two opinions strove for mastery. At first there was some little
disposition to insist on the recall of the troops from all distant
expeditions. But in a short time every one saw that for this it was
practically now too late. A very large portion of our force was in the
Levant already. That force had been dispatched with the full assent of
the country, because in whatever way it was to be employed, as to which
there were all kinds of conflicting rumours, it was felt that we were
now bound in honour to assist in resisting the Russian attempt to crush
Bulgaria. There was also a certain speculative interest of the ‘What
will he do with it?’ kind, as to the nature of the campaign which Lord
Wolseley has designed. On the whole, though croakers, some of whom were
known not to be altogether exempt from personal and private pique, are
to be heard here and there, a general confidence prevails. Men record
how in ’82, at a time when everyone thought that Arabi’s power in Egypt
was too great for the English force to overcome without a long campaign,
he had announced and allowed it to be published, before he left England,
that ‘whatever resistance Arabi might offer, the campaign would be over
in three months,’ and how exactly that prediction had been fulfilled by
the return of the English troops within that time. It is recalled again
that, though, after all the delays that had taken place, it was
impossible to say, before the Nile Campaign started, whether we should
be in time to save Gordon. Lord Wolseley had announced before leaving
England that we should reach hand to Gordon about Christmas time; and
that this promise again, despite all the difficulties of the Nile, had
been exactly fulfilled by the dispatch of Stewart and the steamer
expedition, which, not by any fault of his, did not ‘reach hand’ the few
days earlier that were necessary to save Gordon. Others have recalled
how this exactness of calculation and prediction had attended all his
earlier campaigns. It is felt that now or never we must settle the
pretensions of Russia on India and in the East; that if we did not take
advantage of the rashness of Russia in attacking us whilst she was
engaged with Germany and Austria, we could never again count upon the
support of those allies. The alliance with Italy is immensely popular. A
few manly sentences from Mr. Balfour in announcing his proposal to call
out the volunteers, and one of the finest speeches which Mr. Chamberlain
has ever made in reply to a rather snappish little speech of Lord
Randolph, expressed the popular sentiment, and with general consent on
May 17th, the day before the Declaration of War against Russia, the
volunteers were called out.
[Illustration:
CALLING OUT THE VOLUNTEERS—PARADE OF THE SIGNALLERS OF THE ST.
MARTIN’S LE GRAND CORPS.
]
The response to the call has been very remarkable. It has, of course,
been necessary everywhere to make special arrangements for the
marshalling of the volunteers interfering as little as possible with
business. But, whereas with the militia, unfortunately, the contrast
between the peace effective and those who now show on parade is
melancholy, with the volunteers it is almost startling. A few men have
been with great reluctance, and probably only for a time, obliged by
business necessities to withdraw from the ranks. Their places have been
filled over and over again by passed ‘efficients,’ who have returned to
the battalions. But that is not all. The change that has come over the
spirit of the men is reported from all quarters. During quiet, peace
times it was very difficult to get any response from the volunteers if
appeal was made to them as representing the purpose of the British
people to take the defence of the country on their own shoulders. Those
did not understand the volunteers who so addressed them. They were
volunteers because they liked it, because others joined, because they
were good shots, and liked competing for the prizes, because they liked
the fun of skirmishing and outdoor practice of all kinds, because it was
a change from the sedentary habits of ordinary life. But now that the
nation is roused, when all men feel that they would like, if they could,
to play their part in the service _of England_ here, when Scotland does
not intend to lag behind, and when the blood of Irishmen is up, the talk
is different. ‘What other men want to do, _we_ can’ is rather the
feeling.
At the same time the contrast between different corps is certainly a
marked thing. The steady work of some, the indifference of others now
tells. No past ‘butter’ compensates for present weakness. It is quite
extraordinary what has been done by some corps to prepare for present
events. The Lord Mayor’s subscription has greatly assisted the
Metropolitan Corps to be ready for the field. Generally, the town corps
have had great facilities for turning out promptly. The Government
grant, which has been defined already as payable on mobilisation,
suffices to provide most that is required. In the big towns, where some
steps have been taken beforehand to ascertain where waggons, carts,
horses, stores, could best be obtained, and where some of the officers
responsible knew just what was wanted and had it all tabulated
beforehand, the battalions and brigades have formed up ready to move, so
that they could live anywhere, with wonderful rapidity.
