SPECIAL PROVIDENCE AND PRAYER.
"England's thinkers are again beginning to see, what they had only
temporarily forgotten, that the difficulties of metaphysics lie at
the root of all science."--J. S. MILL.
The most sharply defined issue between Science and Religion--in fact,
the only real issue at the present time--is in regard to the doctrine of
Special Providence and the efficacy of Prayer.
These are not in reality two distinct questions: they are but opposite
phases of one and the same question. The doctrine of special providence
is the _theoretic_ aspect, and the doctrine of the efficacy of prayer is
the _practical_ aspect of the Christian doctrine of the relation of God
to nature and man. We can not, therefore, discuss the practical question
apart from the theoretic; neither can we reach any decisive conclusions
in regard to either unless we start with clear and well-defined
conceptions of the fundamental relations between God and nature, and
between God and man.
We shall assume the existence of God as the common postulate of all
religion and of all philosophy. If this be denied, then all discussion
of the present question is useless, because we have no common
starting-point. But it will not be denied, we think, that the vast
majority of scientific men are agreed that the idea of God is the
necessary presupposition of all those branches of science which concern
themselves with "genetic problems"--that is, with problems of origin;
and which, strictly speaking, are not problems of science, but of
philosophy. These scientists may not all choose to employ the term
"God," but they will all recognize, with Mr. Spencer, the existence of
"an unconditioned Cause" as "the ultimate of all ultimates," and they
will admit with him that the First Cause must be infinite, absolute, and
perfect, "including within itself all power and transcending all
law."[405] Mr. Spencer calls this idea of a First Cause "a datum of
consciousness;" and he asserts that this "inexpugnable consciousness, in
which religion and philosophy are at one with common-sense, is likewise
that on which all exact science is founded."[406]
Taking this fundamental presupposition as generally conceded--namely,
the existence of a Power which is unoriginated and independent; a Power
which is conscious of itself and determines itself; a Power which
transcends all law and is the source of all law--the question at issue
may be thus stated--_Have our prayers any influence with this Power?_
Can they in any way affect the Divine feeling and action toward us? Do
they have any indirect influence upon that succession of events in
nature and history which is effectuated and determined by that Supreme
Power? This is the real question at issue between science and religion.
Nothing need be said to deepen our sense of the importance of this
issue. We all regard it as one of the vital questions of the hour, the
most vital question for religious men, yea, the most vital question for
scientific men, inasmuch as there are moments of sadness and sorrow, of
doubt and mystery, when man feels that his only refuge is in prayer,
and, science or no science, he must pray. But if there is no living God
to sympathize with us in our sorrow and help us in our deepest need, or,
which amounts to the same thing, if God is so completely environed by
laws which He has Himself enacted, and so imprisoned in his own works
that He can do nothing to aid us, then prayer is an illusion, and
instead of being in any way beneficial to us, it inflicts a deep and
irreparable injury upon our intellectual and moral life. If there is
nothing in the universe but mechanical force and necessary law; if there
is no freedom and no moral purpose, then prayer for help and succor and
guidance is a conscious or unconscious deception practiced by the soul
upon itself, and the sooner we are undeceived the better; for of all
deception the most pernicious and depraving is that which a man
practices upon himself. We could not even accept the cold apology for
prayer which was made by David Hume, that it may have a wholesome reflex
influence upon the mind of the worshiper, and be a good way of preaching
to ourselves.[407] There can be nothing useful or helpful in the belief
and practice of a lie. No accession of moral force or moral purity can
come from doing any thing in which we do not believe. If there is any
moral value and any real helpfulness in prayer, it must be based upon a
_rational_ belief that the Divine mind is accessible to the supplication
of his creature, and that the Divine will is moved thereby. "He that
cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them
that diligently seek Him."
Humbly professing this belief without any reservation, and regarding it
as a perfectly rational belief, we proceed to defend it against certain
so-called scientific objections, and to consider certain difficulties
which present themselves to the minds of scientific men.
We have said that there is a _real_ issue between science and religion
as to the efficacy of prayer. The statement is not strictly correct, and
we amend it by saying that the issue is not between science and
religion, but between certain men who study and teach science and
certain men who study and teach religion. For, as Mr. Murphy observes,
"The antagonism between science and religion themselves is purely
imaginary. The antagonism between the men who study and teach science
and the men who study and teach religion is unfortunately sometimes
real, though it is the fashion [just now] to exaggerate it; but so far
as it is real it is an accident of the present time, which will
disappear, and indeed is already visibly disappearing."[408]
No man is in a position to affirm that there is an antagonism between
science and religion until he has first clearly determined the sphere
and function of each, and can say distinctly _what science is and what
religion is_. He may have utterly misconceived the nature of religion,
or he may have misapprehended the function of science, and therefore the
supposed antagonism may be purely imaginary. For example, Herbert
Spencer says, "Every religion may be defined as an _à priori_ theory of
the universe."[409] If this definition were correct, we could easily
conceive how religion and modern science might come into collision,
because the tendency of science at the present time is to occupy itself
with "questions of origin"--that is, with "theories of the origin of
things," instead of being, as Spencer defines it, "a systematic
collection of facts, ascertained with precision, and so classified and
generalized as to reveal the uniform relations of co-existence and
succession among phenomena, and thus give _prevision_." This is the
legitimate sphere of all that science which can lay any claim to be
regarded as "exact science." When it transcends this limit it ceases to
be science and becomes philosophy--a philosophy which will be more or
less valid and legitimate as it recognizes the authority and submits to
the guidance of _à priori_ ideas of the reason.
But is Mr. Spencer's definition of religion correct? We think not.
Indeed, it would be difficult to give a definition of religion wider
from the mark. He might with just as much propriety have said that
religion is an _à priori_ theory of the origin of language, of
government, of trade, or of music. Either Mr. Spencer must have made
this definition for an unworthy purpose, or he must be in utter darkness
as to the nature of religion. One needs only to cast a hasty glance over
the history of ancient religions, or to consider with an unprejudiced
mind any of the contemporaneous forms of religion, to be convinced that
religion is, and always has been, a mode of life determined by the sense
of dependence upon a Supreme Power.[410] Religion has always been a
matter of practical interest and personal concernment, and has no more
to do with "theories of the universe" than with theories of light, or
theories of electricity, or theories of political economy.
The separate spheres of religion and science have been admirably defined
by James Martineau in a few words--"Science discloses the _Method_ of
the world but not its cause; religion [or theology] discloses the
_Cause_ of the world but not its method. There is no conflict between
them except when either forgets its ignorance of what the other alone
can know."[411] This is well said, and directly to the point. Religion,
or more properly theology (for theology is the objective correlate and
piety the subjective correlate of religion), teaches _what God is_, what
are his attributes, what are the moral and spiritual relations which
subsist between God and man, and what are the duties which arise out of
these relations. Science teaches _what nature is_, and what are the
relations and laws of natural phenomena. Science is the co-ordination of
phenomena. Here no conflict can arise. The truths which are taught by
each rest on their own appropriate evidence, and they are capable of
verification by direct or indirect reduction to experience--the facts of
science to external experience, and the facts of religion to internal
experience. These experiences can not, in the nature of the case, be
contradictory, because religion deals with one class of facts and
science with another. Such being the case, the scientist may be as
certain of the reality of religion as of the reality of science--that
is, he may be directly and immediately conscious of the same feeling of
reverence, the same sense of dependence, the same feeling of obligation,
and the same loyalty of soul toward the unseen "Power which makes for
righteousness,"[412] which is experienced by the unscientific believer.
This is frankly avowed by Dr. Tyndall. He says, "The facts of religious
feeling are to me as certain as the facts of physics;" and he refers
with evident emotion to a period in his earlier years when he "prized
the conscious strength and pleasure derived from moral and religious
feeling." "Give me," he says, "their health, and there is no spiritual
experience of those earlier years, no resolve of duty or work of mercy,
no act of self-denial, no solemnity of thought, no joy in the life and
aspect of nature which would not still be mine."[413] We doubt not that
there are thousands of scientific men who to-day might bear the same
testimony.
Here the question will suggest itself, How, then, comes it to pass that
there exists any antagonism between the teachers of science and the
teachers of religion? We answer, the antagonism has arisen on that
debatable ground which lies between the two, where speculative thought,
whether from the stand-point of religion or the stand-point of science,
seeks to form definite conceptions of the relation between God and
nature, to bring our outer and inner experiences into a higher unity of
reason, and to construct "_à priori_ theories of the origin of things."
