NORTH SEA AND FIRST MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND.
The expedition to the Scheldt was being fitted out when Sir Edward
arrived from India; and had he reached England but a few days sooner, it
was understood that he would have received the naval command. The
military commander-in-chief, whose friendship he had long enjoyed,
wished him to be appointed; but the final arrangements of the Admiralty
had been already completed.
Lord Mulgrave afterwards proposed to him to be second in command in the
Mediterranean; and suggested that Lord Collingwood would probably be
glad to surrender his charge to an officer who possessed the confidence
of the Admiralty; for that of late he had repeatedly expressed a desire
to be relieved from it on account of his declining health. But Sir
Edward, who was not aware of the actual condition of that distinguished
Admiral, declined the offer, for he could not be persuaded that Lord
Collingwood would resign a command which he filled so usefully and
honourably, as long as he could possibly hold it with advantage to his
country.
He did not remain long unemployed, though he never attempted to create
an interest in his favour by any indirect means. Political intrigue, he
has said, does not sit well on a sea-officer; and he would not attach
himself to the fortunes of any administration, or party. This, as it is
the most honourable, is also in the end the most successful path; but
the man who travels thus alone and unsupported, must be prepared for the
many attacks to which such a position will expose him. Some such
annoyance or interference may have prompted the following blunt avowal
of independence in a letter, of the 28th of July, 1810.
"I have no right to the favour of Mr. Percival, or any minister.--I have
never intrigued, nor ever will--and as to sneaking after such people, I
will not--and as to the command of the Channel fleet, be it Pole, or be
it Calder, I care not one straw--and whether I am on the shelf by any
new set, is equally indifferent--and for me, who am fifty-three, except
the heart-felt satisfaction of serving my country in such times, I will
never be at the trouble to write a letter to ask a favour of any
minister alive. I care not who comes in, or who goes out, and if they
send me on shore, well; and if not, it is the same."
In the spring of 1810 he hoisted his flag on board the _Christian VII_.
as commander in-chief in the North Sea. He rode at anchor with his fleet
all the summer, off the mouth of the Scheldt, just in sight of land;
while his smaller vessels were actively employed along the whole line of
coast. He frequently stood into the Scheldt in a cutter, that he might
reconnoitre the enemy's fleet in person. A gale from the eastward having
blown the fleet off the coast, it was at anchor in the Downs, when a
gun-brig arrived with intelligence that the enemy had dropped down to
the Western Scheldt, apparently ready to sail. He ordered the fleet to
sea immediately; but many of them having made signal of inability, for
the pilots refused to get them under weigh, he sent for the chief pilot
of the flag ship, and questioned him if it were practicable to take out
a ship in such weather. The pilot having reported that it was quite
safe, even for the _Christian VII._, which from her great length was the
least manageable ship in the fleet, much more so for the others, some
of which worked like cutters, the Admiral made signal for all captains
and pilots to come on board. He then repeated his order to sail, and
enforced obedience. The fleet sailed, and beat across the North Sea to
their station, without an accident; and the enemy returned to their
former anchorage as soon as the blockading force appeared. As the autumn
advanced, the pilots gave up the charge of the fleet; but Sir Edward
kept his station, until the increasing severity of the gales compelled
him to take shelter in the Downs.
In the spring of 1811, he succeeded Sir Charles Cotton as
commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. He proceeded to his station in
the _Caledonia_, with his brother Israel, lately promoted to be a Rear
Admiral, as captain of the fleet; and arrived off Toulon on the 18th of
July. Next morning, two French frigates returning from Genoa with
conscripts for the fleet were chased by the _Conqueror_ and _Sultan_,
the inshore squadron; and the French commander, Vice-Admiral Comte
Emeriau, sailed out with thirteen line-of-battle ships and a frigate, to
protect them. The _Conqueror_ approached near enough to fire upon the
frigates, and afterwards, with her consort, exchanged a few distant
broadsides with the advanced ships of the enemy: but these, whose only
object was to secure the frigates, did not wait for the main body of the
British force, now fast coming up, but hastened back to their anchorage.
