BLOCKADE OF FERROL.--PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY.
The _Impetueux_ remained with the Channel fleet until she was paid off
at the end of the war, when Sir Edward was allowed a short repose. He
passed it chiefly in the quiet of domestic retirement at Trefusis, a
seat belonging to Lord Clinton, which occupies the promontory between
the two principal branches of Falmouth harbour, and adjoins the little
town of Flushing, where his grandfather had lived. Here, in the bosom of
his family, and with many of his companions and friends in the service
around him, he enjoyed his first period of relaxation from the beginning
of the revolutionary war.
Early in 1801, there was a naval promotion, which left him nearly at the
head of the post list; and he was shortly after made a Colonel of
Marines. His popularity was now very great, for the credit gained by his
first action was increased by every future success, until there was no
officer of his rank whose name was more known and honoured through the
country. That this should create jealousy was only to be expected; for
it is always the hardest trial of liberality to be just to the superior
fortunes of a competitor. Some, contending that he enjoyed a reputation
beyond his deserts, would under-rate his services, which, they said, any
other officer with the same chances could have performed as well. But
chance, though it may afford an occasional instance of unexpected
fortune, never gives a long and uniform career of distinction. Sir
Edward displayed the same character through all his grades of rank, and,
except in the _Hazard_, which was employed on a station and a service
which could afford no opportunity for distinction, obtained the same
success in every ship he commanded. It is encouraging to unassisted
merit to observe, that he had no influential friends until he had made
himself independent of their support, and was attached to the fortunes
of no leading commander. All his promotions, and every honour he
received, were given expressly to reward some recent and distinguished
service.
Many years after he had retired from active employment, he made a modest
allusion to this subject at a naval dinner, at which his late Majesty,
then Lord High Admiral, presided. In rising to return thanks, when his
health was drunk with compliments which demanded acknowledgment, he
referred to his own history as a proof that no officer, however
unsupported by influence, need despair of receiving his due reward from
the justice and gratitude of his country. "I have never known," he said,
"what fortune meant. I never chose my station, and never had a friend
but the King's pennant; but I have always gone where I was sent, and
done what I was ordered; and he who will act upon the same principles,
may do as I have done."
At the general election in 1802, he was solicited to stand for
Barnstaple; for which, after a severe contest, he was returned on the
8th of July, by a very large majority. His correspondence at this period
shows he was very early wearied with his situation. Nor was he better
satisfied when he had gained an insight into the nature of a
parliamentary life. Indeed, a naval officer of reputation will seldom
promote his comfort by going into Parliament; where his inactivity may
present an unfavourable contrast to his professional character, or his
prominence expose him to the virulence of party. Yet the experience
thus obtained was not without value to a man who was henceforth to be
employed as a commander-in-chief, with a greater share of political
responsibility than usually attaches to a naval command. If he had
wished to estimate the value of political friendships, and the spirit of
party intrigue, a lesson which professional employment at sea is little
calculated to teach, he could not have entered Parliament at a better
season. The high character and truly English politics of Mr. Pitt had
united very different parties to support him in carrying on a just and
necessary war; but when the bond which he had afforded to his party was
removed by his going out of office, and peace had deprived them of their
common object, former principles of repulsion regained their influence;
and the uncertainty whether the premier was the rival or the _locum
tenens_ of Pitt increased the confusion. It was still more embarrassing
when, at a later period, Mr. Pitt threw himself into avowed opposition
to a government, of which the premier was his friend and pupil, and the
other ministers, one of whom was his own brother, might all be regarded
as his nominees. Indeed, six remained in office when he returned to
power, and the ex-premier himself joined the administration in a few
mouths after.
Sir Edward had not long been in Parliament, before he expressed a
confident opinion that Mr. Pitt would soon come in. Succeeding events
strengthened this conviction; and when the peace, or rather armed truce,
of Amiens was evidently drawing to a close, he said in one of his
letters, "Pitt _must_ now be the minister." He gave a general support to
the Government in the very small part which he took in the business of
the House, but he availed himself of the earliest opportunity to escape
from it; and on the very day when the King's message was delivered,
which indicated the renewal of hostilities, he solicited and obtained
employment.