We do not presume to say that these metaphysical speculations are either
futile or improper. But what we do insist upon, and beg the reader
distinctly to note, is that these speculations are neither _scientific_
nor _religious_, and that neither true science nor true religion is
responsible for them. They are not religious, even though indulged in by
theologians; because religion is solely concerned with the personal
consciousness of our relation to God, and the discharge of our personal
duty to God, and not in the remotest sense with any theory as to the
method of causation in the world around us. It is equally certain that
these speculations are not scientific, even though indulged in by
scientists; because science deals only with phenomena, and the laws of
phenomena; and it is a fundamental canon of all scientific induction
that no problem is to be mooted unless it can be presented in terms of
experience, and no principles are to be admitted which can not be
verified by experiment. But the modern speculations respecting the
_origin_ of motion, of life, and of mind can not be presented in terms
of sensible experience, and can not be verified by actual experiment. So
far as sensible experience goes, every case of physical motion is a
transformation of energy, and every new physiological unit or
aggregation of units is derived from pre-existent bioplasm. And so Dr.
Tyndall, in the speculations in which he indulges, in the now celebrated
"Inaugural Address" delivered at Belfast, particularly in regard to the
origin of life, admits that he "_oversteps the boundary of the
experimental evidence_;" therefore, by his own admission, these
speculations are _unscientific_.[414] These discussions are inevitable,
and even valuable. We would protest as earnestly as Dr. Tyndall against
the attempt of any man to set limits to human thought, but we would
equally protest against the attempt to pass off the results of
speculative thinking in any direction as "exact science." True science
is itself dishonored and discredited by all such attempts.
We have said that it is solely within the field of speculative thought
that all controversy has arisen concerning the doctrine of special
providence and the efficacy of prayer. This will be apparent from the
consideration of the fact that from the dawn of speculative thought to
the present hour two radically opposite theories of the origin of things
have prevailed--one _mechanical_, the other _vital_.
The vital theory regards nature as the product and the continued work of
an ever-living and ever-creating Spirit, who is the immediate fountain
of all force, and the immanent life of all that lives. It looks upon the
universe "as the manifestation and the abode of a Free Mind like our
own," who realizes his thoughts in its collocations and adjustments,
embodies his ideals in its typical forms, and by his free volition
subordinates nature to the higher purposes of intellectual and moral
life--the formation of noble human characters. In a world so constituted
prayer is a real power, and human character is a free development
through the power of prayer which influences that ever-present Will that
sustains our life.
The mechanical theory regards the world as a huge machine supplied with
motor power in the primal act of creation, and then left to make its own
history according to rigid laws of mechanics and "the multiplication
table." There is no "Power which makes for righteousness," and no
purpose of love mingling in the necessary order of things. Evolution is
the only law of creation; there is nothing spontaneous, nothing free.
All the processes of nature, all the forms of life, all the facts of
consciousness, all the sympathies, sacrifices, joys, and sorrows of
social life, and all the noble or ignoble deeds of history, are only
mechanical functions which can be weighed or measured, and catalogued
in tables of statistics. Inflexible necessity, inexorable law, absolute
uniformity, unbroken continuity tell the story of the universe. In such
a world there is no place for prayer, or at most it is but the cry of
anguish wrung from the lips of those who are being mangled and crushed
by the ponderous mechanism, which floats away into the infinite spaces,
and never finds a living ear or touches a compassionate heart. Then, as
Dr. Hedge puts the melancholy case, "We must rough it as best we can
with driving-wheel and fly-wheel, and trust that the power may not fail
and the gearing foul in our short day."
This is the position of some, but by no means of the majority of the
scientists of our time. We venture the assertion that it is no part of
the doctrine of modern science, neither does it follow as a logical
consequence from any of the accepted principles of modern science, nor
does it reflect the real feeling of the best exponents of modern
science.
Dr. Tyndall stands as one of the most popular exponents of scientific
knowledge, and may be regarded as a fair representative of the feelings
of many scientific men. And in his estimation "the problem of problems
of our day is to find a legitimate satisfaction for the religious
emotions." He admits that these religious emotions are inexpugnable
facts of human nature, as certain and as incontestable as the facts of
physics. Now what is meant by a _legitimate_ satisfaction of the
religious emotions? Does it not mean that human reverence must have a
_real_ and a worthy Object? that for human duty there must be an
imperative ground of obligation? that for true loyalty of soul to truth
and right there must be an eternal reason? and that the instinctive
trust of the soul in everlasting righteousness and everlasting love
must have a rational vindication? Where shall we look for this object?
"May we look upward and onward, or have we nothing to do but yield to
the pressure from behind and below?" What conception are we to form of
that mysterious Power or Principle which stands in necessary correlation
with the religious nature of man? Dr. Tyndall permits us "to fashion
this conception as we will"--with that "he has nothing to do;" only he
demands that in doing so we observe two conditions: 1. "Be careful that
your conception is not an unworthy one;" "invest it with your highest
and holiest thoughts." 2. Allow "no intrusion of purely creative power
into any series of phenomena," no arbitrary interference with the order
of nature "for special purposes." The first condition would be violated
by our conceiving that Power as purely _mechanical_, for then the
sublimest interests of our moral and spiritual life would be surrendered
to the action of the same force as that which draws a stone to the
earth. The conception of unconscious and unmoral force is not our
highest and holiest thought--it can not inspire reverence and loyalty
and love. The second condition would be violated by our regarding that
Power as _arbitrary_--that is, as following no law; for that would be
opposed to all the inductions of modern science, and would invalidate
all conclusions based on the assumed permanence of natural laws. The
problem, then, is to steer between the Scylla and Charybdis of mechanism
and arbitrariness, and find the open sea where freedom may move in
harmony with law, and where, in the grand hierarchy of laws the physical
order of the world may be co-ordinated with, perhaps subordinated to,
the higher reign of righteousness and love.
The solution of this problem can only be reached through the discussion
of the following questions: 1. What are "the facts of religious feeling"
involved in this problem, and what are the necessary correlatives of
these facts? 2. What are the facts concerning the order of nature
involved in the problem, and what are the logical inferences from these
facts? 3. How can the conception of the _Force_ which is manifested in
the phenomena of nature be brought into harmony with the idea of _God_
as revealed in the religious consciousness?
1. First, then, what are the facts of religious feeling which "as
experiences of consciousness are perfectly beyond the assaults of
logic," and what are the necessary correlatives of these facts?
We present first of all the incontestable fact that _prayer is natural
to_ man. Like our instinctive belief in the being of God, the
accountability of man, and the immortality of the soul, we have also an
instinctive prompting to pray, and an instinctive belief in the efficacy
of prayer. This is an essentially human characteristic; it is common to
all men. Man has been defined in many ways, as "a rational animal," "a
social animal," "a tool-using animal," "a language-speaking animal;"
with more justice may he be called "a _praying_ animal," for prayer is a
universal characteristic and fundamental differentia of man. Never has
the traveler yet found a people which did not pray. Tribes of men have
been found without houses, without raiment, without letters, without
science, but never without prayer any more than without speech. This was
remarked by Plutarch eighteen centuries ago,[415] and the researches and
explorations of modern travelers and ethnologists have added
confirmation to its truth. The flow of prayer from human lips is just as
natural as the flow of speech. Is man in danger or in sorrow, his most
natural and spontaneous refuge is in prayer. The suffering, bewildered,
terror-stricken soul that knows not where to fly, flies to God. There
are few men, probably no men, who in moments of extreme peril or intense
anguish can resist the impulse to pray. Nature is stronger than all our
logic; and, science or no science, the cry for help will rise from the
lips of even skeptical men.[416]
We ask that these facts may be fully considered and fairly estimated.
The instinctive tendency to pray is a universal fact of human nature, as
valid and as significant as any fact in physics. It presents as rightful
a claim to be taken account of in our theories of the ultimate
constitution of the universe as the First Law of Motion or the
Conservation of Energy. If we disregard it, our _Systema Mundi_ will be
one-sided and partial, and, instead of being a philosophy, will be only
a caricature.
We do not claim that the presence in man of this instinctive tendency
to pray proves the efficacy of prayer--that is, proves the existence of
a living God and Father who hears and answers prayer. But it does
establish a strong presumption in favor of the doctrine; for how comes
it to pass that the sentiment is so perennial and so universal? Either
it was originally implanted in the soul of man by the Creator, or there
exists something in the constitution of nature--the "relation between
the organism and its environment"--which determines this feeling in man,
and in either case it must be regarded as normal, and as essential to
humanity. If nature teaches us to pray, and, as it were, compels us to
pray, then we are justified in the assumption that there is nothing in
the ultimate constitution of nature which can contradict her own
ordinances and render prayer an absurdity.
