CHAPTER XI.

GEN. HOOD’S DISASTROUS CAMPAIGN IN TENNESSEE—THE FATAL

MISTAKE—BEFORE FRANKLIN—SCHOFIELD’S STRONGHOLD—EATING HIS

LAST RATIONS—THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN—THE REBEL YELL—TERRIFIC

MUSKETRY—LOCKED BAYONETS—ONE-THIRD HOOD’S ARMY LOST—CO. K WIPED

OUT—LOSSES OF THE “FIRST”—FAITHFUL UNTIL DEATH—THE RETREAT FROM

TENNESSEE—THE LAST ROLL CALL.

It was raining slowly as, on Sunday, November 20, the First Alabama

formed and marched down to the Tennessee river, crossed the long pontoon

bridge, and went into camp four miles beyond. Monday, there was a light

fall of snow, and the command advanced but seven miles. At night it

turned off very cold, and Tuesday morning the roads were frozen hard.

During the day the army crossed the State line of Tennessee, marked

by a rough board sign placed by the roadside, every regiment cheering

heartily, Tennessee troops being especially enthusiastic. The day’s march

was thirteen miles. Wednesday saw us twelve miles on our journey. The

day was cold and wintry, and the soldiers, thinly clad and generally

without overcoats, suffered keenly. It was slightly warmer on Thursday.

As on Wednesday, the route lay through a hostile, mountainous country,

and the slow progress made by the artillery and wagon trains, as well

as the necessity of keeping the men well closed up, delayed the army,

and only twelve miles were made. The mountaineers were mostly Union

men, and showed no mercy to stragglers, either killing them outright or

horribly maltreating them. On Friday the roads were better; the mountains

were behind us; and as the troops passed through Henryville they were

met with friendly greetings. The First Alabama went into camp two miles

beyond Henryville, having marched fifteen miles, the best score since

crossing the river. Saturday, the people were still more cordial, and the

troops were cheered at Mount Pleasant. Sixteen miles had been tramped

when the First went into camp eight miles from Columbia. On Sunday,

the 27th, Stewart’s corps arrived at Columbia, invested by Lee’s corps

the preceding day. At dusk the First Alabama were sent to the skirmish

line. During the night the enemy evacuated the town, taking position

on the other side of Duck River. The regiment remained in camp Monday.

Gen. Forrest crossed four miles above Columbia on that day; and, a

pontoon bridge having been put down, Cheatham’s and Stewart’s corps and

Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps followed on the 29th. Schofield at once

withdrew, and now began a spirited race for Franklin on parallel roads,

the Federals having the advantage of holding the regular pike, while

the Confederates marched over rough by-roads and through the fields.

There was brisk skirmishing throughout the day between the flankers;

but Cheatham, who had forged far enough ahead to have thrown his corps

across the pike, failed to execute Hood’s positive orders to do so. Hood

then ordered Stewart’s corps to the front to make the attack, but by the

time they got up it was dark, and the men could not be got into proper

position to ensure success. The two corps bivouacked at Spring Hill, and

Schofield’s army, unmolested, filed by so near that their wagons could be

heard on the stony pike. This blunder lost Hood the Tennessee campaign.

Gen. Hood states that Gen. Cheatham afterwards magnanimously acknowledged

his error. Even Hood did not place any blame upon the army for this

failure to attack. The soldiers were greatly fatigued after the twenty

miles’ march of the day; but would have gallantly responded to the order

to attack, and themselves wondered why it was not given.

On the morning of November 30th the race was renewed, but Schofield

had the advantage of being ahead of his foes. He was so hardly pushed,

however, that he was obliged to sacrifice a considerable portion of his

wagon train, overturning and burning the wagons or cutting down the

wheels, and shooting the animals whenever they blocked the retreat of

the infantry. In some cases whole teams could be seen lying dead in the

traces. At another point a quartermaster’s wagon had been overturned,

and for rods around the road and fields were strewn with blankets. About

noon, when four miles south of Franklin, the Federal cavalry deployed

along a wooded crest running at right angles to the Columbia pike, and

covered the wearied infantry while filing into the entrenchments at

Franklin.