This affair, with the evident high state of equipment of the French
fleet, led all to expect that there would soon be a general action; a
hope in which the Admiral fully participated. He writes thus on the 28th
of December, 1811, when the fleet was on its way to Mahon:--
"MY DEAR BROTHER,--I would not permit a ship to sail direct for
England without carrying you a few lines to say we are all well, on
our way to replenish our provisions and water for the winter's
cruise: when this is done, we return to our old ground; or it is
possible we may attempt to lay in Hyères Bay, should we find the
ground good for winter gales, of which at present we are not quite
assured. We lay there a month in full expectation it would force
the enemy to give us battle, and it will probably at last compel
them to do so next spring. They are actively fortifying the islands
and bay all around, in order to guard against attack, and have at
least ten thousand men at work: they suspect our army will move
this way. As far as we can judge from appearances, I have never yet
seen a French fleet in half the order the Toulon one is. They have,
I am sorry to say, adopted but too many of our arrangements, and in
point of clothing, they exceed us. They also keep everybody on
board, so that the French officers are now of necessity obliged to
find amusement in their duty; and become acquainted with their
people. The ships are magnificent; four of 120 guns, larger than
_Caledonia_, and twelve fine two-deckers, are all ready and manned.
Two of 120, and two of 80 are building, and may launch by March or
April; so that I think we shall have twenty to fight, without any
from Genoa, Naples, or Venice; and I trust a glorious day we shall
have. Keats is a host of strength to me; and we are all well
together, eager for the day, which I trust will help to put an end
to the miseries of war, and the irksome eighteen years' confinement
between wooden walls we have all experienced.
"God be with you ever,
"My dear Sam,
"Your truly affectionate brother,
"E. PELLEW."
The hopes of the fleet were disappointed: for the enemy came out only
when the wind was fair to return; and thus, though they often allowed
the advanced ships to approach nearly within gunshot, nothing was, or
could be done, on those occasions.
In the following week, prompted perhaps by the recollections of the new
year, he again writes:--
"I never expect to live the war through, and am not at all anxious
about it. If I can only have the happiness of doing service to the
country, I would give a great deal to be ten years younger; but as
that cannot be, I must content myself with the reflection that my
children are good, and provided for; and that I leave them attached
to their mother, and to each other. We have all reason to be
thankful, and to praise God for his great and manifold mercies. We
are ready to start at a moment's notice, and have a strict
look-out. The enemy are also ready, sixteen sail, a three-decker of
140 guns launched Christmas Day.
"God bless you, and yours; and may He enable me to do honour to my
country and my family--for myself, I care not."
The number of points which required to be constantly watched (for more
than two thousand miles of coast, from the Ionian Islands to Gibraltar,
was in the hands of the enemy), made a considerable force necessary; and
the Mediterranean fleet was at this time one of the largest ever
entrusted to an Admiral. The commander-in-chief, with a principal part
of the line-of-battle ships, blockaded the French fleet in Toulon,
cruising off that port from the beginning of March to the end of
November, and sheltering in Mahon through the three winter months. A
Rear-Admiral was kept at Malta, with a sufficient force under his
direction to guard the different points of the station at the upper part
of the Mediterranean. Another Rear-Admiral was stationed on the south
coast of Spain, to watch the movements of the enemy, and to assist the
Spaniards whenever they could assemble in numbers to make a stand. A
third remained at Gibraltar; and a Commodore, with a ship of the line,
and frigates, watched the Gulf of Genoa, and the western coast of Italy.
Frigates and small vessels were detached wherever their services became
necessary.
Knowing from his own experience what could be done by the flag-officers
and captains of his fleet, he was enabled to assign to all of them their
respective duties in the full confidence that they would not disappoint
him. He associated much with them, and was in the habit of freely
communicating his ideas, as well on general subjects connected with the
movements of the fleet, as on their own personal charge. By his prompt
measures, and personal attention to the repairs, victualling, and
storing of the fleet, and his care to obtain ample supplies of stores
and provisions from England in such good time as never to be deficient
in any necessary article, he kept all the ships in a high state of
equipment, and afforded at the same time an example of activity and
forethought which was not lost upon his officers. He was attentive to
everything which affected the discipline of the crews, and was
particularly strict in enforcing regulations for constant exercise at
the great guns and small arms.
How perfect was the discipline of the fleet may be inferred from the
fact, that with so many ships, and on a station where the enemy had the
chief part of his naval force, he lost, in three years that he held the
command, not a single vessel by capture: and only one, a small gun-brig,
by shipwreck. It may be added, that through almost twenty years of
command in war, as Commodore and Admiral, no vessel under his orders was
ever taken. Something of this may be ascribed to fortune; but more must
be referred to the excellence of the officers and crews; which, when the
results are so uniform, is in fact also the praise of the commander.