The next fact to which we desire to direct attention is that _prayer is
an essential element of life_--we do not mean physical life, but that
which gives significance and value and completeness to human
existence--namely, ethical and spiritual life. That religion is deeply
seated in the nature of man, and, in fact, ineradicable, is conceded by
Dr. Tyndall. "No atheistical reasoning," he says, "can dislodge religion
from the heart of man. Logic can not deprive us of life, and religion is
life to the religious. As an experience of consciousness, it is
perfectly beyond the assaults of logic."[417] This general admission
that man has a religious nature, a religious consciousness, is
important. The bearing of this upon our argument will be obvious when we
have considered more particularly the nature and content of this
"religious consciousness." In what does it consist? Into what elements
is it resolvable by psychological analysis? We answer, religious
consciousness is a consciousness conditioned by the idea of God, and
involves a sense of dependence; a feeling of reverence; a sense of
obligation; a sentiment of loyalty; a conscious community of nature; and
a longing for a deeper fellowship with the _Divine_.
Every thing around us and every thing within us makes us conscious of
limitation and dependence. We know that our own existence is not
self-originated or self-sustained. We have the sense of an immanent
all-pervading Life which sustains and conditions our life. We have the
sentiment of an overshadowing Power and Presence which compasses us
behind and before, and lays its hand upon us, and we are constrained to
bow in reverence and awe before that Power which controls our destiny.
With the sense of dependence is associated the feeling of obligation to
conform our conduct to the will of this Supreme Being, and to
subordinate the ruling purpose of our life to the Divine purpose of
creation so far as that purpose can be known. There is also more or less
loyalty of soul to what is just and true, a natural and constitutional
sympathy of reason with the law of God--"it delights in that law," and
"consents that it is good." Finally, there is the consciousness of some
community of nature between God and man, and some living susceptibility
to the influences and inspirations of the higher world which authorizes
the belief that there may be a communion of thought, a relation of
conscience, and an approach of affection between the Divine and human
that shall purify and elevate our nature, and lift us up into a
resemblance to God.
The bearing of all that we have just said on the necessity of prayer
will have already suggested itself to the reader. The feeling of
dependence, the sense of feebleness will prompt man to pray. Man is not
sufficient for himself. He is not fit to be his own all in all. He has
not resources within himself to supply his own spiritual wants. He needs
some external succor, some support to the will, some inspiration from
without. And he can become a strong man and a noble man only by aspiring
and striving after something beyond and above himself--
"Unless above himself he can
Erect himself, how mean a thing is man!"
When his affections and cares and thoughts all centre upon himself, his
soul shrivels down to a dreary selfishness, and becomes a dry
microscopic point, or else a mass of putrid sensuality. Man needs a
lofty object above himself, after which he may aspire and upon which he
may lay hold and lift himself into a nobler form of life. That lofty
object is the ideal of a _perfect, noble human character_. "The
formation of noble human character," says Mr. Murphy, "is the highest
work that man or, so far as we know, that God can be engaged in."[418]
The thoughtful mind recognizes that there is a purpose to be fulfilled
in life which is nobler than mere enjoyment. Who has dared to say that
our highest duty is to be happy? But every one must feel that it is our
highest duty to form a nobler character and let the happiness take care
of itself.
And now is it not a fact of experience that the more a man strives after
a pure and noble life, the more does he become conscious of the need of
superhuman strength and grace? He finds that he has to wage an
uncompromising, sometimes even agonizing warfare against hereditary
"taints of blood," against morbid instincts and low passions, against
inherent selfishness and meanness, against tyrant habits engendered in
the recklessness of youth, against the temptations of designing men and
abandoned women, and the false sentiment, despotic opinion, and
arbitrary customs of modern fashionable society. In the presence of
these giants of evil with their fetters of iron he stands appalled, and
against himself, against his temptations and sins, even against society
itself, he feels he must _call upon God for help_. Through Divine
strength he may conquer; without it--never. There are those who hope to
conquer evil through a certain inherent force of nature, or a certain
self-caused and self-attained culture. We do not dare to say that they
will utterly fail, or that what they achieve is utterly valueless. But
we do say that the character they develop is not the highest style of
excellence. There is in it a boldness bordering on audacity, a
self-sufficiency akin to haughtiness, and an arbitrariness which is
repulsive. The very basis of a noble character, the very essence of that
prophetic power which has exerted the mightiest influence on the
destinies of man, is humility. The loftiest and finest minds have been
eminently trustful--men of heroic confidence who derived their
inspiration and confessed their dependence on the light and strength
which come from above. These are the men who really shape the history of
the world,[419] these are the men who command the esteem and win the
reverence even of unbelievers. We can not illustrate this point better
than by quoting the words of Dr. Tyndall in regard to Michael Faraday.
Faraday, it is well known, was one of the greatest of modern
scientists--it ought also to be as widely known that he was a devout
Christian. Tyndall dined with Faraday, and on that occasion Faraday
"said grace."
Tyndall writes: "I am almost ashamed to call his prayer a 'saying' of
grace. In the language of Scripture, it might be described as the
petition of a son into whose heart God had sent the Spirit of his Son,
and who, with absolute trust, asked a blessing from his father. We dined
on roast beef, Yorkshire pudding, and potatoes; drank sherry, talked of
research and its requirements, and of his habit of keeping himself free
from the distractions of society. He was bright and joyful--boylike, in
fact--though he is now sixty-two. His work excites my admiration, but
contact with him warms my heart. Here surely is a _strong_ man. I love
strength, but let me not forget the example of its union with _modesty_,
_tenderness_, and _sweetness_ in the character of Faraday."[420]
This, then, is the point we desire to emphasize. It is a fact of
experience that prayer can give calmness, purity, and strength of soul.
It can lighten perplexity and sorrow. It can empower us to resist
temptation, and enable us to overcome sin. It can give "modesty,
tenderness, and sweetness" to character. In a word, it can aid us
materially in the formation of a noble human character.
Noble character can only be formed under two conditions. First, it can
only be formed under the condition of _freedom_. The unfree is the
unmoral.[421] There can be no dignity and no moral worth in action which
results from mere mechanical force. Personality alone has
responsibility, dignity, and worth. If, then, moral personality has true
freedom and self-determination, we are free to pray, and God is free to
answer prayer. We may believe that the physical world is held in iron
bands of necessary causation, but we can not believe that the moral
world is so bound. The human will is free, and the Divine will is free.
"The First Cause," says Mr. Spencer, "includes within itself all
power"--therefore alternative power--"and transcends all law"--therefore
it can not be necessitated. We can not doubt that Mr. Tyndall would
freely accord this position. He might hesitate, he would unquestionably
refuse to unite in "prayer for rain," for example, because he holds that
the fall of rain is governed by changeless physical laws, and "no act of
humiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from heaven;"
this would be a miracle, and "the age of miracles is past."[422] But we
do not see how he could refuse to unite in the prayers of the National
Church for the forgiveness of sins, for strength to overcome sin, for
fortitude to endure, and for consolation under the afflictions and
sorrows incident to human life.
The second condition necessary to the development of noble character is
that man shall be capable of receiving inspiration from the great source
of all life, especially of all spiritual life. The universal belief of
our race that there is a community of nature between God and man,
expressed alike in the words of Aratus, the Asiatic poet, Cleanthes, the
Stoic philosopher, and Paul, the Christian teacher--"_We are the
offspring of God_"--justifies the further expectation and hope that
there may be a real communion between the human and the Divine. Of
course this is fundamentally "a question between Theism and Atheism,
between a God and no God," between a conscious Being and an unconscious
Force. If there is a personal God, then He may communicate with our
souls which dwell, as it were, within the ocean of his immensity, and
are surrounded and interpenetrated by his living presence. Then there
may be a real sympathy, a loving fellowship, and a sanctifying
communion. Even should science forbid the Author of nature to interpose
in the slightest degree in the procession of phenomena or modify in the
least the action of the so-called natural forces, surely it will not be
so "audacious"[423] as to forbid that He shall come near to human souls,
and interpose in the moral order of the world to deliver man from sin
and purify and elevate human society. Here at any rate science is out of
its place. It is guilty of that very presumption with which it is
evermore charging the theology of the Middle Ages, viz., the attempt to
monopolize the whole field of human knowledge and experience. If the
good man does feel that God is with him and in him, if he knows by
experience that prayer is an act of Divine communion--that it opens to
him an unfailing fountain of refreshment, solace, and strength; if he is
conscious that it does lift him up to a larger and more blessed life,
then even science, which boasts its rigid adherence to the inductive
method, and its unswerving loyalty to fact and experience, must obey the
Divine injunction--"Be still, and know that I am God." "I dwell with him
that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the
humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite."
