THE BATTLES OF JUNE
Thus, within five or six weeks of the first landing, the situation had
become serious. At home, the originator of the campaign had ceased to
hold important office; its opponents were encouraged by despondent
criticism; and the Government, which had hitherto controlled it, was
transformed. On the Continent, the retirement of the Russian armies
in Galicia and Poland cancelled the expectation of a Russian force to
co-operate from the Black Sea, and rendered the position of Bulgaria
dubious. On the Peninsula, the only lines of communication were
threatened by submarines; such assistance as naval guns could supply
to the flanks was greatly diminished; the lack of guns and ammunition,
specially of howitzers and H.E. shells, was severely felt; the new
drafts were unacquainted with their officers, and the officers with
each other; at Helles and Anzac the positions were fairly secured, but
the men were much worn by almost continuous struggle, and harassed by
repeated and random shelling. From this, indeed, the dead ground below
the cliffs at Anzac offered protection, but hardly any point at Helles
was safe, or even sheltered, whether the enemy’s guns fired from Achi
Baba or the Asiatic coast. As reinforcement, Sir Ian had received
the 42nd Division and already had been promised the 52nd (Lowland
Territorial); but this did not begin to arrive till the middle of June,
and he was now compelled to ask Lord Kitchener for two complete army
corps in addition. Yet the expedition had justified itself in that, but
for its presence in the Dardanelles, the whole of the Near East would
have fallen to the enemy’s influence, the Russian left flank would have
hung in air without hope of succour, and an overwhelming attack upon
the Suez Canal would almost certainly have been attempted.
[Sidenote: JUNE 4 AT HELLES]
It was now essential to gain more room at Helles, and by repeated
assaults to push the enemy’s lines farther away from the landing
beaches. Accordingly, Sir Ian issued orders for another general attack
on June 4. It was a Friday, the day after Przemysl had fallen into the
enemy’s hands once more. At early morning Sir Ian and the Headquarter
Staff crossed to Helles, and were there joined by General Gouraud. They
stationed themselves on the high ground of the command-post above Cape
Tekke, whence a prospect of the slightly hollow plain and opposite
slopes of Krithia and Achi Baba could be obtained, although, under the
northerly breeze, a violent dust storm blew. As before, the British
VIIIth Corps (consisting of the remains of the 29th Division, together
with Sikhs and Gurkhas of the Indian Brigade, the 42nd Division, and
the R.N.D., in that order from left to right) held the left and centre
of the line, while the French and Colonial Corps of two Divisions held
the right. The Ægean and the Straits protected either flank, but, as
was inevitable on the Peninsula, this very protection rendered flank
movements in attack impossible, and every advance was necessarily made
straight against the enemy’s front. The British front of about three
and a half miles was occupied by 17,000 infantry, with 7000 in reserve.
The attack was preceded by a longer bombardment than usual, probably
because the French General had generously lent the British two groups
of “75’s” (six batteries of four guns apiece) with H.E. shell. The guns
from sea and land opened fire at 8 a.m. and continued till midday, with
short intervals. During the latest interval a feint was practised in
the hope of inducing the Turks to fill up their first line of trenches,
which were thinly held. Our men fixed bayonets, and waved them above
the parapets, as though about to advance. The Turks swarmed down the
communication trenches to their front line, and were caught by a sudden
renewal of our bombardment. At noon the guns lengthened their range,
and, protected by their “barrage,” as the manœuvre came to be called
later in the war, the infantry advanced in earnest. For the first
half-hour the advance was rapid, especially in the centre, and hope of
decisive victory rose high.
This success was chiefly due to the extraordinary dash of the
Manchester (42nd Division) and the 2nd Naval (R.N.D.) Brigades. Under
young and high-spirited leaders such as few troops possessed,[122]
the so-called “amateurs” of the Anson, Hood, and Howe Battalions
rushed forward through the bushes and small ravines of the neutral
ground, stormed the first trench, and captured the southern face of a
projecting Turkish redoubt. It was done in a quarter of an hour, and
in five-and-twenty minutes their consolidating parties were at work
upon the positions gained. The Manchester Brigade (always a model of
what Lord Haldane’s Territorials could become) swept forward with even
greater success. In five minutes they were over the first line; in
half an hour they had captured the second, and it was believed that
no defences lay between them and Achi Baba. The belief was probably
too sanguine, but at all events they had won a third of a mile, and
the working parties began reversing the aspect of the excellently
constructed Turkish trenches.
