night news of an advance of the French Army of the north had come in,
and we began to retrace our steps over the same ground already
traversed. As we were starting, intelligence of the British victory in
the Mediterranean arrived, and with it rumours of Communistic
disturbances in Paris. I was also told that two Corps had been detached
from the 2d Army from near St. Menehould, and two more from the Russian
frontier had arrived about Pont-a-Mousson, and with the four Bavarian
reserve divisions were preparing to strike the French Army of the west
in their right flank. At night we reached the line of the great road
Chalons-sur-Marne—St. Menehould, and about 4 P.M. fell right on the
flank of a French corps moving from Epernay on the Camp of Chalons. Part
of the Corps from St. Menehould marching by Suippes was on our right,
and together we drove the French back in some disorder into the complex
of hilly ground about Moronvilliers, cutting them off from Rheims.
The Corps left to watch this latter place had fallen back fighting
the previous day, and lay along the road from Suippes by
Somme-puis-Attigny—_i.e._ about north and south.
At daybreak we advanced again, and soon a struggle began which, in the
hilly, wooded ground we now were in, utterly defies description. As
before, it was mainly decided by superior endurance of loss and a
better-trained Staff. Of tactical combination there was none on a large
scale, but divisional artillery and cavalry suffered heavily in
endeavouring to support their comrades of the infantry.
We reached the culminating point of the plateau after five hours’
successive fighting, but the exhaustion of our men was extreme; hundreds
dropped unable to go a step further, and we afterwards picked up at
least an equal number of French in the same condition. Indeed, during
the last hours of the afternoon, it had become a struggle of the
survival of the fittest. The French fought with a determination they
never before displayed—probably because the ground, by giving scope to
our cavalry on previous occasions, never gave them the opportunity.
But this time every copse and bush gave them the chance to rally, and
many are the instances recounted of how superior officers on the French
side emulated the example of Ney in the retreat from Russia, and rifle
in hand stood to the last.
The battle was actually decided by a blow delivered some six miles to
the north, where the ground did give our three arms a chance of
co-operation, and about 6 P.M. the resistance in front of us gave way
altogether. The fighting broke off, and the men lay on their arms where
they stood, too weary to move another step.
During the night, however, a cavalry division belonging to the 2d
Army—which had moved round our rear while the action was going on—beat
up the bivouacs of the French, falling first on the artillery and some
cavalry and stampeding their horses, who took flight right down the
extent of the line. And this last blow turned the French retreat into
rout. It was York’s manœuvre at Laon, in 1814, over again, only more
thoroughly carried out.
[Illustration:
GERMAN CAVALRY ATTACK BY NIGHT ON THE FRENCH BIVOUACS.
]
Our Corps were too weary to follow, but the one next on our right, which
had been squeezed out of line by our converging movement the day before,
took up the pursuit before daybreak in the direction of Rethel.
ADVANCE OF THE SECOND AND THIRD ARMIES ON PARIS.
THE BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS.
WARMERIVILLE, _June 6_.
The general situation is as follows:—On the eastern wing the Germans
eventually made some 30,000 prisoners, and drove the wreck of the Army
of the East into Epinal and Belfort.
Leaving three Corps and the Bavarian reserve divisions to watch them—the
remainder of the second and third Armies are moving by the valley of the
Marne on Paris, their advance guards to-day reaching Epernay. The
available troops of the western wing drove the enemy before them
northwards into Laon and against the Belgian frontier, making 40,000
prisoners; but at least 60,000 are known to have escaped by rail into
Paris.
Rheims has been closely invested—my Corps, which lost 25 per cent. in
the last action, is in reserve round and about the village from which I
write. The light siege-train arrived here to-day, and the remainder is
expected shortly.
RIOTING IN RHEIMS.
RHEIMS, _June 14_.
The siege-train arrived here complete on the night of the 10th, on the
11th it was put in battery; and at daybreak next morning opened fire
against the three forts, Brimont, Fresnes, and Berru. It was just the
same here as before Verdun; within a few hours our converging fire from
covered positions knocked the forts to pieces, and the French guns were
buried in the _débris_ of their own parapets. Some of their guns, firing
by indirect laying, remained unsilenced; on the other hand, their fire
hit nothing to speak of. The advantage of smokeless powder, combined
with indirect laying, turned entirely in favour of the attack.