2. We come now to the consideration of the second question, What are the
facts concerning the order of nature which have been placed beyond
controversy by the inductions of science, and what are the logical
inferences from these facts?
The facts concerning the order of nature which it is claimed are placed
beyond controversy may be stated in the following words: Now of all the
results of science, none is more universal and more emphatic than this:
that there is no arbitrariness in the series of events which constitute
our experience; but that a perfect order or uniformity prevails through
them all, an order which our intellect can apprehend under the form of
cause and effect, or _permanent_ force and _necessary_ phenomena, or,
better, a constant persistency of amount both of matter and force in the
universe.[424] This statement of the scientist is accepted by many
theologians (of the Calvinistic school), who say with Rev. William
Knight, "The doctrine of the persistence of physical force and the
invariability of natural law, is a physical truth of which the
theological phase or corollary is the uniformity of Divine operation and
the inviolableness of Divine love. 'The permanence of the order of
nature' is the scientific equivalent of the Divine constancy--'the same
yesterday, to-day, and forever.'"[425] How far and in what sense we
accept this doctrine will be seen as we advance in the discussion.
At the beginning of this chapter we remarked that if the Christian
doctrine of the efficacy of prayer is disputed, whether on _theoretical_
or _experiential_ grounds, an adequate and complete defense can only be
made by falling back upon the fundamental conception of God, and the
relation of God to nature and humanity presented in the preceding
chapters of this volume. Is there a God in the proper and commonly
accepted sense of the term--a conscious, free, personal First Cause, the
Creator of the world and man? Is He the immanent Conservator of the
universe--is his omnipotence the _force_, his reason the _law_, and his
omnipresence the _life_ of all nature? These are the questions which
must be settled before we can successfully deal with the problem of the
efficacy of prayer. If we are not agreed on these points, the debate
must be adjourned until we have settled the first principles which
underlie the discussion. This will be obvious to all who are acquainted
with the history of the controversy. If it can be proved that there is
no conscious, free, personal God, the creator and conservator of the
universe, the question is settled; then prayer can be of no avail, and
must "be abandoned to the domain of recognized superstitions." But if it
be admitted that there is a God, in the proper import of that term, then
the question may be debated whether the Christian doctrine of the
efficacy of prayer is consistent with the scientific conception of
material nature as "the living garment of God."[426]
Dr. Tyndall is the fairest and ablest representative of that class of
scientific men who to-day are denying the efficacy of prayer--that is,
of such prayer the answer to which would seem to involve the
interference of personal volition in the economy of nature; and he
believes in the existence of a God. He has again and again repelled with
feeling the imputation of atheism which the English theologians have
inconsiderately and unfairly cast upon him. He is a frank, outspoken
man, and he admits that in "his hours of weakness and doubt" he has
temptations to material atheism. "But," he says, "I have noticed that it
is not in hours of clearness and vigor that this doctrine commends
itself to my mind, and that in presence of stronger and healthier
thoughts it ever disappears as offering no solution of the mystery in
which we dwell and of which we form a part."[427] He also expresses his
conviction that "the Power which works for righteousness is
_intelligent_ as well as ethical."[428] And furthermore he asserts that
"it is no departure from scientific method to place behind natural
phenomena _a universal Father_ who, in answer to the prayers of his
children, alters the currents of those phenomena. Thus far theology and
science go hand in hand."[429] Let it, then, be distinctly remembered
that we are arguing with men who believe in the existence of God.
In an article which appeared in the _Fortnightly Review_ for August,
1872, entitled "Statistical Inquiries into the Efficacy of Prayer," by
Francis Galton, a species of guerrilla warfare is opened on this
doctrine from the stand-point of experience.
Mr. Galton assumes that "the efficacy of prayer is a perfectly
appropriate and legitimate subject of scientific inquiry." It must be
assumed to be subject to unvarying laws, and, like all physical
problems, may be brought to the test of rigid mathematics. By the
marshaling of very incomplete and partial statistics, drawn chiefly from
Chalmers's "Biographical Dictionary," he endeavors to show that praying
men, especially clergymen, are no healthier, recover from sickness no
better, and do not live any longer than the men who do not pray.
Insurance companies make no distinction between the prayerful and the
prayerless; they regard them as equal risks. Furthermore, praying men do
not make any better statesmen, any more successful men of business, or
any better physicians and lawyers than prayerless men. On the contrary,
"it is a common week-day opinion of the world that praying men are not
practical." Finally, the children of praying parents are no better
endowed intellectually, and do not turn out any better morally than the
rest of mankind. His gentle impeachment is that they are somewhat below
the common average. By this "scientific method," as he is pleased to
call it, the writer flatters himself that he has routed the army of
believers in the efficacy of prayer, and that the practice of prayer
will soon become "obsolete;" "just as the Water of Jealousy and the Urim
and Thummmin of the Mosaic law did in the times of the later Jewish
kings."
But Mr. Galton's fusillade did not produce the effect he expected. True,
it made some noise, and for a brief season commanded attention; but it
was soon discovered to be a mere discharge of rhetorical blank-cartridge
which hit nothing. His parade of argument was found to be utterly
inconsequential. The dullest mind could perceive that the attempt to
solve moral problems by statistical averages was a practical folly,
because it began by unceremoniously assuming the very point it ought to
prove, namely, that _the determinations of will, whether Divine or
human, are governed by necessary laws_ as surely as the revolution of
planets and the vibration of molecules. It is precisely because personal
acts are _not_ reducible to any fixed laws, or capable of representation
by any numerical calculations, that statistical averages acquire any
value as substitutes. "No one dreams of applying statistical averages to
calculate the period of the earth's rotation, by showing that four and
twenty hours is the exact medium of time, comparing one month's or one
year's revolutions with another's. It is only where the individual
movements are irregular that it is necessary to aim at a proximate
regularity by calculating in masses."[430] The comparison of large
averages may approach equality and furnish a basis of probability as to
the future, but the contingency of each individual case remains still a
contingency.
In no department of human inquiry is there so much temptation and so
much opportunity for plausible sophistry as in the now somewhat popular
application of statistics to ethological problems. By a skillful
manipulation of figures, Mr. Buckle[431] flatters himself that he has
made it apparent that "individual felons only carry into effect the
necessary consequences of preceding circumstances;" that marriages are
regulated by the price of wheat; and that the number of suicides is
determined by the rise and fall of the barometer; in a word, that the
whole of man's social and moral life is part and parcel of nature, and
subject to the same necessary mechanical laws.
The logic of statistics, or rather the sophistry of statistics by which
Mr. Galton proves the uselessness of prayer, would, if skillfully
managed, be equally efficacious in proving that sobriety and integrity,
honor and honesty, are unprofitable and useless virtues--at least so far
as this life is concerned; and we might say of each of them what
Shakespeare's "Murderer" says of conscience: "It fills one full of
obstacles.... It beggars any man that keeps it. It is turned out of all
towns and cities for a dangerous thing; and every man that means to live
well endeavors to trust himself, and live without it." Dishonest men are
as healthy, recover as well from sickness, and live as long as honest
men. Wicked men prosper in the world, they succeed in business and
increase in riches better, it may be, than good and godly men.
Dishonorable and unprincipled politicians climb into place and power
with more facility than men of honor and integrity. Distinguished
lawyers and skillful physicians have not been strictly temperate; and
statistical tables may be easily produced which show that the
longest-lived men have been such as did not go to bed sober for the last
fifty years of their lives. Therefore sobriety, honesty, integrity,
veracity are not profitable virtues, and, weighed in the same scales and
by the same standards as are used by Mr. Galton to test the weight and
worth of prayer, they are practically valueless and do not pay.
Simultaneous with Mr. Galton's article, there appeared a communication
in the _Contemporary Review_ entitled "The Prayer for the Sick: Hints
toward a serious attempt to estimate its value," with the indorsement of
Dr. Tyndall. The proposal contained in this communication came to be
generally known in newspaper slang as "Tyndall's Prayer-gauge," though
Tyndall was not its author. The proposition was that "One single ward or
hospital under the care of first-rate physicians or surgeons, containing
a number of patients afflicted with those diseases which have been best
studied, and of which the mortality rates are best known, should be,
during a period of not less than three to five years, made the subject
of special prayer by the whole body of the faithful, and that at the end
of that period the mortality rates should be compared with the past
rates, and also with those of other leading hospitals similarly well
managed during the same periods." This experiment, the writer thinks,
offers "to the faithful an occasion of demonstrating to the faithless an
imperishable record of the power of prayer."
