pretty little bay of Monaco, and, going ashore, found the army of the
Prince—consisting of about sixty-five carabineers—in no small state of
excitement, owing to the prospect of its being forced perhaps by
circumstances to abandon its attitude of armed neutrality, and sucked
into the whirlpool of hostilities, whereof the Riviera might so soon
become the sanguinary scene. But such a prospect had not the least
apparent terror for the visitors to the beautiful Inferno at Monte
Carlo—men and women of all nations—Jews and Gentiles, Elamites and
Assyrians—who, in spite of the military bustle going on around
them—French battalions of Chasseurs and Alpine troops arriving and
departing by road and rail—continued to frequent the tables of the
Casino with an all-engrossing passion for their occupation worthy of the
abstruse philosopher of Syracuse. ‘_Noli turbare circulos meos_,’ also
exclaimed these lost-to-all-else worshippers of the roulette wheels.
It is not, perhaps, generally known in England, but the fact is that
during the last few years the French have been busy constructing a
formidable line of forts all along the Riviera from Marseilles to
Mentone; and every commanding peak and mountain-top overlooking the sea
and the seaside road is capped with one of these terrifically strong
stone-works. Careless pleasure-seekers on the Riviera are not likely to
take special notice of these mountain-crowns, with heavy long-range guns
for their jewels; but there they are, all the same. They form, indeed,
France’s silent answer to the Triple Alliance, and were placed there
since the conclusion of that pact to bar the advance of Italy, should
that Power, in fulfilment of her treaty engagements with Germany, be
called upon to assail the flank of France, and select as her line of
attack the sea-board rather than the mountain route.
[Illustration:
ITALIAN ARTILLERY CROSSING THE MONT CENIS.
]
An important reason why the Italian army should prefer the Riviera road
into France with all its perils was that, apart from the natural
difficulties of the Alpine routes, which had rather increased than
diminished since the time of Hannibal and Cæsar, they were
unwilling—such was their loyalty to public law—to expose themselves to
the charge of infringing the neutrality either of Switzerland or of
Savoy. For it must be remembered that, even after it had changed hands
with Nice in 1860, Savoy, this section, so to speak, of the
Franco-Italian Alsace-Lorraine, continued subject to the Treaty of
Vienna (1815) as neutral territory, part of which, Chablais and
Faucigny, might even be occupied with Federal troops ‘in the event of
Switzerland’s neighbours being in a state of open or imminent warfare.’
Indeed, a portion of the Federal Army had already made bold to brave the
displeasure and even the reprisals of France by occupying as it was,
theoretically speaking, entitled to do, the upper part of Savoy; and
this had introduced into the military situation an element of complexity
which the Italians would have been foolish to ignore. Consequently, they
resolved to force the passage of the Riviera road—the more so as their
fleet could cover their march to some extent, and even land troops at
particular points, as long at least, at the other portions of the French
navy, at present engaged in the Baltic and elsewhere, should not be free
to make for the Mediterranean.
The Italians had also resolved to send another smaller army, consisting
of their 1st and 3d Corps (whose places in the army of the Riviera were
to be taken by the 6th and 8th), across the Alps by the Mont Cenis
route, so as thus to attempt to turn the flank of the French Army,
consisting mainly of the 7th, 14th, 15th, and 16th Corps, which were now
pretty well all the French could spare from the further draft they had
had to make on their military resources with a view to repair their
reverses on the Rhine.
BATTLE OF COSTEBELLE.
MOUNTAIN WARFARE.