At daybreak on the 12th we moved forward to the attack of the
intermediate positions—not against the forts themselves, for these were
mere mudheaps, so saturated with the carbonic oxide due to the explosion
of our gun-cotton shells that they were equally untenable by friend or
foe.
The fight presented no special features of interest. It was noticeable,
however, how much the _morale_ of the other side had been shaken, and
how devastating is the power of 40 and 60 lb. shrapnel fire. The hills
on which Berru and Brimont stand were both in our hands by about noon.
Fresnes was surrounded, and surrendered shortly after. We could pursue
down the slopes with fire only, for Rheims itself was still protected by
hasty entrenchments which, as the sun was beginning to decline, it was
hardly possible to see.
[Illustration:
SCENE IN THE STREETS OF RHEIMS: GERMAN TROOPS CLEARING THE STREETS OF
FRENCH RIOTERS.
]
During the night the light siege-train was put in battery on the
captured heights, and our outposts reported sounds of firing and tumult
in the town, and, indeed, scarcely had our guns opened fire next morning
when the white flag flew out from the Cathedral tower; and about 10 A.M.
we marched in as peacemakers, for a number of territorialists and armed
workmen had broken out in the night, shot the Commandant, and began to
plunder the inhabitants, and as all discipline was at an end the second
in command yielded to the pressure of the inhabitants and consented to
surrender. We cleared the streets without much difficulty, the rioters
bolting like hares as we entered them; and the good people of Rheims,
remembering the good behaviour of the troops in ’70, welcomed us as
friends rather than enemies.
THE MARCH UPON THE FRENCH CAPITAL.
THE REVOLUTION IN PARIS—ARMISTICE DECLARED.
MEAUX, _June 21_.
After a day’s rest we marched to Dormans, and thence down the valley of
the Marne, through the most lovely scenery. At every halting place,
fresh news of Anarchistic trouble in Paris reaches us, and I fancy the
end cannot now be far off, everything depends on the time our engineers
and railway troops take to restore the communications, and I have seen
no single case of injury which will require more than three days at the
outside to make practicable.
CLAYE, _June 27_.
At daybreak this morning, after a preliminary bombardment of twenty-four
hours, the position between the forts of Vaujours and Chelles was
stormed. The effect of the bombardment was just what it had been before
Rheims, and we left the forts untouched. The garrisons had taken shelter
in the bomb-proofs, and at first refused to come out; but seeing
themselves completely surrounded, and as the deadly fumes of our
bursting shells began to penetrate into their retreat, they at last came
out and laid down their arms, seeing the impossibility of further
resistance.
The line between the two forts was closed with every resource of field
fortification; but they proved of no avail, and only gave a fresh
illustration of the old saying, related of a British soldier in the
Crimean days, who, when taunted by a superior officer with being afraid
of the Russian trenches, replied, ‘It ain’t the —— mud heaps, it’s the
—— that stands behind!’
The line depended on the forts for flank defence, and when these were
silenced, the struggle degenerated into a purely frontal one, in which
the immense superiority of our fire in accuracy told. It was, perhaps,
in its commencement, the nearest approach to an ideal skirmishing fight
we have yet had. Covered by the fire of every available heavy
gun—maintained to the last moment possible—our skirmishers crept in to
within the edge of the obstacles and entanglements, potting every
Frenchman as he showed his head, so that the working parties who
followed immediately behind could cut the wires, etc., at their leisure.
In places dense lines of abattis could not be thus easily dealt with,
but the value of these fell when once the flanks were turned; and when
the troops told off for the actual storm broke cover there was
practically nothing in front to stop them. We carried the place almost
at the first rush; then ensued many long hours of wood fighting, and at
the fall of night our outposts finally held the line, Dugny, Le Bourget,
Raincy, Neuilly. Many of the officers had been there before. We are now
within easy bombarding range of the city.
As I write a report comes in that great fires are raging in Paris. This
cannot be caused by our shells.