There was a tone of moderation and candor in this proposition which for
a moment beguiled the popular mind, and there were Christian ministers
so injudicious as to admit that the proposal should be entertained and
the experiment tried. But its superficial fairness was delusive, and
its plausibility concealed a snare. The writer must have been
sufficiently conversant with the Christian doctrine concerning prayer to
know that the acceptance of his challenge would be a theological
blunder; for there are no unconditional assurances in the Word of God
that prayers for health and long life shall always be answered. We
presume also that he must have been sufficiently acquainted with medical
science to perceive that the acceptance of his challenge would be a
scientific blunder, for there are elements in the problem which can not
be scientifically appreciated, measured, and recorded. Such, for
example, are the temperament, idiosyncrasy, hereditary diathesis,
previous habits of life, and mental characteristics of the patients;
such the variety in skill, care, sympathy, and almost inspiration among
physicians and nurses; such also the differences of climatal, sanitary,
and hospital conditions; all these elements, whose varied degrees of
potency are incapable of being estimated, enter into the problem and
affect the results. The multiplicity and complexity of these elements
render the effects as irregularly variable as if each cause had not been
subject to any previous conditions.[432] The problem is not even capable
of being scientifically presented in terms of experience, and until that
is done it can not be subjected to experiment. Suppose the experiment to
be tried in the manner proposed by the writer, and the mortality rates
to be in favor of the hospital for which prayer had been offered, it
would still be open for the scientific skeptic to affirm that the causes
of the difference are to be found in those elements whose varying values
had not been enumerated in the statement of the problem, and not in any
Divine interposition in answer to prayer.[433] He might claim that the
patients were not all of the same age or temperament, the physicians
were not all of equal skill, the nurses were not all alike attentive,
the climatal and sanitary conditions were not equal, and the question
would be left in precisely the same condition as before.
Whatever may be the award of a thoughtless derision, we do not hesitate
in saying that the proposition is an improper one, and can not be
entertained. Especially because there is one party concerned in this
matter for whom no human being is authorized to make any engagements,
and that is "the Hearer and Answerer of Prayer." There is only one class
of blessings for which He has given us any warrant to pray
unconditionally, and these are _spiritual_ blessings. For strength to
resist temptation, to endure affliction, and perform well our appointed
work in life; for grace to purify our nature, elevate our aims, conquer
our selfishness and pride, and help us to form a noble character, God
has authorized and commanded us to pray. But for the blessings of this
life, for deliverance from danger and suffering, for restoration from
sickness and for long life, we are taught to pray in submission to that
highest wisdom which knows what is best for us, and to append to every
supplication, however ardent our desire and intense our solicitude,
"Nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt." This submission is the
loftiest attitude of prayer.
At the same time we shrink not from the distinct avowal of the Christian
doctrine that it is reasonable and proper to offer prayer for recovery
from sickness, and that such prayer, offered in submission to the Divine
will, may be answered. We are not ashamed of the good old faith--"the
Aberglaube," or superstition, as some are pleased to call it--that "_the
prayer of faith shall save the sick_." The calmness and serenity of mind
which the prayer of faith supplies is favorable to recovery. In fact, as
"the systematic excitation of a definite expectation and hope," it has a
legitimate place in psycho-therapeutics, as Feuchtersleben has shown,
and even as Dr. Tuke concedes in his work on the "Influence of the Mind
on the Body."[434] This "definite expectation and hope" is not a mere
illusion. We have the assurance of Scripture that there is a Divine
blessing which "giveth wisdom to the wise and knowledge to men of
understanding," and which may descend upon the head and the heart of the
most skillful physician in answer to prayer. Furthermore, it is
generally admitted by medical men that "as in health certain mental
states may induce disease, so in disease certain mental states may
restore health."[435] Now these "mental states" may be the subject of
Divine influence. Science has not dared to shut out the Spirit of God
from the realm of mind, and therefore restoration to health may be
given, in this manner at least, in answer to prayer. But no man would
propose to make the prevalence of such prayer the subject of statistical
averages. Prayer for the sick can not always result in their recovery,
for then they would never die. Our lives are in the hands of God, and we
shall live until our work is done, or until we have clearly shown that
we will not do our work, and our life is a failure and a defeat.
Finally, in the name of our holy religion, we repel with scorn the
attempt of certain scientists to test the value of prayer, and with it
also the value of a life of self-denial, purity, and piety, by merely
temporal, secular, and visible results which may be weighed and measured
and set down in statistical tables. Christianity teaches that the
present life is a probationary scene. It is a state of trial and
discipline with a view to the formation of moral character. Therefore
our principles and our virtues must be put to the test. Temptation tries
our fortitude; affliction ascertains our submission; suffering purifies
our souls; doubt and mystery give energy to our faith. Amid the good and
the evil of the present our character has to be developed and perfected.
There is much to be encountered, much to be endured. But as Richard
Winter Hamilton has said, "This discipline is salutary. The furnace heat
purities the gold by its rigorous assay. The vine prunes until it bleeds
that it may bear its richer clusters. A theatre is raised for lofty
struggle and celestial dint." The end of all is to make us pure and
noble and heroic souls.
The scientists of this age, who are so enamored of inert matter and
insensate force, may have no eye to see, no heart to sympathize with,
and no competent faculty by which to estimate the value of this blessed
vintage; but there are souls to whom honor is dearer than life, and
wisdom more precious than rubies, and purity more desirable than fine
gold, who will continue to pray--"Cleanse the thoughts of our hearts by
the inspiration of thy Holy Spirit, that we may perfectly love Thee and
worthily magnify thy holy name."
So much for the argument against the efficacy of prayer from the
experiential stand-point. We are compelled to pronounce it a failure.
There seems good reason to believe that Dr. Tyndall regards it as a
failure, for we do not find that he any where denies the efficacy of
prayer for spiritual blessings. But, like a second Ajax Telemon, he
makes haste to interpose his ample shield for the defense of his
unfortunate friends; he is careful, however, to change the entire mode
of warfare, and he opens the attack on the efficacy of prayer from the
_theoretical_ stand-point.
Dr. Tyndall begins by observing that "the idea of direct personal
volition mixing itself in the economy of nature is retreating more and
more" in presence of advancing science, and among educated and
scientific communities there is a growing conviction that "nature is
absolutely uniform," and that her laws are changeless and permanent. He
takes the ground that all prayer for Divine interposition "to produce
changes in external nature," such, for example, as "prayer for rain or
for fair weather," is irrational, because the answer to such prayer
would be "a violation of the order of nature," "a manifest contradiction
to natural laws," and in fact "a _miracle_." "The dispersion of the
slightest mist by the special volition of the Eternal would be as great
a miracle ... as the stoppage of an eclipse or the rolling of the St.
Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara. No act of humiliation, individual or
national, could call one shower from heaven or deflect toward us a
single beam of the sun."[436]
We have characterized this attack of Dr. Tyndall's as an attack on the
efficacy of prayer from the _theoretical_ stand-point: 1. Because he
does not claim that the belief in the changeless uniformity of nature is
a _self-evident_ truth--a direct intuition, either of sense or of
reason, which needs no proof. 2. Because he does not assert that the
absolute uniformity of nature has been _inductively_ proved, or is even
capable of verification by experience, since all experience, whether of
the individual or the race, is necessarily limited, and can not,
therefore, give a universal truth. All that he can say of it is that it
is "an _assumption_"--an assumption which all carefully conducted
experiments have justified, and upon which all successful scientific
research has been based. The majestic fabric of modern science has been
reared upon this foundation.
But mark, it is still "_an assumption_,"[437] and the central question
around which the battle must be fought is, _What ground have we for the
assumption that the order of nature is so absolutely persistent and
changeless that it never has been and never can be interfered with by an
act of intelligent volition?_
Dr. Tyndall has attempted an answer to this question. We shall endeavor,
first, clearly to comprehend his answer, and, secondly, to estimate its
logical validity.
1. He tells us that the belief in a changeless order of nature "is a
kind of inspiration." "The passage from facts to principles (that is,
the passage from our limited experience of uniformity to the affirmation
of universal and permanent order) is called induction, which in its
highest form is inspiration."[438] This, however, is poetry, and not
science. This inductive inference embraces vastly more in the conclusion
than is contained in the premises; the antecedent is limited, the
consequent is unlimited; and the only warrant that Dr. Tyndall has for
the violation of the most fundamental logical canon is "inspiration."
But, whatever Dr. Tyndall may understand by this ambiguous phrase, it is
certain that his own mind is not satisfied, and so he tries again.