On the 11th of March, 1803, he was appointed to the eighty-gun ship
_Tonnant_, in which, after some delay, occasioned by the general
difficulty of procuring men, he joined the Channel fleet. Anxious to
take part in the important naval operations to be expected, he wished to
sail with Nelson, whose reputation gave a just presage that the most
decisive blow would be struck where he commanded; but after he had been
appointed to a station, his sense of naval obedience forbade any attempt
to change it. With that care for the improvement of his young officers
which was always a prominent feature of his conduct, he advertised for a
superior schoolmaster for the _Tonnant_, to whom he offered 50_l._ per
annum, in addition to his pay, that he might obtain for them better
instructions than the regulations of the service would afford.
Early in the summer, he was detached from the Channel fleet, with the
_Mars_ and _Spartiate_ under his orders, to intercept or blockade a
Dutch squadron, which had put into the neutral port of Ferrol, on their
passage to India. The enemy had proceeded on their voyage the day before
he arrived, and he followed under a press of sail as far as Madeira.
They were the ships which he afterwards destroyed at Griessee. In his
absence, a French squadron of five sail of the line arrived at Corunna
from St. Domingo, and took advantage of the first westerly gale to cross
the bay to Ferrol. Here they were blockaded by Sir Edward, whose force
was soon increased to six, and afterwards to eight sail of the line.
On the 2nd of September, during a strong easterly gale, with thick
weather, two other French ships from St. Domingo, the _Duguay Tronin_
74, and _Guerrière_ frigate, were chased by Sir Robert Calder, who was
coming out to relieve the Commodore. The _Culloden_ had a running fight
with the enemy for two hours and a half, but could not prevent them from
getting into Corunna. In autumn, the _Tonnant_ having been refitted at
Plymouth, Sir Edward resumed the command, and maintained a very close
blockade, at considerable risk, by night and day. He constantly expected
a French force from Brest, and often remarked to his officers, that
they would have to fight both squadrons at once. Under such
circumstances, every precaution was required, and though unwilling to
interfere with the men's rest, yet, to prevent surprise, he thought it
necessary to keep them at quarters all night, and pipe down the hammocks
in the morning.
As the season advanced, the weather became so tempestuous that the
squadron was often driven off the land for many days together, and only
occasionally fetched near Ferrol. Sir Edward became anxious therefore to
find an anchorage in the neighbourhood, where the fleet could ride out a
gale, and obtain necessary supplies. He first examined a bay near Cape
Ortugal, but this was too distant. He then went in a cutter into the Bay
of Bentanços, between Ferrol and Corunna, on the eastern side of which,
in a bay called Ares, he considered, contrary to the opinion of the
celebrated Spanish hydrographer Tofino, that the anchorage was safe, and
the ground good. The correctness of his judgment was proved by the
number of heavy gales which the squadron rode out through the winter.
The place much resembles Cawsand Bay, and a windmill stood on the
adjacent height, from which the harbour of Ferrol could be seen as
distinctly as Hamoaze from Maker Tower. In this mill, the English and
French officers on the look-out often met. As long as the wind was
westerly, the squadron remained here; but when it shifted to the
eastward, which was fair to leave Ferrol, Sir Edward anchored his ships
across the entrance of the harbour.
Owing to the prevalence of the westerly gales, the supplies from England
were totally inadequate to the wants of the squadron: and it became
indispensable to procure them on the spot. Occasionally a few live
cattle were received, but the vessels bringing them were driven back, or
detained, until the beasts were almost dead. Water was soon found: but
it was not easy to obtain provisions in the depth of winter from so poor
a country. The Spaniards were very lukewarm, and the French Admiral
naturally created every obstacle in his power. This important charge was
entrusted to Mr. Fitzgerald, purser of the _Tonnant_, and acting
secretary to the Commodore, a gentleman of great resources, and
unbounded courage and enterprise. By his exertions a small supply of
fresh meat was obtained, with some wine and biscuit; and as confidence
became established, cattle and other necessaries were purchased forty
miles in the interior. In the performance of his arduous service, Mr.
Fitzgerald was twice attempted to be assassinated; and he escaped only
by killing the assailant upon one occasion, and by wounding some of the
party on the other. Sir Edward was thus enabled to maintain an effectual
blockade all the winter. He always expected an attack from Brest, which
perhaps might have been attempted if the enemy had known his real
strength; but his frequent exchanges with the Channel fleet deceived the
French Admiral into a belief that a force was cruising in the
neighbourhood, of which the ships he saw were only the in-shore
division. Early in the year ships arrived from England with supplies,
and every difficulty had been removed, when political events at home led
to his recall.
