what was to come, if England persisted
in extreme measures. Johnstone besought the House not to wreak its
vengeance upon such men as fought that day; for their courage was
deserving, rather, of admiration, and their conduct of forgiveness.
Honorable Temple Lutrell followed with an attack upon the "evil
counsellors who had so long poisoned the ear of the Sovereign."
Conway, who on this occasion spoke with his old fire, and held the
close attention of the House, called for more information as to the
condition of affairs in the colonies, and at the same time rejected
the idea of reducing them to submission by force. Barré entered
minutely into the particulars and results of the campaign since the
19th of April, as being little to England's credit, and urged the
Ministry to embrace the present opportunity for an accommodation with
America, or that whole country would be lost to them forever. Burke,
in the same vein, represented the impolicy of carrying on the war, and
advised the government to meet the colonists with a friendly
countenance, and no longer allow Great Britain to appear like "a
porcupine, armed all over with acts of Parliament oppressive to trade
and America." Fox spoke of Lord North as "a blundering pilot," who had
brought the nation into its present dilemma. Neither Lord Chatham nor
the King of Prussia, not even Alexander the Great, he declared, ever
gained more in one campaign than the noble lord had lost--he had lost
an entire continent. While not justifying all the proceedings of the
colonists, he called upon the Administration to place America where
she stood in 1763, and to repeal every act passed since that time
which affected either her freedom or her commerce. Wedderburne and
Dunning, the ablest lawyers in the House, took opposite sides. The
former, as Solicitor-General, threw the weight of his opinion in favor
of rigorous measures, and hoped that an army of not less than sixty
thousand men would be sent to enforce Parliamentary authority.
Dunning, his predecessor in office, questioned the legality of the
king's preparations for war without the previous consent of the
Commons. Then, later in the debate, rose Lord North, the principal
figure in the Ministry, and whom the Opposition held mainly
responsible for the colonial troubles, and defended both himself and
the king's address. Speaking forcibly and to the point, he informed
the House that, in a word, the measures intended by the government
were to send a powerful sea and land armament against the colonists,
and at the same time to proffer terms of mercy upon a proper
submission. "This," said the Minister, "will show we are in earnest,
that we are prepared to punish, but are nevertheless ready to
forgive; and this is, in my opinion, the most likely means of
producing an honorable reconciliation."
But all the eloquence, reasoning and appeal of the Opposition failed
to have any more influence now than in the earlier stages of the
controversy, and it again found itself in a hopeless minority. Upon a
division of the House, the king was supported by a vote of 278 to 110.
The address presented to him closed with the words: "We hope and trust
that we shall, by the blessing of God, put such strength and force
into your Majesty's hands, as may soon defeat and suppress this
rebellion, and enable your Majesty to accomplish your gracious wish of
re-establishing order, tranquillity, and happiness through all parts
of your United Empire." In the House of Lords, where Camden,
Shelburne, Rockingham, and their compeers stood between America and
the Ministry, the address was adopted by a vote of 69 to 33.[1]
[Footnote 1: Outside of Parliament, all shades of opinion found
expression through the papers, pamphlets, and private correspondence.
Hume, the historian, wrote, October 27th, 1775: "I am an American in
my principles, and wish we could let them alone, to govern or
misgovern themselves as they think proper. The affair is of no
consequence, or of little consequence to us." But he wanted those
"insolent rascals in London and Middlesex" punished for inciting
opposition at home. This would be more to the point than "mauling the
poor infatuated Americans in the other hemisphere." William Strahan,
the eminent printer, replied to Hume: "I differ from you _toto
coelo_ with regard to America. I am entirely for coercive methods
with those obstinate madmen." Dr. Robertson, author of _The History of
America_, wrote: "If our leaders do not exert the power of the British
Empire in its full force, the struggle will be long, dubious, and
disgraceful. We are past the hour of lenitives and half exertions."