2. He tells us that this belief rests upon the long-continued
observations, registered experiences, and experimental verifications of
a succession of scientific men, as Galileo, Torricelli, Pascal, Kepler,
and Newton. But here again the experiences are limited, and do not
justify a universal conclusion; and Dr. Tyndall himself is not
satisfied. He says, "The scientific mind can find no repose in the mere
registration of sequences in nature. The further question obtrudes
itself with resistless might, _Whence come the sequences?_ What is it
that binds the consequent with the antecedent in nature?" What is it, we
ask with redoubled earnestness and emphasis, which authorizes our
drawing a universal conclusion from particular premises? "The truly
scientific intellect never can attain rest until it reaches the FORCES
by which the observed succession is produced.... Not until the relation
between the forces and the phenomena has been established is the _law of
the reason_ rendered concentric with the _law of nature_, and not until
this is effected does the mind of the scientific philosopher rest in
peace."[439] Here we have "the law of the reason" substituted for "the
highest form of inspiration," and we are curious to learn what this "law
of the reason" is. Is it the principle, or law of causality--namely,
that "all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of
_power_, and refer us to a causal ground?" But this law of the reason
says nothing about uniformity. The same power may produce a diversity of
effects. "Infinitely numerous and various universes might have been
fashioned by the various distribution of the original nebulous matter,
although the particles of matter should obey the one law of
gravity."[440]
3. And, finally, Dr. Tyndall tells us that "The expectation of likeness
[_i. e._, uniformity] in the procession of phenomena is not that on
which the scientific mind founds its belief in the order of nature. If
the force is _permanent_, the phenomena are _necessary_ whether they
resemble or do not resemble any thing that has gone before. Hence in
judging of the order of nature our inquiry eventually relates to the
permanence of force,"[441] or, as he elsewhere styles it, "the
conservation of energy," which means "that no power can make its
appearance in nature without an equivalent expenditure of some other
power; that natural agents are so related as to be mutually convertible,
but that no new agency is created."[442] Whether this is or is not a
correct statement of the principle of the conservation of energy we
shall see by and by. And now, after having hunted the game through many
tortuous passages to its final burrow, what have we found? That the
ultimate principle which justifies the belief or "assumption" that the
laws of nature are so rigidly inflexible and the order of nature is so
absolutely uniform that "personal volition can not mingle in or
interfere with the economy of nature" _is the principle of the
conservation of energy_.
The answer of Dr. Tyndall is now fully and clearly before our mental
view, and we are prepared for the consideration of its logical validity.
This answer may be conveniently divided into two propositions. First,
personal volition, human or Divine, can not intermingle or in any way
interfere with the economy of nature because her laws are inflexible and
her order is uniform. Second, the ultimate principle which justifies the
assumption that the laws of nature are absolutely inflexible and the
order of nature is absolutely uniform is the principle of the
conservation of energy. We shall consider this latter proposition first.
There are in this proposition three ambiguous terms, which have hitherto
been the source of serious misapprehension; and unless we can attain to
clearer and more definite conceptions, which shall be mutually accepted,
the controversy will be interminable. These are the terms "nature,"
"laws of nature," and "uniformity of the order of nature." We have made
the attempt in a previous chapter[443] to give precision and
definiteness to the concepts which these terms should connote. Referring
the reader to the chapter indicated, we shall here simply restate our
results.
1. _Nature_ is the aggregate or totality of all material or physical
phenomena.[444] "Nature (_nascor_, to be born) means that which is
produced or born."[445]
2. _A Law of Nature_ is the statement of a certain uniformity observed
in the relations among phenomena.[446] The laws of nature are "simply
expressions of phenomenal uniformities, having no _coercive_ power
whatever."[447]
3. _The Uniformity of the Order of Nature_ may mean either "uniformity
of co-existence" or "uniformity of succession." "Uniformity of
co-existence" means that the same substances must always have the same
essential properties[448] and the same permanent relations to other
substances, as, for example, every molecule of hydrogen must have the
same properties, the same definite mass, the same periodic vibrations,
and the same chemical affinities. If these were to be altered in the
least, it would no longer be a molecule of hydrogen.[449] This is
uniformity in the ultimate _constitution_ of nature. "Uniformity of
succession" means that the same or similar consequents will always be
found to follow similar antecedents, or "the same causes will always be
followed by the same effects,[450] as, for example, the combination of
carbon and oxygen will always be followed by the evolution of heat, and
heat will always melt ice." This is uniformity in the _course_ of nature
or the procession of phenomena. Belief in the constancy of the course of
nature or the uniformity of causation is the general expectation that
"the future will resemble the past."[451]
With a clearer apprehension of the terms, we may now discuss the first
proposition with more precision, and hope to reach a logical conclusion.
We approach the discussion by remarking--
1. The constancy of the _course_ of nature or the uniformity of
causation is not a self-evident and necessary truth. In so far as it is
a scientific truth it is purely an induction from experience, an
experience which is necessarily limited, and therefore does not warrant
a universal conclusion. There is no rational _à priori_ ground for the
assumption that the same or similar causes (even if we understand by
physical causes all antecedent conditions) shall necessarily produce the
same effects. In other words, there is no authority for the assertion
that the course of nature or the procession of phenomena must be
absolutely uniform. Science has succeeded in establishing a strong
probability, but it is beyond her power to demonstrate an absolute
certainty. This is generally conceded, alike by physicists and
metaphysicians. J. S. Mill says, "The uniformity in the course of events
... must be received, not as a law of the universe, but of that portion
of it which is within the range of our means of observation, with a
reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases."[452] "The uniformity
of causation," says Murphy, "is not a truth of the reason, it is known
by experience only; and the truth of a conclusion from experience can
never be free from all possibility of limitation or exception."[453] And
Professor Jevons asserts, "The conclusions of scientific inference
appear to be always of a hypothetical and purely provisional nature.
Given certain experience, the theory of probability yields us the true
interpretation of that experience, and is the surest guide open to us.
But the best calculated results which it can give us are never absolute
probabilities: they are purely relative to the extent of our
information. It seems to be impossible for us to judge how far our
experience gives us adequate information of the universe as a whole, and
of all the forces and phenomena which can have place therein."[454]
2. It is an immediate fact of consciousness that the will is a cause
which is adequate to the production of a diversity of effects. Whatever
may be true of the world of matter, it is certain that within the sphere
of our conscious personality the relation of cause and effect is not a
relation of invariable and necessary sequence. Further, it is certain
that a self-determining agent exists. "Every event in the universe of
matter is determined by the events which precede it, but physical
reasonings make it certain that the chain of causes and effects can not
have been of absolutely endless length through past time. There must
have been a first link of the chain; there must have been a first act of
causation; and this act must have been determined, not by any previous
act of causation when as yet there was none, but by the free
self-determining power of the agent. The first act of causation we call
Creation; the freely self-determining agent we call God."[455]
3. Physical science itself does not teach that the course of nature is
absolutely uniform; on the contrary, all the conclusions of science lead
to the conviction "that the universe is ever changing, and that,
notwithstanding secular recurrences which would _primâ facie_ seem to
replace matter in its original position, nothing in fact ever returns or
can return to a state of existence _identical_ with a previous
state."[456] Every theory of the origin of things is compelled to assume
that an innate tendency to _variability_ is a fundamental fact of
nature. This is made apparent by the reasoning in Spencer's chapters on
"The Instability of the Homogeneous" and "The Multiplication of
Effects."[457] The advocates of Natural Selection are very emphatic in
the assertion of this "Law of Variation," as the cardinal fact upon
which turns their doctrine of the origin of species, and the whole
system on which organic life has been developed from the lowest to the
highest forms.[458] "There is," says Comte, "an irregular variability of
effect engendered by the great number of different agents determining at
the same time the same phenomena [meteorological, social, and vital],
from which it results in the most complicated phenomena that _there are
not two cases precisely alike_." "The multiplicity [of the agents]
renders the effects as irregularly variable as if every cause had not
been subjected to any previous conditions."[459] Dr. Tyndall himself is
in fact compelled to surrender the doctrine of uniformity in the
succession of phenomena. He says "if the force be permanent, the
phenomena are necessary whether they _resemble_ or do not resemble any
thing that has gone before."[460] But if the phenomena do not resemble
any thing that has gone before, how can there be "uniformity" in the
succession of phenomena?
4. The uniformity of the _constitution_ of material nature, or the
principle that the same substances must always have the same essential
properties, is undoubtedly a self-evident and necessary truth, an _à
priori_, rational intuition. It is simply a statement in concrete form
of the principle or law of identity (A = A, or A is not equal to non-A).
