GENERAL COMMON SENSE PRINCIPLES OF APPLIED MINOR TACTICS[11]
=942.= To begin with, you want to bear in mind that there is nothing
difficult, complicated or mysterious about applied minor tactics--it
is just simply the application of plain, every-day, common horse
sense--the whole thing consists in familiarizing yourself with certain
general principles based on common sense and then applying them with
common sense. Whatever you do, don't make the mistake of following
blindly rules that you have read in books.
=943.= One of the ablest officers in the Army has recently given this
definition of the Art of War:
One-fifth is learned from books;
One-fifth is common sense;
Three-fifths is knowing men and how to lead them.
The man who would be successful in business must understand men and
apply certain general business principles with common sense; the man
who would be a successful hunter must understand game and apply
certain general hunting principles with common sense, and even the man
who would be a successful fisherman must understand fish and apply
certain general fishing principles with common sense. And so likewise
the man who would lead other men successfully in battle must
understand men and apply certain general tactical principles with
common sense.
Of course, the only reason for the existence of an army is the
possibility of war some day, and everything the soldier does--his
drills, parades, target practice, guard duty, schools of instruction,
etc.--has in view only one end: The preparation of the soldier for the
field of battle.
=944.= While the responsibilities of officers and noncommissioned
officers in time of peace are important, in time of battle they are
much more so: for then their mistakes are paid for in human blood.
What would you think of a pilot who was not capable of piloting a boat
trying to pilot a boat loaded with passengers; or, of an engineer who
was not capable of running a locomotive trying to run a passenger
train? You would, of course, think him a criminal--but do you think he
would be more criminal than the noncommissioned officer who is not
capable of leading a squad in battle but who tries to do so, thereby
sacrificing the lives of those under him?
You can, therefore, appreciate the importance, the necessity, of every
officer and noncommissioned officer doing everything that he possibly
can during times of peace to qualify himself for his duties and
responsibilities during times of war.
If we are going to have a good army we must have good regiments; to
have good regiments we must have good battalions; to have good
battalions we must have good companies--but to have good companies we
must have efficient company officers and noncommissioned officers.
As stated before, everything in the life of the soldier leads to the
field of battle. And so it is that in the subject of minor tactics all
instruction leads to the battle. First we have map problems; then
terrain exercises; next the war game; after that maneuvers, and
finally the battle.
=945. Map Problems and Terrain Exercises.= In the case of map problems
you are given tactical problems to solve on a map; in the case of
terrain exercises you are given problems to solve on the ground. (The
word "Terrain," means earth, ground.) These are the simplest forms of
tactical problems, as you have only one phase of the action, your
information is always reliable and your imaginary soldiers always do
just exactly what you want them to do.
=946. War Game.= Next comes the war game, which consists of problems
solved on maps, but you have an opponent who commands the enemy--the
phases follow one another rapidly and the conditions change--your
information is not so complete and reliable. However, your men being
slips of cardboard or beads, they will, as in the case of your
imaginary soldiers in the map problems and terrain exercises, go where
you wish them to and do what you tell them to do--they can't
misunderstand your instructions and go wrong--they don't straggle and
get careless as real soldiers sometimes do.
Map problems, terrain exercises and war games are but aids to
maneuvers--their practice makes the maneuvers better; for you thus
learn the principles of tactics and in the simplest and quickest way.
=947. Maneuvers.= In the case of the maneuver the problem is the same
as in the war game, except that you are dealing with real, live men
whom you can not control perfectly, and there is, therefore, much
greater chance for mistakes.
=948. The battle.= A battle is only a maneuver to which is added great
physical danger and excitement.
General rules and principles that must be applied in map problems,
terrain exercises, the war game and maneuvers
=949.= Everything that is done must conform in principle to what
should be done in battle--otherwise your work is wasted--your time is
thrown away.
In solving map problems and in the war game, always form in your mind
a picture of the ground where the action is supposed to be taking
place--imagine that you see the enemy, the various hills, streams,
roads, etc., that he is firing at you, etc.--and don't do anything
that you would not be able to do if you were really on the ground and
really in a fight.
Whether it be a corporal in command of a squad or a general in command
of an army, in the solution of a tactical problem, whether it be a map
problem, a terrain exercise, a war game, maneuver or battle, he will
have to go through the same operation:
1st. Estimate the situation;
2d. Decide what he will do;
3d. Give the necessary orders to carry out his decision.
At first these three steps of the operation may appear difficult and
laborious, but after a little practice the mind, which always works
with rapidity in accustomed channels, performs them with astonishing
quickness.
The child beginning the study of arithmetic, for example, is very slow
in determining the sum of 7 and 8, but later the answer is announced
almost at sight. The same is true in tactical problems--the process
may be slow at first, but with a little practice it becomes quick and
easy.
=950. Estimating the Situation.= This is simply "sizing up the
situation," finding out what you're "up against," and is always the
first thing to be done. It is most important, and in doing it the
first step is to determine your MISSION--what you are to do, what you
are to accomplish--the most important consideration in any military
situation.