I need not describe to you in detail, for that has doubtless already
been done for you, the incidents of the preliminary fighting between the
two armies—French and Italian—since the first outpost collision at
Ventimiglia, and the first serious collision near Mentone. You are sure
to have heard of all the thrilling incidents forming the prelude to the
drama—the splendid but unavailing defence that was made by the 24th
Battalion of French Chasseurs from Ville-Franche against the
irresistible onslaught of the Bersaglieri of the 4th Italian Corps; the
brilliant cavalry encounter between the 5th Italian Lancers and the
French Dragoons of Tarascon (Tartarin’s native place on the Rhone); the
exploits of the Italian Alpini, or Alpine Sharpshooters, in scouting and
hill-climbing that would put to shame the records of the Alpine Club;
the wonders of marching and ‘milling’ (if I may use a slang word) done
by the mule-borne mountain-batteries of either belligerent: the
obstinate artillery duels between the Italian ironclads which steam
along the coast and the bastioned stone-work batteries that crown the
mountain-tops; with all the other novel features in this almost
fascinating picture of bloody war set in such a beautiful framework of
blue sky and purple hills, o’erlooking a paradise of flowers.
* * * * *
The Battle of Hyères, or rather of Costebelle (where Queen Victoria
lately passed a few quiet and peaceful weeks), though it resulted in the
repulse of the French, and their retirement on Toulon, is not quite
decisive of the campaign, as it will be next to impossible for the
Italians to possess themselves of this formidable and important place,
even with the aid of their fleet, before getting reinforcements from
Italy, which cannot for the present be spared; and meanwhile the Brest
Squadron of the French Fleet may be able to get rid of its
embarrassments elsewhere and come round to the Mediterranean.
The situation, no doubt, will be simplified if General Ricotti, with his
two Corps, manages to debouch from the Alps on the Mont Cenis side, and,
disposing of all opposition in that quarter, come down the valley of the
Rhone to co-operate with the army of the Riviera. But, in the meantime,
the issue of the whole war may have been decided on the Vistula and the
Rhine; and, if so, then the Italians will have accomplished their chief
aim, which was to distract and hamper the forces of France, by creating
a diversion on her flank and rear, and thus render her defeat by the
Germans all the easier and all the more certain.
In any case, the victories already achieved by the Italians show them to
be possessed of splendid soldierly material, both in men and
officers—material in no single respect inferior to that of France; and
when, after the late battle of Costebelle, the German Emperor
telegraphed to King Humbert that ‘his troops had done things of which
their Prussian comrades themselves might very well be proud, and which
at least they had never surpassed even at Rossbach and Sedan,’ it must
have been felt by all the world that His German Majesty, in employing
the phrases of compliment, was only using the language of truth.
_To the Editor of ‘Black and White.’_
SIR,—I observe that some confusion has arisen as to the authorship of
the letters from the Baltic and North Sea relating to the terrible war
now raging. They are not mine. The author is my friend, Sir Rambleton
Seaforth, who was on his wedding trip, and has certainly had a
remarkable experience in that way. He is only a yachtsman, not a naval
man, or he would have no doubt been able to give us fuller details, and
a more correct view of the situation. The letters were written to me,
and not intended for publication, and I much fear I shall be hauled over
the coals when he comes home. But I shall answer him with the truth,
which was that his sister stole them off my desk and sent them to you
without asking my leave.
I am sorry to say that the pair did not come to the end of their
adventures in the _Thames_. On her way into Sheerness she was ordered by
signal to transfer her despatches into a picket-boat, which was sent out
to her, and to proceed at once to Plymouth. As Sir Rambleton’s place is
in Devonshire, he and his wife decided to go on in her. Unfortunately,
when she made her number off the Start, she was signalled to proceed at
once off Cape Finisterre for the protection of commerce, and to coal at
Ferrol, but not to call there till actually short of coal. She asked
leave to land her passengers, and was refused, so Sir Rambleton and his
wife are at sea off Finisterre now, if they have not been captured and
carried into a French port, as it was stated that quite a cloud of
French cruisers had been ordered to rendezvous at that point.—I am, Sir,
your obedient servant,
P. H. COLOMB.
_May 10, 189—._
THE LANDING AT TREBIZONDE.
LORD SALISBURY ON THE SITUATION—DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.
LONDON, _Saturday, May 14_.
It was not till May 7th that our Correspondent’s letter (_see page 102_)
announcing the reported arrival of English troops in Trebizonde was
published in London. It had been delayed in transmission. Meantime, on
May 3d, the day following the debate in the House of Commons, the
proclamation calling out the Reserves was posted throughout the kingdom.