As we have already observed, a substance which ceases to have the same
essential properties ceases to be the same substance; for substances are
only known to us through their properties. But this "uniformity of
co-existence" is distinct from "uniformity of succession," and we can
not infer the latter from the former. Admitting that the same substance
must always have the same properties, we can not affirm that the same
substances will always be collocated in the same manner, or distributed
in space with the same uniformity. In fact, "we can discover nothing
regular in the distribution of matter through space; we can reduce it to
no uniformity, to no law."[461] Matter is never replaced in its original
position; "nothing repeats itself, because nothing can be placed in the
same conditions; the past is irrevocable."[462]
Even should we say with Sir William Thomson that "motion constitutes the
very essence of what is commonly called matter," still we know with
infallible certainty that there must be a _something_ that moves, and
that this something which moves must have ultimately a definite _mass_
(inertia) and a measurable _velocity_, and that the _energy of motion_
to which the power of doing work is due is proportionate to the mass
multiplied into the square of the velocity. Matter, then, is something
more than motion.[463] We know further that there are different "modes
of motion"--transitive, rotatory, vibratory, pulsatory, gyratory--and
that these are undergoing perpetual transformation or conversion one
into the other. And, finally, we know that the quantities of visible
molar energy, and of invisible molecular energy (as heat, light,
electricity, magnetism), are not uniform; on the contrary, the quantity
of mechanical energy is being continually dissipated--that is,
transformed into radiant heat, "which may be compared to the wasteheap
of the universe,"[464] and uniformly diffused heat will not yield a
single unit of work.
The principle of the conservation of energy is therefore subject to
limitations which are supplied by the principle of the dissipation of
energy. It simply asserts that, so far as our observation extends, the
whole amount of potential and kinetic energy in the universe is
invariable, but it can not determine whether the amount of vital force,
or of psychic force, is invariable; and it is certainly incompetent to
fix a limitation to the exercise of Creative Power. "It is nothing more
than an intelligent and well-supported denial of the chimera of
perpetual motion, and that a machine can no more create work than it can
create matter."[465] In the words of Grove, we can not conceive of the
production of any new force in the universe "_without the interposition
of Creative Power_."[466]
Dr. Tyndall, in his solicitude to exclude all Divine interposition in
the economy of nature, has stated the law of the conservation of energy
in a form quite different from that of his scientific brethren. He says,
"The principle of conservation is, _no creation_ but infinite
conversion;"[467] and he seems desirous to convey the impression that
any interposition of God to answer prayer would be a creation of
physical force, and as much a miracle as the rolling of the waters of
the St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara. Dr. Tyndall does not here
display his usual fairness and candor. Surely he would not assert that
the qualitative and quantitative combination of the different natural
agents--such as light, heat, electricity, elasticity of vapors, and
aerial currents--which determine the fall of a shower of rain, would be
a _creation_ of energy; or that the disposition of the meteorological,
physical, chemical, vital, and psychical conditions which result in the
cure of the sick, would be as much a miracle as "the stoppage of an
eclipse;" for these natural agents are more or less under the control of
man. But suppose it were granted that all interposition of God in the
economy of nature must be regarded as _miraculous_, would he deny the
possibility of miracles even if they should involve a creation of
energy? Because we can not by any of our mechanical arrangements create
energy, does it therefore follow that God can not create energy? Dr.
Tyndall will not say this. "If you ask who is to limit the outgoings of
Almighty power, my answer is--not I."[468]
It will be seen presently that Dr. Tyndall admits that the interference
of personal volition in the economy of nature is not forbidden by the
law of the conservation of energy. The point we now insist upon is that
he has not succeeded in showing that this principle is an absolute and
universal law of nature. We have already seen that it is limited and
conditioned by the law of the dissipation of energy, and that in reality
"it is merely a kind of _movable equilibrium_ between supply and
destruction."[469] By no experimental evidence has it been shown that it
holds true in the realm of vital dynamics and psycho-dynamics. There are
able scientific men who question its absolute certainty even in the
realm of physics. Professor Brooke says that "the amount of energy in
the world is unchanged, the sum of the actual or kinetic and potential
energies being a constant quantity has been by some writers
overstrained. It may be taken as a postulate, and is probably true; but
it is a proposition equally incapable of proof and of disproof."[470]
To the same effect are the words of Sir John Herschel,[471] and still
more recently of Professor Jevons.[472]
"Nature," says Dr. Cohn, of Breslau, "is an equation with very many
unknown quantities. It is the work of natural science to determine the
value of these quantities. Some believe it never will be possible to
solve the equation, since in it factors occur which can not be
determined." Until this is done, it is simply presumptuous for Dr.
Tyndall to pretend to know all the antecedents which determine the
complex phenomena of nature, and dogmatically to affirm that "no new
agency is created," and no "interference of Divine agency" can be
permitted. "Our knowledge of things is finite, while our ignorance is
infinite; and we must consequently regard all known lines of causation
as being liable to be cut through by unknown ones." For aught we know to
the contrary one of the unknown factors in the equation may be "personal
volition," may be the ceaseless energy of the Divine Will sustaining and
carrying nature forward through successive stages toward a predestinated
goal. The foremost physicists do not deny that there may possibly be
forms of energy which are neither potential nor kinetic.[473] We venture
to assert with Prof. Challis that will, or personal energy, is neither
the one nor the other, but the source of both. Mind is the originator,
and matter is the recipient of force.[474]
We sum up what has been said in the preceding paragraphs on the
uniformity of nature in the following words: We admit that the
uniformity of the _constitution_ of nature is a self-evident and
necessary truth. We admit also that, so far as our experience extends,
the uniformity of the _course_ of nature must be admitted as a
scientific truth, for to deny this would be to deny the possibility of
all science, inasmuch as all science is _prevision_. But at the same
time we maintain that the conclusions of scientific inference must
always be of a hypothetical and purely provisional character, because it
is impossible for us to judge with absolute certainty how far our
experience gives us adequate information of the universe as a whole, and
of all the forces and phenomena which can have place therein.[475] The
conservation of energy, for example, is a very probable hypothesis which
accords satisfactorily with the experiments of scientific men during a
few years past, but it would be a gross misconception of the nature of
scientific inference to suppose that it is certain in the same sense
that a proposition in geometry is certain, or that any fact of immediate
consciousness is certain.[476]
Admitting the principle of the uniformity of nature as a hypothetical
inference from a limited experience, we advance to the main position of
Dr. Tyndall, namely, _that personal volition can not mingle in or
interfere with the procession of phenomena in nature_.
Dr. Tyndall admits the reality of "personal volition." We have not
discovered in his writings any indications of the tendency manifested
by some of his scientific associates to reduce volition to a form of
physical energy. He grants "the power of free-will in man,"[477] but he
seems unwilling to admit that free-will can exert any controlling,
modifying, or determining influence on the procession of phenomena.
"Assuming the efficacy of prayer to produce changes in external nature,
it necessarily follows that natural laws are more or less at the mercy
of man's volition, and no conclusion founded on the assumed permanence
of those laws would be worthy of confidence."[478] But are not natural
laws more or less subject to man's volition? Does he not act _upon_ the
chain of cause and effect in nature, and _alter_ the procession of
phenomena on earth? Certainly he can and does control and direct the
forces of nature. He can so collocate and adjust the properties and
forces of matter as to accomplish the purposes of his intelligence, and
bring about _new_ results which would not otherwise have been produced.
That man has materially modified the physical geography of the globe can
not be denied. He has altered the climatal condition of whole tracts of
country, and changed the physiognomy of the globe. The rain-fall has
been changed by the felling of timber or the planting of trees.[479] He
has extended or circumscribed the geographical boundaries of plants and
animals. He has learned to control the mechanical, chemical, and
electric forces. When he lifts a stone from the earth and suspends it in
the air, or locks it in the arch that spans the river, the law of
gravitation is subordinated to the higher law of intelligent purpose. By
the collocation and adjustment of mechanical forces he overcomes the
resistance of winds and tides, and guides his vessel across the
trackless deep. He seizes the lightning in the clouds and guides it
harmless to the earth, and sends the electric current along the
telegraphic wire to chronicle his deeds and report his thoughts at the
ends of the earth. He loosens the most intricate combinations of
elementary substances, and recomposes them in new forms of the highest
value in medicine and the fine arts. He solidifies carbonic acid;
freezes water at the tropics, and even in red-hot crucibles in the
Temperate Zone. He also modifies and changes the development of
vegetable life, obliterating thorns and spines, altering the color and
size of flowers, and the flavor and nutritive character of fruits. And,
finally, he has wrought marvelous changes in the form, size, habits, and
instincts of the animal creation.[480] Thus in numberless ways does man
control, modify, and subordinate nature to accomplish the purposes of
his intelligence; but we can not see with Dr. Tyndall how this renders
scientific "conclusions founded on the assumed permanence of natural law
unworthy of confidence."