In the country districts, on the other hand, the differences between
different brigades is most marked. Many of them have been telegraphing
up to the Horse Guards to know where they are to obtain this, that, and
the other. The Horse Guards is overwhelmed with work. Local knowledge is
what is wanted. Here and there officers have been sent down from London
to assist the more helpless corps; but few can be spared. The result in
almost all these cases is slow and unsatisfactory. On the other hand,
from some of the country brigades we hear the most encouraging reports.
It appears that a system has been worked out in certain corps in
accordance with suggestions thrown out in some articles in the _United
Service Magazine_. It has even been practised during peace time. In
accordance with this, first of all, long ago application was made to
certain owners of carts and horses to know whether, in case of the
volunteers being mobilised, they would be ready to dispose of their
property at a certain fixed price, and whether they would undertake
always to have a cart, for instance, of that description ready. There
has been found to be no practical difficulty in making these
arrangements beforehand.
Then a set of printed papers of different colours has been drawn out and
kept in the Brigade office. These take a form of this kind:—
‘Private ——. On receiving by telegraph the word, “Mobilise,” you
will....’
On the lists of names kept in the office those men who are to fetch
carts, horses, etc., are detailed. On the printed papers prepared for
these it is recorded, ‘You will at once go to No. X. Y. Street, where
you will find a horse with such and such harness ready for you. You will
take it to No. A. C. Street, where you will find a cart ready for you.
You will harness in the horse and proceed to Mr. Jones’s, No. F. E.
Street. There you will find Privates Blank and Dash, who will have ready
for you the stores to be loaded on the cart, and will load them. As soon
as the cart is loaded you will drive to the rendezvous of the corps at
Anywhere Park.’
This will give an indication of the method which has been pursued. The
Government grant on mobilisation suffices to cover the necessary
expenses. The contrast between the rapidity with which this system works
and the confusion which exists where it has not been adopted; the ease
with which the whole thing is done, is, from all the accounts we have
received, most striking. Unfortunately, where no such preparation has
been made the delay and confusion which result are not the only evil
effect. The discouragement of the men from finding that they have not
been as well looked after as others, the want of confidence in their
officers, has a most demoralising effect. They hear that other brigades
have already marched to the great camps which are being formed all over
England, and they see that they have no prospect of being ready for a
long time. The praises which are daily lavished on other corps for their
extraordinary promptitude and smartness are gall and wormwood to them.
The women chaff them mercilessly. It will not do to throw the blame on
the ‘system’ or ‘the authorities,’ those convenient phrases which are
commonly employed to disguise the absence of a man. Others have managed
well enough under the present system and with the present authorities.
British self-help, guided by forethought and knowledge, has been the
secret.
THE POSITION OF AFFAIRS.
LONDON, _May 28_.
Certainly we have been fortunate in the passages which our transports
have made. It only shows what can be done under favourable conditions of
weather, with selected coal and selected stokers. We understand that the
Admiralty pressed on the Government the importance of attending to these
points in a matter in which it might come to be a question of a run
against time across a danger zone. As we anticipated in writing our last
account of the events of the week, the Declaration of War by France was
issued after we had gone to press on Thursday, May 19th. It was
therefore only barely in time that our great mass of transports safely
passed into the Levant. For, as will be seen from the telegraphic report
of our correspondent—received last night, so that it has somewhat
delayed our issue—the French Fleet has lost no time in following up the
Declaration of War. The telegraphic dispatch, which was sent off on the
very evening of the greatest naval engagement of modern times, explains
clearly the sequence of events which has for some time to come made the
Mediterranean once more a safe highway for us. We need not dilate on the
vast importance of this event. In the present case it is not merely that
our flag is once more supreme at sea; it means that the terrible
anxieties, which had been awakened in the public mind as to the possible
fate of our Eastern expedition, in case Sir George Tryon should not
secure a complete triumph, are now at rest. With the Mediterranean
secure it will be a very easy matter to regain possession of the Black
Sea.