Farther to the left, the 88th Brigade (29th Division), though exposed
to heavy fire from front and left flank, and met with the bayonet by
Turks who courageously awaited their assault, succeeded in capturing
the first line of trenches, the Worcesters especially distinguishing
themselves. But the farther advance of the division was checked because
the 14th Sikhs on their left were held up by barbed wire at the first
trench, remaining undamaged by the bombardment. For the same reason,
the 6th Gurkhas, who had skilfully advanced along the extreme edge of
the cliffs, were compelled to withdraw, and reinforcements were hurried
up from the reserve. But even the new battalions were unable to advance
against the heavy rifle-fire, and the left of the British line was thus
kept in check, unable to conform with the victorious advance in the
centre.
[Illustration: FRENCH DUG-OUT AT HELLES]
[Sidenote: FAILURE OF FRENCH COLONIAL TROOPS]
With the French upon our right, all seemed at first to go well. The
1st Division carried the first trenches. The 2nd or new Division,
with characteristic _élan_, at last rushed the formidable redoubt which
commanded the approach to the southern slope leading up to the crest
above Kereves Dere, and had barred the French advance almost since the
first advance. From its bulging crescent shape, the French called it
the “Haricot.” Unfortunately, here again, as before, the Senegalese and
Colonial troops were found unable to retain positions which they had
won. Within an hour of the first infantry advance, the Turks projected
an overwhelming counter-attack upon the “Haricot,” shelling it heavily
and pouring masses of reinforcements down the deep communication
trenches. A fatal gap was thus opened between the French and British
lines. The right flank of the 2nd Naval Brigade became dangerously
exposed. The fortune of the battle turned.
In less than half an hour from their great success, the Howe, Hood,
and Anson Battalions were thus subjected to intense enfilading fire.
The lately arrived Collingwood Battalion came to their support, but
in this their first battle they were almost exterminated, losing
over 600 men and their commanding officer, Commander Spearman, R.N.,
killed.[123] Compelled to retire across the open ground over which
they had charged, and exposed to a torrential rain of bullets from
machine-guns and rifles, this brigade of the unfortunate but invariably
noble division suffered the losses of massacre. Even worse followed.
The retirement and partial destruction of the Naval Brigade left the
right flank of the Manchesters “in air” upon a very advanced position.
Their Brigadier, General Noel Lee, an excellent leader of men, and in
civil life partner in a well-known Lancashire shipping and cotton firm,
was wounded; many of their officers killed. Yet the men declared they
would for ever hold the ground they had so rapidly won; they only asked
for help upon their right. To check the enfilading fire their right
flank was thrown back to face it, and in the midst of tangled scrub
and enemy trenches the brigade fought on two fronts at right angles to
each other. It was an impossible position, but still the men clung on.
Our reinforcements had already been almost exhausted in drafts to the
extreme left, where the advance was held up, as described.
[Sidenote: INSUFFICIENT RESULTS]
At 6.30, General Hunter-Weston, commanding the VIIIth Corps, after
consultation with Sir Ian, was constrained to “pull out” the
Manchesters from their exposed and untenable salient. With almost
mutinous reluctance the troops withdrew into the first line of Turkish
trenches, taken in the first rush, and the remainder of the Division
conformed. In spite of an endeavour made by the Royal Fusiliers at 4
p.m. to establish themselves beyond this first line, the 29th Division
and the Indians had been unable to advance farther upon the left, and
the gain so confidently expected, especially in the centre, was now
reduced to an advance of 200 yards in some places and 400 yards in
others. The prisoners amounted to 400, including 11 officers, among
whom were 5 Germans, the relics of a machine-gun detachment from the
_Goeben_.[124]
During the night an excellent piece of work was accomplished by the
Nelson Battalion, R.N.D. (Colonel Evelegh).[125] They were sent up to
establish touch between the right of the 42nd Division and the left of
the R.N.D. This task involved digging forward a “switch trench” under
very heavy fire, but the connection between the exposed flanks was thus
made good.