Consider next your own forces and that of the enemy--that is, his
probable strength and how it compares with yours.
Consider the enemy's probable MISSION[12] and what he will probably do
to accomplish it.
Consider the geography of the country so far as it affects the
problem--the valleys to cross, defiles to pass through, shortest road
to follow, etc.
Now, consider the different courses open to you with the advantages
and disadvantages of each.
You must, of course, in every case know what you're up against before
you can decide intelligently what you're going to do.
In making your plan always bear in mind not only your own MISSION, but
also the general mission of the command of which you form a part, and
this is what nine men out of ten forget to do.
=951. The Decision.= It is important that you should come to a clear
and correct decision--that you do so promptly and then execute it
vigorously.
The new Japanese Field Service Regulations tell us that there are two
things above all that should be avoided--inaction and hesitation. "To
act resolutely even in an erroneous manner is better than to remain
inactive and irresolute"--that is to say do something.
You are now ready to come to a decision, which is nothing more or less
than a clear, concise determination of what you're going to do and how
you're going to do it. Frederick the Great, expressed the same idea
in fewer words: "Don't haggle."
Having settled on a plan, push it through--don't vacillate, don't
waver. Make your plan simple. No other has much show. Complicated
plans look well on paper, but in war they seldom work out. They
require several people to do the right thing at the right time and
this under conditions of excitement, danger and confusion, and, as a
result, they generally fail.
=952. The Order.= Having completed your estimate of the situation and
formed your plan, you are now ready to give the orders necessary to
carry it out.
You must first give your subordinates sufficient information of the
situation and your plan, so that they may clearly understand their
mission.
The better everyone understands the whole situation the better he can
play his part. Unexpected things are always happening in war--a
subordinate can act intelligently only if he knows and understands
what his superior wants to do.
Always make your instructions definite and positive--vague
instructions are sometimes worse than none.
Your order, your instructions, must be clear, concise and
definite--everyone should know just exactly what he is to do.
A Few General Principles
=953.= The man who hunts deer, moose, tigers and lions, is hunting big
game, but the soldier operating in the enemy's territory is hunting
bigger game--he's hunting for human beings--but you want to remember
that the other fellow is out hunting for you, too; he's out "gunning"
for you. So, don't fail to be on the alert, on the lookout, all the
time, if you do he'll "get the drop" on you. Remember what Frederick
the Great said: "It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be
taken by surprise."
Do not separate your force too much; if you do, you weaken
yourself--you take the chance of being "defeated in detail"--that is,
of one part being defeated after another. Remember the old saying: "In
union there is strength." Undue extension of your line (a mistake, by
the way, very often made) is only a form of separation and is equally
as bad.
While too much importance can not be attached to the proper use of
cover, you must not forget that sometimes there are other
considerations that outweigh the advantages of cover. Good sense alone
can determine. A certain direction of attack, for instance, may afford
excellent cover but it may be so situated as to mean ruin if defeated,
as where it puts an impassable obstacle directly in your rear. And
don't forget that you should always think in advance of what you would
do in case of defeat.
What is it, after all, that gives victory, whether it be armies or
only squads engaged? It's just simply inflicting on the enemy a loss
which he will not stand before he can do the same to you. Now, what is
this loss that he will not stand? What is the loss that will cause him
to break? Well, it varies; it is subject to many
conditions--different bodies of troops, like different timbers, have
different breaking points. However, whatever it may be in any
particular case it would soon come if we could shoot on the
battlefield as we do on the target range, but we can not approximate
it.
There are many causes tending to drag down our score on the
battlefield, one of the most potent being the effect of the enemy's
fire. It is cited as a physiological fact that fear and great
excitement cause the pupil of the eye to dilate and impair accuracy in
vision and hence of shooting. It is well established that the
effectiveness of the fire of one side reduced proportionately to the
effectiveness of that of the other.
Bear in mind then these two points--we must get the enemy's breaking
point before he gets ours, and the more effective we make our fire the
less effective will be his.
Expressed in another way--to win you must gain and keep a fire
superiority.
This generally means more rifles in action, yet a fire badly
controlled and directed, though great in volume, may be less effective
than a smaller volume better handled.
The firing line barring a few exceptional cases, then, should be as
heavy as practicable consistent with the men's free use of their
rifles.
This has been found to be about one man to the yard. In this way you
get volume of fire and the companies do not cover so much ground that
their commanders lose their power to direct and control.
If it becomes necessary to hold a line too long for the force
available, it is then better to keep the men close together and leave
gaps in the line. The men are so much better controlled, the fire
better directed, the volume the same, and the gaps are closed by the
cross fire of parties adjacent.
FOOTNOTES:
[11] In the preparation of the first part of this chapter, extracts of
words and of ideas, were made from a paper on Applied Minor Tactics
read before the St. Louis convention of the National Guard of the
United States in 1910, by Major J. F. Morrison, General Staff, U. S.
Army.
[12] The word "_mission_" is used a great deal in this text. By your
"_mission_" is meant your business, what you have been told to do,
what you are trying to accomplish.