Indeed, the superiority of the Mediterranean fleet under his command was
well known, and James, in his Naval History, complaining of the dearth
of good seamen on other stations, laments that "so many thousands of the
very best of seamen, who, under the wise regulations of Sir Edward
Pellew, were daily improving themselves in the neglected art of gunnery,
should be denied the power of showing their proficiency where it was the
most wanted."
He was particularly anxious to keep down the expense of the fleet, and
indefatigable in his exertions to economize stores of every description,
which at this time were procured from home with much difficulty. When it
was found that fresh water could be obtained at the mouths of the Rhone,
the fleet went there, and usually completed in forty-eight hours. He was
thus enabled to discharge several transports. From the size and force of
that river, the fresh water floats for a considerable distance over the
sea; and at first, some of the cruisers completed their water by dipping
it carefully from the surface. But on the fleet anchoring in the bay,
the launches, with the armed boats to protect them, were sent up the
river, where the water was not at all brackish. An arrangement was
eventually made with the French General, who agreed not to molest the
boats, the Admiral on his part promising that none of his people should
be suffered to land on the marshes, or in any way to disturb the cattle
grazing there, of which there were many thousands. In the strong
north-west gales, so common in the Gulf of Lyons, the ships were in the
practice of furling sails every night, and driving off from Toulon,
standing in-shore again under easy sail when the gale moderated. During
the winter months, when he sheltered in Mahon harbour, the ships had
their repairs made good, and their stores and provisions completed; the
Admiral being as active in the dockyard, where he would often be found
at the earliest dawn of the morning, as he showed himself when afloat.
Care was taken that while the fleet thus lay in harbour, it should
always be ready for an immediate start if the enemy should put to sea;
and two frigates, occasionally with a line-of-battle ship, were kept off
Toulon to make a daily observation of the state and movements of their
force. On two occasions, the in-shore frigates particularly
distinguished themselves. On the 22nd of September, 1811, the
_Volontaire_ and _Perlen_ retreated from a division of three
line-of-battle ships, and two frigates, with which they were repeatedly
engaged during six hours; and saved themselves through their admirable
seamanship without loss: and in the following May, the _Menelaus_ alone,
when close in-shore, was chased by several line-of-battle ships; and
though her fore-topmast was nearly cut in two by a shot from the
batteries, she secured it, and escaped.
Competent masters were provided for the young gentlemen of the
_Caledonia_, who were assembled every day in the Admiral's fore-cabin,
and kept closely at their studies; the Admiral himself often visiting
them, and interesting himself in their progress. The French and Spanish
interpreters instructed them in these languages: the flag-lieutenant
superintended their navigation, and that they might perfect themselves
in seamanship, a frigate-built yacht of eight or ten tons was provided,
upon which they were exercised in sailing, rigging and unrigging, and
every part of a practical seaman's duty. All the arrangements of the
ship, with regard both to officers and men, displayed consideration for
their comfort and advantage. When the Admiral thoroughly knew his
officers, he confided in them in their respective situations, never
teasing them with interference, or disturbing himself by unnecessary
watching or anxiety, after his orders had been given. The influence
which he exerted on their behalf, and his great success in obtaining
promotion for them, gave every one the strongest inducement to excel. He
had known the anxieties of a young man forcing his way through the
service without friends; and his own recollections taught him how best
to assist and encourage others.
No man could be more careful of the reputation and feelings of his
officers, or more ready to suggest a plea in excuse for their errors. He
had an extreme dislike to bring any of them to a court-martial, and
would never resort to this painful extremity where it could with any
propriety be avoided. Very few cases occurred under his command; so few,
indeed, that it has even been asserted that not one took place. This it
would be too much to affirm. It may be quite true that he was in no case
the accuser: it certainly was his practice to prevent extreme measures
wherever he could support the authority of the superior without
subjecting the accused to the consequences of a public trial; and the
recommendation of the commander-in chief would generally be conclusive.
Still, a serious case would sometimes occur, in which it was impossible
to prevent the law from taking its course. At a particular period of his
command, and on a very important and critical occasion, one of his
captains placed him in a position of much embarrassment, by entering
without authority into a treaty with the Queen and Court of Murat. The
commander-in-chief arrived very soon after, and annulled the treaty; but
he spared the officer the pain of his position by charging him with the
most prominent and honourable service connected with his own
arrangements. In his despatches to the Admiralty on the occasion, he
touches very lightly on the error, but enforces every exculpatory plea.