Late in the afternoon of the battle, Major-General De Lisle, famous
as a dashing leader of mounted troops in the South African War, and
now coming fresh from command of the 1st Cavalry Division in France,
arrived at Helles to take over the command of the 29th Division. The
news that met him there, illustrated by the streams of wounded passing
down to W Beach, was not encouraging. As had happened before in this
campaign, and was to happen more than once in the future, the hope
of victory had been dashed at the moment when victory appeared most
certain, and it had been frustrated by failure at one single point. The
losses were unusually heavy--estimated at 5000 at the time--and large
numbers of the best remaining officers in the 29th Division and the
R.N.D., not to mention the Manchester Brigade, had fallen.[126] Owing
to the retirement of the line from the positions they had taken, some
of the wounded were of necessity left on the neutral ground together
with the dead, and uniforms, hanging loosely upon the shrunken corpses,
were long visible at exposed points, whence nothing could be reclaimed.
By Sir Ian’s personal orders attempts were made to recover the dead and
wounded under the white flag, but they failed.[127] The fact was that
when small parties went out under a white flag they were fired upon.
This frequently happened at the termination of a severe battle, though
the Turks appear to have fired rather as a warning than with immediate
intent to kill. But for this hostile attitude it is possible that a
formal armistice might have been arranged, such as Sir Ian tacitly
granted to the Turks at Helles on May 2, and by negotiation at Anzac on
May 24.
[Sidenote: SERIOUS LOSSES]
Heavy fighting was renewed before dawn on the 6th, and continued
at intervals for two days and nights, the Turks repeating their
counter-attacks, especially down the upper reach of the Gully Ravine.
Here the Royal Fusiliers (86th Brigade) suffered terrible loss. Major
Brandreth, a singularly fine officer, then in command of the battalion,
wounded on the day of landing, was now killed. Many of the new officers
who had lately arrived with the drafts were killed also, including
Captain Jenkinson of Oxford, one of the greatest authorities on
embryology. By June 8 only one officer, the former Sergeant-Major, was
left of those who had originally come out, besides the Quartermaster.
Of the original regiment only 140 remained. All the ten officers
who had recently joined were lost. Their places were taken by a new
Captain from the Dublins, in command, and about fifteen other officers,
collected from various regiments, and all strange to each other and the
men. The Hampshires (88th Brigade) had fared still worse, having only
about 100 of the original men left, and no officers at all.[128] Thus,
under the stress of frontal attacks upon entrenched and commanding
positions, manned by Turks, and assaulted without suitable or adequate
artillery, battalions dwindled to companies, brigades to battalions,
divisions to brigades, and an army corps to a division. Amid losses
so overwhelming it seemed impossible to retain a regimental spirit.
Yet such is the power of a name endowed with traditional honour that
in a week or two the new arrivals, both of officers and men, as they
came drifting in, became inspired with a resolve to carry forward the
inherited reputation maintained by so many deaths.
For the next fortnight repeated small assaults and counter-attacks
continued to reduce the numbers, while holding the Turks in check and
preserving the activity and confidence of the men. On June 21 the
French Divisions captured the “Haricot” Redoubt. The attack began at
dawn, and by noon the 2nd Division had occupied the position. But the
1st Division, after taking a line of trenches, was driven out in a
counter-attack, and exposed to victorious troops on their left, as so
often happened in the French engagements at Helles. In the afternoon
General Gouraud called upon his right flank for a renewed effort,
and at 6 p.m. the lines were taken again and held. The possession of
these lines and the “Haricot” gave the French a partial command of the
Kereves Dere, reduced the salient of our centre by bringing up their
forces on the right, and generally shortened and straightened out our
line across the Peninsula. The French loss was estimated at 2500,[129]
the Turkish at nearly three times that amount. But this estimate of
“over 7000” is probably an exaggeration, though one of the Turkish
trenches, 200 yards long and 10 feet deep, was described as brimming
over with the dead,[130] and 50 prisoners were taken.
By this time two brigades of the 52nd Division had arrived, and the
third was nearly due. It was a Territorial Division (the “Lowland”),
commanded for the first few months by Major-General G. G. A. Egerton.
After the fighting of July 12 and 13, he was ordered to a hospital ship
owing to natural fatigue; but returning next day, he retained command
till mid-September, when he was succeeded by Major-General H. A.
Lawrence, son of the great Lord Lawrence of the Indian Mutiny.[131]
It was a fairly homogeneous and steady division, and, though rapidly
reduced in strength, its improvement after the first month or six weeks
was much remarked.