While the general wishes and confidence of the country were directed to
Mr. Pitt, as the only minister to carry on the war with energy, the
chief support of the Government was the reputation and decisive
character of Earl St. Vincent, First Lord of the Admiralty, whose
ability as a great commander was even surpassed by his consummate skill
as a politician. But the Earl was now suffering the common fate of a
practical reformer, to be opposed by the retainers of a former system,
and distrusted by all who could not appreciate his innovations.
Thoroughly acquainted with his own service, he had introduced
everywhere, and especially into the dockyards, a bold and unsparing
reform, which no ingenuity could evade, and which was felt the more from
being coincident with the reductions of peace. All who were thus cut
off, and others whose emoluments he curtailed, naturally became hostile;
and the inconvenience always created by a change, and which it was the
direct interest of so many to aggravate, afforded too favourable
opportunities for the prejudiced to misrepresent, and the candid to
misunderstand him. In abolishing the practice of building line-of-battle
ships in private yards, he took a step of which all subsequent
experience has proved the wisdom; but it united against him an extensive
and most powerful interest. It was contended that his measures displayed
great and unnecessary harshness, and were calculated to break down the
effectiveness of the navy. Very many persons of the highest integrity,
too little acquainted with the facts, were thus deceived; and even Mr.
Pitt, though he had recommended Earl St. Vincent for the Admiralty,
believed that he was weakening the most important arm of the country.
Under such circumstances, Sir Edward Pellew was recalled, ostensibly,
that the Admiralty might confer with him upon these disputed questions.
Nothing could be more flattering to him, or indeed more honourable to
both parties, than this confidence; for there had never been much
cordiality between Earl St. Vincent and Sir Edward, who was both
politically and personally an admirer of Mr. Pitt; and it was clear to
every one that the ministry was about to fall. But the Earl was too
conscious of the wisdom of his measures to fear the judgment of a candid
opponent; and he too well appreciated Sir Edward's character not to feel
assured that he would allow no private motive, or political
predilection, to interfere with the discharge of his duty.
Thus, when Mr. Pitt gave notice of a motion for inquiry into the state
of the navy, of which the avowed object was to censure the naval
administration, a mutual friend was employed by the Admiralty to learn
Sir Edward's opinion of the subjects it embraced, and on finding that
his judgment condemned them, to induce him to express his sentiments in
the House. To this proposal he readily assented. They had all engaged
his attention previously, particularly that relating to the gun-boats,
which he had frequently discussed with the late Sir Sidney Smith, who
contended that they might be made effective against a line-of-battle
ship. Sir Edward would always say, "I should choose to be in the
line-of-battle ship." On the day he went to the House, he observed in a
letter to his brother that he now quite understood why he had been
recalled from Ferrol.
On the 15th of March, Mr. Pitt brought forward his threatened motions.
He contended, that although the enemy had made the most formidable
preparations for an invasion, which would probably be attempted within a
few weeks, the effective force of the navy, from line-of-battle ships
down to hired armed vessels, was at that moment inferior, and less
adequate to the exigency of the danger, than at any former period.
Notwithstanding it was so evidently necessary to oppose to the enemy's
flotilla a force of a similar description, capable of acting in shallow
water, the Admiralty had ordered only twenty-three gun-vessels to be
built, of which five were to be completed in three, and the remainder in
six months, though the necessity for them was immediate and urgent. He
condemned the Admiralty for giving up the former approved plan of
building line-of-battle ships by contract in private yards. Two-thirds
of the navy, he said, had been thus built; for during a war all the
strength of the King's yards was required for repairing ships, and
building was necessarily suspended in them almost entirely. Through the
last war, of twenty-nine line-of-battle ships, twenty-seven had been
built in merchants' yards; while in the present only two had been
contracted for, although fourteen or fifteen slips fit for building them
were then unoccupied in the river. He contended, finally, that the
Admiralty had been very remiss and unsuccessful in raising men for the
navy. In the war of 1793 we began with 16,000 seamen and marines, and
had 75,000 or 76,000 at the end of the year. In the present war we
began with 50,000 men, and had raised them only to 86,000. Thus, in the
former war there had been an increase of 60,000 men in the year; but in
the present only of 36,000, though our mercantile marine was so much
greater. Upon these arguments he founded motions for an account of all
ships, from line-of-battle ships down to hired armed vessels inclusive,
in commission on the 31st of December 1793, 30th of September 1801, and
31st of December 1803, specifying the service on which they were
respectively employed; for a copy of the contracts made, and the orders
given by the Admiralty in 1793, 1797, and 1803, with respect to the
number of gun-vessels to be built; for a list of ships built in the
King's yards for 1793 and 1801; but if it should be thought that any
intelligence on this head might be a channel of improper information to
the enemy, he would abstain from pressing it, for he was aware that
there would still be grounds sufficiently strong to convince the House
that it was the preferable plan to construct vessels in the merchants'
yards; and, finally, for a similar list of vessels built by contract in
private yards.