Early in 1776, Dr. Richard Price, the Dissenting preacher, issued his
famous pamphlet on the _Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of
Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War_, which had a great
run. Taking sides with the colonists, he said: "It is madness to
resolve to butcher them. Freemen are not to be governed by force, or
dragooned into compliance. If capable of bearing to be so treated, it
is a disgrace to be connected with them."]
This powerful endorsement of the king's policy by Parliament, however,
cannot be taken as representing the sense of the nation at large. It
may be questioned whether even a bare majority of the English people
were ready to go to the lengths proposed in his Majesty's address. The
Ministry, it is true, pointed to the numerous ratifying "addresses"
that flowed in, pledging the support of towns and cities for the
prosecution of the war. Some were sent from unexpected quarters. To
the surprise of both sides and the particular satisfaction of the
king, both Manchester and Sheffield, places supposed to be American in
sentiment, came forward with resolutions of confidence and approval;
and in ministerial circles it was made to appear that substantially
all England was for coercion. But this claim was unfounded. As the
king predicted, the loyal addresses provoked opposition addresses.
Edinburgh and Glasgow, despite the efforts of their members, refused
to address. Lynn was said to have addressed, but its members denied
the assertion, and claimed that the war was unpopular in that town.
The paper from Great Yarmouth was very thinly signed, while Bristol,
Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Wolverhampton, Dudley, and
other places sent in counter-petitions against the war. The justices
of Middlesex unanimously voted that it was expedient to reduce the
colonies to a proper sense of their duty; but at a meeting of the
freeholders of the same county, held at Mile-end, to instruct their
members in Parliament, little unanimity prevailed, "much clamor
arose," a protest was entered against the proposed resolutions, and
only one of the sheriffs consented to sign them all. London, as the
country well knew, sympathized largely with America, but in a manner
which nullified her influence elsewhere. Her populace was noisy and
threatening; Wilkes, her Lord Mayor, was hated at court; her solid men
kept to business. "Are the London merchants," wrote the king to Lord
North,[2] "so thoroughly absorbed in their private interests not to
feel what they owe to the constitution which has enriched them, that
they do not either show their willingness to support, either by an
address, or, what I should like better, a subscription, to furnish
many comforts to the army in America?" An address from this quarter,
signed by "respectable names," he thought might have a good effect,
and one was presented on October 11th, with 941 signatures; but it was
entirely neutralized by the presentation, three days before, of
another address more numerously signed by "gentlemen, merchants, and
traders of London," in which the measures of government were
condemned. When the point was made in the Commons that the war was a
popular measure in England, Lutrell promptly replied that he had made
many a journey through the interior of the country during the summer
season, and had conversed with "a multitude of persons widely
different in station and description," only to find that the masses
were in sympathy with the colonists. The division of sentiment was
probably correctly represented by Lord Camden early in the year, in
his observation that the landed interest was almost wholly
anti-American, while the merchants, tradesmen, and the common people
were generally opposed to a war.[3]
[Footnote 2: "Correspondence with Lord North." Donne.]
[Footnote 3: Upon this point Dr. Price said: "Let it be granted,
_though probably far from true_, that the _majority_ of the kingdom
favor the present measures. No good argument could be drawn from
thence against receding."]
Having voted to push the war in earnest, Parliament proceeded to
supply the sinews. On November 3d, Lord Barrington brought in the army
estimates for 1776. Fifty-five thousand men, he reported, was the
force necessary and intended to be raised for the purposes of the
nation, the ordinary expense of maintaining which would be something
over £1,300,000. Of these troops, twenty thousand would be retained
to garrison Great Britain, ten thousand for the West Indies,
Gibraltar, Minorca and the coast of Africa, while the actual force
destined for America was to be increased to thirty-four battalions,
each of 811 men, including two regiments of light horse, amounting, in
the aggregate, to upwards of twenty-five thousand men. Barrington, at
the same time, frankly acknowledged to the House that these figures
showed well only on paper, as none of the regiments for America were
complete, and, what was a still more unwelcome admission, that great
difficulty was experienced in enlisting new recruits. Nothing, he
said, had been left untried to secure them. The bounty had been raised
and the standard lowered, and yet men were not forthcoming.
