CHAPTER XVII

THE LAST YEAR'S WORK

(1886-1887)

The sudden and unexpected declaration in September of the Union of

Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia which caused so much perturbation in

Europe, and resulted in a war between Servia and Bulgaria, left the

French quite indifferent; but the imminence of hostilities between

England and Burmah provoked French ill-humour, which was all the

more inexcusable because no protest had ever been made against

French proceedings in Tonquin and Madagascar. The truth was that the

Burmese resistance to the Indian Government was largely due to French

encouragement. As far back as 1883 a Burmese Mission had arrived in

Paris, and kept studiously aloof from the British Embassy; and although

every opportunity had been taken to impress upon the French Government

the peculiar relations between Burmah and British India, there was not

the least doubt that the object of the Burmese had been to obtain from

the French Government such a Treaty as would enable them to appeal

to France in the event of their being involved in difficulties with

England. How much encouragement they actually received is not known, but

it was probably sufficient to effect their undoing.

The papers are abusing us about Burmah, and being quite

innocent of any aggression themselves in that part of the world,

are horrified at our holding our own there. Nevertheless, I hope

the Indian Government will finish the thing out of hand, for an

ugly state of feeling about it is growing up here.

The rapidity with which the operations against Burmah were conducted

left nothing to be desired. The campaign was over within a few weeks;

on January 1, 1886, the annexation of Burmah was proclaimed, and the

affairs of that country ceased to be of any further interest to the

French Government.

Lord Salisbury's tenure of the Foreign Office, which had been marked

by so successful a policy that even Mr. Gladstone had expressed

satisfaction, came to an end early in 1886, and he was succeeded by Lord

Rosebery. 'The irony of events,' wrote the latter to Lord Lyons, 'has

sent me to the Foreign Office, and one of the incidents of this which

is most agreeable to me, is that it brings me into close relations with

yourself.'

Although the Paris press had circulated a ridiculous fiction that Lord

Rosebery (presumably because he was personally acquainted with Bismarck)

was anti-French by inclination, the change of Government in England was

received in France with perfect equanimity, as had been the case in the

previous autumn.

The new Foreign Secretary, however, could not fail to be painfully

impressed by the unsatisfactory feeling which obviously existed in

France towards England, and found it difficult of explanation.

* * * * *

_Lord Rosebery to Lord Lyons._

March 3, 1886.

I am rather anxious about the attitude of the French. In

my short tenure of office they have brought up three or four

questions, all in the highest degree distasteful to us.

1. The Consul at Suakim: as to which they say, with accuracy

which is disputed, that they had gone too far and could not

withdraw the appointment.

2. Arbitration on the Somali coast troubles: as to which they

declare that Salisbury promised it, which Salisbury, I understand,

denies.

3. The revival of the Suez Canal Commission.

4. The announcement made to me by Waddington yesterday that

they should be obliged shortly to send a cargo of recidivists to

the Isle of Pines. I remonstrated strongly with him, and indeed

I cannot foresee all the consequences, should they carry their

intention into effect. One, however, I do clearly perceive, which

is that we should have to denounce the Postal Convention of 1856,

which gives the Messageries privileges in Australian ports, which

could not be sustained, and which the colonists would not for a

moment, under such circumstances, respect.

But these are details. What I want to point out is the

apparent animus displayed in these different proceedings. I shall

not mention them to my colleagues until I hear your view of them,

and anything you may be able to collect on the subject.

What does it all mean? These things did not occur during the

late Government? Are they directed against the new Administration?

I cannot view them as a chapter of accidents.

As for myself, I have entered upon this office with the most

sincere wish to be friendly with France. There can be no earthly

reason why we should not be so. It is a pity, therefore, that our

cordiality should be poisoned at its source.

I wish you would let me know what you think of all this. You

can pick up much directly, and perhaps even more indirectly, on

these points. Pray forgive the length of this letter.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, March 5, 1886.

I have naturally been on the watch since you came into office

for indications of the feelings of the French Government respecting

the change. In answer to your letter of the day before yesterday,

asking my opinion, I can only say that I think the French are quite

as well disposed towards the new Government as they were to the

late one--indeed, of the two, I should say better. We come so much

into contact with the French all over the globe that questions

more or less unpleasant are always arising in smaller or greater

numbers, according to circumstances; and French feeling is in a

chronic state of irritability about Egypt.

The four subjects you mention are certainly annoying, but I do

not believe that the French proceedings respecting them have been

actuated by any animus against the present English Ministry.

I shall be somewhat staggered in this opinion, however, if the

French Government proposes to substitute arbitration by any third

Power for the understanding that the Somali coast questions shall

be treated by friendly negotiations between the two Governments,

and that meanwhile the _status quo_ shall not be disturbed. With a

view to proceeding with the negotiation, M. Waddington proposed to

Lord Salisbury on Jan. 20th, and by a written note the next day,

that an inquiry should be made on the spot by two Commissioners,

one English and one French. Lord Salisbury received the verbal

proposal favourably, but did not at the moment give a definitive

answer.

The proposal to reassemble the Suez Canal Commission is simply

the renewal of a proposal made by M. Waddington to Lord Salisbury

at the beginning of January.

The most serious of the affairs you mention appears to me to

be the imminent despatch of a cargo of _récidivistes_ to the Isle

of Pines. I have seen from the beginning the importance of this

_récidiviste_ question as regards public feeling in Australia,

and there is hardly any question about which I have taken so much

trouble. I have attacked successive French Ministers upon it in

season and out of season, but I have never succeeded in obtaining

any promise that _récidivistes_ should not be sent to the Pacific.

As I reported to you, I remonstrated with Freycinet about the

intention actually to send off a batch, as soon as I became aware

of it. I did not perceive any difference in his manner or language

from what they had been when some other Ministers had been in

office in England, but my remonstrances were equally ineffectual. I

am glad you had an opportunity of speaking strongly to Waddington.

I see troubles ahead, for the Australians have before now

threatened to pass Dominion laws against French ships found to have

escaped convicts on board, which seem to go a good deal beyond

international usage, not to say law.

It is time, however, for me to wind up this long story. My

answer to your question is that I am far from thinking that there

is any _malus animus_ against Her Majesty's present Government on

the part of Freycinet and his Cabinet. Nor do I know that there is

more than the usual irritability towards England among the French

public; but still I feel strongly that it behoves us to tread

cautiously as well as firmly, when we are coming upon French ground.

The spring of 1886 was noticeable for another Government onslaught

upon such members of ex-reigning families as were then residing in

France. Of these the most conspicuous were the Orleans Princes. There

was nothing in their conduct to cause alarm to the Republic, as they

confined themselves to taking part in social functions, at which they

maintained a kind of semi-state, being always attended by ladies and

gentlemen-in-waiting after the manner of recognized Royal personages.

This innocent procedure was sufficient excuse to work up an agitation

against them, and to introduce an Expulsion Bill.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, May 25, 1886.

The question of the day is the expulsion of the Princes. The

measure, if taken, will be quite unjustifiable, discreditable to

the Government, and, I should say, not at all injurious to the

cause of the victims. Considering the people and the institutions

with which they had to deal, the partisans of the Orleans Princes

have not been so prudent and correct as the Princes themselves.

They have gone about twitting the Republicans with weakness for

permitting the very mild demonstration made by the Royalists, and

declaring that such want of vigour was simply a sign of the decay

of the Republic.

* * * * *

The general opinion is that the Expulsion Bill will pass in

its present, or even in an aggravated form, and that if it does,

the Government will proceed to expel the Comte de Paris at least,

if not the Duc de Chartres, and some others. On the other hand, it

is not expected that the Bill confiscating the property, real and

personal, of the Orleans and Bonapartes will be adopted.

Much anxiety is felt respecting Boulanger's goings on with

respect to the army. He seems to think of nothing but currying

favour with the lowest ranks in the service, and with the mob

outside. It is believed by many people that he would not act

vigorously, as Minister of War, against any disturbances, but would

try to turn them to account and set up for himself as dictator or

what not.

The financial situation is very bad, and if common scandal is

to be listened to, the very short duration of French Ministries is

having the effect of making most of the individual Ministers very

unscrupulous and very impatient to make hay during the very short

time that the sun shines.

The above letter contains one of the first allusions to the enterprising

impostor Boulanger, who very nearly succeeded in making history, and

of whom much was to be heard for some considerable space of time. His

popularity was due in great measure to the vague discontent which

was then prevalent in France. People thought that they saw the same

inefficiency in the Government, the same relaxation of authority, the

same financial difficulties, and the same venality which marked the last

days of the Second Empire. There seemed to be no individual, in or out

of the Royal or Imperial Dynasties, capable of exciting any enthusiasm

or of inspiring any confidence, and public feeling was in that state of

lassitude and dissatisfaction which might give a reasonable chance for a

bold stroke for power.

The scandalous Expulsion Bill passed both Chambers, and the Princes took

their departure.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, June 25, 1886.

The departure of the Comte de Paris from Eu has been

accompanied by many very sad circumstances, but I cannot help

thinking that his political position is improved by his expulsion.

His own partisans are much pleased at its having elicited from

him a distinct assertion of a claim to the throne, and of a

determination to work for the restoration of monarchy.

It is less easy to give an opinion on the position of the

Princes who have remained in France. It seems to be hardly

compatible with dignity and comfort, considering the unabated

hostility to them of the Reds, who seem generally to end in

overpowering all generous and conservative feelings in the Chambers

and in the Government.

Prince Napoleon and his son Prince Victor went off in opposite

directions, one to Geneva, the other to Brussels. The departure of

neither seems to have made much apparent sensation in Paris when

it took place, but I am far from certain that Prince Victor is not

really a more formidable opponent to the Republic than is the Comte

de Paris.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, July 2, 1886.

* * * * *

The topic of the day here is the conduct of the Minister of

War, General Boulanger. He was supposed to be an Orleanist. Then

he went round to Clémençeau, and was put into Freycinet's Cabinet

as a representative of the Clémençeau party, which though not the

most Red in the Chamber, is more Red than the Freycinet section.

Since he has been in office Boulanger has lost no opportunity of

ingratiating himself with the Radicals, and he has been travelling

about the country making speeches, the object of which has

evidently been to gain personal popularity for himself without

regard to his colleagues.

He has also by degrees put creatures of his own into the

great military commands. A crisis was produced, during the last

few days, by his quarrelling with General Saussier, the military

Governor of Paris, and provoking him into resigning. He is also

said to have used strange language in the Council of Ministers. At

any rate, President Grévy and the Ministers seem to have thought

they would be more comfortable at Paris without having a satellite

of Boulanger as Governor, and they have insisted upon declining

Saussier's resignation. From the way people talk, one would think

that the questions were whether Boulanger is aiming at being a

Cromwell or a Monk, and if a Monk, which dynasty he will take up.

There is a good deal of alarm here about foreign affairs. The

reports of a large concentration of Russian troops in Bessarabia

are supposed to confirm other indications that Russia is meditating

a revenge for the check she has sustained with regard to Bulgaria.

This, it is supposed, must bring Austria into the field. Moreover,

Bismarck does not seem to be in an amiable mood towards France;

and with or without instigation from him, Germans talk as if war

was inevitable.

Then the Republic here has lasted sixteen years, and that is

about the time which it takes to make the French tired of a form of

Government. The Republic has not been successful financially, and

trade and agriculture are not prosperous, nor is the reputation of

the Republican administration high for purity or efficiency.

So there is plenty to croak about for those who are inclined

to croak.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Paris, July 13, 1886.

The regular session of the French Chambers is to be closed the

day after to-morrow, and the Chambers are to spend to-morrow at

the Review at Longchamps, and I suppose to take part in the other

nuisances which makes Paris insupportable on a National Fête day.

I conclude the Chambers will come back in October for an extra

session as usual. In fact, they have not yet voted the Budget; or,

I had almost said, any useful measure. In Commercial matters and

indeed in everything relating to intercourse with other countries,

they have shown the narrowest and most exclusive spirit. Their

great feat has been the law for the persecution of the Princes,

which seems to be carried out as harshly as possible. I should

not have said that the literal wording of the law necessitated

or even justified the dismissal from the army of Princes who

already belonged to it, but I suppose that was the intention of

the legislators. The Duc d'Aumale's letter to the President is a

powerful document, but was sure to lead to his expulsion, and was

perhaps intended to have that effect.

Among people who ought to have good information from abroad,

the alarm as to a war this autumn seems stronger than among

the French politicians who confine themselves more closely to

considering French feeling at home. Certainly it comes round to

one in various ways from Germany that war is very generally

expected, or at all events talked of there. The accounts current

in Germany of supposed French provocations look as if there was

a party there trying to work up hostile feeling against France.

An alliance between France and Russia seems to be the bugbear. I

don't see symptoms at present of any war spirit in this country;

but of course a quarrel between Russia and Germany would be a great

temptation to French Chauvinism.

The abhorred annual fête of July 14, 1886, possessed an interest which

had been wanting previously, and has never since been renewed. This

was due to the presence of a number of troops at the Longchamps Review

who had just returned from Tonquin, and to the excitement caused by

the first appearance of Boulanger at a big military display in Paris.

Notwithstanding the inflated rubbish which was published the next day in

the French press, there could not be the least doubt that the Tonquin

troops were received without the slightest enthusiasm. In Paris the

very word 'Tonquin' was hated; the country was associated with loss of

life, and with heavy taxation, and nothing could have expressed more

eloquently the disenchantment produced by a Spirited Colonial Policy,

than the chilling reception accorded to these returned soldiers. The

enthusiasm which should have been bestowed upon these humble instruments

was lavished upon the charlatan who at that moment was the most

prominent and popular figure in the eye of the French public.

The military mountebank (aptly christened by Jules Ferry, 'a music

hall St. Arnaud') had, with some foresight, provided himself with a

high-actioned black circus horse, and those who were present on the

occasion will never forget the moment when he advanced to salute the

President, and other notabilities established in the official Tribune.

Only a few days before, it was currently believed, he had terrified his

ministerial colleagues by appearing at a Cabinet Council in uniform,

and now as he pranced backwards or forwards on the circus horse and the

public yelled their acclamations, President Grévy and the uninteresting

crowd of bourgeois ministers and deputies who surrounded him, seemed

visibly to quiver and flinch as shuddering memories of December 2 and

other _coups d'état_ obtruded themselves upon their recollections.