Of the unauthorized arrangement with the enemy, he merely writes, "which
I should have been glad he had never entered upon;" yet he adds, "from
my conviction that he had been actuated by the purest motives, and
placed in a peculiar situation. I thought it right, in acknowledging his
letter, to express my approbation of his general proceedings; and in
consideration of all the circumstances connected with his engagements. I
gave him my sanction to," &c. He then proceeds to describe the
flattering trust he had committed to this officer.
But kind as he was, he endured no relaxation of discipline, and never
forgot what was due to his rank and station. His manners were formed by
his character; and whenever an individual with commanding talents
directs them to worthy objects, combining a proper sense of what he owes
to himself with a just consideration for others, he will always, and
without an effort, appear dignified and amiable: far more so in his
unaffected simplicity, than the man who only assumes the character of
the chief and patron, because his position requires it.
His temper was warm, the common failing of quick and active minds. No
one was more conscious of it than himself; and where he feared it had
given pain, he would labour to remove the impression by marked and
continued attentions. In the multiplicity of cares and duties which
surround a commander-in-chief, there are so many sources of irritation
and disappointment, that it is no wonder the mind should sometimes be
brought to that extreme point of endurance, when a small additional
annoyance destroys its equanimity.
The service in the Mediterranean was one of multiplied details,
individually too unimportant for history, yet calculated to influence
materially the progress and result of the war. Along the eastern coast
of Spain, the support and co-operation of the ships afforded that
encouragement to the inhabitants which in the western provinces they
derived from the presence of the British army. Even when the fortresses
had fallen, and Spain had no longer a force for a rallying point in that
part of the country, the guerillas, acting in concert with the fleet,
were enabled to perform exploits which alarmed and distressed the
invader, and kept alive the spirit of hope and resolution. Along the
shores of Italy and France, the most daring and brilliant enterprises
were continually achieved. Batteries and forts were stormed in open day,
and prizes, sometimes in whole convoys, carried off from anchorages
where they seemed to be unassailable. Looking at the evident danger of
such attempts, one is astonished at the constant success which attended
them, and at the generally inconsiderable loss sustained. It would be
unjust to the courage of the enemy, and still more to that of the
gallant officers and men who performed such services, not to state the
cause of this impunity and success. It was not that the defences on
shore were feebly maintained, or that their defenders were surprised and
overpowered by the reckless desperation of the assailants; but that the
different boat attacks were planned with a judgment, and supported by a
force, which prevented effectual resistance. Officers such as Hoste,
Gordon, Rowley, Maxwell, Duncan, Ussher, and indeed all, for no
commander ever placed more general and deserved confidence in his
officers than Sir Edward Pellew, were not men to send away their people
on doubtful and desperate services. The Admiral himself, much as he
admired enterprise, strongly discouraged all acts of useless daring. He
was always most unwilling to risk men's lives in boat attacks, when they
could not be supported by the fire from the ships; and when his own
boats were necessarily detached on service, his anxiety for their safety
was very great. But the men, who saw in these successes only the daring
courage which obtained, but not the considerate judgment which planned
them, learned to fancy themselves invincible, and would go to what might
appear a death service, as if it were an excursion of pleasure. The crew
of the _Imperieuse_, who had often distinguished themselves in these
attacks, petitioned their captain to remain with them, when he had been
appointed to a finer ship, and offered to prove their attachment to him
by taking any two French frigates they could meet. It is right to add,
that their captain, a son of the great and good Lord Duncan, submitted
their petition to Sir Edward Pellew, who continued him with his faithful
followers. "You are a brave nation," said Napoleon at Elba to an English
captain, one of Sir Edward's officers, "so are the French; but the
English are individually brave." Services like these create the
individual bravery which Napoleon admired.
Still more important was the moral influence which these attacks
impressed on the enemy. When the inhabitants along the southern coasts
of Europe could scarcely look upon the waters without seeing an English
cruiser; when they saw the apparent ease with which their strongest
defences were carried; when they felt themselves at the mercy of the
assailants, yet always experienced their forbearance and protection; the
respect felt for an enemy so powerful and generous, taught them to
desire the more earnestly their own day of deliverance from the common
tyrant. And when the tremendous judgment which visited him in the
Russian campaign offered the prospect of his speedy and final overthrow,
every facility existed for acquainting them with the full extent of his
reverses, and preparing them to avail themselves of the earliest
opportunity to assert their freedom. "Affairs in these countries," says
Sir Edward, in one of his letters, "look well, and promise much next
summer, all over the East. Detestation, amounting to horror, is the
general expression against this tyrant of the earth."