[Sidenote: SHORTAGE OF ARTILLERY]
It was not long before one of the newly arrived brigades was called
into action. The artillery, even with French help, was now insufficient
for another general advance. The shells were running out; few H.E.
shells were left; the howitzers numbered eight, or two to a division
(four others which arrived later had seen service at Omdurman in 1898);
whereas, even at the beginning of the war, eighteen howitzers went to
each division in France. Among the field-guns were batteries of old
15-pounders, which had established their futility in the Boer War (one
Vickers gun was reported to have come from a well-known museum); but
such things were thought good enough for the Dardanelles. Except the
29th and the Anzacs, the Divisions had no other field-guns, and the
R.N.D. had no guns at all. It was, therefore, essential to limit the
thrust, and General Hunter-Weston formed a scheme for pushing forward
on the left, so as to clear the obstacles which had hitherto checked
our advance along the coast, and to reduce the salient in the centre,
as the French had reduced it by seizing the “Haricot.” While the centre
remained steady about a mile from the sea, the left was to swing
forward upon it as upon a pivot, covering less ground as the pivotal
point was approached. Thus five Turkish lines had to be captured by the
29th Division on the extreme left, and two by the 156th Brigade (52nd
Division), which had been inserted on their right.
[Sidenote: THE GULLY RAVINE]
The battle began on June 28 with a severe but brief bombardment,
limited to the Turkish trenches on our front nearest the coast. The
batteries were assisted from the sea by the light cruiser _Talbot_
(5600 tons, 1896) and the destroyers _Wolverine_ and _Scorpion_, which
were able to enfilade such positions as remained visible. But, for
want of ammunition, the land bombardment was limited in extent, and
lasted only twenty minutes. The 87th Brigade (Major-General W. R.
Marshall),[132] supplied with the new drafts which had been gradually
coming in, at once advanced on both sides of the Gully Ravine (Saghir
Dere). Their part in the attack was to clear a further lap of this
long and deep ravine or cañon, which forms one of the most surprising
features of the southern Peninsula. Advance along the bottom was
impossible. Near the entrance from the sea the cliffs on both sides
rise 200 feet. The slope upwards along the Gully is very gradual,
and the sides nearly up to the very end remain steep, in parts bare
sandy cliff, in parts covered with bush. The ravine curves frequently,
twice turning for a short distance almost at right angles. Here and
there, along the middle and upper reaches, the bottom was dangerously
exposed to snipers creeping down and hiding among the bushes. Up to
the last, even after it became the main line of communication with our
positions on the left, it was constantly shelled, and beyond a point
about two-thirds up its length no horses were allowed to proceed. In
spite of screens and sandbag barriers, shrapnel and unaimed or dropping
rifle-fire frequently inflicted loss upon the drafts, reliefs, and
supply parties continually passing to and fro. There was the greater
danger because, under the stress of thirst and extreme heat, men and
animals gathered round the water which was in places discovered,
especially at one clear and cold spring rising from the foot of a
precipitous cliff upon the right. About half-way up, the Turks had
barred the valley with a complicated entanglement reaching from side to
side, and other entanglements existed farther on. The only possibility
of clearing such a ravine was to clear the rough and bush-covered
plateau on both sides.
Upon the left, after the brief bombardment, three battalions of the
87th Brigade (South Wales Borderers, K.O.S.B., and Inniskilling
Fusiliers) advanced along the strip of land between the sea and the
ravine, already the scene of gallantry and loss. By eleven o’clock,
forty minutes after the opening of the gun-fire, they had rushed the
first three trenches. They were at once followed by the 86th Brigade,
which pushed right through them, over the three captured trenches. Led
by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, and keeping their formations in spite of
the scrub and a searching rifle-fire, this renowned Fusilier Brigade
stormed onward till two more trenches were taken, and the task of the
29th Division completed. At the same time, the Gurkhas had worked
forward along the edge of the sea cliffs, and secured a green knoll
projecting from the end of a spur which marked our farthest advance. A
few nights after (July 2), the Gurkhas were driven out here, but the
position was retaken by the Inniskilling Fusiliers, though with great
loss, only two officers being left. On the seacoast west of the ravine
our objective was gained, and in honour of the achievement the extreme
point won was always known as Fusilier Bluff.