From that day Boulanger became a dangerous man; the circus horse

had done the trick; the general embodied in the public fancy the

_clinquant_, for which the French had so long been sighing in secret;

_l'homme qui monte à cheval_ in place of _l'homme qui monte à la

tribune_, and for a long time he survived even that ridicule which in

France is supposed to kill more effectively than elsewhere. Even when

he engaged in a duel with an elderly and short-sighted civilian, M.

Floquet, and was decisively worsted, he continued to remain a popular

hero.

Lord Rosebery, upon whom the unreasonable ill-feeling then constantly

shown by the French towards England had made a painful impression,

had realized in May that the Gladstone Government was doomed, and

had wisely decided in consequence that a process of marking time

was preferable to embarking upon anything in the nature of a heroic

policy. Upon his retirement and the formation of a new administration,

Lord Lyons experienced what was probably the greatest surprise of his

life in the shape of the following letter from Lord Salisbury. In

order to reinforce its arguments the late Lord Currie, then Permanent

Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, was sent over with it to

Paris.

[Illustration: _General Boulanger._

LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD.]

* * * * *

Confidential. July 26, 1886.

I accepted yesterday the Queen's commission to form a

Government. It is a task full of difficulties; and I would have

gladly seen Lord Hartington undertake it. This, however, he could

not be induced to do; and the duty falls upon me. One of my first

thoughts is to provide a Foreign Secretary for the new Government:

for I could not, with any hope of carrying it through successfully,

repeat the experiment of last summer by uniting the Foreign

Secretaryship with the Premiership.

There is no one possessing the experience and knowledge of

Foreign Affairs which you have, and no one whose appointment would

exercise so great a moral authority in Europe. And we certainly

have not in our political ranks any one who could claim a tithe of

the fitness for the office which every one would acknowledge in

your case. I earnestly hope the proposal may be not unacceptable to

you. If that should happily be the case, a great difficulty in our

way will have been most successfully removed.

As there is much to be said on the matter which it would be

too long to write, Currie has very kindly undertaken to take this

letter over and discuss the matter with you. We have talked it over

very fully.

If you should be in need of any interval of repose, I could

easily take the seals for a few weeks.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris. July 27, 1886.

Currie brought me your letter early this morning. In answer to

it I sent you at 11.30 a.m. the following telegram:--

'I am very much gratified, and I am very grateful for the kind

consideration with which your proposal is accompanied, but my

age and the state of my health make it quite impossible for me to

undertake the office.'

I hope I need not assure you that I am fully sensible of the

kindness of your letter, and that if I cannot feel that I merit all

you say of me, I am at least grateful for your good opinion.

The truth is, that I could not now undertake new and laborious

duties with any confidence that I could discharge them efficiently.

I feel the need of rest, and I am not equal to beginning a new

life of hard work. I could not conscientiously assume the great

responsibility which would be thrown upon me.

If the post of Foreign Secretary has ever been offered during the

last hundred years to any other person outside the ranks of orthodox

party politicians the secret has been well kept, and it might perhaps

be suggested that few people would be found with sufficient strength

of mind to decline so glittering a prize. Lord Lyons, however, as is

sufficiently evident, found no difficulty in at once deciding upon the

refusal of an offer which the ordinary mediocrity would have accepted

with avidity. In the above letter he founded his refusal upon grounds

of age and ill-health, and in private he used to express the opinion

that after the age of forty a man's faculties began and continued to

deteriorate. But it is not in the least likely that he would have

accepted the honour which it was proposed to bestow upon him, at any

period of his life. His extreme modesty and diffidence have already

been dwelt upon, but a more valuable quality than these is a man's

realization of his own limitations, and it is probable that Lord Lyons,

by the exercise of his exceptionally impartial judgment, was able to

form a more correct opinion as to his own potentialities than Lord

Salisbury. A thorough and profound knowledge of foreign politics is

not the sole necessary qualification of an English Foreign Secretary;

had such been the case, Lord Lyons would have been an ideal occupant

of the post; but in England, where the value of Ministers is gauged

chiefly by the fallacious test of oratorical capacity, the Foreign

Secretary is constantly obliged to make speeches in defence of or in

explanation of his policy, and although the House of Lords is the

most long-suffering and good-natured assembly in the world, it would

have been no easy task for a man of sixty-nine, who had never put two

sentences together in public, to suddenly appear in Parliament as the

representative of one of the most important departments, to say nothing

of public meetings, deputations, banquets, etc. It may also be doubted

whether, in spite of his many admirable qualities, he was really adapted

for the post. All his life, he had been merely an instrument--a highly

efficient instrument--of the existing Government, and had received

instructions, which had invariably been carried out with singular skill

and intelligence. But the responsibility had not been his, and as

Foreign Secretary the initiative as well as the responsibility which

would have rested upon him might have imposed too formidable a strain

upon one of so cautious a temperament. Taking into consideration these

doubts, his advanced age, failing health, and the effect of depression

caused by the recent death of his much loved sister, the Dowager Duchess

of Norfolk, the refusal of the Foreign Office by Lord Lyons was only an

additional instance of that robust common sense which was one of his

most pronounced characteristics. Lord Rosebery, at all events, thought

that he had decided wisely.

* * * * *

_Lord Rosebery to Lord Lyons._

Dalmeny, Aug. 10, 1886.

As my Foreign Office episode is at an end, I write a line of

good-bye, not as a Minister, but on the footing of what I hope I

may call friendship.

My six months' experience has led me to the conviction that

our relations with France are really more troublesome than with

any other Power. She is always wanting something of us which it is

impossible to give her, and she then says plaintively, 'You never

do anything for me.' She is quite oblivious of the fact that she

never loses the opportunity of playing us a trick. Witness the

secret expedition to the New Hebrides. Nothing would have induced

me to go on with any one of the negotiations with Waddington until

they had removed their troops from those islands. Whenever he asked

for an answer about anything, I always turned the conversation

round to that interesting spot.

With this conviction, therefore, it has been a great comfort

to feel that you were at Paris.

I am not surprised that you did not care about my succession!

It is a weary post.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Rosebery._

Heron's Ghyll, Uckfield, Aug. 17, 1886.

Your friendly letter has followed me here and has much

gratified me.

I think you must look back with great satisfaction to your

time at the Foreign Office. You have certainly won golden opinions

from your subordinates and from the world at large, which is

perhaps a less competent judge. My own official intercourse with

you was certainly both very pleasant to me and very satisfactory.

I attribute the difficulties with France more to the

inevitable consequences of our coming into contact with the French

in all parts of the world, than to any ill-will on either side,

although I do not pretend to say that the state of feeling is what

I could wish it to be.

Independently of any other considerations, I felt altogether

too old to undertake the Foreign Office. I was so convinced of

this, that I regarded it as what the French call an objection

_préjudicielle_ to entertaining the question at all.

The post which Lord Lyons had declined was accepted by Lord Iddesleigh,

who had just been removed from the House of Commons, and, as was only

natural, it is evident that he was in the habit of consulting Lord

Salisbury before taking any step of importance. In October, 1886, with

the concurrence of Lord Salisbury, Lord Lyons was instructed to approach

the French Government on the question of Egypt, and to explain the

conditions under which it would be possible to terminate the British

military occupation. There seems to be absolutely no doubt that Her

Majesty's Government were perfectly sincere and honestly desirous of

carrying out the promises that had been made at various times, and as

subsequent history showed, it was the misguided opposition of France and

Russia which was as much responsible as anything else for the permanent

British occupation of Egypt.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Oct. 22, 1886.

In my previous letter of to-day I have told you what M. de

Freycinet said to me about the Suez Canal Convention. I had a long

interview with him, but though I gave him plenty of opportunities,

he did not say one other word about Egypt. This being the case,

I thought it prudent to abstain, at all events at this first

interview, from saying anything on my side. So far then I have not

made known to him any part of the contents of your letter to Lord

Salisbury of the 18th or of his telegraphic answer.

The fact is, that from what I have made out since I came back

here, I am led to think that the French Government have now good

reason to doubt whether they would get Bismarck's support if they

raised the Egyptian question with a view to embarrass us. This

being the case, they are very much hesitating to do so, and are

on the look-out for signs of our impressions on the subject, and

would interpret any appearance of unusual anxiety on our part, or

any fresh offers of concessions from us, simply as indications

that we still thought Germany might join against us. If the French

Government are not pretty sure of help and sympathy from abroad,

they will probably not stir in the matter.

In the meantime, however, the press has been strongly excited,

probably by d'Aunay and Charmes. There is a very nasty article,

principally about the financial part of the Egyptian question, in

the _Débuts_ this morning.

I shall perhaps be able to see my way more clearly in a day or

two. In the meantime I am disposed to think the most prudent plan

will be to be reserved and firm about Egypt, but not to display

anxiety on the subject.

The idea of Lord Salisbury, speaking generally, was that a somewhat

distant date of evacuation should be foreshadowed; that if evacuation,

as was fully intended, should be carried out, some return should be

expected for the expenditure of British blood and treasure, and that

the Suez Canal difficulty should be settled without further delay. He

considered that the negotiations should be carried on with the Porte

(Sir Henry Drummond Wolff had already been despatched on this mission),

and that confidential communications should be made to France and

Germany.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Oct. 26, 1886.

I shall be very anxious to know what line Waddington took on

his return to his post, and particularly what, if anything, he said

about Egypt.

Freycinet is the man chiefly responsible for the refusal of

France to join in our expedition to Egypt, and this no doubt makes

him very anxious to gain for himself the credit of some striking

success in getting England out of that country. So far as I can

make out here, the attempts that have been made to get the Powers

to unite in calling for a general Conference upon Egyptian affairs

have not met with much success. If Bismarck decidedly opposes

attempts of this kind, they will no doubt be abandoned. The Press

continue to urge strong measures against our continuing in Egypt,

and is not measured in its language.

The autumn session is often fatal to French Ministers. I

recollect Gambetta's saying to me not long before his own fall:

'_En automne les feuilles tombent et les porte-feuilles aussi._'

It is more than likely that the instructions which M. Waddington

received about this period were of a disagreeable nature. A well-known

French Ambassador once remarked to me some years later, that the London

Embassy was no very desirable post from the French diplomatist's point

of view. 'We are sent there with the mission of getting the English out

of Egypt, and the thing cannot be done!'

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Nov. 23, 1886.

Freycinet's aim seems to be to improve his own position in

the Chambers and in the country by obtaining our withdrawal from

Egypt, and of course the object cannot be attained unless he can

make it appear that the withdrawal is his doing. Hence his strong

desire that we should negotiate with him and his dislike to our

negotiating with Turkey or any other Power.

The crushing defeat of the Right in the elections in the

Department of the Nord is another proof of their blindness in

misusing the chance they had after the general election. They might

possibly have led gradually up to a restoration by giving strength

to Conservative principles and measures. They could only discredit

themselves by joining the extreme Radicals and attempting to

produce mischief and confusion.

The Germans are either very dilatory, or they have some

_arrière pensée_ about the Zanzibar affair. Yesterday afternoon

Münster was still without any instructions to make the joint

invitation to the French.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Dec. 3, 1886.

You will see by my despatch that Freycinet has again attacked

me about Egypt. He wants the negotiation to go through him, and

if possible to be made with him, independently of the Turks, or

at least virtually in conjunction with us. I have not yet seen

any symptoms of his being anxious really to help us in Egyptian

matters; and I am not generally favourable to carrying on parallel

negotiations, or the same negotiation in different places. The

danger of informal conversations between Freycinet and me is that,

however cautious I may be, he may somehow or other find occasion

to quote me, as being more _coulant_ than you. At any rate, if I

had to talk to him it would be very necessary for you to tell me

very exactly how far I could go: and above all, that I should be

guarded from holding any language which might by any possibility be

embarrassing to the line circumstances might make it advisable for

Her Majesty's Government to take in Parliament afterwards.

I was long enough at Constantinople to see that no dependence

whatever was to be placed upon what the Porte told an Ambassador

about his colleagues. Still I cannot say that the Turkish

revelation about the communications the Porte affects to receive

from the French and Russian Ambassadors about Egypt and about us,

are, in the face of them, improbable. At any rate, our views must

be much nearer than those we now have to the French ideas, before

we shall get any real help from France at the Porte.

I write, as you know, in ignorance of Wolff's opinion, as he

did not stop here on his way home.

Freycinet's defeat in the Chamber this afternoon is serious

because it followed a strong speech from himself against the

_Sous-Préfet_ abolition, but he has wonderful skill in patching

things up.

Freycinet in December was defeated by one of those combinations of

Royalist and Radicals which were not uncommon in French politics, and

although the absurdity of the situation was obvious to every one,

insisted on placing his resignation and that of the Cabinet in President

Grévy's hands. A change of Government was so useless that even those

who had combined to overthrow Freycinet endeavoured to persuade him

to reconsider his determination. He remained obdurate, however, and

the President, casting about for a successor, pitched at first upon M.

Floquet, a strong Radical who was particularly obnoxious to the Russian

Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Dec. 7, 1886.

The chances seem to be in favour of Floquet being Prime

Minister. He is of the section of the Chamber called 'Gauche

radical,' that is to say, he falls just short of the most extreme

Left. Who would be his Minister for Foreign Affairs and what would

be his foreign policy I do not pretend to say. The incident in

his life most talked about is his having cried out, '_Vive la

Pologne!_' and used some expressions taken as disrespectful to

the late Emperor of Russia, when His Majesty was at the Palais de

Justice, on his visit to Paris during the Exhibition of 1867. The

Russian Ambassadors have, I believe, declined or avoided exchanging

courtesies with him when he has since been in situations, such

as that of _Préfet de la Seine_, and President of the Chamber of

Deputies, which have brought him into communication with the rest

of the diplomatic body. Russia at this moment is paying so much

court to France that she might perhaps get over this.

The Left of the Chamber have hitherto been opposed to the

Tonquin and Madagascar Expeditions and to an adventurous and

Chauvin policy altogether; but if in power they would probably go

in for pleasing the Chamber and the bulk of the people out of doors

even more unreservedly than Freycinet did.

I should have regretted Freycinet's fall more, if he had

not taken up the Egyptian question in the way he did. Our

communications with him on that subject were becoming very

uncomfortable. I am not very sanguine, however, about their being

more satisfactory with his successor.