It appears that warning notices, issued as secretly as possible, had
been sent out four days earlier, following the precedent set in 1882. On
May 6th Mr. Balfour gave notice that he should on May 10th ask for a
credit vote in the House of Commons for ten millions, and for authority
to call out the Militia. On the reception of the news received from our
Correspondent, however, a hasty conference of the Liberal leaders, which
met at Mr. Gladstone’s house, decided that, as it would be inconvenient
to have a debate in the House of Commons prior to that on the credit
vote on May 10th, Lord Kimberley should on Monday night, May 9th, ask
for explanations of Lord Salisbury, and notice was at once sent to Lord
Salisbury to that effect. On the afternoon of May 9th the House of Lords
was crowded from floor to ceiling. All the Princes were in their places.
The House of Commons occupied the whole of the space at the bar in a
dense mass. The galleries were filled with the Princesses and Peeresses.
Amid breathless silence, Lord Kimberley rose. In a few cautiously worded
sentences he expressed a hope that Lord Salisbury would be able to give
an unqualified contradiction to the ridiculous rumour which had reached
England. He referred, of course, to the report of a correspondent that
as long ago as April 29th, English troops, the forerunners of an English
expedition, either had landed, or were immediately about to land, at
Trebizonde. The House was ready to support the Ministry in every measure
which they might take to safeguard the honour and interests of England.
No part of the House was more zealous in that respect than those noble
Lords with whom he had the honour to be associated. But a landing at
Trebizonde implied something which in no way concerned the honour and
interests of England. It was impossible that their Lordships should not
be led by it to suppose that the noble Marquis, the head of the
Government, considered himself bound by that ridiculous compact, the
Cyprus Convention, and that he now felt himself called upon to draw the
sword of England in defence of Turkey, because Russia had crossed the
Asiatic frontier of Turkey. However few the Liberal Peers in that House
might be, they felt that they expressed the mind of England in declaring
to the noble Marquis that, in behalf of the corrupt Government of
Turkey, the sword of England ought never again to be drawn. As for the
Cyprus Convention, it had been abrogated by Turkey herself. It was
conditional, and the conditions had not been fulfilled. Speaking with
the authority of many able military men, he could assure the noble
Marquis that if he contemplated a campaign amid the mountains of Asia
Minor, a campaign which, even if successful, could only lead up to a
long and dreary siege of the Russian fortress of Kars, he was involving
the country in military difficulties of untold magnitude and limitless
duration. He was doing this at a time when, amid a universal
conflagration, we required all our forces for the complications which
were sure to arise both in Europe and in Asia.
[Illustration:
LORD SALISBURY ADDRESSING THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON THE QUESTION OF PEACE
AND WAR.
]
There was rather a buzz of excitement than any definite applause when
the noble Lord sat down. It was promptly hushed, as Lord Salisbury
immediately rose to reply. He spoke as follows:—
‘My Lords, I do not require the assurance of the noble Earl that your
House is ready to support Her Majesty’s Government in any steps which
may be indispensable to safeguard the honour and interests of England. I
cannot discuss with that freedom which the noble Earl, naturally as an
independent Peer, allows himself, the character of the Government of our
ally, the Sultan of Turkey, or the present position of the Cyprus
Convention. Happily for the explanation which I am glad to have this
opportunity of offering to your Lordships, it is wholly unnecessary for
me to refer to either. We have never professed ourselves ready to
support the Government of the Sultan against his Christian subjects,
should that contingency arise. But there is one thing on which I think
it is well that Europe should understand, that not only this House, but
the whole of England, is agreed. We do not desire to see the independent
Balkan States crushed beneath the heel of Russia. We do not desire to
see the population of Asia Minor pass from the Government of the Turk to
that of the Czar. I am unwilling to say all that I easily might say on
that subject at the present moment. War between us and Russia has not
been declared. Our relations are in so delicate a condition that I
should have asked the noble Earl to postpone his question, but that I
feared that might give rise to misunderstanding. We live in hope that
such a dire calamity as a war between us and Russia may yet be averted
by the wisdom and the notoriously peaceful disposition of the Czar. But
the situation is this. Russia has commenced by sea an attack upon
Bulgaria. In order to say nothing that may tend to aggravate the
difficulties of the present moment, I refrain from referring to the
circumstances which preceded that invasion. In any case, it has been
impossible for us to allow Bulgaria to be crushed when the support of
our fleet would be of the most material importance to her. We, on
hearing of the Russian invasion, at once issued orders to Sir George
Tryon to act under the instructions of our ambassador at Constantinople.