Anticipating this dearth, he had warned the king of it as early as
July, when the latter first determined to increase the army. "I wish,
sir, most cordially," wrote this faithful secretary, "that the force
intended for North America may be raised in time to be sent thither
next spring; but I not only fear, but am confident, the proposed
augmentation cannot possibly be raised, and ought not to be depended
on."
Barrington was compelled to give an explanation of this state of
things, for the point had been made in and out of Parliament that few
recruits could be had in England, because the particular service was
odious to the people in general. For the government to admit this
would have been clearly fatal; and Barrington argued, per contra, that
the scarcity of soldiers was to be traced to other and concurrent
causes. The great influx of real and nominal wealth of recent years,
the consequent luxury of the times, the very flourishing state of
commerce and the manufactures, and the increased employment thus
furnished to the lower classes, all contributed to keep men out of the
army. Above all, it was represented that the true and natural cause
was an actual lack of men, which was due chiefly to the late increase
of the militia, who could not be called upon to serve except in
extreme cases, and who were not available for the regular force.
Barrington, a veteran in official service, true to the king, and
justifying the war--though not at all clear as to the right of taxing
the colonies--no doubt expressed his honest convictions in making this
explanatory speech to the House. There was much, also, that was true
in his words; but, whatever the absolute cause, the fact did not then,
and cannot now escape notice, that in preparing to uphold the
authority of Parliament, and preserve the integrity of her empire in
America, Great Britain, in 1775, found it impossible to induce a
sufficient number of her own subjects to take up arms in her behalf.
It remained, accordingly, to seek foreign aid. Europe must furnish
England with troops, or the war must stop. The custom of employing
mercenaries was ancient, and universally exercised on the Continent.
Great Britain herself had frequently taken foreign battalions into her
pay, but these were to fight a foreign enemy. It would be a thing new
in her history to engage them to suppress fellow-Englishmen. But the
king regarded war as war, and rebellion a heinous offence; and the
character of the troops serving for him in this case became a
secondary matter. A more serious question was where to get them. No
assistance could be expected from France. Holland declined to lend
troops to conquer men who were standing out for their rights on their
own soil. In Prussia, Frederick the Great expressed the opinion that
it was at least problematical whether America could be conquered, it
being difficult to govern men by force at such a distance. "If you
intend conciliation," he said in conversation to a party of
Englishmen, "some of your measures are too rough; and if subjection,
too gentle. In short, I do not understand these matters; I have no
colonies. I hope you will extricate yourselves advantageously, but I
own the affair seems rather perplexing."[4]
[Footnote 4: "A View of Society and Manners in France, Switzerland,
and Germany." By John Moore, M.D. Lond., 1786. Vol. V., Letter 75.]
Of all the European powers, Russia and the German principalities alone
presented a possible field of encouragement.[5] To the former, King
George looked first; for England's friendly attitude had been of the
greatest advantage to Russia in her campaigns against Turkey. The
king, therefore, at an early date, gave directions that Gunning, the
British Minister at Moscow, should approach the Empress Catherine on
the subject of lending aid; and, on the proper occasion, Gunning held
an interview with Panin, the Russian Prime Minister. Catherine
promptly returned what appeared to be a very favorable reply. To use
Gunning's own words communicating Russia's answer: "The empress had
ordered him (Panin) to give the strongest assurances, and to express
them in the strongest terms, of her entire readiness on this and all
other occasions to give his Majesty every assistance he could desire,
in whatever mode or manner he might think proper. She embraced with
satisfaction this occasion of testifying her gratitude to the king and
nation for the important services she had received in the late
war--favors she the more valued and should not forget as they were
spontaneously bestowed.... We were as fully entitled to every succor
from her as if the strongest treaties subsisted."[6]
[Footnote 5: Respecting sentiment in Europe on American affairs, the
English traveller Moore wrote as follows from Vienna in 1775: "Our
disputes with the colonies have been a prevailing topic of
conversation wherever we have been since we left England. The warmth
with which this subject is handled increases every day. At present the
inhabitants of the Continent seem as impatient as those of Great
Britain for news from the other side of the Atlantic; but with this
difference, that here they are all of one mind--all praying for
success to the Americans, and rejoicing in every piece of bad fortune
which happens to our army."--_Moore's View_, etc. Letter 96.]