The notion, however, of having M. Floquet as Prime Minister frightened

every one except the extreme Radicals so much that that gentleman was

unable to form an administration, and the choice of the President

ultimately fell upon a M. Goblet, who was Radical enough for most people

and not much hampered by pledges and declarations. The office of Foreign

Minister remained vacant, but, much to the relief of Lord Lyons, it was

definitely refused by M. Duclerc. Lord Lyons had, by this time, had no

less than twenty-one different French Foreign Ministers to deal with,

and of these Duclerc was the one he liked least. No suitable person

seemed to be available, and it was in vain that, one after the other

French diplomatists were solicited to accept the office. At length a

Foreign Minister was found in M. Flourens, a brother of the well-known

Communist who was killed in 1871. M. Flourens was completely ignorant of

everything concerning foreign affairs, and his appointment was perhaps

an unconscious tribute to the English practice of putting civilians at

the head of our naval and military administrations.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Iddesleigh._

Paris, Dec. 21, 1886.

I have not yet had the means of improving my acquaintance

with Flourens, but I expect to have some conversation with him

to-morrow. He had not a word to say about Bulgaria when I saw him

on Friday. He did not seem to have known anything about foreign

affairs before he took office, nor to expect to stay long enough in

office to become acquainted with them. Some people suppose that he

is to make way for the return of Freycinet as soon as the Budget is

passed. Anyway, the Goblet Ministry is only the Freycinet Ministry

over again without the strongest man, who was undoubtedly Freycinet

himself. When Parliament meets, things will be just as they were.

There will still be in the Chamber 180 Deputies on the Right,

ready to vote any way in order to make mischief and discredit the

Republic; about 100 Deputies on the extreme Left, intimidating the

Government and forcing it into extreme Radical measures, they being

able to count in all emergencies upon getting the vote of the Right

to turn out a Ministry; and lastly there will be 300 remaining

deputies, who cannot agree enough amongst themselves to form a

majority that can be relied upon, who do not at all like violent

radical measures, but who are too nervously afraid of unpopularity

to show resolution in opposing the extreme Left.

So far the Comte de Paris's declaration seems simply to have

made the ultra-Monarchists furiously angry, and not to have induced

any great part of the Right to think of taking the wise course it

recommends.

I do not see any outward signs here of the strained relations

between France and Germany and the imminent war between the two

countries which the _Standard_ announces. But it is true that among

the French themselves some suspicion and distrust of Boulanger's

aims are becoming more apparent.

The hackneyed saying: _Plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose_, was

never more appropriate than in the case of the change from a Freycinet

to a Goblet Government; one section of uninspiring ministers had merely

given place to another, and no one in France seemed in any way the

better for it.

On New Year's Dav, 1887, President Grévy broke out into Latin in

congratulating the Diplomatic Corps on the already long continuance

of peace, but a more accurate view of the situation was expressed by

a French newspaper in the sentence: 'Jamais année nouvelle ne s'est

ouverte au milieu d'autant de promesses de paix et de préparatifs de

guerre que l'année 1887.' 'I do not know,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'which is

the nation which wishes for war. France certainly does not, she is, on

the contrary, very much afraid of it. But one would feel more confidence

in peace if there appeared less necessity in all countries to be

perpetually giving pacific assurances. There are rumours of a defensive

alliance between Russia and France. The bond of union between the two

countries, if it exists, must be simply a common hatred of Germany.'

At the beginning of the year 1887, the Germans professed to be in

dread of an attack from France, while the French complained that they

were threatened by Germany. In France it was believed that in August,

1886, preparations had been actually made to mobilize the German army,

and the language held by Boulanger was to the effect that the military

power of France would be found to be very different to what it was in

1870. Meanwhile an unsuccessful attempt had been made by those two old

Parliamentary hands, Freycinet and Ferry, to get rid of Boulanger, who

was now becoming to be considered as equally dangerous both in France

and Germany.

It was probably the apprehension caused by the presence of this

adventurer, whose incapacity was as yet imperfectly realized, that was

responsible for the state of tension and alarm which prevailed in France

during January and February, 1887.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._[44]

Paris, Jan. 18, 1887.

I saw M. Grévy this morning, and found him, as it seemed to

me, really alarmed at the possibility of France being attacked

by Germany. The only overt act he spoke of, on the part of

Germany, was the increase of the strength of the German garrisons

in the neighbourhood of the French frontier. Grévy himself is

most peaceful, and quite sincerely so. His natural character and

temperament, and his interest too, tend that way. He would hardly

be able to hold his own as President in case of war, and there is

very little chance of France going to war as long as he is the head

of the State. Flourens also spoke to me of danger to France and

Germany when I saw him this afternoon.

I think the alarm of Grévy and Flourens was sincere, though I

do not share it myself at this moment.

In France there is no desire to go to war, and I doubt whether

she is able, or at all events fancies herself able, to cope with

Germany.

It is perhaps more difficult to keep her on good terms

with us. Egypt is a sore which will not heal. There was a nasty

discussion about Newfoundland Fisheries in the Senate yesterday. I

send you a full report officially. Happily, so far, it has not had

much echo in the public.

Alarm with respect to Germany continued to grow, and was fed by private

communications from Bismarck, who sent by unofficial agents messages

to the effect that 'he was all for peace, but that it was impossible

for him to stand the way that France was going on.' These messages came

through Bleichröder and members of the _haute finance_ in Paris, who

expressed the opinion that if Boulanger remained in office, war with

Germany was certain. The _haute finance_ is by no means invariably

correct in its political judgment, but it seems highly probable that the

war scares prevalent in 1887 were promulgated with the object of getting

rid of the troublesome firebrand upon whom so much public attention was

concentrated. The position of Boulanger, however, was a strong one, and

to dislodge him was a work of no slight difficulty. Ever since the day

when he had been taken into Freycinet's Cabinet he had contrived by

adroit advertising to keep himself before the public, and to distinguish

himself from his colleagues as exercising a separate and commanding

influence in the Chambers and with the public. In the army he had

managed to make himself feared by the higher officers and assiduously

courted popularity with the rank and file. In the political world he

had at first been regarded as being ultra democratic, but now excited

suspicion by paying court to the Conservatives, and by endeavouring, not

entirely without success, to obtain their good will.

On the whole, there was a very general impression that he was ambitious,

self-seeking, and thoroughly unscrupulous; but there were few means of

forming an opinion as to what his special plans really were, if indeed

he had formed any. Still he successfully flattered the belief of the

French that they were fast emerging from the eclipse in which their

military power and reputation were involved in 1870, and there were

not wanting those who asserted that he was inclined to seek a war, in

the hope of conducting it with success, and so establishing himself as

a military dictator. Others, influenced by their wishes, indulged in

the hope that he might be meditating a Monarchist restoration under an

Orleanist or Bonapartist Dynasty. Unsubstantial and improbable as these

suppositions may have been, it was plain that in the army and among the

public at large there prevailed a vague notion that he might be the man

of the future, a notion fostered by the absence of any one recognized in

France as possessing conspicuous and commanding abilities, and by the

craving for a real personality after a long succession of second-class

politicians.

The embarrassment with regard to Germany created by the presence of

so disturbing an element in the Government as Boulanger did not,

contrary to what might have been expected, tend to improve Anglo-French

relations, and a letter from Lord Salisbury expresses in forcible

terms his dissatisfaction at difficulties which seemed to have been

gratuitously created.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Feb. 5, 1887.

The French are inexplicable. One would have thought that under

existing circumstances it was not necessary to _make_ enemies--that

there were enough provided for France by nature just now. But

she seems bent upon aggravating the patient beast of burden that

lives here by every insult and worry her ingenuity can devise. In

Newfoundland she has issued orders which, if faithfully executed,

must bring the French and English fleets into collision. At the

New Hebrides, in spite of repeated promises, she will not stir. In

Egypt she baulks a philanthropic change out of pure 'cussedness.'

In Morocco she is engaged in appropriating the territory by

instalments, threatening to reach Tangier at no distant date. And

now, just as we are entering on pacific negotiations, the French

Government sent orders to do precisely that which, a month ago,

Waddington promised they should not do, namely run up the French

flag at Dongorita.[45] It is very difficult to prevent oneself

from wishing for another Franco-German war to put a stop to this

incessant vexation.

We have protested earnestly about Dongorita, which has more

the air of a studied insult than any of the others. As to the

Newfoundland Fisheries, if they execute their threats, they render

the passage of a Bait Bill next year a matter of certainty. We

have strained the good will of the colonists very far in refusing

to allow it this year. The other matters will, I suppose, be the

subject of slow negotiations.

D'Herbette has made at Berlin more practical suggestions as to

naming a date for the annexation of Egypt than we have yet had from

the French Government. I hope the large majorities will persuade

the French that the national feeling is in this instance not in

favour of scuttle.

All that Lord Lyons, who was always most anxious to make the best case

he could for the French, was able to say in their defence, was that he

hoped that it was an exceptionally dark moment, and that there must be a

change shortly for the better.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Feb. 18, 1887.

The French seem to be more confident of peace and altogether

in better spirits than they were a few days ago, but I do not know

that they have any positive facts or distinct information to go

upon. The hopes of a certain number of them rest upon the belief

that the Goblet Ministry is likely to be upset as soon as the

Budget is finally disposed of, and that thus Boulanger will be got

rid of.

The newspaper accounts of Wolff's mission to Constantinople

have brought Egypt on the tapis again, and as anxiety about

Germany falls into the background, irritation against England

comes prominently forward. There are, however, some symptoms of

a return among wiser men to more prudent and reasonable views

respecting the relations of France towards England. These men are

alarmed especially respecting the hostility towards France which is

apparent in Italy, and they see the folly of making enemies on all

sides. If there should be a new Ministry it might possibly pursue

a policy more friendly towards England with regard to Egypt and

other matters. The Egyptian question would no doubt become less

difficult if a change should remove M. Charmes from the Foreign

Office and put into his place, as Political Director there, a man

less prejudiced about Egypt.

In the meantime much amusement has been caused by an escapade

of Madame Flourens. On Saturday last she called upon Countess Marie

Münster, and found with her Count Hoyos, the Austrian Ambassador.

Madame Flourens announced loudly that her husband had resigned

the Foreign Office, because Boulanger had attempted, without his

knowledge, to send a letter direct to the Emperor of Russia by the

French Military Attaché, who was to start for St. Petersburg.

Hoyos fetched Münster himself out of an adjoining room, to hear the

story. Madame Flourens, it appeared, supposed that Flourens was on

the point of announcing his resignation to the Chamber of Deputies.

It turned out, however, that Flourens had made a scene with

Boulanger at the Council of Ministers, had gone away in a huff,

but had been subsequently calmed by M. Grévy and M. Goblet; no

letter to the Emperor had been sent, and the resignation had been

withdrawn. The story had of course spread all over the town. In

defiance of truth, a _communiqué_ contradicting it was inserted in

the _Agence Havas_, with no other effect than that of discrediting

the _communiqués_ which the Government is apt to put into the Havas.

There is so little mention of women in Lord Lyons's correspondence that

Madame Flourens's indiscretion comes as a welcome relief, although in

all probability it got the unfortunate Count Münster into trouble with

Bismarck, and afforded an excuse for fresh bullying. Count Münster,

who had been for many years Ambassador in London, where he had been

extremely popular, found the transfer to Paris singularly unpleasant,

more especially as in order to make things thoroughly uncomfortable for

him, Bismarck had provided an entirely new Embassy Staff.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Feb. 19, 1887.

* * * * *

We are thinking of renewing our negotiations with respect to

the Suez Canal in a serious spirit. But before we sign anything we

shall want some satisfaction about Dongorita and the New Hebrides,

and possibly about the Corvée.

I think it was very shabby of the French to open the Dongorita

affair upon us, just after we had made so material a concession

upon the subject of the bait in Newfoundland.

Waddington is gloomy and rather ill-tempered--either from the

fogs or the crisis. I have not had any further talk with him about

Egypt lately. I think he avoids the subject. Wolff tells me that

the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople is a mere creature

of Nelidoff's. Our negotiations are dragging on with little

prospect of success. We are willing to fix a distant date for our

leaving, if we receive a treaty power to go back whenever internal

or external security are threatened. The tone in which both France

and Turkey have received this proposal may be best expressed by the

colloquial phrase 'Damn their impudence!' I do not expect to carry

what I want at present, but before modifying these terms, I should

like to know what is going to happen in Europe.

Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was at this time at Constantinople endeavouring

to negotiate the Convention with regard to the evacuation of Egypt,

and the French and Russian Embassies were actively engaged in the

senseless opposition which eventually prevented the ratification of the

Convention. The above letter from Lord Salisbury is an additional proof

of the honest desire of the British Government to carry out the rash

undertakings which had been given in the past.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Feb. 25, 1887.

The general feeling here seems to be that war has been

escaped, but still there is a good deal of discontent against the

foreign policy of the Goblet Cabinet. It seems to be considered

that the understanding between Italy, Austria, and Germany is as

good as made, and that the result of it will be to put an end to

any fear of war between Russia and Austria. On the other hand, it

is thought that Russia will feel it too necessary to watch Germany

for it to be prudent of her to make an alliance with France, while

without the alliance of Russia, France of course cannot face

Germany, particularly as she has almost hostility to expect from

Italy and no great sympathy to look for from England. The policy

which has thus isolated France from the other Powers is seen to

have been a mistake, and there seems to be a disposition to throw

the blame on the Goblet Ministry. If the Goblet Ministry should

fall, it is not improbable that the new Government might take

the line of being conciliatory to the neighbouring countries and

to Italy and England in particular. I am not very sanguine about

this, but if in the meantime no irritating questions come to excite

public opinion against us, there may possibly be a chance that

a change of Ministry here would make our relations with France

smoother.

My hopes that a change towards England may be in contemplation

have perhaps been strengthened by a visit which I have just had

from a person wholly unconnected with the French Ministry who

evidently came to ascertain what were the particular points with

regard to which the relations between France and England might be

improved. I said that instead of thwarting us in our endeavours

to improve the condition of Egypt and put it in a state to stand

alone, the French might help us; and they could not expect

comfortable relations with us if they endeavoured to stir up other

Powers to make difficulties with us about Egypt. I mentioned also

the New Hebrides question, which most certainly ought and might

be settled at once. I alluded also to those various matters all

over the world which might be treated in a cordial and not in an

antagonistic spirit.

P.S.--I have strong reasons for thinking it very important

that Waddington should not have the least inkling of my having had

the above interview, or any communication of the kind.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Feb. 26, 1887.

I will not mention to Waddington the interview which you have

had as to English grounds of complaint. I have not seen him for ten

days: he must have taken huff at something.