These entrenchments had been carefully constructed, and had already

received their baptism of blood the year prior (April 10, 1863), when

Gen. Van Dorn attacked Gen. Granger and was repulsed. The inner line was

a regularly constructed earthwork, with a ditch on the outside about

three feet deep and five feet wide. From the bottom of the ditch to the

top of the parapet was at least six or seven feet. Heavy timbers or

head logs crowned the top of the parapet, space being left between the

logs and earth to allow the soldiers to fire. An abattis of black locust

protected the front. Two hundred and fifty or three hundred yards in

front of this—an open field with gentle slope intervening—was another

connected line of earthworks, made by digging a ditch about eighteen

inches or two feet in depth, and throwing the earth to the front. Outside

of this, again, were detached rifle pits. This was the nature of the

works on each side the Columbia pike, where the heaviest fighting took

place. The works extended around Franklin in a semi-circle, touching Big

Harpeth River above and below the town, a length of a mile and a half.

As Stewart’s corps, which was in the advance, came up, the Federal

cavalry also withdrew into Franklin. The Confederate forces rapidly

deployed, Stewart’s corps forming the right and Cheatham’s the left,

Johnston’s division of Lee’s corps being still in the rear. Stewart’s

corps was formed in line of battle between the Nashville and Decatur

Railroad and the Lewisburg pike, about one and a quarter miles from

Franklin and three-quarters of a mile from the Union lines. The corps was

so fronted that an advance would take it across the railroad, striking

the enemy’s main line near the Columbia pike. Walthall’s division was in

the centre, with Quarles’ brigade on the right. In front of Walthall was

a deep cut in the railroad, which was not discovered till the advance

had begun, and which necessitated his moving by the left flank, as

subsequently stated, to avoid the obstacle. Much straggling had been

caused by the forced marches of the two preceding days, and probably not

over 15,000 or 16,000 men of Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps were engaged

in the battle, and Johnston’s division, say 2,000 or 3,000 men, did not

take part till the main attack had failed, about 7, P. M. The artillery,

with the exception of a section of two Napoleon guns, did not participate

in the battle. Forrest’s cavalry was held in reserve on the flanks, Gen.

Forrest himself being with the infantry during the charge.

Gen. Schofield’s force was composed of the Fourth Corps, which was

officially reported ten days after the battle to have numbered 14,172

men, the Twenty-third Corps, 10,207 men, and the Forty-fourth Missouri

and Seventy-second Illinois unassigned. A Federal officer present stated

that they had more men than could stand at the works, the lines being in

some places six deep, those in rear loading for those in front.

The spirit of the Confederate troops, while not enthusiastic, was good.

While waiting the completion of the formation, the men of the regiments

first in line were quietly discussing the probable issue of the impending

battle; some with an eye to the future were picking white beans from the

dead vines in a field in our front; others, no less industrious, were

eating every crumb in their haversacks. Among the latter was poor Brown

of Co. K, who, on being remonstrated with for his imprudence, replied

that he would be killed; his forebodings proved too correct; one hour

later he was dead.

About half-past three the command “Attention!” ran quietly along

Stewart’s lines; a detail was ordered to the front to throw down a rail

fence, and then came the orders “Forward!” “Double quick!” For two

hundred yards the advance was through a corn-field, the dead stalks

of which, of giant dimensions, were crossed and interlaced in every

direction. When the farther side of the field was reached the command was

halted, moved by the flank to the left, and the alignment corrected. The

enemy’s works were now in full view, and not over a half mile distant.

Immediately in the front of the First Alabama there was a valley with a

small stream of water at the bottom, the descent and ascent on the other

side being quite sharp. An open grove of sugar maples, entirely free

of underbrush, extended to the Federal rifle pits. Away to the right

the rattle of musketry showed that the battle had begun, and the order,

“Skirmishers to the front!” almost immediately followed. The latter moved

rapidly forward, availing themselves of the cover of the large maples and

firing slowly as they advanced. As yet not a bullet had whistled by us,

and it was hard to realize that it was more than a skirmish drill, with

such precision did the men move.