Whatever may be the ultimate purposes of the Italians in regard to an
Algerian expedition, we think that there will now be no injury to the
public service in letting it be known that the preparations which were
recently made with that apparent object were only a _ruse de guerre_. Of
course, in order that they might attain the object which they have so
successfully achieved of drawing the French Fleet out into the open sea,
it was necessary that these facts should be known only to Sir George
Tryon. Our correspondent, therefore, telegraphs under the impression
which prevailed in the fleet at the time. The rule is a sound one, even
in regard to fleets where they have communication with the land, that
what is believed among your own people will very soon be believed by the
enemy. But the Italian Government, as much as our own, recognises the
importance of the principle of concentrating its efforts at one point at
one time as far as that may be at all possible. The Italians have quite
enough on their hands in their war by land and sea with France. Our
efforts are already directed to the East. All those most desirable
objects, which the people ‘who know,’ or ‘have been there,’ or have been
‘ten years resident’ in various places, have been of late pressing upon
the Government through the newspapers, really must wait till we have
time, and armies, and fleets to attend to them. ‘One thing at a time’ is
a simple principle of military and naval affairs, but it is one which
the casual correspondents of newspapers never keep before their minds.
Meantime we have received news of the great battle between France and
Germany, a report of which we have been expecting.
PREPARATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN FLEET.
THE ALLIED FLEET AT PORT MAHON.
(_From an Officer in Sir George Tryon’s Fleet._)
I may begin the story of our great success by reminding your readers
that when the French violated the Belgian Frontier, and we mobilised our
fleet, Sir George Tryon had ten battleships with him, while the French
were supposed to have about eighteen available for sea at Toulon, for
they had withdrawn thither the Mediterranean and Levant Squadrons
simultaneously with their demand upon Germany.
Sir George Tryon seems to have been very early informed that if war
arose the Home Government must depend greatly on the alliance of Italy
and Austria to maintain command of the Mediterranean Sea, for a great
naval force would be necessary in the North to counteract the designs of
Russia and France on the German sea-coast. Sir George Tryon, on his
part, talked quite openly—which was said to be a wonder for him—of the
fact that he was not desirous of large reinforcements. He did not
believe, he said, that, if it came to the point, the French would bring
out their older wooden ships, such as the _Colbert_, the _Suffren_, or
even the _Richelieu_. The Italians, on the other hand, would most
probably be able to complete eight of their very fine ships, while
Austria might bring four or five vessels, which, though inferior, would
not be ineffective. As it turned out, Tryon was only reinforced by two
ships, the _Ajax_ and the _Benbow_. Thus, supposing the eight Italians
could be brought into line, and supposing the French produced eighteen
ships, Tryon’s fleet would be but two sail stronger than that of Admiral
Rieunier. As events developed themselves, it was plain that Sir George
grew anxious; but it was, both with himself and Admiral Markham, the
anxiety of eagerness, and we were all very well assured that if it came
to blows we should be daringly, as well as efficiently, led.
On the withdrawal of the fleet from the Black Sea, we were all assembled
at Malta, where the garrison was labouring night and day in constructing
out-works and exercising in the batteries. For us, on the other hand,
there was absolutely nothing to do, except to keep our coals and stores
complete day by day, which was not a very arduous undertaking. There
were, however, constant and long conferences between the Admirals and
the captains of the battle-ships, and it was no secret that every one of
these took the form of discussions over possible or probable forms of
attack or defence by the fleet at sea. It came to be accepted that if we
met the French in open fight we should be numerically inferior, and the
question was, how we should act from that point of view? The discussions
amongst us, who were not directly responsible, took every variety of
form. Sometimes a hot party would arise, claiming that it was perfectly
useless to make plans until the enemy disclosed his. This was met by
another party declaring that, if plans were not carefully made
beforehand, there would be no plans at all. This, again, was taken up by
a third party, which claimed that there was only one plan of any use,
and that was, as soon as the hostile fleet was seen, to make a general
signal, ‘Ram the enemy,’ and leave each ship to fight it out with its
fellow. When it was pointed out that perhaps the enemy would not stay to
be rammed, the general answer was, ‘Well, it is all the same. There is
nothing like the ram.’
Two things made themselves clear in these arguments; first, that hardly
any one—even amongst the captains—had ever thought seriously on what now
seemed to be drawing so very close to us; and, secondly, that the
Admirals were beginning to lay down certain definite principles, which
the captains were inclined to accept as being very likely to turn out
sound. Before very long the whole result came out in a general order
which was confidential to the captains, the commanders, and the
first-lieutenants of the battle-ships.