I think, as the French are coming to their senses, it might be

well to mention unofficially to Flourens that I am quite ready to

resume the negotiations about the Suez Canal; and that I have good

hope of bringing it to a successful issue, but that I am hindered

by the flag that is floating at Dongorita, and by the delay of the

French in performing their promises as regards the New Hebrides. We

are being a good deal reproached here, on account of our apparent

submission to this breach of faith. If these two matters are

corrected, I shall find it possible, and shall be very glad to

renew the Suez Canal discussion either at Paris or here.

I have seen Karolyi to-day--an unusual occurrence--and for the

first time have had the admission from him that a war with Russia

was not an impossible contingency.

The Russians are very quiet; and the negotiations about

Bulgaria do not really advance a bit.

M. Flourens, in spite of his complete inexperience, seems to have

realized the simple fact that it was not advisable to quarrel with

England just at the moment when relations with Germany were in a

critical condition; but unhappily the public did not appear to be in

an accommodating mood. The statements published in the English press

respecting the Drummond Wolff mission had caused great irritation,

and what was perhaps more serious, had alarmed the French again

about the security of the coupons. As long as they felt sure that

the coupons would be paid regularly, and that there was no fear of

future reduction, they were reasonably patient, unless some specially

severe blow, such as a reduction of the numbers and salaries of French

officials, as compared with English, was struck at their _amour propre_.

Now, however, they were beset with the fear that, under what they

considered to be English mismanagement, they were about to lose their

money as well as their influence.

In March the Goblet Ministry was already in difficulties, and it was

believed that Freycinet was likely to return to power, although what the

precise advantages were of these continual changes, no one was capable

of explaining.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

March 8, 1887.

By taking credit to himself at the expense of his

predecessors, in the interpellation yesterday, Goblet has stirred

up the bile of a large party in the Chamber, and the determination

to turn his Cabinet out, if possible, has revived with fresh

vigour. It is supposed that the attempts will be made as soon as

the Corn Duties Bill is disposed of. It seems to be thought that,

if it succeeds, Freycinet must be Prime Minister; but there appears

to be a strong feeling against his having the Foreign Office again.

He is thought to have got France into uncomfortable relations with

many of his neighbours. In the treatment of the Egyptian question

he is believed to have sacrificed cordiality with England to a

desire to regain the popularity he had lost by the policy which

led to England's occupying her present position in Egypt; while

his attempt to get up an opposition to England on the part of the

European Powers and his worrying way of dealing himself with the

British Government about Egypt, are thought simply to have excited

public opinion on both sides of the Channel and to have provoked

ill will, without in the least improving the position of France.

There can be no doubt that Freycinet looked upon a success with

regard to Egypt as a personal necessity for himself, and was much

influenced in his policy towards England by this feeling.

It is apprehended that unless the _prestige_ of Boulanger is

put on high again by strong language from Germany, there will be no

difficulty in obtaining, as a matter of course, his fall, with the

rest of the Cabinet of which he is a part. M. Grévy is believed to

be very anxious to be rid of him.

I hear on good authority that the Russians have been trying

again, though without success, to come to a special understanding

with the French Government.

To say that M. Grévy was very anxious to be rid of Boulanger was

probably an understatement, for he could not conceivably have desired

anything so ardently. But the 'Music Hall St. Arnaud' was by no means

at the end of his tether, and had contrived to advertise himself by

egregious conduct with regard to the Army Committee of the Chamber

of Deputies. That Committee had drawn up a military Bill, based upon

three years' service, and Boulanger, on the pretext that it was 'not

sufficiently faithful to democratic principles,' had, without consulting

any of his colleagues, written a letter condemning the provisions of

the bill and proposing something quite different. This letter was

thoughtfully communicated to the press before it reached the Committee,

and the outraged members of the Committee as well as his colleagues

were at last goaded into resistance. The Chamber condemned the attitude

of the General towards the sacrosanct representatives of the nation;

the General himself beat a hasty and prudent retreat under cover of an

apology; the Moderate Republicans denounced him as a would-be dictator,

and the Ultra-Radicals accused him of cowardice in consequence of his

apology. Most men under the circumstances would have felt disposed to

resign office, but in the case of Boulanger it was probably immaterial

to him whether he was blamed or praised, so long as he could keep his

name before the public.

It was, and probably is still, a regulation in the British Diplomatic

Service, that its members should retire at the age of seventy, and, as

a rule, an Ambassador who had attained that age, usually considered

himself fit to discharge his duties for a further period. Lord Lyons,

however, was an exception. His seventieth birthday fell due in April,

and a month beforehand he wrote to announce that he wished to resign.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, March 22, 1887.

Towards the end of the next month, the time will come when

I shall be superannuated, and I feel very strongly that it will

not come too soon. It will not be without a pang that I shall

find myself no longer a diplomatic servant of the Queen, who has

ever received my endeavours to obtain her approval with the most

generous indulgence. But the labour and responsibility of this post

are becoming too much for me, and I shall be anxious to be relieved

from them when the time fixed by the regulations arrives.

I need not assure you that I shall much regret the termination

of the official connexion with you from which I have derived so

much satisfaction.

It may not unfairly be presumed that resignations of important official

posts are habitually welcomed by Governments, as they not only remedy

stagnation in the public service, but frequently provide opportunities

for political patronage. It is plain, however, that the prospect of

losing Lord Lyons was looked upon by Lord Salisbury as a genuine

misfortune, and he did his best to induce him to reconsider his decision.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

March 26, 1887.

I have considered your letter of the 22nd, stating that you

felt very strongly that the time of your superannuation would not

come too soon; and though it was a matter of very deep regret to me

to receive such an announcement from you, it was not altogether a

matter of surprise; for I remembered the language you had used to

me when I tried to induce you to join us as Foreign Secretary last

July.

The loss which the Diplomatic Service will suffer by your

retirement will be profound, and, for the time, hardly possible to

repair. Your presence at Paris gave to the public mind a sense of

security which was the result of a long experience of your powers,

and which no one else is in a position to inspire.

In face of the expressions in your letter I feel as if I were

almost presuming in suggesting any alternative course of action.

But it struck me that possibly you might be willing to make your

official career terminate with the end of your current appointment,

rather than with the precise date of superannuation. The effect of

this would be to prolong your stay at Paris till next December.

My reasons from a public point of view will, I hope, strike

you at once. We are passing through a very anxious European crisis.

If any fateful decisions are taken this year, it will be within the

next three or four months. It will add very much to our anxiety to

know that the reins at Paris are in new hands, which have never

held them before. This mere fact may even be an element of danger.

The avalanche hangs so loosely, that any additional sensation or

uneasiness may displace it. If we could avoid a change till the

winter it would be a great public advantage, even if the change

should be inevitable.

I hope you will forgive me for having pressed this on you in

the interests of the public service. Whatever your decision may be,

I give you the warmest thanks for the kind and loyal support which

you have always given to the policy which it has been my duty to

carry out.

An appeal of this kind from an official chief could not well be

disregarded, setting aside the fact that but few officials can have

experienced the compliment of being assured that their continued service

was essential to the peace of Europe. With well justified misgivings,

Lord Lyons therefore consented to remain on until the end of the year,

knowing perfectly well that his physical energies were on the point of

exhaustion.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, March 29, 1887.

I am deeply touched by your letter of the 26th, and I feel

that, after what you say in it, I should be extremely ungrateful if

I were not ready to sacrifice a great deal to meet your views.

For my own part I feel that the work and responsibility here

are an increasing strain both upon my mind and upon my bodily

health, and I am beset with misgivings lest, even in ordinary

times, I may be unable to discharge my duties with energy and

efficiency, and lest, in an emergency calling for much labour,

I may break down altogether. This being the case, it would

undoubtedly be a great relief and comfort to me to retire on

becoming superannuated towards the end of next month.

Begging you to take the misgivings into full consideration,

and to be sure that they have not been conceived without good

reason, and that they are strongly and very seriously felt by

me, I place myself in your hands. If after giving full weight to

them, you still think that it would be a satisfaction to you that

I should continue to hold this post till the winter, and that it

would be a great public advantage to avoid a change till that time,

I am ready to stay on, and trusting to your indulgence to do my

best.

I should, of course, look upon it as quite settled that in any

case I should retire at latest when my current appointment comes to

an end at the close of the present year.

If you wish me to hold on, I must ask you what, if any,

announcement respecting my retirement should be made. Up to this

time I have simply stated to people who have questioned me,

that nothing was definitely settled. I did not mention to any

one my intention to write my letter of the 22nd expressing to

you my wish to retire, nor have I made any one acquainted with

my having written it, except of course Sheffield, who, as my

private secretary, made a copy of it for me to keep. The question,

therefore, as to announcing my retirement remains intact.

I cannot conclude without once more saying how much I am

gratified by the appreciation of my services expressed in your

letter, and how truly I feel the kindness shown by it.

The offer was accepted by Lord Salisbury in singularly flattering terms,

Queen Victoria also expressing much satisfaction at the consent of the

Ambassador to remain at his post. From Lord Salisbury's language, it

might be inferred that he was in some doubt as to whether his own tenure

of office was likely to be prolonged.

I have had no hesitation in availing myself of your kind

consent--though you seemed to doubt whether on reflection I should

do so. Of course I fully understand that you do not feel equal to

the amount of exertion which you would take in a more favourable

condition of health. But this circumstance will not detract

from the great value of your counsel and judgment, nor from the

authority which by so many years of experience you have acquired.

I quite understand that towards the close of the session of

Parliament you will require the holiday you have been accustomed

to take in recent years. I hope also to get to a bath at that

time--whether I am in office or not.

Why Lord Salisbury should have spoken so doubtfully is not clear, unless

instinct warned him of Miss Cass, who was the first to strike a blow

at the Unionist administration. At the end of March there reappeared

the mysterious emissary who has been already mentioned. There are no

means of actually establishing his identity, but there can be little

doubt that it was M. de Chaudordy, who represented the French Foreign

Office at Tours and Bordeaux during the war. M. de Chaudordy had made

friends with Lord Salisbury at the time of the Constantinople Conference

in 1876, and he was, therefore, a suitable person to utilize for the

purpose of making advances towards a better understanding between the

two Governments.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, March 29, 1887.

In a private letter which I wrote to you on the 25th of last

month, I mentioned that I had received a visit from a person wholly

unconnected officially with the French Government, who appeared to

have come to ascertain what were the particular points with regard

to which the relations between the English and French Governments

might be improved. The same person has been to me again to-day,

and has only just left me. This time he did not conceal that it

was after being in communication with Flourens that he came. He

enlarged on the embarrassing and indeed dangerous position in which

France was placed by the adherence of Italy to the Austro-German

Alliance, and said that M. Flourens was ready to make almost any

sacrifice to secure the good will of England. I said that there

could be no great difficulty in this, if only France would abstain

from irritating opposition to us, and would settle promptly and

satisfactorily outstanding questions. My visitor answered that

Flourens conceived that he had sent conciliatory instructions

to Waddington which would settle these questions, and that both

Waddington and Florian[46] (who had come on leave) reported that

there was decidedly a _détente_ in the strain which had existed in

the Anglo-French relations. I said that I was delighted to hear it,

and that it showed how ready you were to welcome all conciliatory

overtures. My friend seemed on this occasion, as on the last, to

wish me to tell him some special thing which Flourens might do

to please you. I said that I should at any rate mention a thing

which he might do to avoid displeasing you. He might prevent the

French setting up an opposition to financial proposals in Egypt in

cases in which all the other Powers were ready to agree. My friend

spoke of Flourens's readiness to give to Russia on the Bulgarian

question advice which you might suggest, and he mentioned various

things which he thought M. Flourens might be ready to do to please

England. These things appeared to me to be rather too grand and

too vague in character to be very practical. I said, however, that

I would always bear in mind what he had told me of M. Flourens's

good dispositions, and would speak frankly and unreservedly to the

Minister whenever I could make a suggestion as to the means of

acting upon those dispositions in a manner to be satisfactory to

England.

The conclusions I drew from the conversation of Flourens's

friend were that the French are horribly afraid of our being led

to join the Italo-Austro-German Alliance, and that they have been

urged by Russia to exert themselves to prevent this. I do not

conceive that the French expect to induce us to join them against

the Germans and the German Alliance. What they want is to feel sure

that we shall not join the others against France and Russia.

It is somewhat curious that M. Flourens, who was evidently desirous

of establishing better relations with England, should have selected

an unofficial person for communication, rather than approach the

Ambassador himself; but perhaps, being quite ignorant of diplomatic

usage, he considered it necessary to shroud his action in mystery.

The Triple Alliance dated in reality from 1882, Italy having joined

the Austro-German Alliance in that year; but a new Treaty had been

signed in the month of February, 1887, and caused the French to feel a

well-justified alarm. In fact, their position was anything but a happy

one, for it was generally believed that the Emperor Alexander III. had

resolved, since the abortive attempt on his life, that he would never

ally himself with Revolutionists, and that he considered the French to

be arch-Revolutionists. Perhaps this belief may have accounted in some

measure for Flourens's amiable professions towards England.

In the month of April there occurred one of those incidents which

are the despair of peaceably minded politicians and the delight of

sensational journalism and of adventurers of the Boulanger type. A

certain M. Schnaebelé, a French Commissaire de Police, was induced to

cross the German frontier, and thereupon was arrested and imprisoned.

The act had the appearance of provocation and naturally caused a

prodigious uproar in France; Flourens endeavouring to settle the

matter diplomatically and Boulanger seizing the opportunity to display

patriotic truculence.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, April 26, 1887.

So far as one can judge at present the French are irritated

beyond measure by the arrest at Pagny, but generally they still

shrink from war. It will not, I conceive, be difficult for

Bismarck to keep at peace with them, if he really wishes to do so.

The danger is that they are persuaded that he is only looking out

for a pretext, and that however much they may now give way, he will

be bent upon humiliating them till they _must_ resent and resist.

I don't see that so far the German Government have treated the

Pagny affair as if they wished to make a quarrel of it. The German

_Chargé d'Affaires_ has taken many messages from Berlin to Flourens

in the sense that if Schnaebelé shall prove to have been arrested

on German soil, all satisfaction shall be given. But, then, in the

Press of the two countries a controversy is raging as to which side

of the frontier he was arrested on, and as to whether or no he was

inveigled over the frontier.

The French undoubtedly shrink from war, but they do not

shrink from it as much as they did ten years ago; and if the press

should get up a loud popular cry, there is no Government strength

to resist it. I conceive that at this moment the Government is

pacific, and that it does not believe the army to be yet ready.