[Footnote 6: "History of England from the Accession of George III. to
1783." By J. Adolphus. Vol. II., p. 326.]
Greatly elated by this unequivocal tender of aid, King George wrote to
the empress in his own hand, thanking her for the proffer; and Gunning
at the same time was instructed to ask for twenty thousand Russians,
and enter into a treaty formally engaging their services. If he could
not secure twenty thousand, he was to get all he could. But Gunning's
negotiations were to fail completely. To his surprise and chagrin,
when he opened the subject of hiring Russian troops, the empress and
Panin answered with dignity that it was impossible to accommodate him;
that Russia's relations with Sweden, Poland, and Turkey were
unsettled, and that it was beneath her station to interfere in a
domestic rebellion which no foreign Power had recognized. This sudden
change in Catherine's attitude, which without doubt was the result of
court intrigue,[7] filled the English king with mortification and
disappointment, and compelled him to seek assistance where he finally
obtained it--in the petty states of the "Hessian" princes.
[Footnote 7: Two views have been expressed in regard to this. The
English historian Adolphus charges Frederick of Prussia and secret
French agents with having changed Catherine's mind, and he gives
apparently good authority for the statement. The secret seems to have
been known in English circles very soon after Catherine's refusal. On
November 10th Shelburne said in the House of Lords: "There are Powers
in Europe who will not suffer such a body of Russians to be
transported to America. I speak from information. The Ministers know
what I mean. Some power has already interfered to stop the success of
the Russian negotiation." Mr. Bancroft, on the other hand, concludes
(Vol. V., Chap. L., Rev. Ed.) that "no foreign influence whatever, not
even that of the King of Prussia, had any share in determining the
empress;" and Vergennes is quoted as saying that he could not
reconcile Catherine's "elevation of soul with the dishonorable idea of
trafficking in the blood of her subjects." But since Catherine, four
years later, in 1779, proposed to offer to give England effective
assistance in America in order to be assured of her aid in return
against the Turks, it may be questioned how far "elevation of soul"
prompted the decision in 1775. (See Eaton's "Turkish Empire," p. 409.)
In view of England's relations with most of the Continental Powers at
that time, Shelburne and Adolphus have probably given the correct
explanation of the matter.]
Success in this direction compensated in part for the Russian failure.
What the British agent, Colonel Faucett, was able to accomplish, what
bargains were struck to obtain troops, how much levy money was to be
paid per man, and how much more if he never returned, is all a
notorious record. From the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, Faucett hired
twelve thousand infantry; from the Duke of Brunswick, three thousand
nine hundred and a small body of cavalry; and from the reigning Count
of Hanau, a corps six hundred and sixty strong. These constituted the
"foreign troops" which England sent to America with her own soldiers
for the campaign of 1776.
The plans for the campaign were laid out on a scale corresponding with
the preparations. When Sir William Howe was sent out to reinforce
General Gage at Boston, in the spring of 1775, it was assumed by the
Ministry that operations would be confined to that quarter, and that
if Massachusetts were once subdued there would be nothing to fear
elsewhere. But the continued siege of Boston changed the military
status. Howe was completely locked in, and could effect nothing. The
necessity of transferring the seat of war to a larger field became
apparent after Bunker Hill, and military plans were broached and
discussed in the Cabinet, in the army, and in Parliament. Lord
Barrington, who well knew that men enough could not be had from
England to conquer the colonies, advocated operations by sea. An
effective blockade of the entire American coast, depriving the
colonists of their trade, might, in his view, bring them to terms. Mr.