By the time the skirmishers were fifty yards away there came the orders,

“Forward! Double quick!” Down the hill, across the brook, up the slope,

over the railroad; then came the first deadly Yankee greeting—a shrapnel

bursting in the ranks of Co. E, killing and wounding nine men. In three

minutes more the space was covered, the Confederates were past the rifle

pits and in the outer line of the enemy’s works. Most of the Federals

occupying them surrendered and were sent to the rear; many of those who

tried to run back to the main line were shot down.

For an instant the line was halted and the men lay down in the captured

works. Not a stump nor a stone obstructed the open field, on the

farther side of which, behind their entrenchments, lay the main body of

the enemy. To the right the roll of musketry was unintermitted, but

immediately in our front, except from the Federal artillery, there was a

momentary lull. It was but for a moment, then the order “Forward!” was

repeated down the line. The men sprang to their feet, for the first time

in the battle gave the “rebel yell,” and dashed forward, corps, division,

and brigade officers leading in the assault. At the same instant a sheet

of smoke shot out from the earthworks in front, thickening, as volley

after volley poured forth, into a great white bank, but broken every

moment by tongues of flame from the cannon. Looming up above the smoke

in shadowy form, like some old tower, just inside the enemy’s works,

were the huge timbers of a cotton-press; this was the only landmark; all

else was hidden. But few shots were fired by the Confederates as they

dashed forward, for, though there were no orders, each man instinctively

felt that this was to be a struggle man to man. Two Napoleon guns, run

forward by hand on the Columbia pike, kept well up with the line of

battle and were fired steadily. No other artillery on the Confederate

side fired a shot. The roar of the Federal musketry was something never

to be forgotten; not even the Napoleons, nor the siege guns, firing from

the fort on the other side of the river, could be heard distinct from

that terrific volume of sound; yet the Confederates moved forward towards

this death-dealing bank of smoke with all the precision of battalion

drill. At the distance of forty yards from the works the Confederate

line was unbroken and had suffered comparatively little loss. The effect

of this solid, steady charge was such that Federal officers afterwards

acknowledged that they could with difficulty keep their men from going

to the rear. When within forty yards the enemy’s fire began to tell,

and the Confederates fell rapidly. The enemy fired remarkably low, due,

it is said, to their simply laying their muskets on the slope of the

parapet and pulling the trigger without exposing themselves to take aim.

At last the ditch was reached; some of the assailants dashed through the

embrasures of the battery; others tried to clamber over the parapet,

and others exchanged shots with the Federals under the head logs. Men

were brained with butts of muskets or bayonetted on the parapet, while

the flanking fire of the angles soon filled the ditch with the dead and

dying; a few got inside of the works unscathed and were taken prisoners.

Just to the left of the pike the Confederates broke the Federal line, and

for a short time held one of their batteries, but the Federal reserve

charged, and after a desperate struggle regained possession. This was the

situation at dark: the opposing forces confronting one another, with but

a bank of earth between, like two stags of the forest head to head and

antlers locked. Johnston’s division coming up at 7, P. M., made a gallant

effort to turn the evenly-balanced scale, but only added to Hood’s

already appalling losses. About 9, P. M., the firing slackened and the

roar of musketry gradually died away, but was renewed at intervals as one

or the other side perceived or suspected some movement of its foe.

So soon as the Federals were satisfied that the assault was over, they

commenced quietly to withdraw, and by 3 o’clock the next morning they

were safely across the river.

Daylight revealed to the Confederates their fearful loss; in front

of some portions of the works the ground was covered with the dead.

Report at the time placed the Confederate loss at 1,500 killed and 3,000

wounded. Hood, in his despatches from the battle-field, gave his loss at

4,500 killed, wounded and prisoners, the last being estimated at 1,000.

Swinton, the historian, gives the Confederate loss as 1,739 killed, 3,850

wounded and 702 prisoners; total, 6,201. This would, in a measure, agree

with Hood’s own statement in “Advance and Retreat,” where he places his

total losses from all causes, from November 6th to December 10th, 7,547;

this includes the losses at Columbia and in Forrest’s skirmishes. It

will thus be seen that nearly one-third of those engaged were killed

and wounded, and that one-tenth were killed. Probably there never was a

battle fought on the American continent, between civilized armies, where

the slaughter was so great as in Hood’s army. The Federals reported their

loss at 189 killed, 1,033 wounded and 1,104 prisoners; total, 2,326.