But if, as is no doubt the case, the Germans also believe that the

French army is not as ready now as it will be two or three years

hence, they may be impatient to begin. In the mean time, so far

as I can make out, the Pagny affair is being treated by the two

Governments with each other, in correct form diplomatically, and

without any apparent willingness to embitter matters. I cannot say

as much for the press on either side, though there are symptoms of

prudence and caution in the moderate French papers.

The Schnaebelé incident was disposed of by his release from prison and

transfer to another post at Lyons; but the agitation did not subside

readily, and a bill brought in by Boulanger to mobilize an army corps

caused much disquietude at the German Embassy. It was now generally

known that Bismarck considered Boulanger a danger and desired his

removal from the War Office; but the very knowledge of this feeling and

the support accorded to him by the League of Patriots and other noisy

organizations rendered this step all the more difficult.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, May 13, 1887.

I have not heard of any new incident between France and

Germany, but the suspicion and susceptibility with which the two

nations, and indeed the two Governments, regard each other, are

certainly not diminishing.

In France home politics are in so peculiar a state as to be

positively disquieting. The Budget Committee and the Ministry have

come to an open breach, and the Committee intend to propose to

the Chamber a resolution which apparently must, if carried, turn

out the Goblet Cabinet. This the Chamber would be willing enough

to do, if it could see its way to forming another Government. The

plan would be to form a Ministry with Freycinet as Prime Minister,

but not as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and without Boulanger.

But then they are afraid to try and upset Boulanger, while they

feel that to form a new Government and put Boulanger in it would

be, or might be, taken in Germany as a plain indication that they

are warlike at heart. It is an emergency in which the Chief of

the State should exert himself; but Grévy's caution has become

something very like lethargy. In the mean time they are letting

Boulanger grow up into a personage whose position may be a danger

to the Republic at home, even if it does not embroil the country

in a foreign war. The redeeming point in all this is that the

Government does seem to feel that it would not do to be upon bad

terms with England, and that it would be wise to be conciliatory

toward us.

The Goblet Ministry soon found itself in hopeless difficulty over

the Budget, and it was plain that another aimless change of men was

inevitable. Goblet's Government had lasted for five months (inclusive

of a prolonged recess), and the real question of interest was whether

Boulanger was to be a member of the new Government or not. If he was

included in it, it was apprehended that the suspicions of Germany would

be aggravated; and on the other hand, it was doubtful whether any

Government could be formed without him. An ultra-patriotic demonstration

in Paris against German music, in the shape of Wagner's operas, was

eloquent of the state of feeling between the two nations at the time,

and the Government found that the only course open to them was to close

the theatre where the obnoxious productions were to have appeared.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, May 20, 1887.

Freycinet appears to have agreed with Grévy to try and form a

Cabinet and to be hard at work at the task. Of course the question

is whether Boulanger is or is not to be in the new Cabinet? It was

believed this morning that Grévy and Freycinet had decided upon

offering to keep him as Minister of War. As the day has gone on,

however, the belief has gained ground that Freycinet has not found

colleagues willing to run the risk of war which the maintenance

of Boulanger would produce, and that he is to propose to Grévy a

Cabinet from which Boulanger is to be excluded. He is, however,

to make it an essential condition with Grévy that he is to have

the power to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies in his hands, as

without this power he does not feel able to form a Cabinet without

Boulanger, or indeed any Cabinet at all. In the mean time the

Reds are getting up in all directions addresses and petitions in

favour of Boulanger, with a view to forcing Grévy's and Freycinet's

hands and working on their fears. If Boulanger is got rid of, the

immediate danger of war will probably be escaped for the moment.

Boulanger's own character, and the position in which he has placed

himself, make him threatening to peace; and the opinion held of him

in Germany and the irritation felt against him there make him still

more dangerous.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, May 24, 1887.

The last news is supposed to be that Floquet, the President

of the Chamber, has undertaken the task of forming a Ministry,

and that he will keep many of the outgoing Ministers, Boulanger

included. The goings and comings at the Elysée; the singular

selections of men to be Prime Ministers, or quasi Prime Ministers,

and the apparent want of firmness and inability to exercise any

influence on the part of the President of the Republic, have

certainly not increased the reputation of M. Grévy. Floquet will,

I suppose, be unacceptable to Russia, for the Russians have always

ostentatiously kept up the show of resentment against him for the

cry, offensive to the Emperor Alexander II., which he raised when

that monarch visited the Palais de Justice during the Exhibition

of 1867. Boulanger has lately declared that he does not want to

continue to be Minister, but that if he is Minister, he will,

whatever Germany may say, continue his mobilization scheme, and not

relax in his preparations to resist an attack from Germany, and to

avert the necessity of submitting to humiliation.

I think, in fact, that things look very bad for France both

at home and abroad. I can only hope that as the phases of the

Ministerial crisis change from hour to hour, you may receive by

telegraph some more satisfactory news before you get this letter.

In course of time a new Ministry was formed under M. Rouvier, and the

important fact attaching to it was that Boulanger had been got rid of.

Otherwise there was nothing much to distinguish the new Ministers from

the old, and they seemed disposed to angle for popularity in the country

much in the same way as Freycinet and Goblet.

The object of removing Boulanger had been to reassure and placate

Germany, but no sooner had this been done, than the Government appeared

to feel alarmed at the danger of incurring unpopularity in the country,

and hastily announced that the new Minister of War would continue to

follow in the footsteps of his predecessor.

Again, it had been understood that one of the objects of the new

Government would be to put an end to the isolation of France by

placing itself on more cordial terms with the neighbouring nations

and especially with England; but what it appeared anxious to profess,

was the intention of stoutly refusing to accept or even acquiesce

in the Anglo-Turkish Convention respecting Egypt. All this, as Lord

Lyons observed, might proceed in great measure from ignorance and

inexperience, and might be mitigated by the knowledge of affairs and

sense of responsibility which accompany office, but still it was

disquieting: all the more disquieting, because the French Foreign

Minister never failed to intimate that France would never be a party to

an arrangement which would confer upon England an international right

to re-occupy Egypt under certain circumstances after evacuation, whilst

France was to be formally excluded from enjoying an equal right.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 12, 1887.

Baron Alphonse de Rothschild came to see me this afternoon,

and told me that the last accounts he had received from Berlin

caused him to feel more than usual alarm as to the feelings of

Prince Bismarck and of the Germans in general towards France. They

did not indeed imply that Germany was actually contemplating any

immediate declaration of war, but they did show that in Germany

war with France was regarded as a contingency that could not be

long postponed, and of which the postponement was not desirable

for German interests. The Germans did not seem to be prepared to

incur the opprobrium of Europe by attacking France without having

the appearance of a good reason for doing so, but they did seem to

be looking out impatiently for a plausible pretext for a rupture;

far from being sorry, they would be very glad if France would

furnish them with such a pretext. Prince Bismarck was evidently

not disposed to facilitate the task of M. Rouvier's Government,

notwithstanding the pledges it had given of its desire for peace

abroad, and the efforts it was making to promote moderation at home.

Baron de Rothschild had, he told me, seen M. Rouvier to-day

and made all this known to him. He had pointed out to him the

danger which arose from the sort of coalition against France of

the Powers of Europe, had dwelt on the importance of making almost

any sacrifice to break up this coalition, and had especially urged

the imprudence of allowing coldness, if not ill-will, to subsist

between France and England.

M. Rouvier had expressed an anxious desire to establish

cordial relations with England.

Baron de Rothschild had answered that the time had come

to show this by acts, and had strongly pressed M. Rouvier to

settle without any delay the outstanding questions which produced

irritation between the two countries. M. Rouvier had expressed his

intention to do so, and Baron de Rothschild had reason to believe

that this was also the desire and intention of M. Flourens.

I said that I heard this with great pleasure, and that

I had received with much satisfaction assurances to the same

effect respecting M. Flourens's sentiments, which had come to me

indirectly through various channels. I must, however, confess that

I had not found in M. Flourens himself any disposition to push

assurance to this effect beyond generalities. I had not seen any

strong practical instances of a desire on his part to give a speedy

and satisfactory solution to outstanding questions.

Baron de Rothschild observed that what he had said on this

point to M. Rouvier had appeared to make a considerable impression

on him.

I said that it so happened that I should in all probability

have the means of testing this almost immediately. I had in fact

only yesterday strongly urged M. Flourens to close a question, that

of the New Hebrides, which was creating suspicion and annoyance to

England and causing great inconvenience in consequence of the very

strong feeling about it which prevailed in the colonies. The two

Governments were entirely in accord in principle upon it, and in

fact it was only kept open by the pertinacity with which the French

Government delayed to take the formal step necessary for closing it.

Baron de Rothschild went on to tell me that in speaking of

the relations with England, M. Rouvier alluded to the convention

negotiated by Sir Drummond Wolff at Constantinople, and said that

he did not see why it should produce any lasting disagreement

between France and England. Whether it was ratified or not, France

might be as conciliatory as possible towards England in dealing

with the matter in future. In answer I suppose to a remark from

Baron de Rothschild, M. Rouvier would seem to have said that the

Comte de Montebello[47] appeared to have gone far beyond his

instructions in the language he had used to the Porte.

I asked Baron de Rothschild whether M. Rouvier had also

said that the Comte de Montebello had received any check or

discouragement from the Government at Paris.

Passing on from this, Baron de Rothschild told me that before

concluding the conversation, he had pointed out to M. Rouvier that

the great addition of strength which the Ministry had received

from the vote of the Chamber yesterday, would enable them to act

with more independence and vigour, and that they might now settle

questions with England, and establish good relations with her

without being under the constant fear of a check in the Chamber of

Deputies.

There can be no doubt that, in fact, the position of the

Rouvier Ministry has been immensely strengthened by the large vote

they obtained yesterday on the interpellation put forward against

them on the subject of Monarchical and Clerical intrigues. It is

earnestly to be hoped, for their own sakes, and for the sake of

France, that they will turn it to account in order to pursue a more

reasonable and conciliatory policy towards England, and to take

stronger and more effectual means of preserving order in Paris. The

riot at the Lyons railway station seems to have done Boulangism

harm even among the ultra-Radicals, and to have been the main cause

of Boulanger's having been thrown over by Radical speakers in the

Chamber yesterday. But it is a very dangerous thing to give the

Paris mob its head.

M. Rouvier's friendly assurances with regard to England had, of course,

been imparted to the Baron in order that they might be communicated

to the British Embassy, but the action of the French Government

appeared to have very little in common with them; nor was there any

reason to assume that Montebello was exceeding his instructions in

opposing at Constantinople the ratification of the Anglo-Turkish

Convention with regard to Egypt. The egregious action which forced

the Sultan to withhold his consent to the Convention, and thereby

perpetuated the British occupation of Egypt, was not the result of the

unauthorized proceedings of the French Ambassador, but the consequence

of the deliberately considered joint policy of the French and Russian

Governments. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that the fruitless

attempt to negotiate the Convention was yet another convincing proof

of the absolute honesty of British policy with regard to Egypt, and

the following letter from Lord Salisbury shows no satisfaction at the

frustration of Sir H. Drummond Wolff's mission.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 20, 1887.

I am afraid the temper of the French will not make the

settlement of the Egyptian question more easy. I do not now see how

we are to devise any middle terms that will satisfy them. We cannot

leave the Khedive to take his chance of foreign attack, or native

riot. The French refuse to let us exercise the necessary powers

of defence unless we do it by continuing our military occupation.

I see nothing for it but to sit still and drift awhile: a little

further on in the history of Europe the conditions may be changed,

and we may be able to get some agreement arrived at which will

justify evacuation. Till then we must simply refuse to evacuate.

Our relations with France are not pleasant at present. There are

five or six different places where we are at odds:--

1. She has destroyed the Convention at Constantinople.

2. She will allow no Press Law to pass.

3. She is trying to back out of the arrangement on the Somali

coast.

4. She still occupies the New Hebrides.

5. She destroys our fishing tackle, etc.

6. She is trying to elbow us out of at least two

unpronounceable places on the West Coast of Africa.

Can you wonder that there is, to my eyes, a silver lining even

to the great black cloud of a Franco-German War?

On account of the tension existing between France and Germany, and

of the agitation produced by the transfer of Boulanger to a command

at Clermont-Ferrand, it was feared that the National Fête of July 14

would be marked by serious disturbances; these fears were happily not

realized, although Boulanger's departure from Paris a few days earlier

had formed the pretext for a display of embarrassing Jingoism. The

French Government were so apprehensive of an anti-German demonstration,

that, although Count Münster received the usual invitation to attend

the Longchamps Review, M. Flourens privately begged him to absent

himself, and the two German military attachés, instead of joining the

War Minister's Staff in uniform, went to the Diplomatic Tribune in plain

clothes.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 15, 1887.

The National Fête of yesterday passed off quietly enough.

There are said to have been cries in various places of 'Vive

Boulanger,' and 'À bas Grévy,' but nowhere was there anything which

assumed anything like the proportions of a demonstration. There do

not appear to have been any cries at all in the army.

The low French papers keep up a constant fire of scurrilous

language against the Germans and even against the Germany Embassy.

This sort of thing seems to be taken more seriously and to cause

more irritation in Germany than it would in most countries. Count

Münster naturally enough did not come to the President's stand, to

which he and the other Ambassadors were as usual invited to see

the Review. The German military attachés did not go in uniform

with the staff of the Minister of War, but saw the Review from the

Diplomatic Tribune in plain clothes. In fact, ill will between

France and Germany seems to be on the increase. It looks as if the

Germans would really be glad to find a fair pretext for going to

war with France. On the other hand, Boulangism, which is now the

French term for Jingoism, spreads, especially amongst the reckless

Radicals and enemies of the present Ministry. And even among the

better classes, warlike language and, to some degree, a warlike

spirit grows up with a new generation, which has had no practical

acquaintance with war. Abject fear of the German armies is being

succeeded by overweening confidence in themselves.

The present Ministry seem to have been afraid of unpopularity

if they abandoned altogether Boulanger's absurd mobilization

scheme. The Germans seem to be taking this quietly. Perhaps they

look on with satisfaction at the French incurring an immense

expenditure for an experiment apparently without any practical use

from a military point of view. Perhaps they believe, as many people

do here, that the Chambers will never really vote the money.

It is supposed that the session will be over next week, and I

trust that then you will be disposed to receive an application from

me for leave. I am getting quite knocked up by the Paris summer,

and am in urgent need of rest and country air.