Mr. Tierney, who led the defence for ministers, would agree only to the
first and second motions; and he moved, as an amendment to the first,
that it should include all other armed ships and vessels employed in the
public service. He denied Mr. Pitt's assertions, and combated his
arguments. It was an extraordinary proceeding, he said, that an inquiry
should be proposed, having for its object the censure of the Admiralty,
when every port of the enemy was sealed up, our commerce protected in
every direction, and our trade prosperous in an unexampled degree. Our
naval force was immense, and admirably calculated for a great variety of
service. We had 1,530 vessels employed, of which 511 included the force
from line-of-battle ships to hired armed vessels; and 624 were a
flotilla completely equipped and ready for immediate service; besides 9
block-ships supplied by the Trinity-house, 19 ships furnished by the
East India Company, and 373 lighters, and small craft, fitted in the
King's yards. Of 100,000 seamen and marines voted by Parliament, 98,174
had been raised, besides 25,000 sea-fencibles; and this, although the
volunteer force of the country was 450,000. He strongly condemned the
practice of building ships in merchants' yards. He alluded to the
_Ajax_, which had been thus built. She had cost 41,000_l_., and the
bargain was thought a good one, yet in three years she required a
further sum of 17,000_l._ to fit her for service.
Two parties in the House supported the motions; Admiral Berkeley, Mr.
Wilberforce, and others, because they agreed with Mr. Pitt in condemning
the measures of the Admiralty; Mr. Fox and his friends, because they
considered that an inquiry would redound most highly to the credit of
Earl St. Vincent. They contended that ministers opposed it only to
screen their notorious incapacity under the shelter of his great name.
On the other hand, Admiral Sir Charles Pole, Mr. Sheridan, Mr.
Addington, Captain Markham, and others, supported Mr. Tierney, and
confirmed all his statements. Nothing, it was said, could afford a
stronger proof how enormous were the abuses which Earl St. Vincent had
corrected, than the argument of Mr. Pitt and his friends, that
men-of-war could not be built in the King's yards, although 3,200 men
were employed in them; and it was known that forty-five shipwrights
could build a seventy-four in a year. Four hundred of the men discharged
had been receiving six shillings a day for doing nothing. Blockmakers'
and coopers' work, for which 2,000_l._ had been paid, was proved upon a
survey to be worth only 200_l._ As to the gun-boats alluded to, which
were built by contract in the last war, they were so bad, that
eighty-seven out of a hundred-and-twenty had been sold by public
advertisement for almost nothing. The men-of-war launched from private
yards had been the ruin of the navy. Three of them went to Portugal, and
were found so defective that it was necessary to send them home, with a
frigate for convoy. The arrangements for the naval defence of the
country were most admirable and complete, and if there were any delay in
building the twenty-three gun-vessels ordered by the Admiralty, it was
because no dependence was placed upon that description of force. It
would be folly to meet the enemy with the inferior weapons which
necessity obliged him to employ, when we possessed a more powerful arm
in our heavy men-of-war and frigates. The depth of water would allow
these to act close to our very shores; and if the enemy's flotilla
should venture out, Captain Markham, Sir Edward Pellew, Sir Thomas
Troubridge, or any officer known in our naval records, would, with a
single seventy-four, shoot through and sink a crowd of their
contemptible craft.
Ministers obtained a majority of 201 against 130; a most triumphant
result for Earl St. Vincent, considering the character of his accuser,
and the grounds upon which Mr. Fox and his friends voted for the
motions.