CLAYE, _June 28_, 9 P.M.
All firing has ceased at the outposts. A report is current that a
_parlementaire_ with a white flag has come in, and an armistice is
looked on as certain.
LATER.
The report is confirmed. An insurrection has broken out in the city; the
Government is deposed, and some members of it massacred. We are moving
forward to the line of the old forts which will be given up to set free
the garrisons to act against the Commune, and from them we hold the
whole city at our mercy.
BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN BULGARIA.
DECISIVE DEFEAT OF THE RUSSIANS.
LONDON.
At length we have great news to report from the British Army. A great
battle has been fought and won. Nay, more—the whole Russian Army in
Bulgaria, caught like rats in a trap, has, after two days of fierce
fighting, laid down its arms. It will be seen, therefore, that the
British Army has, after all, not turned up in Asia Minor, but in
Bulgaria. All the rumours and apparent demonstrations which led to the
belief that a great campaign in Asia Minor was intended, were merely
designed to distract attention from the real objects of the expedition.
Those who are familiar with Lord Wolseley’s methods now profess to have
been always made suspicious by the fact that, as we reported in our
issue of June 4th, he had been talking a great deal of the advantages of
a campaign in Asia Minor. They say that it is notorious that he holds
strongly to the belief that what is supposed in your own army to be
about to happen will soon be believed by the enemy. He succeeded in this
way in imposing on Arabi so completely during the ’82 campaign, that
(extraordinary as it may appear) the Egyptian leader was a prisoner in
Ceylon, when he was for the first time made acquainted with the great
movement of the English expedition from Alexandria to Ismalia. Lord
Wolseley then succeeded in deceiving Arabi because he had imposed upon
the world at large, although precisely in a similar manner he had, by
spreading reports of a call from Captain Glover during the Ashantee
campaign, managed to embark his troops for the surprise of the coast
towns from which the Ashantees were drawing their supplies, without any
one suspecting the direction in which he was going to strike. The former
ruse had been forgotten, and caused no suspicion as to the second. If we
may judge by the comments of our contemporaries on the reports which
have been hitherto furnished of the war, they have been either very
discreet and loyal, or have been completely bamboozled. And yet it was
tolerably plain that the direction in which an English Army could at the
moment be most effectively employed was in clearing Bulgaria of the
aggressive force of Russians, which, from the peculiar circumstances of
the case, she had not force to dispose of alone.
Seeing that it is immediately in behalf of Bulgaria, and only
secondarily in behalf of Turkey, because of the support she had offered
to Bulgaria, that we were engaged in the struggle, there was,
independently of the military advantages of the movement, an important
political object to be gained by exercising our strength at once in
support of the gallant Bulgarian forces. Even if it had been altogether
politically convenient to allow the Turkish Army to enter Bulgaria and
move upon Tirnova and Shumla, the material obstacles in the way were
very serious. On the other hand, twenty-four hours’ easy steaming would
bring our troops to the place at which the Russians had originally
landed. It was almost certain that as soon as the Russian General found
that our ships had again cut his communications by sea, he would abandon
his attempt to move upon Sofia and endeavour to make good his retreat by
the Dobrudja. From Kavarna we could easily cut across such a movement,
which it was to be hoped that the Roumanians would endeavour to delay by
every means in their power. It appears that Lord Wolseley, all the time
that he was at Constantinople, was in full and direct communication with
the Bulgarian Generals, and that all movements were concerted in
connection with them; while the Roumanians, assured of English support
both by sea and land, were ready to do their utmost to hamper the
Russian movements should any attempt be made, either from north or
south, to force the passage of the Dobrudja.
Without entering into further details, it will be sufficient to say that
Lord Wolseley’s delay at Constantinople was mainly in order to receive
the very latest reports from Bulgaria as to the exact position and
movements of the Russian Army. From the nearest point on the coast to
which telegraphic communication has been carried from Constantinople
swift dispatch boats were to bring off the cypher messages, either to
the fleet or to Kavarna, whence, as the army advanced inland, the news
would be carried. A second line of communication was also established by
way of Kustenjeh and Bucharest. Thus the General had the great advantage
of knowing more precisely than would usually be the case what the exact
movements of his enemy were. To a certain extent those movements were
tied. Detachments of too large force to be left to take their fate had
been placed to watch Shumla and Varna. From the reports which reached
Lord Wolseley, it was clear that the Russians having broken up their
camp at Tirnova were marching by way of Shumla—either intending to call
in their detachment from Varna and move from Shumla direct upon the
Dobrudja, or to advance upon Varna.