The ordinary cares and duties of his command, and his very extensive
correspondence, for the number of letters he was in the habit of writing
on service was almost incredible, were by no means Sir Edward's heaviest
charge. Perhaps there was no ambassador on whom a greater diplomatic
responsibility was imposed than on the commander in the Mediterranean.
It formed by much the largest and most anxious portion of Collingwood's
duties, and the greatness of the trust, the impossibility of confiding
it to another than the commander on the station, and the uncommon
ability with which Collingwood sustained it, gave the British Government
much uneasiness when the state of that officer's health threatened to
deprive them of his services. It increased materially in extent and
importance after Sir Edward had succeeded to the command, when the
reverses of the French in Russia opened a prospect of deliverance to all
the states along the shores of the Mediterranean, including the southern
provinces of France itself. Sir Edward exerted himself unceasingly to
prepare them for this consummation, and to encourage them to seize the
first opportunity to effect it; and the judgment he displayed in these
services obtained from a British Cabinet minister the declaration, that
"great as he may be as a sea-officer, he is still greater as a
statesman."
One professional distinction was yet wanting, and this he anxiously
desired, as a means of hastening an honourable peace, and on personal
grounds, perhaps, to connect his name with the history of his
country--to command in a general action. Though the enemy had shrunk
from meeting him, as he expected when he first assumed the command, yet,
while they continued to build ships of the largest class, and to keep
their fleet always ready for sea, he could not but hope that they only
waited for a favourable opportunity to try the fortune of their flag. At
the end of 1811 there were sixteen sail of the line in Toulon. Two
others were launched next year, and by the close of 1813 there were
twenty-two, of which six were three-deckers of the largest size. Sir
Edward gave them every opportunity, and every prudent advantage, but he
never could induce them to attack him. They had been forbidden to
engage, and the Emperor had hitherto seen nothing to induce him to
recall the order. Thus, though they were kept in a state of high
equipment through the whole period of Sir Edward's command, they never
ventured far beyond the protection of the batteries; and came out only
when they had a leading wind to return.
The restoration of his fleet was a favourite ulterior object with
Napoleon; and if a different result of the Russian campaign had placed
the resources of Europe at his command, there is no doubt but that the
days of St. Vincent and Trafalgar would have been renewed. There was an
English officer who was much in his presence and confidence at Elba, and
to whom he proposed the most flattering inducements to enter his
service. "I am honoured by your Majesty's offer," was the reply, "but I
was born an Englishman." Conversing with him on naval affairs, he one
day said, "I would have had two hundred sail of the line, and when I
brought against you such a force, you must have been crushed." But the
officer soon convinced him that the tactics which he had made so
effectual on land, by concentrating an overwhelming force upon his
enemy, were not applicable to naval operations. Sailors are made but
slowly. It requires an able commander to direct twenty ships, and the
most skilful could scarcely manoeuvre forty. Dark nights and gales would
disperse the unwieldy armada, and a small, but well managed force, would
hang upon it and destroy it in detail. The Emperor saw the force of the
objections, and closed the conversation with the compliment already
related.
Once, towards the end of the war, an opportunity seemed to be offered by
which the enemy might be compelled to sacrifice part of his fleet, or to
risk a general battle. On the morning of November 5th. 1813, the French
fleet had sailed out of Toulon with the wind at E.S.E., and advanced to
a greater distance than usual, when the wind suddenly shifted to
south-west. Immediately the enemy made every exertion to work back to
their harbour. The main body of the British fleet was just in sight to
the southward, and an advanced squadron of four sail, with a fifth at no
great distance, was about half-way between the two fleets. This squadron
lay up for the enemy under all sail, with every appearance of being able
to cut off the rear ships, the _Wagram_ of 130 guns, with four
two-deckers and four frigates. On the approach of the British, the enemy
tacked, and stood in so close, that many thought they intended to run
themselves on shore; but they again tacked off to the southward, and the
advanced squadrons stood on with every prospect of passing to windward
of them. Unfortunately, as the British ships approached, the wind headed
them, and threw them off so much, that they only fetched just within
gun-shot of the _Wagram_, the enemy's rear ship. The fleet was at this
time bringing up the original wind, and the _Caledonia, San Josef_, and
_Boyne_, actually fetched within gun-shot of the French Admiral, before
the wind headed them. The _Wagram_, which had reserved her fire for the
_Caledonia_, exchanged broadsides with her, but at too great a distance
to produce material effect; and the enemy being so far to windward,
succeeded in reaching Toulon. Eleven shots from the _Wagram_ and the
batteries struck the _Caledonia_, wounding the mainmast, cutting some of
the shrouds, and destroying a small boat upon the booms. Much
disappointment was felt by all the fleet, and the conduct of the
advanced squadron was strongly censured by many in the ships astern, who
supposed that they had intentionally bore away, when in fact they had
come up within influence of the head wind.