With the consent of the Sultan, the fleet under Sir George Tryon entered
the Black Sea five days after the Russians had effected their landing in
Bulgaria. We then intimated to the Czar that we could not allow any
further reinforcements to be carried to Varna, and we heard yesterday
that the Russian fleet, yielding to the superior force of ours, had
retreated to the harbour of Sebastopol. The roadstead of Varna is in
occupation of our cruisers. The Russians have advanced inland, leaving a
force to cover the siege of Varna, which is held by about 5000
Bulgarians. It was in consequence of the Turks having announced their
intention of supporting their vassal State, Bulgaria, that the Russian
troops, without any declaration of war, crossed the frontiers in Asia
Minor. As it had been at our instance that Turkey had agreed to give
support to the Bulgarians, it was impossible that we could leave her
without a pledge of our support when this aggression took place. It is
not a political question of the future destinies of Asia Minor as
between Turkey and the Armenian population. It is simply a question of
giving military support to a valuable ally during actual warfare. We
cannot afford to throw away the assistance of thousands of most valiant
soldiers, who are ready to support our just demand that the Balkan
States shall be allowed to pursue in tranquillity that orderly
development which has excited the astonishment and the admiration of
Europe.
‘As to the military dangers which the noble Earl apprehends, I think
that it would be highly inconvenient, at a time when it is at least
possible that actual war may follow, that we should discuss, for the
information of those against whom we may have to fight, our military
projects. It will, I think, be sufficient for me to say that we have
intrusted the conduct of the whole of these operations to a member of
your Lordships’ House, in whom we have complete confidence, and whose
name will be a guarantee to the country that nothing will be wanting in
the command of the war, should it unfortunately be forced upon us, which
will tend to the honour and success of the British arms. The gallant
Viscount, the present Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, whom I am glad to
see in his place to-night, will, I have no doubt, be quite prepared to
accept responsibility for any dangers which trouble the imagination of
the noble Earl. But I should suppose that he will prefer to discuss his
plans with him after rather than before the war. It is not in presence
of armies which, as we have recently seen, are conducted with absolute
secrecy, and are able to deliver unexpected blows, because no one knows
what is going to happen till the stroke falls, that we can afford to
discuss our arrangements in the face of the world. The gallant Viscount
has at least fully satisfied Her Majesty’s Government that he has a
complete grasp of the whole situation, that he knows his own mind, and
we accept full responsibility for all that he proposes to do. If you do
not trust us, replace us by those whom you do trust. But, in Heaven’s
name, let me implore you not to allow the strength of England at this
moment to be weakened by divided counsels or by want of confidence in
those to whom the conduct of military affairs is intrusted. At this
moment it may make the whole difference between our obtaining by
peaceful means the acceptance of our just demands and a war which must
be terrible and may be long. In any case, should war break out, the firm
attitude of the whole country, its patriotic resolve and a temporary
abstinence from feeble criticism will have a most decisive effect upon
the future.’
When Lord Salisbury sat down there was a momentary and most impressive
hush, as of awed silence, in presence of the tremendous events which
appeared to be imminent, and then there came from all parts of the House
a burst of general and enthusiastic cheering, all the more striking
because of the usually impassive attitude of that august assembly. The
ladies in the gallery for a moment rose altogether as by a single
impulse, and when they sat down not a few of them burst into tears from
excitement, while a buzz of eager talk filled both House and galleries.