There is a vacillation in Dr. Tyndall's treatment of this aspect of the
subject which renders it difficult to fix his exact position. Does he
intend to assert that "personal volition" can not in the slightest
degree change the succession of phenomena? Will he say that man does
not, and that God can not control and modify and subordinate natural
forces so as to bring about _new_ and _special_ results? Unless he is
prepared to assert this in the most unequivocal manner, the whole
superstructure of his argument falls to the ground. If it is granted
that human volition can change the procession of phenomena, and "alter
within certain limits the current of events," then _à fortiori_ we may
conclude that Divine volition may also interfere in the economy of
nature to answer prayer. At one time Dr. Tyndall insinuates that "our
notion" (that is, the Christian's conception) "of the Power which rules
the universe" is a "mere fanciful or ignorant enlargement of human
power,... a _mythologic imagination_ which pictures a being able and
willing to do any and every conceivable thing."[481] At another time he
admits that "the theory that the system of nature is under the control
of a Being who changes phenomena in compliance with the prayers of men
is, in my opinion, a perfectly legitimate one.... It is a matter of
experience that an earthly father, who is at the same time both wise and
tender, listens to the requests of his children, and if they do not ask
amiss, takes pleasure in granting their requests. We know also that this
compliance extends to the alteration, within certain limits, of the
current of events on earth. With this suggestion offered by our
experience, it is no departure from scientific method to place behind
natural phenomena a universal Father, who in answer to the prayers of
his children alters the currents of phenomena. Thus far theology and
science go hand in hand. The conception of an ether, for example,
trembling with the waves of light, is suggested by the ordinary
phenomena of wave-motion in water and in air; and in like manner the
conception of personal volition in nature is suggested by the ordinary
action of man upon earth. I therefore urge no _impossibilities_, though
you constantly charge me with doing so. I do not even urge
inconsistency, but, on the contrary, frankly admit that you have as good
a right to place your conception at the root of phenomena as I have to
place mine."[482]
If this concession is made in good faith, and really means any thing at
all, it covers the whole ground. It is neither unscientific nor
irrational to place behind natural phenomena a universal Father who
alters the current of phenomena in answer to prayer. But this is not the
conception which Dr. Tyndall places behind the phenomena of nature. His
conception is that of a _permanent force_, which is "under the
circumstances _necessary_," producing "an unerring order which in our
experience knows no exception." This brings us to the third and last
question.
3. How can the scientific conception of the _force_ which is manifested
in the phenomena of nature be brought into harmony with the idea of
_God_ as revealed in the religious consciousness?
We are now in the very heart of what we have characterized as the
debatable ground which lies between science and religion, where
questions are mooted concerning the relation between God and nature.
On the one side we have the facts of external sensible experience--the
_statical_ phenomena of nature as mass, extension, position, and
distance--conditions essential to the action or manifestation of force;
then the _dynamical_ phenomena of nature as rotatory, vibratory,
pulsatory, gyratory, and transitive motion, which to our reason, not to
our senses, are manifestations of force. Science observes the uniformity
of relations among these phenomena--uniformities of resemblance,
co-existence, and succession, and calls these uniformities _laws of
nature_. This is all that science can do, all that men of exact science
claim to be able to do.
On the other side we have the facts of internal experience--the
consciousness of effort, the sense of power and freedom, the idea of
right and wrong, the feeling of dependence, of duty, and of obligation,
the consciousness of moral responsibility and of moral desert, and the
anticipation of a future retribution. These to our reason are the
revelation of a righteous Lawgiver and Ruler who is over us; by whom we
are obliged, and to whom we must account. This is the theoretic basis
and necessary presupposition of all religion.
And now speculative philosophy steps in and endeavors to reduce these
concepts of science and religion to an ultimate unity. It endeavors to
construe in thought the nature of that relation between the force
manifested in nature and the moral Ruler revealed in conscience.
Therefore it asks the questions, What is force? What is life? What is
mind?
If we say that force is as inherent and essential to matter as extension
and inertia are, and that life and mind are but modes of force, we are
on the high-road to mechanical Deism, if not _material Atheism_. If we
say that matter is itself only a function of force, and that force is
the ultimate of all ultimates, then the distinction between finite
existence and the infinite Being is a merely verbal distinction, and we
must yield to the seductions of _Pantheism_, which under this aspect of
it is but another name for Atheism. But if we say that Spirit is the
originator and matter the recipient of force, or "the recipient of
impulse and energy," and that the immanent God is the life of all
nature, we are pure _Theists_. We have now a "workable theory" by which
we can satisfactorily interpret the universe.
This, however, is not the conception of Dr. Tyndall. The power which he
sees in nature is a force which is inherent and essential to matter, and
"in that matter he sees the promise and the potency of all _terrestrial_
life," but not of all life, for "religion is life." The Power which is
revealed as the object of the "religious emotions" is a Power which
works for "righteousness," and is "intelligent" as well as "ethical."
This Power he seems to regard as distinct from the force which produces
the necessary phenomena of nature. But whence does he obtain this
conception of force? He writes as though he had seen force, or cognized
force, by some one of the senses. We claim that force is "a subtile
mental conception, and not a sensuous perception or phenomenon;"[483] it
is a metaphysical idea, "a postulate of reason applied to nature." We
venture the assertion that the physicist has not the remotest conception
of force except as a datum of consciousness. The senses give us only
phenomena. All we perceive is motion, change, succession. "All we know
or see is the effect; we do not see force."[484] So say all physicists
as well as all metaphysicians. "Experiences of force are not derived
from any thing else,... and the force by which we ourselves produce
changes, and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in general,
is the final disclosure of all analysis."[485] Whenever, therefore, Dr.
Tyndall attempts to account for motion and change in external nature by
assuming the existence of invisible, imponderable forces, he is
interpreting nature in terms of consciousness--we mean that
consciousness of personal causation which we have when we put forth
_effort_ with an _intention_ thereby to accomplish an end. Force is
known to us by immediate consciousness as a function of our own
mind--that is, mind acting in will is conscious of itself as a force. We
are able to conceive of force in no other way. "Force dissociated from
personality and will must be forever incomprehensible by us, because it
would be something contradictory to our consciousness."[486] If we may
not regard will-force as "the type of all the force in nature," then the
physicist knows nothing about it, does not know there is any force, and
the only consistent course is to unite with Comte in eradicating the
word from the vocabulary of science.
In the only case in which we are admitted into any immediate personal
knowledge of the origin of force, we find it connected with volition,
with will, with motion, with intellect, and with all the attributes of
mind in which personality consists.[487] We must, therefore, conclude
that all force is mind-force, is spirit-force, and that the forces which
animate nature are spiritual. Either the force manifested in the
universe is the force of a self-existent and self-determining
Intelligent Will, or we can form no conception of it whatever.
When we have once arrived at the conception of force as an expression of
will, which we derive from our experience of its production, "the
universal and constantly sustaining agency of the Deity is recognized in
every phenomenon of the universe."[488] "The laws of nature are the laws
which God in his wisdom prescribes to his own acts. His universal
presence is the necessary condition of any course of events. His
universal agency the only origin of all efficient force."[489] The
persistence of force is the permanence of the Divine agency, and the
deepest ground of our faith in the uniformity and changelessness of
natural laws is the immutability of God.
We come, then, at last, to this, that the Power which is manifested in
nature is the God who is revealed in consciousness, and that He is at
once a God of power, of righteousness, and of love. In prayer, the
intelligent believer does not invoke a different Power from that which
is manifested in all the forms of physical energy which were manifested
in nature; he does but invoke the _same_ Power and the _only_ Power
which is the source of all causation and produces all the processions of
phenomena.
The perpetual immanence and ceaseless action of God in nature is the
source of all _force_ and all _law_. There is no force and no law
besides and apart from this. All our conceptions of necessity and
uniformity, of special providence and miracle, are merely relative
conceptions which result from our imperfect vision. These are all
swallowed up and lost in the Divine Immensity. God is Power. God is Law.
God is Love. Love is the motive, Law is the method, and Power is the
hand manifested in all the changes of the universe. "The devout feel
that wherever God's hand is, _there_ is miracle; and it is simply an
undevoutness which imagines that only where miracle is can there be the
hand of God."
Let us say with Goethe, "Nature is the living garment of God," which at
once reveals and conceals his mysterious splendors. In our days of
darkness and sorrow and danger there are vouchsafed to us clearer
gleamings of the Creative Spirit through the veil of nature in answer to
prayer. These we may call "special providences," and even "miracles,"
if we please, but let us not fall into the error of supposing that we
have seen more of God than in the budding of the leaf or the blooming of
the flower in the time of spring. "There are diversities of operations,
but it is the _same_ God which worketh all in all."[490]