was obvious that no very material change of frontier was likely to be
made. Germany had no disposition to yield any of the Reichsland; France
was in no position to demand it. Things on that frontier, therefore,
remained very much as they had been, with just this difference, that
France, no longer able to count upon the support of a baffled and
impoverished Russia, was not likely to become aggressive for many years
to come. A general disarmament was discussed, and some steps for
reducing the armaments on all sides were actually adopted. But the
difficulties in the way of any general agreement were too great to admit
of any formal stipulation being recorded in the treaty. The final
ratifications have been delayed until quite recently.
Germany has already set to work to put right any weak points in her
harness. In England the successes which have attended our arms have
glossed over not a few weak points which have been detected in our
organisation. The army, it is obvious, will be allowed to lapse again
into a condition adapted to mere peace parading, despite the vigorous
protests that were addressed by Lord Wolseley at the end of the war to
the Government, against the dangers which must attend such a result. The
country will continue in the belief that everything is for the best in
the best of all possible armies. Prompt reductions in the fleet and army
have been insisted on. These steps have prevented the Central Powers
from entering into an alliance with us for guaranteeing the peace of
Asia and of Europe, for which their experiences of the value of an
effective alliance with England had at first made them very anxious. How
far the future will justify our omission to secure the peace of the
world by taking proper steps to secure it, it is for the experience of
future generations to determine. For the moment, England has been once
more fortunate in the circumstances under which she entered on the war,
in the allies she found in it, and in that increased strength of her
navy for which a recent awakening to her dangers had prepared the way.
The reserves prepared for her army, despite the most fanatic opposition,
have enabled her to place an effective army in the field. Fortunately,
the war has not tested her resources beyond that point. One
comparatively small, though absolutely great, improvement has been made.
Those complaints as to the character of our artillery armament, which
were ignored during peace-time, have been enforced by the experience of
war. Both the Horse Artillery and Field Artillery are to be armed in
accordance with war experience, and not on workshop decisions
unconnected with their actual employment and use.
FINIS.
APPENDIX.
SIR CHARLES TUPPER ON IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
In conversation some months ago with Sir Charles Dilke, he assured me
that he considered the suggestion made in the columns of _Black and
White_ by one of the contributors to the ‘Great War of 1892’—that, in
the event of an imbroglio with India, we might carry our troops by the
American continent—one that was open to much argument. This criticism of
Sir Charles Dilke’s I mentioned to Sir Charles Tupper.
‘Well,’ replied this doughty upholder of Imperial Federation, ‘let us
discuss the whole question, and we will come to Sir Charles’s criticism,
with which I do not at all agree, later on. I was much impressed by the
way in which you fought out your Great War. The case was presented in a
very strong light. Should such a contingency ever arise, the Canadian
Pacific Railway will furnish a most important service to the Empire in
providing a special route to India. As an alternative route to India
under the British flag from end to end, and bringing England as it does
certainly a fortnight nearer to Yokohama than Suez, it evidently may
play a very important part in Imperial policy and defence. As has been
stated in your paper, not only does the Canadian Pacific furnish a
direct line from Quebec on British territory throughout, but in winter,
with the Intercolonial Railway to Quebec, the service is made from ocean
to ocean by a complete line. It has already been greatly used by the
Admiralty. I do not see any force in Sir Charles Dilke’s argument that
mercenaries in the States could be engaged to render the line impassable
in time of war. Of course we assume we are at peace with the States
themselves. We have not only the fact that the line is as capable of
being defended against attack as any line here in England would be which
might be threatened by dynamiters; but Canada would furnish protection
for the line by large bodies of trained militiamen and mounted police in
the North-Western Provinces; and there would be the further co-operation
of the States in the same direction, just as they came to our aid in the
Fenian raids in Canada, when the States heartily seconded us. England
would have the entire force of Canada to help to make the protection of
the line as complete as it would be between Liverpool and London. And
another point is this: By making a _place d’armes_ of Esquimault or
Vancouver you could send forward at a few weeks’ notice any number of
soldiers you required to those two points, and hold them there at a
point as near to India as they are now here, _i.e._ within as easy
striking distance of India as they are in England going by Suez. And you
may always trust to Canadian loyalty in any struggle in which England
might be engaged.’
[Illustration:
SIR CHARLES TUPPER IN HIS PRIVATE OFFICE IN VICTORIA STREET,
WESTMINSTER.
]
‘I am glad to hear that,’ said I, ‘for when I was in Washington last
year I heard much talk of the annexation of Canada by America, and of
the pleasure with which the Canadians themselves would receive such a
measure.’