On the right of the Gully the remaining battalion of the 87th Brigade
(1st Borderers) within five minutes stormed a redoubt overhanging the
ravine, and called the Boomerang from its curved shape. Advancing
rapidly, they next carried a stronger redoubt, known as the Turkey
Trot, perhaps from the speed of the enemy in abandoning it, though
the trenches right up to the redoubt remained in Turkish possession,
separated by a sandbag wall. These rapid successes were mainly due
to two trench-mortars, lent by General Gouraud and dropping bombs
containing some 30 lb., some 70 lb., of melinite, vertically into the
trenches at short range. The British force at this time possessed a few
Japanese trench-mortars--very effective, but numbering only six, and
these short of ammunition. We had no others of any kind. Yet, in the
scarcity of howitzers, trench-mortars were more needed than any gun.
Our hand-grenades were improvised out of jam-pots.
To the right of the Borderers, the 156th Brigade of the newly arrived
52nd Division came into action for the first time. The 4th and 7th
Royal Scots quickly gained the two trenches allotted to them, but the
rest of the brigade (7th and 8th Scottish Rifles), owing to severe
losses (22 officers and 509 men killed) could hardly advance, and an
attempt upon the trenches in front of Krithia that afternoon also
failed. Nevertheless, the morning’s work was a victory. It marked the
most decisive advance upon the Peninsula hitherto. Three-quarters of a
mile along the coast, and about half a mile up the Gully Ravine were
won, and the Gully’s lower reaches and beach rendered more secure.
Large quantities of stores and ammunition were taken, together with
about 100 prisoners. The Gully was for some distance cleaned of the
dangerous filth and rubbish characteristic of Turkish lines--the more
dangerous owing to the unimaginable hosts of flies which now added to
the discomfort of life on the Peninsula, and probably diffused the
malignant type of diarrhœa with which almost every one was afflicted.
Our casualties for the day were 1750, the Royal, Lancashire, and Dublin
Fusiliers suffering most. The losses of the 156th Brigade included
their Brigadier, General Scott-Moncrieff, who was killed on “Worcester
Flat.”
[Sidenote: JUNE 28 AT HELLES]
The Turks lost more heavily, especially in their determined
counter-attacks during the next few nights, when they attempted to
recover the lost trenches by rushing upon them with bayonet and bombs,
their supply of which was plentiful. All these attempts were vain, and
the useless loss of life severe.[133] They seem to have been prompted
by Enver Pasha, in opposition to his German advisers, and the Turkish
troops were specially stimulated to the sacrifice by the following
divisional order, discovered upon a wounded officer. The trenches
referred to were the five captured by the 29th Division on June 28:
“There is nothing causes us more sorrow, increases the courage of the
enemy, and encourages him to attack more freely, causing us great
losses, than the losing of these trenches. Henceforth commanders who
surrender trenches, from whatever side the attack may come, before
the last man is killed, will be punished in the same manner as if
they had run away. Especially will the commanders of units told off
to guard a certain front be punished if, instead of thinking about
their work, supporting their units, and giving information to the
Higher Command, they only take action after a regrettable incident
has occurred.
“I hope that this will not happen again. I give notice that if it
does I shall carry out the punishment. I do not desire to see a blot
made on the courage of our men by those who escape from the trenches
to avoid the rifle and machine-gun fire of the enemy. Henceforth
I shall hold responsible all officers who do not shoot with their
revolvers all privates trying to escape from the trenches on any
pretext.
“COLONEL RIFAAT, C.O., 11th Division.”
To this order a regimental commander added the following note:
“To the C.O. of 1st Battalion.
“The contents will be communicated to the officers, and I promise to
carry out the orders till the last drop of our blood has been shed.
Sign and return.
“HASSAN, C.O., 127th Regiment.”
[Sidenote: TURKISH PROCLAMATIONS]
Two days before the battle, a Turkish aeroplane scattered copies of a
long proclamation intended to shake the discipline of the Mohammedan
Indian troops. It called upon Mussulmans to ask themselves why they
were sacrificing their lives for English people, who had grabbed their
country, made them slaves, and now ruled them by tyranny, sucking
their blood by taxes, taking their wealth to London, and regarding
them as more contemptible than English dogs. It further dwelt upon the
desperate position of the Allies, the triumphs of Germany in Belgium,
France, Russia, and by submarines on the sea. It said that in Singapore
and Ceylon the native armies had killed all the English and occupied
the forts. It asserted that many more submarines were coming, and the
British communications on the Peninsula would be entirely cut off.
Therefore, it called upon the Indian soldiers to slay their tyrant
enemies, or at least to join their fellow-Moslems in the Turkish army,
where they would be treated as brothers. It concluded by offering a
grim dilemma:
“You are at liberty either to desert to us, and save your lives, or
to have your heads cut off, to no purpose, along with the English.”