A more serious, though very partial affair occurred in the following
February. On the evening of the 12th, Rear-Admiral Kosmao Kerjulien
sailed from Toulon, with three sail of the line, and three frigates, to
escort a seventy-four which was expected from Genoa. On the following
morning, the fleet returning from Mahon, discovered the enemy to the
eastward of Hyères Islands. They were at first supposed to be British
ships, but the Admiral himself going aloft, clearly made out their
character. The _Boyne_, Captain Burlton, a small three-decker, sister
ship to the _Victory_, was considerably in advance of the fleet. It was
on Sunday, and the ships were preparing for the morning service, which
had already commenced on board the _Boyne_, when the signal for a
general chase was thrown out. The wind blew strong from E.S.E., and the
_Boyne_, perceiving the enemy's intention to come through the little
pass of Hyères Bay, stood for that pass to intercept them. Sir Edward,
who was leaning on the foreyard, watched her with admiration, but
extreme anxiety. "Hold on, my brave Burlton!" he exclaimed, as the
_Boyne_ dashed at their whole force. Then, as he feared they would all
close, and overpower her before he could arrive to her assistance, he
turned to an officer at his side, and declared with energy, "If they
take her they sha'nt keep her, for I'll go in with the fleet!"
Passing through the enemy immediately astern of a frigate, to which she
gave a broadside, the _Boyne_ separated the rear-ship from the others,
and brought her to action. This ship, the _Romulus_, a two-decker,
immediately hauled in for the north shore, and kept so close, going
round all the bays, that the _Boyne_ could neither run her on board, nor
get inside her. They ran side by side with studding sails set, and at
the rate of ten knots, before the wind, which blew directly into Toulon.
Once it was thought that the _Romulus_ was aground, as she luffed up to
the wind, which brought all her sails aback, and her starboard lower
studding-sail in upon the gangway. The _Boyne_ also backed her sails,
and continued close to the enemy; but the _Romulus_ paying off, and
filling again, continued to run alongshore, and when she reached Cape
Brun, at the entrance of the harbour, had gained on the _Boyne_. The
_Caledonia_ had by this time come up, and the Admiral waved to Captain
Burlton to haul his wind to the southward. The _Boyne_ tacked
accordingly, being then within pistol shot of Cape Brun battery; and the
_Caledonia_ fired a broadside at the _Romulus_, as she ran in to join
her consorts in the harbour. The _Caledonia_ then gave the _Boyne_ three
hearty cheers, and Captain Burlton received the thanks of the
commander-in-chief by signal.
Napoleon was now contending for existence on the soil of France, and the
remains of his former conquests were rapidly melting from him. In the
course of January and February, every place in the Adriatic had
surrendered. In the following month, Lord William Bentinck left Palermo
with an army, supported by a squadron under Commodore J. Rowley, to
reduce Genoa. The advanced guard was landed considerably to the
eastward, and moved forward, supported by the squadron, carrying and
dismantling the batteries as they advanced. On the 30th, the defences
round the Gulf of Spezzia capitulated. On the 13th of April, the army
was landed at Recce, in the Gulf of Genoa; and at day-break on the 17th,
a joint attack was made by the land and sea forces on the defences
around the place. These were carried in the course of the day; and
preparations were in progress to attack the town, when Sir Edward Pellew
arrived with several line-of battle ships. The governor, already alarmed
at the rapid progress of the assailants, capitulated, and the town was
taken possession of next morning. Four gun-brigs, and a number of
merchant vessels were found in the mole; and the _Brilliant_, a fine
seventy-four on the stocks, was launched, and still remains in the navy
under the appropriate name of the _Genoa_.
Paris had already capitulated; and on the 28th of this month, Napoleon
left France in a British frigate for Elba. He landed on the 3rd of May
on the little island which had been assigned to him for a sovereignty,
and a prison: and thus ended a war, one of the longest, the most
dreadful, but in all respects the most glorious, which England had ever
waged.