Sir Charles shook his head. ‘I have said repeatedly,’ replied he, ‘that
there is no annexation party in Canada, and I say so again. I mean that
out of the 215 members we send to Parliament not one would be elected if
he declared in favour of American annexation. Mr. Goldwin Smith, with
all his ability, has laboured for twelve years to convince the people of
Canada that it is their inevitable destiny to become part of America. By
his pen, with his tongue, and in the press, he has done all he can to
bring this to pass; and at his own home, Toronto, a highly respectable
and popular man holding Mr. Smith’s views was induced to offer himself
as a candidate at a local election for the Legislature of Ontario, and
out of 9000 votes at the election he only polled 175! No; we are not
within even the remotest distance of an American annexation. How mad it
would be! You do not know what our connection with England really means
to us. Only a short time ago one of the most prominent members of the
United States Government said to me, “The confederation of British North
America under one Government and the construction of the Canadian
Pacific Railway has brought us face to face with a nation.”’
‘Which leads to another point,’ I replied. ‘Is there no chance of Canada
becoming a nation on her own account?’
‘My dear sir,’ replied the High Commissioner, ‘Canada has _all_ to lose
and nothing to gain by becoming independent of England. From being a
very important part of the mightiest Empire in the world, Canada—or
Australia either, for the matter of that—would sink at once, by becoming
independent, into a position in which they would become the easy prey of
those who desired to subjugate them. I would recommend the strengthening
by every practicable means of the bonds that now unite the mother
country and the outlying portions of the Empire. I have proposed in a
recent article in the _Nineteenth Century_ that Australasia and South
Africa should be each united under a central Government, as Canada now
is, and that these three great British dominions should be represented
in London by a leading member of the local Cabinet. You have to take
things as they are, not as you might wish them to be. A Parliamentary
Federation of the Empire, by forming an Imperial Parliament, in which
all these great British possessions should be represented, I regard as
utterly impracticable, because it is in antagonism with the constitution
of this country, and also with the constitution of all the autonomous
Colonies. Therefore I contend that the means of drawing closer the bonds
between the Imperial Government and these great possessions must be
found in some mode consistent with the constitution of England and the
self-government now enjoyed by the Colonies. I come to the conclusion I
have suggested, that the representatives of the three great British
dependencies, being members of the Local Governments, should be made
members of the Imperial Privy Council, and thus be brought into the
closest intercourse and communication with Her Majesty’s Government here
in England, and thus be in a position to give the most hearty and
complete co-operation for the defence of the Empire everywhere. Another
mode to which I attach great importance, and which is quite practicable,
is the adoption of a fiscal policy that would have the effect of placing
the Colonies fiscally in a different position as regards their relations
to Great Britain from that occupied by foreign countries. Such a policy
would lead to the elevation of the Colonies amongst the countries of the
world, to their rapid development, and to a great expansion of trade
between the mother country and them.’
‘Ah!’ said I, ‘doesn’t the kernel of the whole question of Imperial
Federation lie in this Customs difficulty? If we were entirely a Free
Trade empire, there would be little or no difficulty in securing
Imperial Federation. The Union of Hearts, it seems to me, must be
preceded by a Union of Pockets.’
‘Well,’ replied Sir Charles, ‘there is no reason that I can see why
absolute Free Trade should be adopted, and in fact it is impracticable,
or any objection taken to the adoption of the same policy pursued by
every other country in the world with regard to their Colonies, by which
they place their fiscal relations with them on an entirely different
basis from that on which their relations with foreign countries stand;
thus adding to the strong sentimental tie that binds mother and child,
that still stronger tie of mutual self-interest; and the day is not far
distant when a very powerful agitation will be promoted by the artisans
here in England for the adoption of the policy that will most expand the
trade of England, and promote the interests of all who are engaged in
the manufactures of this country.’
‘Then,’ I interjected, ‘you thereby make the working-man the ultimate
Court of Appeal, and he will decide as to whether Imperial Federation is
to become an accomplished fact or not.’
Sir Charles said, ‘Yes; I believe this policy at no distant day will be
sustained by the operatives.’
We drifted into other currents of thought, all bearing on the question
how best to promote a true and lasting Federation. I alluded to a remark
made to me some time since by a distinguished Cabinet Minister on the
fatal policy, not to say the gross injustice, of pitchforking any scion
of nobility, whether fitted for the post or not, into the vice-regal
thrones of the Colonies.
‘Well,’ replied Sir Charles, ‘speaking as a Canadian, I can only say we
have been most fortunate. The policy which has been pursued with us of
sending out a Viceroy of Cabinet rank is, I think, attended with the
greatest possible advantages; first, because it forms a close connection
between the Crown and Canada, and after the period of service is over
these gentlemen bring their great Colonial experience especially to bear
here in England in Parliament, and at the Council, in a manner highly
conducive to the interests of Canada. Canada owes much to the high
standing and character and the abilities of all her governors since it
became a united country.’
‘THE GREAT WAR OF 18—’:
AN INTERVIEW WITH THE RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES DILKE.