Innes, in the House, proposed securing a strong foothold in the south,
below the Delaware, and shutting up the northern ports with the fleet.
But the basis of the plan adopted appears to have been that suggested
by Burgoyne at Boston in the summer of 1775, and by Howe in January,
1776. "If the continent," wrote the former to Lord Rochfort, Secretary
of State for the Colonies, "is to be subdued by arms, his Majesty's
councils will find, I am persuaded, the proper expedients; but I speak
confidently as a soldier, because I speak the sentiments of those who
know America best, that you can have no prospect of bringing the war
to a speedy conclusion with any force that Great Britain and Ireland
can supply. A large army of foreign troops such as might be hired, to
begin their operations up the Hudson River; another army, composed
partly of old disciplined troops and partly of Canadians, to act from
Canada; a large levy of Indians, and a supply of arms for the blacks
to awe the southern provinces, conjointly with detachments of
regulars; and a numerous fleet to sweep the whole coast, might
possibly do the business in one campaign."[8] To Lord Dartmouth, Howe
represented that with an army of twenty thousand men, twelve thousand
of whom should hold New York, six thousand land on Rhode Island, and
two thousand protect Halifax, with a separate force at Quebec,
offensive operations could be pushed so as to put "a very different
aspect" on the situation by the close of another year.
[Footnote 8: _Fonblanque's Life of Burgoyne_, p. 152.]
The plan as finally arranged was a modification of these two views. It
was decided that Howe should occupy New York City with the main body
of the army, and secure that important base; while Carleton, with
Burgoyne as second in command, should move down from Canada to
Ticonderoga and Albany. By concert of action on the part of these
forces, New England could be effectually cut off from co-operation
with the lower colonies, and the unity of their movements broken up.
It was proposed at the same time to send an expedition under Lord
Cornwallis and Admiral Parker, to obtain a footing in Virginia or
either of the Carolinas, and encourage the loyal element in the South
to organize, and counteract the revolt in that quarter. By carrying
out this grand strategy, King George and his advisers confidently
expected to end all resistance in America at one blow.
Thus Great Britain, instead of attempting to recover her authority
over the colonists by a candid recognition of privileges which they
claimed as Englishmen, resolved in 1775 to enforce it. The government
went to war, with the nation's wealth and influence at its back, but
with only half its popular sympathies and moral support. Parliament
refused to listen to the appeals of its ablest members to try the
virtues of concession and conciliation. A heavy war budget was voted,
the Continent of Europe was ransacked for troops which could not be
enlisted in England, and every effort made to insure the complete
submission of the colonies in 1776.
* * * * *
How America prepared to meet the coming storm is properly the subject
of the succeeding chapter of this work. But we find her in no position
in 1775 to assume the character of a public enemy towards the mother
country. She still claimed to be a petitioner to the king for the
redress of grievances. If she had taken up arms, it was simply in
self-defence, and these she was ready to lay down the moment her
rights were acknowledged. A revolution, involving separation from
England, was not thought of by the mass of the American people at this
time. The most they hoped for was, that by offering a stout resistance
to an enforcement of the ministerial policy they could eventually
compel a change in that policy, and enjoy all that they demanded under
the British constitution. Towards the close of the year, however, when
the intelligence came that the king had ignored the last petition from
Congress, and had proposed extreme war measures, the colonists felt
that serious work was before them. Independence now began to be more
generally discussed; Washington's troops were re-enlisted for service
through the following year, and Congress took further steps for the
common defence.
Future military operations were necessarily dependent on the plans to
be developed by the British. But as the siege of Boston progressed, it
became obvious that that point at least could not be made a base for
the ensuing campaign. No other was more likely to be selected by the
enemy than New York; and to New York the war finally came.
The topography of this new region, the transfer to it of the two
armies, and the preparations made for its defence by the Americans,
next claim attention.