Sir Edward Pellew met the charges against the Admiralty with the plain
and straightforward declarations of a seaman. Nothing could be more
disinterested than his conduct upon this occasion; for there was little
to hope from the gratitude of a ministry just tottering to their
overthrow, and everything to fear from the resentment of their
successors. But he justly considered that upon a vital question, and at
such a crisis, no personal or party feeling should intrude; and he felt
himself called upon to support the Admiralty with more than a silent
vote, because he quite approved their measures, which no man could
better understand. He rose fifth in the debate, and spoke as follows:--
"SIR,--As I very seldom trouble the House, I hope I may be
permitted to make a few observations on a subject of which, from
the professional experience I have had, I may be presumed to have
some knowledge. From the debate of this night, there is one piece
of information I have acquired, that the French have got upwards of
a thousand vessels in Boulogne. I am glad to find they are shut up
there; we have one advantage in it--we know where they are. I wish
we had any means of knowing when they intend to come out. I know
this much, however, that they cannot all get out in one day, or in
one night either; and when they do come out, I trust that our
cockleshells alone, as an honourable admiral has called a very
manageable and very active part of our force, will be able to give
a good account of them.
"Sir, I do not really see in the arrangement of our naval defence
anything to excite the apprehensions of even the most timid among
us. On the contrary, I see everything that may be expected from
activity and perseverance to inspire us with confidence. I see a
triple naval bulwark, composed of one fleet acting on the enemy's
coast; of another, consisting of heavier ships, stationed in the
Downs, and ready to act at a moment's notice; and a third, close to
the beach, capable of destroying any part of the enemy's flotilla
that should escape the vigilance of the other two branches of our
defence.
"In respect to what has been said of building ships by contract, I
must confess that I do not much admire that mode of keeping up our
navy. I have seen some of them--I particularly allude to the _Ajax_
and _Achilles_--that I took for Frenchmen.
"As to these gun-boats, which have been so strongly recommended,
this musquito fleet, they are the most contemptible force that can
be employed. Gun-brigs, indeed, are of some use; but between a
gun-brig and a gun-boat there is almost as much difference as
between a line-of-battle ship and a frigate. I have lately seen
half a dozen of them lying wrecked on the rocks.
"As to the probability of the enemy being able, in a narrow sea, to
pass through our blockading and protecting squadrons, with all that
secresy and dexterity, and by those hidden means that some worthy
people expect, I really, from anything that I have seen in the
course of my professional career, am not disposed to concur in it.
"I know, sir, and can assert with confidence, that our navy was
never better found; that it was never better supplied; and that the
men were never better fed and better clothed. Have we not all the
enemy's ports blockaded from Toulon to Flushing? Are we not able to
cope anywhere with any force the enemy dares to send out against
us? And do we not even outnumber them at every one of the ports we
have blockaded? It would smack a little of egotism, I fear, were I
to speak of myself; but as a person lately having the command of
six ships, I hope I may be allowed to state to the House how I have
been supported in that command. Sir, during the time that I was
stationed off Ferrol, I had ships passing from the fleet to me
every three weeks or a month; and so much was the French commander
in that port deceived by these appearances, that he was persuaded,
and I believe is to this very hour, that I had twelve ships under
my command, and that I had two squadrons to relieve each other, one
of six inside, and the other of six outside."
He was highly complimented by several who followed him in the debate,
particularly by Mr. Addington, Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Courtenay, as well
as by other members out of the House. Twenty, who had come down
intending to vote for Mr. Pitt's motions, were induced to support the
Admiralty, confessedly by Sir Edward's statements. But it is, perhaps,
the most decisive proof of the effect of his speech, that Mr. Pitt
himself referred to it in a debate on the defence of the country six
weeks after. At the same time he disavowed the gun-boats, and contended
for "good stout gun-brigs," declaring that he had observed with much
satisfaction the efforts which had lately been made to increase that
description of force.
Mr. Addington resigned on the 12th of May, with Earl St. Vincent; Mr.
Yorke, the Home Secretary; and Lord Hobart, Secretary at War. They were
succeeded by Mr. Pitt, and Lords Melville, Harrowby, and Camden.
On the 23rd of April, there was a naval promotion, in which some of the
senior captains, including Sir Edward Pellew, were advanced to be
Rear-Admirals of the White, passing over the intermediate step. This
favour was probably considered due to them, for they had served
considerably beyond the time which had hitherto given an officer his
flag, the former promotion having been a small one, and the interval
much longer than usual.
Sir Edward received with his promotion the appointment to be
commander-in-chief in India. He hoisted his flag in the _Culloden_, and
gratified Captain Christopher Cole, the youngest brother of his deceased
friend, and who had served with him as a midshipman in the _Winchelsea_,
by naming him for his captain.