BY RAYMOND BLATHWAYT.
No man in England, few even on the Continent, are better qualified than
Sir Charles Dilke to judge of the merits or demerits of the other
articles which have called forth so much criticism both here and on the
Continent. With him these subjects have been a matter of life-long
study; to their consideration he has devoted all the energies of a
singularly clear and powerful mind. There are few men, even in these
days when the balance of education is so much more even than it used to
be in the past, who have so thoroughly, and from so scientific a point
of view, grasped the great political problems which now confront the
thoughtful men in all civilised nations. The splendid potentialities
that lie within an energetic and resolute Imperialism; the knitting and
welding together of the mother country with her colonies and
dependencies, the accurate knowledge and estimation of the means of
attack and defence that belong respectively to our own country, and to
the great Continental Powers; these and many other of the great
questions, a proper comprehension of which is absolutely essential to
every well-trained, well-furnished statesman, have for many years
received from Sir Charles Dilke the most careful thought and attention.
No English statesmen and few soldiers, even on the Continent, know more
of the relative strength and capacity of foreign armies than this quiet
student and calm observer in Sloane Street.
[Illustration:
THE RIGHT HON. SIR CHARLES DILKE.
]
To no better authority, therefore, could the clever and interesting
_brochure_ be submitted for judgment and criticism than Sir Charles.
A little older and greyer, a shade more thoughtful and careworn than
when I last saw him some few years ago, upon the occasion of some
political gathering, when he delivered a speech of much brilliance, and
clear, well-defined, consecutive thought, he yet impressed me as he
impressed me then, with a sense of wonderful versatility, and a
plenitude of knowledge of the subject upon which I had come to talk.
‘I feel some little hesitation in replying to your request,’ he began,
‘but since the Editor is evidently anxious that I should do so, I will
endeavour to give you my views as briefly and clearly as I can. Mind
you, I don’t think it is either an easy or a gracious task to criticise
the work of the brilliant staff of experts who have fought this Great
War. Any strictures therefore that I may have to offer will deal
entirely with generalities, or with political and military
considerations; the details of the War seem to me to have been admirably
carried out; and nothing else could have been expected, considering who
are the men who have had part in it. Then, too, I feel that the Editor
was justified, when he wanted to make a war, in making a war which lent
itself to literary and dramatic treatment, instead of the war which
might be more natural but less picturesque. One of my criticisms also
goes to the root of the whole matter, and must necessarily seem a little
by the way. It is that we are assured that a Great War ‘will probably
occur in the immediate future.’ I do not think so, and have indeed,
during all the alarms of the last seventeen years, been an obstinate
believer in the probabilities of peace.’
‘In which the writers clearly differ from you, Sir Charles,’ I replied;
‘I was much struck, however, by the clever manner in which they caused
the war to break out in a small, insignificant country like Bulgaria,
and then spread like a prairie fire, till the whole world was in a
blaze. Do you consider that was a good and probable beginning?’
‘Well,’ replied Sir Charles, as he leaned forward and began to rapidly
sketch out a little map of the Continent, to which he made constant
subsequent reference, ‘it was, perhaps, more ingenious than either
scientific or probable. For my own part, I do not believe that the next
great war, when it does come, will arise from events in the Balkan
Peninsula. Of course, Russia can cause a war whenever she wishes to do
so, but I don’t think she does so wish. The writers of this brochure
state that they have striven to make the imaginary conflict spring from
the most likely source of conflicts. They therefore chose Bulgaria, and
I think with a good deal of reason from their point of view. But, for
all that, Russia has pursued an adventurous and indefensible policy with
regard to these States, and however irritating her conduct may have
been, she means peace at heart. Therefore it is, I think, they are
wrong.’
‘It is quite fair then, Sir Charles, that I should ask you where you
would have applied the match, had you been writing this war?’
‘Quite fair,’ he replied, with a very genial laugh, as he placed his
finger on the Franco-German frontier. ‘The most probable cause of a war,
which I nevertheless think wholly improbable, will be a frontier
incident between Germany and France, exaggerated by the newspapers, and
subject to the difficulty, as between two great Powers of equal strength
and spirit, of making excuses. It is easy for excuses to be made by one
side when there is obvious disparity of strength, and when that side,
whether the stronger or the weaker, does not desire to face the risks of
war; but, as I have pointed out in an article on the French grand
manœuvres of last year, neither side could now make such efforts for
peace as were made by the Emperor William I. a few years ago, when
frontier incidents of the kind to which I allude occurred.’
‘Very good, Sir Charles, your war would obviously have very materially
differed from ours; but now, given the causes of ours, what do you think
of the strategy supposed?’