In either case, an immediate landing at Kavarna would apparently be out
of reach of any serious disturbance from the Russian forces until the
landing was effected, and was extremely likely to tempt the Russians to
move to attack us in that position. In that case, if we were only able
to hold our own in a position already examined and surveyed, it was
probable that our force would be amply sufficient to deal with the
Russians, even alone, and that within forty-eight hours the Bulgarians
who had undertaken to hang closely upon the Russian rear, might be
expected to arrive and make the position of the Russians impossible.
Immediately after the ships had passed out of sight of land, the whole
fleet changed its course to the N.-N.-West—and by mid-day following that
on which the fleet had left the Bosphorus the greater portion of it was
in the bay which extends from Kaliakra Cape towards Varna.
The landing had already been begun before our Correspondent arrived—but
he was fortunate enough to be allowed to join Colonel French’s Hussars,
who were landed soon after it was ascertained that the debarkation of
the troops would meet with no immediate resistance. This regiment was
pushed southwards, supported by a body of mounted infantry under Colonel
Hutton, the second day after the arrival of the troops, and as soon as
possible a couple of Horse Artillery guns, which were accompanied by
Colonel Marshall, with a small cavalry escort were sent after them in
support. The orders for the cavalry were to ascertain the condition of
affairs at Varna; if possible to capture a few prisoners, and, taking
advantage of the friendliness of the inhabitants, to endeavour to obtain
reports of the movements of the enemy.
THE BOMBARDMENT OF VARNA.
AERIAL WARFARE.
Our Correspondent’s description of this march is most interesting and
graphic, but we must abridge it in order to come to greater events. It
will be sufficient to say that they ascertained that the Russian
headquarters had arrived near Shumla without having had any news of the
landing of the English Army. The Russian Army was moving on Varna. The
Varna force had, however, evidently received orders to make an attempt,
if possible, to induce the town to surrender. Just as the cavalry
arrived on distant hills within sight of the town, they saw a balloon
hanging over it. This at first gave them some anxiety lest their
movements might be watched, and their position discovered. In a short
time, however, they had reason to perceive that the balloon was there
for a very different purpose. A sight, as our Correspondent describes
it, at once appalling and magnificent met their view. A black mass of
some kind was seen to drop from the balloon; as it about reached the
level of the tallest buildings in the place it suddenly burst into a
lurid glare which lighted up the minarets and pinnacles of the old
Turkish town. Its course was marked by crashing buildings and falling
ruins. It was evidently a dynamite shell of vast proportions, which had
been deliberately dropped from the balloon.
The object could only have been to terrorise the inhabitants by a cruel
and wanton destruction of property. If it had chanced on a magazine it
might have produced some effect upon the defence. As it was, it could
and did produce none. It indicated to the Englishmen who watched it,
rather the parting attempt of Russian hopelessness than a serious effort
of war. Nevertheless, a tremendous cannonade was simultaneously opened
from all the works near the town, and was not put an end to until some
of our ships, which had maintained communication with the garrison,
closed in, to within range of the works, and though at a considerable
distance threw such a mass of shells against the Russian field-guns that
they were glad to cease their fire and withdraw.
We give in our Correspondent’s words the next scene. ‘Not so, however,
the balloon. To our amazement we saw it deliberately change its course
over the town and steer in teeth of the wind, which was at the time a
comparatively light breeze setting seawards. As it reached the position
which it was evidently seeking—nearly over the magazines of Varna—we
again saw another shell drop out of the balloon, and as it burst on
reaching the buildings, what seemed like a universal conflagration of
all that part of the town, accompanied by frightful detonations and
explosions, showed the effect it had produced.