Without professing to give the exact wording, I am able to say that the
first principle laid down was the necessity of avoiding giving a friend
the ram, or firing into him either by gun or torpedo. The second
principle was the desirability of so arranging that, if possible, an
enemy’s ship should sustain the fire of more than one of our own ships;
or at least so guarding things that no one of our ships should find
herself opposed by two of the enemy’s.
The memorandum went on to say that, as a consequence of these
principles, ships attached to one another were on no account to separate
unless forced to do so; but that if confusion arose, ships were to keep
their speed and pass out of the enemy’s fleet in the direction opposite
to that from which they passed into it, with the view of reforming out
of the smoke, in order to renew the attack.
In any case, said the order, the enemy will be approached by the fleet
in two or three columns in line ahead, at a speed of about ten knots.
The flag or senior officers will lead their columns, and in whatever
form the enemy may approach—if he does approach—they will endeavour to
cut through at different points, using their guns, torpedoes, and rams
indiscriminately as circumstances offer. In order to avoid all chance of
injuring friends, the columns will be arranged in echelon. The
Commander-in-Chief will lead the first column, and the leaders of
succeeding columns will not be expected to enter the enemy’s fleet until
the rear ships of the preceding column may be supposed to have passed
through. After passing through, the ships not disabled will re-form and
renew the attack in the same way.
If the enemy retires, making use of his stern guns, the fleet will be
formed in line abreast or quarter-line, and every endeavour must be made
to close with him, to ram his ships upon their sterns or quarters, or,
in the event of failure, to carry them by boarding from that position.
The general opinion on this memorandum was that it said quite enough,
and yet not too much. It was quite clear and plain, and nothing seemed
wanting but the declaration of war and the attack of a superior French
Fleet.
We were very much surprised to hear from England that troops were on
their way out, with the idea of operations in the Black Sea. It seemed
very risky, when France might declare war at any moment. But the general
belief is that the Ministry must have had some assurances from the
French Government which we know nothing about. Anyhow the transports
began to arrive at Malta in a continual stream, and there received
orders to proceed to Cyprus, where we hear preparations are being made
for the reception of the troops. The _Orient_, with the Duke of
Connaught on board, did not come in; she only closed sufficiently to
receive a signal changing her destination to Cyprus, and went on.
Several cruisers from the Channel appeared at intervals, watching over
the safety of the troopers; they were not interfered with, and went on
to Cyprus.
News of the Spanish alliance and orders to proceed to Spezzia to form a
junction with the Italian Fleet came simultaneously, and as the ships
steamed out of the harbour the whole population swarmed over the forts
and walls and cheered in the wildest way, which, on a signal from the
Admiral, the ships returned heartily. At Spezzia we found six ships
ready, with orders from home to watch Toulon, but not to make any
attacks upon the French unless they should attempt to attack Italy by
sea. Simultaneously with these orders we heard of the Duke of
Edinburgh’s wonderful and bloodless success in the North Sea. But there
was a general sound of congratulation that our force in the
Mediterranean was not powerful enough to compel such obedience as we had
enforced in the North. The Italians, ashore and afloat, were in a
wonderful state of enthusiasm. They crowded our ships during the few
days we lay at Spezzia, and the women were so demonstrative of affection
that some of the older officers did not half like it.
It soon became known that Sir George Tryon had decided to make Port
Mahon the headquarters of the fleet, and to send cruisers only before
Toulon. I should have said that we were now very fairly supplied in this
way. They had been arriving from England almost daily while we were at
Malta, and we had now fourteen, large and small, with the fleet.
For a reason which I did not at first understand, we only took four out
of the six Italian ships that were ready with us to Port Mahon, namely,
the _Andrea Doria_, the _Francisco Morosimi_, the _Re Umberto_, and the
_Rugiero di Lauria_. Moreover, we left at Spezzia the _Thunderer_,
_Ajax_, and _Agamemnon_. We noted that the Italian ships we took with us
were the newest, and that those of our own we left were, in a sense,
‘lame ducks.’ But still there was a good deal of wonder that we should
deliberately reduce our force to fourteen sail when we were almost
closing with the enemy. It was whispered about later that orders from
home had dictated the detachment, that war would be immediately declared
by England against France, and that an attack would be made by Italian
troops carried chiefly in the _Italia_ and _Lepanto_, and supported by a
combined Anglo-Italian squadron against Algiers.