‘There again,’ was the reply of this keen politician, and endeavour as
best I might I could not puzzle him for a single moment, ‘there again I
have a criticism to offer. I cannot see why Russia should attempt a
descent near Varna, when a descent near Constantinople would so much
better suit her purpose. The garrison of Constantinople is not,
numerically speaking, a strong one. It is very deficient in effective
field artillery, and its infantry, numbering perhaps 18,000 men, could
not make much of a defence, unsupported as they are by a real system of
land fortification, against a Russian rush from the Black Sea coast by
land, accompanied by another landing on the Asiatic side, and a vigorous
naval attack against the Therapia batteries.’
‘Talking of Turkey, Sir Charles, should we be certain of her as an ally
if France joined Russia, and we supported Germany?’
‘By no means,’ was his emphatic reply; ‘although I grant you that actual
temporary circumstances in the Mediterranean would have a great bearing
on their attitude, the Turks would look to the possibilities of the
moment. If we could terrorise them—yes; if not——’ and here my companion
smilingly shook his head.
‘Was _Black and White_ right in sending English troops to Belgium on the
outbreak of a Franco-German war?’ I next asked.
‘I think not,’ slowly replied Sir Charles. ‘It is not likely that public
opinion in England would force the British Government to such a course.
And then again,’ he continued, ‘I think the writers wrong in another
important movement. It seems incredible to me that the Russians should
expose themselves to the three defeats which they met with in your War.
It is much more probable, in my opinion, that when the time comes when
they have to fight the battles described, against the Turks near
Erzeroum, and against the Austrians on the Galician frontier, they will
fight without having the young Emperor William at the same moment in the
field against them. They will fight under conditions which will enable
them to clear the Black Sea coast of the Turks and the Galician plain of
the Austrian forces.’
‘And now, Sir Charles, quitting the storied “War of 189—” for a moment,
I would like to ask you a question or two as to the character of the
warfare of the future, the circumstances under which it will be carried
out, the kind of men best suited for it. Smokeless powder will doubtless
revolutionise all past methods of attack and defence, don’t you think
so? Again, who will be the General of the future—the student Moltke or
the dashing Skobeleff; the politician, the chemist, or the fighter?’
Sir Charles laughed outright as he replied: ‘Rather Moltke than
Skobeleff, but not the politician,—and there is no real political
soldier in France, for instance,—nor the chemist, nor the man of genius;
but the cool-headed man, with plenty of force and of physical strength
to stand the five or six days’ battles which will be the result of
smokeless powder; dash won’t go for much. Few realise the changes that
will be brought about by this smokeless powder. For instance, the
officers will inevitably be picked off. The puzzle to me is how in such
cases vast masses of men will be induced to advance without their
leaders.’
‘And as to the ethical intent of our War?’ I queried, mindful of the
severe strictures passed by worthy, but ultra-timid old ladies of either
sex upon it when its noiseless cannon first disturbed the journalistic
peace of Europe.
‘Oh,’ said Sir Charles, with an easy laugh, ‘I cannot see how your
articles could do anything but good; certainly they have done no
harm—that is, from a moral point of view; but, as regards certain other
aspects of their teaching, I am not quite so certain. I am afraid that
people will say only, “Here are great experts who give us the victory,”
and will imagine, therefore, whatever you may say, that our state of
preparation must be excellent, and our enormous expenditure upon defence
not thrown away. It should be borne in mind that you have given us a
victory in the Mediterranean by procuring for us an Italian alliance;
but that there is, and always must be, a grave risk of our having some
day to find ourselves at war with France, or with France and Russia
without any European alliance, and on questions which do not interest
Continental Powers. Again, the Poland resuscitation is prehistoric. If
you leave out the aristocracy and a few townspeople, there is no part of
the Russian Empire in which the Russian Government is less unpopular
than in Poland, and no Polish force could be collected except one
composed of nobles and that small middle-class which really consists of
the little nobility. The capture of Sierra Leone by France was capital,
for under the present circumstances it would be, of course, inevitable,
and it is well that attention has been so ably called to this point,
which involves grave risk to the Cape route. I cannot think, however,
that the Canadian Pacific route is a very safe one to employ, as our
enemies, by spending a little money in sparsely-settled portions of the
United States, could easily break up the line by bands of hired raiders.
And here my criticisms come to an end. But I would like to say again
that in my opinion the War as conceived by your contributors has been
admirably carried out. With few exceptions, the consequences flow well
and naturally, and in perfect logical sequence from the foundation in
facts.’
Printed by T. and A. CONSTABLE, Printers to Her Majesty, at the
Edinburgh University Press.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
1. Changed “th bitterness” to “that bitterness” on p. 6.
2. Changed “silver of white bone” to “sliver of white bone” on p. 109.
3. Changed “brought it again to a top” to “brought it again to a stop”
on p. 217.
4. Silently corrected typographical errors.
5. Retained anachronistic and non-standard spellings as printed.
6. Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.
7. Superscripts are denoted by a caret before a single superscript
character, e.g. M^r.