‘Colonel Marshall was standing next me at the moment, and exclaimed,
“Good God! I will tell you what it is; I remember hearing, just before I
left England, from an engineer named Delmard, that the French were in
possession of a war balloon capable of being steered backwards and
forwards even against a light wind, and that they had an arrangement by
which a particular form of shell, with a steel casing and some
arrangement of liquid oxygen and blasting gelatine, could be dropped
from the balloon. They expected great results from it, and must
evidently, as a special favour to the Russians, have sent this specimen
of the thing over to them.”
‘The evening sun had long set in the direction of Shumla. A crescent
moon had risen, and some brilliant stars shone in the sky. As we looked
over the undulating ground which separated us from the burning town, the
flames lighted up the ships in the offing to the east, making a picture
difficult indeed adequately to represent.
‘One thing, however, was clear to us, that the attention of the force
round Varna would be entirely occupied by the attempt to take advantage
of the destruction they had produced, which, disastrous as it was for
the inhabitants, did not seem likely, as far as we could judge, to
enforce any surrender.
‘The cavalry, finding themselves not observed, maintained their position
for the following day, sending scouting parties in all directions, and
reporting to headquarters.
‘This was the evening of the third day since the debarkation had begun.
Another cavalry regiment, with the remainder of the Horse Artillery
battery, had been sent up to support us; and early the following morning
Lord Wolseley, with several of his Staff, including Sir Baker Russell,
who is in command of the Cavalry Division, joined us. About 6 A.M. I was
looking down over the plain, when I saw two Bulgarian peasants
apparently in fierce altercation, coming up towards the position where
we were, escorted by one of the Hussars, who was vainly endeavouring to
make himself intelligible to them. Presently they came in, one of them
holding up a letter in his hand. One of the interpreters with Lord
Wolseley in a short time made out their story. It appeared that a
Russian officer, who had missed his way, had been seized and murdered by
the villagers in the place to which these two men belonged. One of the
Hussars had found them in possession of certain property of this
officer, and had noticed that a bag of letters was part of it. Being an
intelligent fellow, he had managed to make them understand that they
should accompany him to Colonel French. The letter the man was holding
up proved to be one of no importance, but it was only intended as an
indication of the purpose for which he had come. His companion had what
was evidently an officer’s sabretash, and on this being opened, several
letters were found in it, evidently dispatched from the Russian
headquarters to the commandant of the force before Varna. It informed
him of the fact that the English troops, which were reported to have
entered the Black Sea, were believed in Russia at the latest news to
have all gone on towards Trebizonde. It informed him further that the
Russian General proposed to make a direct march to the Dobrudja, and
gave him the different halting points on the march. It informed him of
the point at which he was to join the march, and told him that the
greater part of the Cossacks and the remainder of the Russian cavalry
would be required to watch the Bulgarian force, which, though inferior
to the Russians, and at some marches distant, might be expected to
follow up their retreat. It would therefore be necessary for the rather
considerable cavalry force which was attached to the troops at Varna to
protect the right flank, and to watch the advance of the main army when
it arrived. Without troubling your readers with the very ample
information which this dispatch conveyed, I may say generally that the
period at which the Russian Army, marching in two columns along two
roads at some distance from one another, would arrive at about the level
of Kosluji with its left column, was still about four days off. All this
information we received later. At the moment I saw Lord Wolseley
carefully reading through the translation of the dispatches as it was
put into his hands.
‘Admiral Markham had ridden out with the party, and the first person to
whom Lord Wolseley turned, after he finished, was the Admiral. A short
discussion took place between them, the nature of which I did not at the
moment hear, but which I have reason to believe related to the question
of the amount of transport and supplies that could be landed in the next
day or two. At all events, it was evident to all of us in a very short
time that the plans had been changed. Orders were immediately issued for
the march that afternoon of the three brigades which had first landed;
fortunately they were in the neighbourhood of Baltjik, so that they were
the nearest to Varna. The Cavalry, with the mounted Infantry, were at
once brought up, and extended so as to cut off all communication between
the main Russian Army and Varna.
‘Fortunately the country in this neighbourhood consists of a series of
undulating uplands, with numbers of features permitting the concealment
of large bodies of men.’