The Sikh and Gurkha troops, however, preferred to risk the latter
alternative.[134]
To both the main battles at Helles during this month (June 4 and 28)
the Anzac corps rendered valuable support. Their task was to retain
in position the large Turkish forces which hemmed them round in their
triangle of cliff and ravine. By repeated threatenings and attacks they
continually remained “a thorn in the side” of the enemy’s defence,
always endangering his communications and delaying his reinforcement.
The chief share of the service naturally fell to the troops allotted
in “shifts” to maintain the apex of the triangle at the farthest end
of Monash Gully, the continuation of the main ravine or valley called
“Shrapnel.” This position was mainly guarded by Pope’s Hill, throughout
commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Harold Pope, 16th Battalion (South and
Western Australia), and by Quinn’s, Courtney’s, and Steel’s Posts,
stationed at short intervals along the edge of the steep ridge on the
right, slightly in advance of “Pope’s.” By the digging of narrow and
complicated trenches and subterranean passages, all these points had
been converted into small forts; but the proximity of the enemy’s
counterworks exposed them to continuous danger; for the lines of trench
approached each other in places within 15 yards, and even within five.
It was easy to lob bombs and grenades over from one side to the other,
and to converse with taunts or ironic compliments in such languages as
Colonials and Turks could master in common.
[Sidenote: QUINN’S POST AT ANZAC]
But perilous as the whole position was, “Quinn’s,” hanging on the
summit of its almost precipitous ascent, was regarded as the point of
greatest danger and highest honour. Here Major Quinn, 15th (Queensland
and Tasmania) Battalion, was killed on May 29 in repelling a violent
and almost successful Turkish assault, preceded by a mine explosion,
which obliterated part of his carefully dug defences. After this severe
loss, the position was commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Malone, Wellington
(New Zealand) Battalion, for a little over two months, until he fell in
the great assault upon Sari Bair in August. Though not a professional
soldier, being a solicitor in civil life, he was, none the less, an
Irish officer of the finest type. Never tired of impressing upon myself
and other friends the true and serviceable paradox that “the whole art
of war lies in the exercise of the domestic virtues,” he maintained
his exposed position by the unflinching practice of the cleanliness,
punctuality, courage, and humorous endurance of perpetual provocation
in which the domestic virtues consist.
From this Post a sortie was made on the night of June 4 to destroy an
enemy’s trench close in front. The trench was taken, but the small
party was bombed out of it in the early morning. Next night a somewhat
larger party (100 men and 2 officers, 1st Australian Infantry Brigade)
assaulted the strong position to the right from Quinn’s, known as
“German Officers’ Trenches” from the appearance of German officers
there during the armistice. Here a special party of ten men, under
Lieutenant E. E. L. Lloyd, 1st Battalion (New South Wales), was told
off to destroy a dangerous machine-gun. It was a difficult task, for,
like most Turkish trenches in this quarter, the trench was protected
by heavy overhead beams. But one of the ten discharged a few rounds
into the gun through holes at 5-foot range, and the remainder of the
sortie party destroyed some of the trench. These sorties cost 116
casualties--a heavy loss in proportion to the numbers engaged; but the
Turkish loss was reported considerably greater.
[Sidenote: JUNE 29 AT ANZAC]
Fighting of some sort was continuous day and night along that ridge
of Posts. Bombs, rifles, machine-guns, and artillery were incessantly
at work. At night especially the Turks would sometimes be seized with
a kind of frenzy, and pour out streams of bullets, most of which went
wailing and whining overhead to fall in showers upon the sea. But on
the 29th they made another genuine night attack under orders from
Enver, who again called upon them to chase the Infidel from the soil
of Islam. It was further provoked by a sortie the previous afternoon
from the southern end of the Anzac position. About half a battalion of
Queenslanders (1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, of course unmounted)
and some of the Queensland Infantry (9th Battalion, 3rd Australian
Brigade), led by Lieut.-Colonel H. Harris, rushed from the trenches
near the so-called “Wheat Field,” where the farthest Anzac ridge
falls gradually towards the coast, and dashed upon a strongly held
Turkish position opposite. The object seems to have been to divert
Turkish reinforcements making for Krithia, and in this the movement
was successful. Large numbers of Turks were seen coming up from Eski
Keui, supposing the Australian outburst to be a serious assault, and
when they were entangled in the scrub and gullies, exposed to various
fire from Anzac and from destroyers close off shore, the Queenslanders
withdrew.