The foregoing letter was one of the last communications received from

Lord Lyons at Paris, and his official career practically terminated a

few days later, when he left on leave, destined never to return to the

post which he had so long occupied, for the unfavourable view which

he held with regard to his physical condition was only too completely

justified.

He appears to have passed the months of August and September quietly

with his near relatives in Sussex. Towards the end of October he

must have learnt with some surprise that, whereas in March he had

been most urgently begged by Lord Salisbury to remain at his post

until the end of the year, a successor to him, in the person of Lord

Lytton, had been appointed, and that there was no necessity for him to

return to Paris. If he, as would have been the case with most people,

really felt aggrieved at this change of circumstances, there is no

trace of resentment shown in his correspondence. On the contrary, he

warmly welcomed the new appointment, and at once set about making

arrangements for his successor's convenience. On November 1, he made

a formal application to be permitted to resign his appointment, was

created an Earl, and the few remaining letters (the latest bearing the

date of November 20) deal with business details, and unostentatious

acts of kindness to various persons who had been in his service or

otherwise connected with him. The very last of all was a characteristic

communication to Sir Edwin Egerton, the Chargé d'Affaires at Paris,

respecting the payment of the fire insurance premium on the Embassy.

The close of his life was destined to coincide dramatically with the

close of his official career. Intellectually there were no signs of

decay; but physically he was even more worn out than he realized

himself. On November 28, whilst staying at Norfolk House, he was

stricken with paralysis, and a week later he was dead, without having

in the meanwhile recovered consciousness. Thus the end came at a moment

singularly appropriate to his well ordered existence, and to no one

could the time-honoured Latin epitaph have been applied with greater

accuracy.

In an earlier portion of this work some attempt has been made to

portray Lord Lyons's personality and to explain the causes of his

success as a diplomatist, but the best criterion of the man is to be

found in his letters, which have been reproduced verbatim, and may be

said to constitute a condensed record of the most interesting episodes

in English diplomatic history during a space of nearly thirty years.

Throughout this long series there is hardly to be found an unnecessary

sentence or even a redundant epithet; there is a total absence of any

straining after effect, of exaggeration, of personal animosity or

predilection, or of any desire to gain his ends by intrigue or trickery.

On the other hand, they are marked by profound mastery of detail, sound

judgment, inexhaustible patience, an almost inhuman impartiality, and

an obviously single-minded desire to do his best for his country as one

of its most responsible representatives. Such, then, was the character

of the man, and the general public is probably quite unconscious of the

inestimable value to the country of officials of this particular type.

It was Lord Lyons's fate twice to represent this country at most

critical periods during wars, in the course of which, England, while

desiring to observe the strictest neutrality, aroused the bitterest

hostility on the part of the belligerents. In spite of untiring efforts

he had the mortification of seeing the relations of England, first with

the United States and then with France, gradually deteriorate, and never

experienced the satisfaction, which no one would have appreciated more

highly than himself, of seeing those unfriendly relations converted into

the condition which now happily prevails; but it may be fairly said

of him that no one ever laboured more assiduously and efficiently to

promote peace and good will between England and her neighbours; that he

never made either an enemy or apparently a mistake, and that no other

diplomatist of his day enjoyed to an equal degree the confidence of

his chiefs, and the regard of his subordinates. Overshadowed by more

brilliant and interesting personalities, the unobtrusive services of

Lord Lyons are unknown to the rising generation, and probably forgotten

by many of those who have reached middle age; but in the opinion of

the statesman who amongst living Englishmen is the most competent to

judge, he was the greatest Ambassador who has represented this country

in modern times, and by those whose privilege it was to serve under him,

his memory will ever be held in affectionate remembrance.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 44: Lord Salisbury had taken over the Foreign Office upon the

death of Lord Iddesleigh on January 12, 1887.]

[Footnote 45: Dongorita. A town on the Somali coast.]

[Footnote 46: Secretary of French Embassy at London.]

[Footnote 47: French Ambassador at Constantinople.]

APPENDIX

LORD LYONS IN PRIVATE LIFE.

BY MRS. WILFRID WARD.

It is not uncommon to find a seeming contradiction between the official

and the private characters of the same individual. Extreme reserve, for

instance, even an astonishing power of silence in conducting official

work, may not indicate the same power of silence in private life, or the

same reserve in the life of the affections. In Lord Lyons there was no

such contrast, and no attempt to depict him could pretend to penetrate

his extreme reserve as to his deeper feelings. This reticence on his

part must severely limit any account of his _vie intime_. Moreover,

curiously enough there is another difficulty in describing him which

lies in quite an opposite direction. Lord Lyons had a keen sense of

the ridiculous, and he loved the absolute relaxation of talking pure

nonsense which, however amusing at the moment, would hardly bear the

strain of repetition. Indeed, very little can be added to the history

of the public life of a man so absolutely reticent as to his feelings,

his thoughts, and his opinions, which he further concealed rather than

revealed by an almost burlesque habit of talking nonsense among his

intimates.

It would be easy to give many instances of his gift for silence when he

did not wish to be 'drawn' by his interlocutor. A little story told to

me by the late Sir Edward Blount is a case in point.

Sir Edward, waiting to see Lord Lyons at the Embassy, heard talking in

the next room which lasted some time, and soon distinguished the voice

of M. Blowitz. As soon as he was alone with Lord Lyons he said that he

felt obliged to warn him that, if he had liked, he could have overheard

his conversation with the journalist.

'You might,' was the answer, 'have overheard what was said by M.

Blowitz, but you could not have heard anything said by me for the good

reason that I said nothing at all!'

It was never known to anybody, as far as it is possible to ascertain,

whether Lord Lyons had ever even contemplated marriage, though he

certainly did not recommend celibacy. 'Matrimony,' he constantly used to

repeat--slightly varying the phrase in his favourite _Rasselas_--'may

have thorns, but celibacy has no roses.'

There was at one moment, while he was attached to the Embassy at Rome,

a rumour that he was engaged to be married. Hearing something of it he

inquired of a lady friend whether she could tell him to whom he was

supposed to be attached, and later on he discovered that she was herself

the person in question!

His nature was certainly lonely, and I believe from quite early in life

he was conscious of suffering from loneliness. I have been told of a

letter of his written from school in which this was quite clearly set

forth. In later life he would never have expressed so much. What he felt

and thought on any intimate question can, I think, only be inferred by

his comments on life in general, or on the sorrows and joys of others.

Once only I believe did he take any part in directly influencing the

lives of young people in the critical question of marriage. The daughter

of an old friend, with a courage in her confidence which seems to me

almost phenomenal, told him the story of a mutual affection existing

between her and a young man who did not seem to her parents to be a

sufficiently good match. Lord Lyons listened with the utmost attention,

and eventually interceded with his old friend, speaking of the terrible

danger of causing irremediable pain to two young hearts, and was the

means of making these young people happy. Was there, perhaps, in this

action some reminiscence of a possible past happiness lost by himself?

No one can even make the faintest surmise as to whether this was the

case. He made no allusion to his own past when telling the story.

Of his childhood I know little, but there is a toy preserved in the

family that gives a curious and characteristic foretaste of what he

was to become. It is a miniature escritoire fitted with pen and paper

and seals, and also soap and towels, etc. All this was supposed to

belong to the children's dog, who was promoted in their games to the

position of an Ambassador, and described as 'His Excellency.' There are

still existing despatches written to and by 'His Excellency' in the

handwriting of the four children.

I think he must have been too old to have joined in his sister Minna's

bit of naughtiness when at Malta she put snuff in the guitar of a young

exquisite who had provoked their mirth, and whose name was Benjamin

Disraeli.

He used to say that among his most vivid recollections of his boyhood

while at Malta, was the unexpected return of his father and the fleet.

The children had been deeply engaged in preparing theatricals which were

postponed on account of their father's arrival. He remembered his guilty

feeling that he ought to be glad, and that he was not glad at all!

It was not at first intended that Bickerton Lyons should enter the

diplomatic service; he began life in the navy. But Bickerton, unlike

his brother Edmund, had no vocation for the sea. The sorrow of Edmund's

loss, who died at Therapia, from a wound received when commanding his

ship in the Sea of Azoph during the Crimean war, was a shadow that never

passed from the lives of the other three. Bickerton was deeply attached

to both his sisters and their families. Annie married Baron Wurtzburg,

and Minna married Lord Fitzalan, afterwards Duke of Norfolk. Other

relations with whom he was in close intimacy all his life were his aunt,

Mrs. Pearson and her children, especially her daughters, Mrs. Lister

Venables and Mrs. Little, who both survived him.

All his life Lord Lyons was devoted to children, and especially so to

the large family of the Duchess of Norfolk, with whom he was able to

indulge his domestic tastes and his love of fun. He spent with them the

greater part of every holiday, and in the last twenty-five years of his

life they were frequently with him in Paris. My mother, Lady Victoria,

the eldest of the family, married very young, and my aunt Minna, the

second daughter, became a Carmelite nun. Mary, the eldest of the sisters

who remained at home, was Lord Lyons's constant companion and secretary.

I think she was the only person who did not experience the strong sense

of his reserve which so impressed those who had to do with him even in

everyday intercourse. In a very serious state of health which followed

his work at Washington he depended greatly on the companionship of his

nieces. I have been told that for months he could not raise his head,

and the only thing he could do by himself was to play with glass balls

on a solitaire board. During this interval in his career, before he

accepted the Embassy at Constantinople, he had more leisure than usual

for the society of his sister's family, but he had always been devoted

to them when they were quite little children, and was once described as

'an excellent nursery governess.' He said to his sister: 'I could never

have married; it would not have been right, as I could never have loved

my own children as much as I love yours.'

Into this near association with him my sisters and I were more

closely drawn after the death of our parents. We had lost our mother

in the winter of 1870, and my father, James Hope-Scott, died in the

spring of 1873. It was then that my grandmother took us to live with

her at Arundel, and we were added to the large family party who had

often stayed with him in Paris. My own earliest recollections of my

great-uncle are tinged with an awe which no amount of time spent with

him ever quite overcame; but it did not prevent great enjoyment of all

the fun we had with him. He was certainly very indulgent to the younger

members of the family circle, particularly my brother, who was some

years younger than the rest of us, and this was especially the case when

we were his guests.

I think that what inspired awe was the immense strength of character,

the reserved force, the severely controlled natural irritability. He

had, too, a humorous vehemence of expression which seemed at times to be

a safety valve to the forces he had under control, and was a reminder of

their existence.

I suppose that nothing could be imagined more stately and more regular

than life at the Embassy in those days. The Ambassador himself lived

in a routine of absolute regularity and extremely hard work. He got up

at seven, had breakfast at eight, and was, I think, at work by nine

o'clock. His very small leisure, when he was alone, was mostly spent

in reading. And this was carefully classified in three divisions. In

the morning he read history or science, in the evening, between tea and

dinner, biography; while, for an hour before he went to bed he read

novels. While in France he never left the Embassy. Once a year he did

leave it for his annual holiday--generally spent in England. He used to

boast how many nights in succession--I think in one year it amounted

to over 300--he had slept in the same bed. Every afternoon when we

were with him, he drove with my grandmother, generally in the Bois de

Boulogne, and in the warm weather we always stopped at some _café_ for

us children to have ices. He also took us to the circus once during each

visit until, in later life, he became afraid of catching cold. He still

occasionally went to the theatre, to which he had been much devoted as

a younger man. We all dined downstairs, and he used to like my youngest

sister and my brother to sit at a little table near the big one and have

dessert. He insisted on this, and was rather pleased than otherwise at

the scolding he received from an English friend for keeping them up

so late. In later life he used to speak of the pretty picture the two

children had made.

I recollect the extraordinary general sense of importance as to

his movements in those days, partly on account of their phenomenal

regularity. I could not imagine him ever acting on impulse, even in the

matter of going up or downstairs. I cannot picture him strolling into

his own garden except at the fixed hour. This without intention added to

the dignity of his life which seemed to move like a rather dreary state

procession.

I wonder if the servants who never saw him break through his routine,

or lose one jot of his dignity, ever guessed at how shy he was of them,

or suspected the rather wistful curiosity he felt about their lives.

I think it was Pierre, the butler, who lived with his family in the

_entresol_ between the two floors of reception rooms in the Embassy.

Lord Lyons was much interested in their family life, and liked to

speculate as to what went on there. One inconvenient result of his

extreme shyness was that when he really wished to alter any detail as

to the daily routine, he could not bring himself to impart his wishes

to any of the servants. I have often heard him say how tired he was of

the same breakfast which never varied in the least, and he would add

that his Italian valet Giuseppe was so convinced that it was the only

breakfast he liked that when he travelled, the man took incredible

pains that the coffee, the eggs, the rolls, the marmalade, the two

tangerine oranges in winter and the tiny basket of strawberries in

summer, should not differ an iota from those served up every morning

at the Embassy. But Lord Lyons could never summon up courage to speak

to him on the subject. On certain days Pierre undertook Giuseppe's

duties, and for many years Lord Lyons wished that Pierre would arrange

his things as they were arranged by Giuseppe, but he never told him

so. While he grumbled, he was amused at the situation and at himself.

Indeed, his keen sense of the ridiculous and his endless enjoyment of

nonsense explain a good deal of his life. He used to say that as he was

too shy to look at the servants' faces, he had learnt to know them by

their silk stockinged calves. When he dined alone he made an amusement

of identifying the six or seven pairs of calves, and was proud of his

success in this odd game of skill.

I recall one ludicrous instance of his shyness with servants. It was

his custom annually when he came to stay with us to shake hands with

the old family nurse, and on one occasion, meeting her on the stairs,

he leant across the banisters to perform the ceremony with such

_empressement_ and effort that he broke one of the supports. He always

afterwards alluded to the extraordinary emotion he had shown in this

greeting. Nothing is so unaccountable as shyness, but it was curious

that a man who had seen so much of public life and of society should

have so much of it as he had. I remember once helping him to escape

with, for him, astonishing speed across the garden of a country house,

when a very agreeable woman, whom I believe he really liked, had come

to call; he was as full of glee as if he were a boy running away from a

school-master.

[Illustration: THE BRITISH EMBASSY, PARIS.

_F. Contet, Paris. Phot._]

I don't think that in Paris he ever gave way to such impulses; they were

the relaxation of a shy nature in the holidays.