Their report of killed is, in the writer’s opinion, understated, though

the total may be correct. It was reported at the time that 300 Federal

dead lay in the rear of the centre, where the heaviest fighting took

place.

The casualties among the Confederate general officers were unparalleled,

and their reckless exposure of their lives was the general subject of

comment in the army. Nearly all went into the charge mounted, and Gens.

Cleburne and Adams were killed while trying to spur their horses over the

breastworks. Maj.-Gen. P. R. Cleburne and Brig.-Gens. Gist, John Adams,

Strahl and Granberry were killed; Maj.-Gen. Brown and Brig.-Gens. Carter,

Marrigault, Quarles, Cockrell and Scott wounded, and Brig.-Gen. Gordon

was captured. Of Gen. Quarles’ staff all were killed and wounded but the

General’s son, a lad of fourteen, who seized the brigade flag when the

color-bearer fell, and bore it inside the enemy’s works. Dismounted in

the melee, he tore the flag from the staff, concealed it under his coat

and got safely out with it.

Of Co. K, eleven men went into the charge; of these, two were killed,

four wounded and two taken prisoners. Private C. W. Brown was shot

through the heart, Private J. W. May was killed on breastworks by the

butt of a musket, Lieut. Smith received a ball in the face, breaking the

lower jaw, when near the main line of the enemy; Sergt. C. H. Royals was

shot in the knee in the ditch and captured, but left behind when the

enemy retreated; Serg. Averheart was wounded in the abdomen by a pistol

bullet; Corp. Tunnell was shot through one thigh and across the other;

Private W. L. Ellis was captured in the ditch, and Private J. C. Hearn

sprang through the embrasure of the battery and was captured inside the

enemy’s lines. He relates that he placed his hand on the 12-pounder as

he went in, and that it was so hot that it burned him. Corp. Rice and

Privates A. D. Ellis and John Killough escaped unhurt. Of the members

of Co. K not in the charge three were detailed, three were in the rear,

footsore, barefoot or sick, and one—E. Hearn—had accidentally shot

himself through the hand. A singular fatality followed the members of the

Brown family in Co. K. There were three brothers—A. Pinkney, Elnathan

and C. Wesley Brown—and a brother-in-law, J. A. Fergerson. The first two

died of disease, and the last two were killed in battle. All were good

men and brave, reliable soldiers. A fourth brother—Richard—who belonged

to another command, lost an arm in battle. The loss in the regiment was

about 150 out of 300 engaged. The color-guard were all killed or wounded.

Lieut. Crymes, of Co. I, went over the entrenchments, and, refusing to

surrender, was shot dead while waving his sword and calling to his men

to follow. Maj. Knox was mortally wounded, Capt. Williams was taken

prisoner, and the command of the remnant of the regiment devolved upon

Lieut. McRae.

Corp. Rice collected together, on the morning after the battle, six men

of Co. K, viz.: Privates T. M. Boggan, Day, A. D. Ellis, Killough, Martin

and John Tunnell, and proceeded with the regiment to Nashville, where,

some days later, O. Sergt. Alexander and private Moncrief rejoined the

command.

Companies C and K were now united, and Orderly-Sergt. Alexander, of Co.

K, was placed in command; Sergt. Blaylock, of Co. C, being second. The

weather was extremely cold, and as nearly all the remnant of Co. K were

barefoot and thinly clad, they suffered severely.

On December 15th, the first day of the battle of Nashville, Stewart’s

corps occupied the left of Hood’s army. The First Alabama was stationed

on the left flank of the corps, at right angles to the main line,

behind a stone wall on the Hillsboro’ pike. In response to a call for

sharpshooters, Sergt. Alexander detailed T. M. Boggan, Killough and

Moncrief to go to an outlying redoubt on the extreme left. The ground

was covered with snow and ice. Late in the evening the enemy advanced in

two heavy lines on the left, and, overlapping the Confederates, captured

the redoubt, and appeared in the rear of the stonewall. The First had up

to this time successfully held their ground against the attack in front,

but now had to fall back, a considerable number being captured. Of Co.