Next day was fairly quiet until afternoon, when the Turks were seized
by one of the frenzies above mentioned. It died away, but at midnight,
after various feints, they made a violent assault up the Nek, or apex
of the triangle. It began with heavy firing for an hour and a half,
and then in the moonlight swarms of Turks were seen trotting forward
across the narrow Nek against our trenches, hardly more than 100 yards
away, and shouting “Allah! Allah!” as their religious manner was. They
were Nizam troops--18th Regiment, 6th Division--fresh arrivals from
Asia. As they came on, they encountered an overwhelming fire from
the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade (Brigadier-General Russell,
one of the most distinguished of N.Z. officers), together with some
South Australian Light Horse under Brigadier-General F. G. Hughes,
destined to win still higher reputation upon the same scene. These
were stationed on Russell Top, commanding the Nek and the complicated
Turkish position known as the Chessboard, close beyond it. Three times
the Turks ran forward, but rifles and machine-guns shattered them as
they came, and the shadowy forms ceased to move. Others tried to work
round the Nek on each side, down Monash Gully on their left, and by
the precipitous front of Walker’s Ridge on their right. Both attempts
failed. Few survived. Next morning the Nek and defiles were littered
with the dead. At least 600 were counted. It was the last Turkish
attack upon the heights of Anzac.[135]
[Sidenote: GENERAL GOURAUD WOUNDED]
So the midsummer month drew to an end. There was a sense of victory in
the air. Officers and men grew elated by confidence in superiority. All
felt the Turks were beaten, if only Helles and Anzac could maintain the
pressure. Drafts came dribbling in, a hundred or so at a time. But,
though nominally in sufficient numbers to fill up the gaps reported
when they left England or Egypt, they arrived only to find the gaps
had meantime increased, and their numbers never filled them. Since
the landing, two Divisions (Territorials) had now arrived. Three more
(New Army or “Kitchener’s”) had been promised, but were delayed for
another month, and few soldiers can retain the elation of victory at
high pitch through weeks of inaction. “You cannot bottle up enthusiasm
for future use, as you do pickled herrings,” said Goethe. Guns were
short; ammunition was worse than short; the lack of it was perilous;
trench-mortars and hand-grenades hardly existed. Heat, dust, flies,
want of water, and the restriction of large forces to narrow limits
of ground increased sickness and wastage in the trenches and dug-outs
of both Helles and Anzac landings. On the whole, the French retained
health and vigour best, their rations being less monotonous, and
themselves more fastidious in cookery. But on the last day of the
month the French, and, indeed, the whole army, suffered an almost
irreparable blow. General Gouraud, commanding the French Army Corps,
was visiting the wounded on V Beach when an 8-inch shell from Asia
burst within six yards. As though by miracle, the fragments missed
him, but the explosive force flung him over a six-foot wall and into
a fig tree, which perhaps lessened the shock. His thigh, ankle, and
arm were broken, and he was compelled to surrender the command, though
ultimately he recovered, and won further fame at Châlons and in command
at Rheims. General Bailloud, that volatile and high-spirited veteran,
succeeded to the command till he was transferred to Salonika in
October, and was succeeded by General Brulard, of the 1st Division.
Upon the Russian front, of which the Dardanelles should always have
been regarded as an essential strategic part, the course of war
continued disastrous for the Allies. As noticed above, Przemysl was
retaken by German-Austrian armies on June 3. The fall of Lemberg
followed on June 22; nearly the whole of Galicia was reoccupied; Warsaw
was threatened; and at various points, north and south, the Russian
frontier was crossed. So far as Turkey was concerned, the Russian
armies were withdrawn from the war, and Sir Ian’s mixed and mainly
inexperienced forces, insufficient in numbers, ill supplied with guns,
worse supplied with ammunition, dependent upon long and hazardous
communications, were left to confront the full strength of the Turkish
Empire alone.[136]
During the month, the Italians crossed the Isonzo, but against Turkey
no declaration of war had yet been made. Both sides in the European
struggle still looked to Bulgaria as a vital point. Each was still
trying to outbid the other by offers of territorial advantage, and both
were equally confident of a successful bargain with that tough and
secretive, but, in point of territorial ambitions, typically Balkan
race.
[Illustration: GENERAL GOURAUD STANDING WITH GENERAL BAILLOUD]