When the excitement had a little quieted down, Lord Rosebery, in a few
short sentences, expressed his entire sympathy with the general policy
enunciated by Lord Salisbury. He could not, however, refrain from hoping
that we were not about to be committed to a dangerous and difficult
campaign in Asia Minor, where the roads were bad, the country difficult,
and the end uncertain. He had, however, complete confidence in the
prudence and military genius of the gallant Viscount, and had no wish to
hamper either him or the Government with untimely criticism.
The general effect throughout the country of the debate in the House of
Lords decided the Liberal leaders to allow Mr. Balfour’s application for
the credit vote to pass unchallenged. Mr. Labouchere, however, moved the
rejection of the vote, and was seconded by Sir Wilfrid Lawson. The
credit was voted by a majority of 412 to 17. We do not propose to
trouble our readers with the details of the debate. No one took Mr.
Labouchere very seriously, and Sir Wilfrid Lawson’s jokes, which by no
means suited the temper of the House, may be found scattered through his
previous speeches. With the exception of two or three peace-at-any-price
members, nearly the whole of those who followed Mr. Labouchere consisted
of Parnellite members, who avowedly voted only in order to show their
independence of Mr. M‘Carthy and of both political parties. The funniest
incident occurred when Sir Wilfrid Lawson, whose own position was an
absolutely isolated one, repeated his old proposals to boycott the army.
The humour of the situation took the fancy of the House, and a general
titter gradually broke into a roar of laughter as the honourable member,
either not appreciating the point, or wilfully blind, exclaimed, ‘Well,
I shall!’ It was the only opportunity which members had for relieving
pent-up feeling, and they indulged it freely.
MOBILISATION OF THE FIRST ARMY CORPS.
CALLING OUT THE RESERVE.
Meantime the mobilisation of that portion of the 1st Army Corps, which
was not moved with Sir Evelyn Wood to Antwerp, proceeded. It is
necessary to explain what was and was not done in the case of the
regiments that went to Antwerp. The troops at Aldershot were gradually
increased, with a view nominally to the summer drills, till they
numbered something under 12,000 men. To these, for the purposes of the
expedition, were added three battalions of the Guards from London, two
of the regiments of Household Cavalry, and two batteries of Field
Artillery from Woolwich.
[Illustration:
THE MOBILISATION OF THE ENGLISH ARMY—TROOPS MARCHING THROUGH THE DOCK
GATES, PORTSMOUTH.
]
It must, however, be understood that in the proper sense of the term
these regiments could not be ‘mobilised.’ _There is at this moment no
battalion in the whole kingdom, except those of the Guards, that is fit
to go on active service as it stands on parade._ The battalions are
filled with recruits who, when mobilisation is ordered, have, in the
first instance, to be replaced with men from the Reserve. This cannot be
done without a proclamation, and without the fact of the Reserves being
called out being known to everybody. For such a sudden movement as Mr.
Balfour announced in the House of Commons on May 2d, there are no troops
but the Guards ordinarily available; but when application was made to
the military authorities to know how soon it would be possible to carry
out a move of this kind, it was pointed out, in the first instance, that
the occupation of a fortress like Antwerp is a very different thing from
a campaign in the field. It would do no harm to the young troops to be
moved across sea to Belgium. There they would be comfortably housed, and
when mobilisation was ordered it would be easy to send over to that
quarter the Reserve men to take their place in the ranks. Indeed, it was
pointed out that this course would be positively advantageous. For
supposing that Sir Evelyn Wood’s troops were required for a campaign
elsewhere, it would be best to replace them in Antwerp by forming depôts
there of recruits who with, perhaps, a few Militia regiments, who might
be induced to volunteer for the purpose, would form a sufficient
garrison; since it was in the last degree unlikely that, with all they
had on their hands, any of the armies in the field would attempt a siege
of such a fortress as Antwerp, occupied by English troops, even though
young and raw. As soon as the probability of the Eastern expedition
arose, we believe that Lord Wolseley pointed out that it was
indispensable to carry out this plan. As the Reserves for the battalions
now at Antwerp came in at the home stations they were shipped over to
that town, and in fact all arrived there about the 9th of this month.