To return for one moment to Paris. He occasionally gave a big official

dinner which I don't think he at all enjoyed, and of which we knew

nothing. But he certainly enjoyed small gatherings, especially if they

included old friends who were passing through Paris, although not one

word of ordinary sentiment would probably pass his lips, nor would one

of the day's arrangements be changed. He certainly enjoyed the society

of his women friends, and I liked to watch him talking to Mrs. Augustus

Craven, the author of the _Récit d'une Soeur_. Two characteristic

sayings of his about the Cravens I remember. He was always pleased at

showing his knowledge of the most orthodox and strict views of Roman

affairs. He used to say that Mrs. Craven could never make amends for

her conduct at the time of the Vatican Council--when her _salon_ was a

centre for 'inopportunist' Bishops--unless she went back to Rome and

gave 'Infallibilist tea-parties.'

Mr. Augustus Craven, her husband, was intensely mysterious in manner,

and Lord Lyons used to call him 'the General of the Jesuits.' Once, on

meeting him in London, he asked him if his wife were with him. Mrs.

Craven was staying with Lady Cowper, and Mr. Craven answered with

solemn, slow and mysterious tones: 'She is at Wrest,' and my uncle said

'Requiescat in Pace,' with equal solemnity.

I think that with all his natural British prejudices he liked French

people and their ways. He used to maintain that Frenchwomen were more

domestic and kept earlier hours than Englishwomen. He certainly liked

French cooking. He spoke once in tones of horror of an Englishman who

had committed the monstrosity of putting pepper on young green peas--a

crime of which a Frenchman was incapable.

Many of his opinions, however, like Dr. Johnson's, were evoked by the

spirit of contradiction, and it was chiefly with English people that I

heard him talk about the French.

In the holidays in England reading aloud was one of his chief pleasures.

He read much poetry to us at one time, but later I think he had to

give this up as it tired him. At Arundel he wrote his letters in the

dressing-room opening out of his bedroom. We used to sit there waiting

for him before the appointed time, making drawings in red ink, of which

there was always a large supply, when he would make a mock solemn

entrance, as of a stiff professor. We were allowed to scribble during

the reading, but, woe betide us! if we showed any inattention. He read

'Marmion,' Southey's 'Thalaba,' and, I think, 'The Curse of Kehama,'

also much of Byron, the 'Siege of Corinth,' with especial enjoyment. He

knew many pages of Byron by heart, and we used to get him to repeat any

amount while out walking. 'Rejected Addresses,' 'Bombastes Furioso,'

'The Rape of the Lock' were also among the many things he liked to

recite. I wish I could remember half the things he read or repeated

to us. I am sure there was no Tennyson, and certainly no Browning. He

used to jeer at the obscurity of both the Brownings, and to mutter such

phrases as the 'thundering white silence' of Mrs. Browning with intense

scorn. I think he may have met the Brownings when he was in Rome. He saw

a good deal of Fanny and Adelaide Kemble at that time. He liked Adelaide

much the best of the two, and used to quote with delight a saying of

hers as to the Brownings. When she was told of the birth of their son

she exclaimed: 'There are now then not one incomprehensible, or two

incomprehensibles, but three incomprehensibles!'

He was always amused at the Kemble grand manner. He used to imitate the

dramatic utterance with which Fanny Kemble frightened a young waiter

who had brought her some beer. 'I asked for _water_, boy; you bring me

_beer_!'

At that same time he knew Sir Frederick Leighton, and they once had a

pillow fight! Who could imagine that pillow fight who only knew him as

Ambassador in Paris? He always spoke as if he had enjoyed life in Rome;

he was devoted to the theatre, and he had much congenial society. He

used to say, too, that Pius IX. was the most agreeable sovereign with

whom he ever had diplomatic relations.

Lord Lyons's literary tastes were not those of the present generation.

He declared that he only liked verse that rhymed and music with a tune.

He loved the sonorous sound of Byron as he loved the solemn cadence of

Latin verse. All the time the love of absurdity was never far off. He

would suddenly imitate the action of a schoolboy repeating Latin verse,

first with his arms and then with his feet! A stout, very dignified

elderly man, in some path in the garden, punctuating the verse with the

action of his feet, is sufficiently surprising. Occasionally he would

have the oddest freaks of this kind, and I remember an afternoon when he

took a whim of pretending to be imbecile; he made the most extraordinary

faces, and not a word of sense could be got from him.

Once in a steamer on the lake of Lucerne he insisted on his nieces

joining him in impersonating a typical family of English tourists

out for their holiday. He was the _paterfamilias_, one niece was his

wife, another the German governess, a third his child. In the middle

of the performance he found that he was being regarded with surprise

and curiosity by some English society friends whose acquaintance with

him had hitherto been exclusively in the character of a very dignified

ambassador.

My aunt, Mary Howard, used to read aloud to him by the hour, and we all

enjoyed these times immensely. It would be difficult to say how often we

had 'Pickwick,' 'Cranford,' 'Rasselas,' 'The Rose and the Ring,' and

'Mrs. Boss's Niece.' I have never met anybody outside that circle who

ever even heard of 'Mrs. Boss's Niece;' it is a serious loss. To quote

at all appropriately from any of his favourites was to be exceedingly

in his good books for the rest of the day. Like the late Lord Salisbury

he delighted in Miss Yonge; he could not have too many pairs of twins,

or too large a family circle to read about. He loved the analysis of

domestic life, and would have been ready to canonise any really and

genuinely unselfish character. Detective stories were a great joy. 'The

House on the Marsh,' and 'Called Back,' were among the most successful.

He used to prolong discussion as to the solution of the mystery, and

would even knock at our doors very late at night if he thought he had

identified the murderer, and mutter in dramatic undertones, 'So-an-so

was the man who did it.' But the detective story was never read before

dinner, and to look into the book meanwhile was a crime. Anybody who

peeped to see the end of a novel 'deserved to be dragged to death by

wild horses.' And there must be no skipping. Only descriptions of

scenery--to which he had the strongest objection--might be left out.

The annual holiday was, for the most part, spent with the Duchess of

Norfolk at Arundel, and later at Heron's Ghyll. Sometimes he went to

Germany to take the waters, in company with his eldest sister, Baroness

Wurtzburg. When in England he always paid a certain number of country

house visits. These generally included Knowsley and Woburn. The visits

that were paid every year, I think without exception, were those to

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and to an old schoolfellow--Major Trower,

who had been with him at Winchester. Major Trower was one of four old

Wykehamists who remained close friends. The other two had died some time

before. I think the visit to Raby was annual. He specially enjoyed the

society of the Duchess of Cleveland and of Lady Mary Hope. He was at

Raby in the September before he died, and I believe that was the last

visit he ever paid. The famous visitors' book there always amused him,

and he was fond of quoting from it. One of his own contributions I

remember was written with mock modesty. He took from Lockhart's Spanish

ballads the lines:--

''Twere better to be silent before such a crowd of folk,

Than utter words as meaningless as he did when he spoke.'

His recollections of the society of his youth in these houses had some

amusing details. I think it was at the Duchess of Bedford's that there

was a Christmas tree, off which each young man visitor was given a piece

of flowered silk for a waistcoat. Early next morning, at Mr. Lyons's

suggestion, one of the young men, provided with a list of the names and

addresses of the tailors employed by the others, went up to London and

brought back all the waistcoats made up in time to be worn at dinner

that evening. He used to speak with some amusement of the ungraciousness

of Rogers, the poet, whom he met at the Derbys'. On one occasion Rogers

had lost his spectacles, and Mr. Lyons went a long way in the big house

to find them. Rogers who was drinking tea took the spectacles, but did

not thank him, and, a moment later, when he heard Mr. Lyons refusing

sugar, he observed to the company: 'That young man, having nothing else

to be proud of, is proud of not having sugar with his tea!'

I don't suppose that he talked much as a young man, and probably he

followed the rule he always preached, that young men should speak

'little but often.'

Among the few serious sayings to be quoted from him was that the great

axiom in diplomacy was 'Never do anything to-day that can be put off

till to-morrow.'

In speaking of Leo XIII. and his successful policy with Bismarck, he

said: 'Those very clever men succeed by doing what no one expects. My

success has been made by always doing what was expected of me. I always

did the safe thing.'

In conversation he enjoyed a Johnsonian style of repartee. One retort of

his had an excellent practical result. He acted as a special constable

in London during the Chartist Riots. Hearing a woman in the dense crowd

cry out, 'Let me faint, let me faint,' he turned to her at once, and

said: 'Pray do, madam,' whereupon she recovered immediately.

Soon after the Berlin Conference when the Disraeli party were making the

most of the accession of Crete, a visitor at the Embassy, gushing over

its charms concluded with the assertion that Crete was the loveliest

island in the world. Whereupon Mr. William Barrington (now Sir William

Barrington) said drily: 'Have you seen all the others?' This amused

Lord Lyons immensely, and some years afterwards when a young lady who

was and is still famous for her powers of conversation had talked at

him for some time, he adopted the same method. After a good many other

sweeping assertions she said of some work that had just come out: 'It is

the best written book that has appeared this century.' 'Ah,' he said,

'have you read all the others?' Being alone with her soon afterwards I

was not surprised at her inquiring of me dubiously whether I liked my

great-uncle.

* * * * *

It need hardly be said that, in the matter of his personal religion,

Lord Lyons was very reticent. He was absolutely regular in his

attendance at the Sunday service in Paris and in England. He was very

fond of the singing of English hymns.

He never had any sympathy with the ritualist party in the Church of

England, and was inclined to be sarcastic as to those whom he designated

'Puseyites,' as was then the custom.

One who knew him very well told me that for a time he was somewhat

unsettled in the matter of definite religious belief. There is also

evidence that in middle life the idea of joining the Catholic Church

had been present to him as a possibility. As far as can be known it

was during the last summer of his life that he began to consider the

question practically. It is not surprising that Lord Lyons, when he

took the matter up, showed the same characteristics in its regard that

he had shown in any serious question throughout his life, namely, the

greatest thoroughness and care in studying the Catholic religion and

in carrying out its practical side, reserve as to deep sentiment, not

without humorous touches which were intensely characteristic. Newman's

works formed the chief part of his study during those summer months.

A letter written in that August says of him, 'He is always reading

Newman.' It was not until shortly before his death that he spoke on the

matter to any of the family. A note in the writing of his secretary and

intimate friend--Mr. George Sheffield--says that he spoke of it six

weeks before his death. Lord Lyons had known Bishop Butt for many years

when he was parish priest at Arundel, and it was to him that he applied

for advice. He studied the Penny Catechism most carefully, learning the

answers by heart, like a child. He began to fulfil the practices of a

Catholic with great regularity. He went to Mass daily at ten o'clock,

and adopted little habits of self-denial and showed greater liberality

in almsgiving. The last honour he ever received was the offer of an

earldom on his retiring from the Paris Embassy. He suggested to Dr. Butt

that it would be a good act of mortification to refuse this honour, but

the Bishop would not advise him to do so. He began, against his usual

custom, to give money to crossing-sweepers or beggars in the streets,

and I am told by my aunt, Lady Phillippa Stewart, that, after returning

from my wedding, he said to her: 'Is it not customary after an event

of this kind to give money in alms?' He then suggested that he should

make some offering to the hospitals and asked her to write out the

names of those she thought would be the most suitable. It was about

ten days before my marriage in November, 1887, that I first heard of

his intentions. I learnt it in a fashion very characteristic of him. I

was not staying in the house, but I had been dining with him when he

remarked casually: 'Really, my austerities are becoming alarming. I have

given up soup for dinner and jam for breakfast.' This struck me as a

novel proceeding, as I knew his fondness for jam and that the ordinary

routine of dinner beginning with a clear soup was a fixed ceremonial

with him. That night I questioned my aunt, who told me that he had been

for some weeks preparing to join the Church. It was at this time that

he said to one of the family: 'I am now ready to be received as soon

as the Bishop likes.' He also characteristically consulted his nephew,

the Duke of Norfolk, as to whether he ought to inform Lord Salisbury of

his intention of becoming a Catholic. He did not, during these weeks,

know that he was in any danger. The last time I saw my great uncle was

at my wedding. He had a stroke about ten days afterwards, and to all

appearance became unconscious. Dr. Butt, knowing what his intentions had

been, had no hesitation in giving him conditional Baptism and Extreme

Unction. I was at the funeral at Arundel, and saw the coffin lowered

into the vault in the Fitzalan Chapel, where his sister Minna had been

placed two and a half years earlier.

* * * * *

I feel most strongly as I conclude these very imperfect notes, how

entirely Lord Lyons belonged to a generation of Englishmen now long

passed away. The force of will, the power of self-devotion, the dignity,

the reticence, the minute regularity, the sense of order, the degree

of submission to authority and the undoubting assertion of his own

authority towards others--all were elements in a strong personality.

There are, no doubt, strong men now, but their strength is of a

different kind. Englishmen to-day are obliged to be more expansive

and unreserved. No fixed routine can be followed now as then; no man

can so guard his own life and his own personality from the public

eye. Lord Lyons was not of the type that makes the successful servant

of the democracy. Fidelity, reticence, self-effacement, are not the

characteristics that are prominent in the popular idea of the strong man

to-day. But no one who knew Lord Lyons can doubt that those qualities

were in him a great part of his strength. He was and must always be to

those who knew him very much of an enigma, and it certainly would not

have been his own wish that any great effort should be made to interpret

his inner life to the world at large.

INDEX

Aali Pasha, i. 146, 150, 151, 155, 161, 166, 167, 172;

and the Paris Conference, i. 153.

Abdul Aziz, Sultan of Turkey, i. 151, ii. 175;

effort for Navy, i. 152;

dismisses Fuad Pasha, i. 155;

unpopularity of, i. 161, 163;

visit to France, i. 169, 170;

to England, i. 171, 173.

Abdul Hamid, ii. 108, 208;

policy of, ii. 137;

reported conspiracy against, ii. 167;

suzerainty in Tunis, ii. 246;

overthrow of, i. 168.

Aberdeen, Lord, ii. 11.

Abolition proclamation, i. 93.

Abou Klea, battle of, ii. 343.

Adams, Mr., U.S. Minister in London, i. 38, 43, 59, 63, 71, 72, 98, 99.

Adams, Sir Francis, chargé d'affaires at Paris, ii. 72;

telegram on Anglo-French sympathies, ii. 136;

Minister at Berne, ii. 220.

Adrianople, railway to Constantinople, i. 176.

Aehrenthal, Count, i. 342.

Afghanistan, Lytton's policy in, ii. 209;

attacked by Russia, ii. 348, 352.

Africa, west coast, ii. 409.

_Alabama_ incident, i. 97, 98, 99, 105, 300;

question revived, i. 162, 189.