However, we steamed away to Port Mahon, and in this magnificent harbour
found a fresh relay of colliers and two more cruisers, the _Apollo_ and
_Sappho_, which showed us that there was a good deal of foresight at
headquarters. We had the declaration of war immediately, and then we
began to see where we were. We were, in fact, at bay. In no case was the
French Fleet strong enough to hope to prevent our putting to sea, and
there was practically nothing that France could do with her fleet, as
long as ours was intact. And now, too, I began to see that we were, at
Minorca, in a position to cover the proposed attack on Algiers. Any
attempt of the Toulon Fleet to drive off our attacking forces would be
liable to be met by a counter attack from ourselves. Yet if France could
really produce eighteen battleships out of Toulon, while we could only
furnish thirteen, we were running very great risks.
However, we went to work in a very business-like way. Tryon placed five
of his largest cruisers, including the _Amphion_, _Australia_, and
_Undaunted_, on the line to Toulon, giving orders that Lord Charles
Beresford in the _Undaunted_, with Dunlop in the _Australia_ to back him
up, were to undertake the watch on the Toulon Fleet, closing with the
harbour after dark, and drawing off before daylight each morning, but
not so far as to lose touch with the port. Then the other three were to
spread themselves towards Minorca, and to work backwards and forwards,
so as to signal to each other and to Minorca at least once in every
twenty-four hours.
For us at Port Mahon it again became a time of inaction; nothing to do
but exercise and keep our coal supply up. But we now lay with fires
banked and steam at half an hour’s notice.
We soon learnt that the seven ships had left Spezzia with several
transports and cruisers; and we began to think that if France had any
chance at all, she might have it by falling suddenly and swiftly on this
weak detachment. The Admirals seemed sure that she would, and the utmost
anxiety attended the reports from the signal station.
THE BATTLE OF SARDINIA.
THE RAMMING OF THE ‘AMIRAL BAUDIN.’
It was just after daylight on the morning of the fourth day that a sort
of cheering cry of ‘The enemy are at sea!’ ran all through the ships. Up
went the simple signal, ‘Weigh,’ and there was really a horrible
contrast between our anxiety and eagerness and the unmoved grind and
crunch as link by link the cables came slowly in. But this was soon
over, and we were at sea, forming at once in two lines ahead, as before
arranged. The report was that the French had left Toulon twelve hours
before, steering about S.E., but it had not been possible to count their
numbers owing to the darkness. We steamed due east at half-speed; but it
was plain to us all that if the French passed through the Straits of
Bonifacio we might easily miss them, even though our cruisers were well
spread out both ahead and astern. While we were in the middle of debate,
down there rolled upon us as dense a fog as ever I saw in the
Mediterranean. The Admiral had provided for this as for everything else,
and we knew that we must preserve order with the steam syrens only,
without the aid of guns; but as it was no use keeping speed, we slowed
down. We were like this all day and all night, and at daylight it seemed
as thick as ever. The ships had of course been all cleared for action,
and we were ready to open fire in a minute, though one naturally prayed
that the fog would lift before the enemy appeared. At 8 A.M. it began to
clear, and at 9 we distinctly counted twenty-one steam-ships to the
south of us. The flag-ship immediately made the signal for eight knots,
and gradually altered course towards the strange fleet. We were soon
able to make them out as sixteen French battle-ships, in the indented
line abreast, steering south, with five cruisers in front of them. They
were smoking up a good deal, but at ten or twelve miles distance we
could not tell whether they were going at speed.
We soon found they were not, for we began to gain on them, and the
signal was made for ten knots. We could tell by the position of the
steam cones, that every ship had steam to spare, and I suppose it was
the desire of making sure of a compact fleet which kept us at
comparatively low speed. Even at ten knots we continued to gain
considerably. We were quite two miles off when the French began to open
fire from their stern guns, and I am bound to say we were all very much
surprised at the bad shots. They fell short and over, right and left,
but after quite an hour few ships apparently had been badly hit.
We were still in two lines ahead and were making no reply at all to the
French fire. We could not understand, when we had got within 3000 yards,
why the Admiral did not put us in line abreast and open fire. But in the
middle of our wonder we suddenly saw the French ships open out to right
and left, and before we knew where we were the whole mass of the
battle-ships were coming right down upon us. We saw at once that it was
in anticipation of some such manœuvre that we had not quitted our first
formation.