K, Moncrief was captured in the redoubt, and Sergt. Alexander, Corp. Rice

and Private A. D. Ellis at the stonewall. T. M. Boggan, in attempting

to leave the redoubt, was seriously wounded in the thigh and captured;

he recovered from his wounds, and remained at Camp Chase till the war

closed. Day, Killough, Martin and John Tunnell succeeded in escaping. The

“First” was hotly engaged again on the 16th, and in the two days lost

some 75 killed, wounded and prisoners.

The retreat from Tennessee abounds with incidents, but they belong either

to the history of the army or to personal experience. Gen. Walthall

commanded the rear-guard, of which Gen. Obdycke, the Northern officer

who restored Schofield’s broken lines at Franklin, says:—“The rear-guard

remained firm, and did its work bravely to the last.... Walthall and

Forrest selected one position after another with such unerring judgment

that even Wilson and Wood were unable to gain any important advantage

during a period of twelve days, and over a distance of 100 miles.” As in

the advance, so in the retreat, the ragged remnant of the First Alabama

was always ready for duty—“faithful even unto death.”

The following letter from Gen. E. C. Walthall to the writer testifies to

their services:—

“GRENADA, Miss., April 20, 1885.

“MY DEAR SIR:—Your letter written to me at Washington was

mislaid but not forgotten. Gen. Quarles’ brigade was with us

on the retreat from Nashville, and the First Alabama Regiment

was along. The rear-guard was composed of eight brigades, but

they were all so small that I temporarily consolidated them in

four. Quarles’ and Featherston’s were put in one, commanded by

Gen. Featherston. The troops all behaved splendidly, and their

services were all of great value.

“Your friend truly,

“E. C. WALTHALL.”

Wounded men got out as best they could, many hobbling along the frozen

pikes on crutches. Among these were all the members of Co. K wounded

at Franklin. Shoal Creek, a stream swollen at that time to formidable

proportions, seemed at one time to have cut off the retreat of the

cripples, but kind-hearted cavalrymen carried those across who could not

wade. It was nearly 100 yards wide, with a rocky bottom full of holes. In

one instance, seen by the writer, a mule slipping threw a cripple into

water nearly to his armpits; but the soldier held on to his crutches,

and without assistance finally hobbled ashore. A cavalryman who had

already carried several over returned, against the remonstrances of his

companions, and took the writer across. The next morning, Saturday,

December 24, the crowd of wounded men were ferried across the Tennessee

in pontoon boats at a point near Florence, Ala., and were safe.

The First Alabama arrived at Verona, Miss., on January 16, 1865; thence

they were ordered to report to Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, in North

Carolina. Six of Co. K were with the regiment: Corp. Josiah Tunnell,

Privates Griffin, Killough, Martin, Robinson and John Tunnell. The

regiment, numbering about 100 men, participated in the last two battles

of the war, Averysboro and Bentonville. On the last day of the second

battle, at sundown, Lieut. William Williamson, Co. C, a gallant Christian

gentlemen, was mortally wounded. The First Alabama was present, and

ended its untarnished career at the surrender of Gen. Johnston’s army at

Greensboro’, N. C., on the 27th of April, 1865. Those of Co. K present at

the surrender arrived at Prattville about the middle or last of May, but

it was about the 1st of July before all the scattered band got to their

homes.

John Killough, John and Josiah Tunnell won the honorable distinction of

being present when the company was mustered in and when it was disbanded.

If the writer remembers correctly, the first two mentioned were never

absent during the three years of service except when the main body of the

regiment were prisoners of war or paroled. The last named of the three

was also present except for two brief intervals, during one of which he

was at the hospital, wounded.

Death, wounds, disease and imprisonment—the sad fortunes of war—kept

others from sharing this honor.

Company K, First Alabama Regiment; or, Three Years in the Confederate Service · 第 11 / 12 章