Alaska, bought by America, i. 168.

Albanian league, ii. 228.

Alderson, Capt., sent to report on army of the Potomac, i. 128, 129.

Alexander, Emperor of Russia, i. 187, 255, 273, 333, 354, ii. 52,

54, 404;

visit to Berlin, ii. 76;

friendliness to England, ii. 80;

attempt on life of, ii. 207.

Alexandretta, ii. 150, 151.

Alexandria, ii. 172, 188, 273;

Anglo-French Naval Demonstration at, ii. 283;

massacre at, ii. 285;

bombardment of, ii. 288.

Algeria, position of French in, i. 199, 268, 271, 382, ii. 159, 249.

Alsace and Lorraine, question of cession, i. 321, 332, 334, 358,

361, 369;

French hopes of recovery of, ii. 103, 135, 195, 197, 247, 346;

trade of, ii. 14.

America, army, i. 45, 47, 48, 79, 109;

methods of recruiting, i. 110, 116;

finance, i. 57;

slave trade, i. 20;

affairs in central, i. 13;

relations between North and South, i. 20, 29, 31;

relations with England, i. 12, 15, 16, 45, 46, 79, 129, 189.

American Civil War, i. 34, 343;

Blockade question, i. 33, 36, 37;

privateering, i. 42;

Confederate Government, i. 53;

Southern Confederacy, i. 31, 33, 34, 36;

position of Consuls, i. 83, 121;

Southern activity, i. 82, 83;

Revolutionary Party, i. 80;

proposed foreign intervention, i. 90, 91, 92, 96;

rising prices, i. 94;

vessel building in England, i. 101, 102;

position of foreigners during, i. 106-109;

seizure of British vessels, i. 100, 104, 105;

Irish in, i. 109, 114, 115;

Germans in, i. 115;

British officers sent to follow operations, i. 128;

M. Mercier on, i. 85.

Anarchical plots, i. 187.

Ancona district, Austrian troops in, i. 3.

Anderson, at Fort Sumter, i. 35.

Anderson, Mr., attaché at Washington, i. 87.

Andrassy, Count, ii. 85;

and the Eastern Question, ii. 127, 134, 138;

and the Austro-German Alliance, ii. 194.

Andrassy Note, ii. 95.

Anglo-Russian Agreement, ii. 143, 160.

Anglo-Turkish Convention, ii. 140-142;

disclosed to Waddington, ii. 148;

made public, ii. 151;

irritation in France, ii. 152, 159, 163.

Annam, French in, ii. 103, 307, 327.

Anti-Slavery party in England, i. 118.

Antonelli, Cardinal, i. 3, 4, 184.

Anzin, ii. 323.

Arabi Bey, rebellion of, ii. 258, 273, 278;

Minister of War, ii. 279, 283;

campaign against, ii. 295, 296.

Arago, Emmanuel, succeeds Gambetta as Minister of War, i. 361.

Archibald, Consul, on the kidnapping of recruits, i. 112.

Arcolay pamphlet, i. 220.

Argyll, Duke and Duchess of, i. 41.

Armenia, ii. 131, 137;

patriarch question, ii. 55.

Army Purchase Bill, ii. 9, 12.

Arnim, Count, Minister at Rome, i. 347;

Ambassador at Paris, ii. 14, 16, 27, 30, 60, 68, 140;

and Thiers, ii. 31;

on French policy, ii. 45;

Bismarck's dislike of, ii. 46.

Arundel, Lyons at, i. 139, ii. 222, 418, 422, 428.

Ashman, Mr., i. 50.

Asia Minor, Russian policy in, i. 268, ii. 133, 137.

Athens, i. 149; Lyons attaché at, i. 1.

Atlantic, coast defence, i. 40.

Augusta, Empress, Bismarck's dislike of, ii. 80, 354.

Aumale Duc d', ii. 2, 7, 16, 44, 48, 51, 56, 64, 311, 368.

d'Aunay, M., ii. 300, 376.

Austria, relations with Prussia, i. 186, 193, 202;

relations with France, ii. 35;

military power of, i. 268;

and the Eastern Question, ii. 85, 127;

in the Moldo-Wallachian Principalities, i. 153;

in the Ancona district, i. 3.

Austro-German Alliance, ii. 194, 199, 205, 398.

Austro-Prussian War, failure of French policy in, i. 177.

Azoph, Sea of, ii. 417.

Bac-ninh, ii. 324.

Baden, Grand Duchy of, and Confederation, i. 208, 266, 276, 285, 293;

French policy in, i. 190, ii. 36;

proposed neutrality, i. 302.

Bagdad railway, ii. 151.

Bahamas, the, i. 130.

Baker Pasha, defeat of, ii. 323.

Balkan Peninsula, ii. 223.

Bapaume, i. 355.

Bardo, Treaty of the, ii. 243.

Baring, Major (Earl of Cromer) in Egypt, ii. 189, 322, 352;

letter to Lyons, ii. 203;

and "Modern Egypt," ii. 295.

_Barracouta_, H.M.S., i. 100.

Barrère, M., ii. 322.

Barrington, Mr. (Sir William), ii. 128, 426.

Bateman, Sir Alfred, ii. 253.

Batoum, ii. 137, 138, 143.

Baucel, M., i. 228.

Bavaria, i. 193;

and Confederation, i. 266;

proposed neutrality, i. 302.

Bayazid, ii. 142.

Baynes, Admiral, i. 23.

Bazaine, General, i. 317, 320;

capitulation, i. 329.

Beaconsfield, Lord, ii. 144.

Beatrice, Princess, ii. 162.

Beauregard, General, i. 35.

Beaury, plot against Napoleon III., i. 285.

Bedford, Duchess of, ii. 425.

Belfort, i. 370, 374.

Belgium, Prince Napoleon on, i. 193;

French in, i. 211;

trade relations with France, ii. 25;

neutrality of, i. 298, 302;

foreign policy towards, i. 303, 355, ii. 113, 124, 206;

secret Treaty, i. 320, 340;

in Constantinople Conference, ii. 109;

Bismarck's policy in, i. 254, ii. 74, 83, 345.

Belgium, King of, i. 212, 216.

Belgrade, Fortress of, i. 161;

evacuated by the Turks, i. 163.

Belligerent Rights, Exposition of French Jurists on, i. 44, 46, 50.

Benedetti, French Ambassador at Berlin, i. 293;

on Franco-Prussian situation, i. 299;

affront to, i. 300, ii. 206;

despatch from, i. 304;

meeting with King of Prussia at Ems, i. 305.

Benjamin, Mr., i. 122.

Berlin, Congress at, ii. 147.

_Berlin Post_, "Is War in Sight" article, ii. 72.

Berlin, Treaty of, i. 342, ii. 227;

Layard on, ii. 160.

Bermuda, i. 130.

Berne, ii. 256.

Bernstorff, Count, Prussian Ambassador in London, i. 196, 256, 259,

260, 268, 293, 304, 309, 317, 323, 337;

on Belgian affairs, i. 218;

letter from Bismarck, i. 261.

Bert, M. Paul, ii. 323.

Berthaut, General, Minister of War, ii. 115.

Bessarabia, ii. 142, 367.

Bessborough, Lord, ii. 11.

Beust, Count, Austrian Minister, i. 162, 272, 314, 320; ii. 202, 231;

and the Belgian question, i. 229;

letter to Metternich, ii. 35.

Beyens, Baron, Belgian Minister, i. 213.

Biarritz, i. 197.

Biggar, Mr., ii. 234.

Billing, Baron de, plan to relieve Gordon, ii. 326.

Billot, General, ii. 311.

Bisaccia, Duc de, French Ambassador in London, ii. 57.

Bismarck, Prince, i. 162, 192, 387;

and Luxemburg railway affair, i. 168, 213;

and German Confederation, i. 247, 251, 276;

at Ems, i. 293;

and the Vatican, ii. 30, 68;

relations with Emperor, ii. 62, 120;

and disarmament negotiations, i. 254, 260-5, 270-3, 275, 278, 301;

foreign policy of, i. 179, 211, 214, 218, 314, 355, ii. 14, 29, 49,

54, 70, 72, 74, 77, 82, 124, 205, 345, 358;

with regard to Austria, ii. 42;

and the Austro-German Alliance, ii. 194;

and Belgium, i. 303;

and the Eastern Question, ii. 90, 97, 231;

and Egypt, ii. 150, 297, 325, 338, 339, 352;

and France, ii. 16, 60, 136, 283, 286, 384;

during war, i. 314;

peace negotiations, i. 345, 348, 357, 361, 365, 370, 374, 380,

ii. 20, 30, 82;

and payment of indemnity, ii. 3;

colonial policy, ii. 60;

and French colonial schemes, ii. 244-5, 251, 259, 264, 268, 342;

and Russia, i. 338;

and Russo-Turkish War, ii. 109;

Suez Canal transaction, ii. 94;

and claims of Prussia in Tunis, i. 200;

and Favre, i. 316, 318, 321, 323, 324, 352;

interviews with Malet, i. 319;

with Thiers, i. 329, 331, 342, 353, 358;

French views of policy, ii. 107;

and Arnim, ii. 46;

and Boulanger, ii. 401;

and Clarendon, i. 250, 279;

and Gramont, i. 307;

and Count Münster, ii. 388;

and Napoleon III., i. 221, 254, 333;

and Odo Russell, i. 338;

and Waddington, ii. 168;

on himself, ii. 61;

on French Press, i. 271-2;

and the German Press, i. 305;

power of, ii. 53, 73;

illness of, ii. 290.

"Bismarck, his Reflections and Reminiscences," quoted, i. 338.

Bizerta, ii. 243.

Black Sea Conference, i. 341, 350, 366;

clauses in Treaty of Paris, concerning, i. 337;

French policy in, i. 337, 339;

Russia policy in, ii. 127.

Blairgowrie, Lord Russell at, i. 119.

Blanqui, revolutionary leader, i. 385.

Bleichröder, ii. 384.

Blignières, M. de, ii. 171, 204;

in Egypt, ii. 189, 238, 261, 278;

resignation of, ii. 279;

on Egyptian finances, ii. 330.

Blockade, international law concerning, i. 97.

Blount, Sir Edward, ii. 415.

Blowitz, M., _Times_ correspondent, ii. 70, 241, 308, 416.

Blue Books, publication of, i. 101, 102, 300.

Boer War, i. 49;

pay of men in, i. 110.

Bonaparte, Prince Pierre, i. 244.

Bonapartist Party, policy of, i. 349, 356, 364, ii. 15, 17, 66, 106,

191.

Bordeaux, i. 345, 349.

Bosnia, ii. 127, 134, 141, 143;

annexation of, i. 342;

insurrection in, ii. 84.

_Bosphore Egyptien_, suspended, ii. 352.

Boston, i. 73, 75;

harbour, i. 64.

Boulanger, General, ii. 121;

policy, ii. 367, 384, 385, 393, 403;

and the army, ii. 365, 383;

popularity of, ii. 366;

at Longchamps, ii. 369;

mobilization scheme, ii. 401, 411;

transferred to Clermont-Ferrand, ii. 409.

Bourbaki, General, i. 327, 354;

on the military situation, i. 327;

at Bourges, i. 348;

defeated, i. 359;

army not included in armistice, i. 360.

Bourges, Bourbaki at, i. 348.

Brassey, Mr., application for railway concession, i. 176.

Bray, Bavarian Minister, i. 302.

Brodie, attaché at Washington, i. 87.

Broglie, Duc de, at Black Sea Conference, i. 341;

French Ambassador in London, ii. 22, 23, 24;

in French politics, ii. 64, 67, 100;

becomes Prime Minister, ii. 111;

unpopularity of, ii. 113.

Browning, Mr. and Mrs., ii. 422.

Bruce, Sir Frederick, i. 140, 141.

Brünnow, Baron, i. 186, ii. 38.

Buchanan, President (U.S.A.), i. 12, 19, 23, 29;

invitation to Prince of Wales, i. 25;

letter from Queen Victoria, i. 26.

Bucharest, i. 149.

Buffet, M., i. 282.

Bulgaria, i. 166-8, ii. 142, 143;

proposed limits of, ii. 130;

Union with Eastern Roumelia, ii. 360;

Russia in, ii. 367, 391, 399.

Bull's Run, Fight of, i. 47-50, 110.

Bülow, Count von, ii. 53, 74, 87.

Bulwer, Sir Henry, at the Constantinople Embassy, i. 145, 146;

opinion on a Turkish Navy, i. 152.

Bulwer, Lady, i. 146.

Bunch, Mr., British Consul at Charleston, i. 42, 51-53, 72, 94.

Burmah, ii. 358;

English in, ii. 360;

annexation of, ii. 361.

Burnley, Mr., Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, i. 134, 136.

Burns, Mr., ii. 343.

Busch, M., ii. 130;

quoted, ii. 82, 344, 352.

Butt, Bishop, ii. 427.

Buyak Dere, ii. 138.

_Cagliari_ case, i. 8-11.

Cairo, intrigues at, ii. 87, 258;

British troops enter, ii. 285;

Northbrook mission to, ii. 332.

Calais, ii. 22.

Calcutta, i. 223.

Calice, Baron, ii. 130.

Cambridge, Duke of, i. 379.

Canada, i. 15, 119;

defences of, i. 40, 43, 49, 60, 72, 74, 80, 132, 134, 291;

despatch of troops to, i. 54;

Reciprocity Treaties, i. 17, 123.

_Caradoc_, the, i. 146.

Carafa, Signor, Neapolitan Foreign Minister, i. 9, 11.

Carey, Capt., ii. 194.

Carnarvon, Lord, resigns office, ii. 123.

Cass, Miss, ii. 398.

Cass, General, i. 12.

Cayenne, i. 243.

Ceylon, i. 223.

Chalons, i. 204;

French army at i. 307.

Chambord, Comte de, i. 364; ii. 2, 9, 18, 21, 25, 56, 57, 64, 66;

proclamation of, ii. 7;

White Flag manifesto, ii. 47.

Chanzy, General, at Le Mans, i. 348, 354, 359;

suggested President, ii. 118, 197;

death of, ii. 305.

Charles X. of France, i. 254.

Charleston, fighting at, i. 34, 51;

prices in, during war, i. 94.

Charmes, M., ii. 376, 387.

Chartres, Duc de, ii. 3, 365.

Chase, Mr., Secretary of Treasury, U.S., i. 43, 119.

Chasseurs d'Afrique, ii. 118.

Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy, Vol. 2 of 2 · 第 8 / 9 章