By Dr. Th. Schiemann.
The writings of Professor Schiemann of the University of
Berlin, who is also the leading editorial writer of the
Kreuz Zeitung, are regarded as inspired by the Kaiser's
Government, and in some degree by the Kaiser himself. Dr.
Schiemann is often spoken of as an intimate personal friend
of the Kaiser. The subjoined article was, in the original,
sent by Dr. Schiemann to Professor John Bates Clark of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with the special
request that it be translated and forwarded for publication
in THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY.
After the great crisis of the first world war, which terminated in the
Congress of Vienna, the relations of England to the German States were
fairly good. People lived in the protecting shade of the great
alliance; England was busy digesting the enormous prey which it had
seized at the expense of all the other powers that had taken part in
the war; Continental Europe was endeavoring, as best it could, to heal
the wounds and sores which had remained behind as mementos of
oppressive but, despite all, glorious years. France recuperated most
rapidly; by the Treaties of Paris there had been recovered from it
only part of the abundant harvest which it had gathered in consequence
of the victories and the coercive policy of Napoleon; the national
soil was still fertile and the national consciousness was still imbued
with the "gloire" which the Corsican General, with the help of his own
and of foreign troops, had won for the French name. The great
disturbances of world peace that marked the years 1830, 1854, and 1870
were attributable to an incessant pursuit of new "gloire," to which
all other aims were subordinate. Parallel with this French striving
for new "gloire" was England's endeavor to keep the Continent in a
feverish condition; this was the policy of Lord Palmerston, and with
it was combined a hysterical fear of attack on the part of possible
enemies that were thought to exist in Russia, and especially in
France. At the same time an arrogant challenge was constantly held
forth to all the nations of the earth, and an almost uninterrupted war
was carried on against the small States adjoining England's colonies
in Asia and Africa. Between the years 1856 and 1900 England waged no
less than thirty-four such wars, and by so doing acquired 4,000,000
square miles of land and 57,000,000 subjects. In Europe after the year
1815 England, for the most part, kept peace; the Crimean war, which
was a coalition war, constitutes an exception, and it was not
England's fault that Prussia, too, was not drawn into that war, which
concerned a specifically English interest. At that time English
threats were quite as numerous as they were in the year 1863, when The
Daily News declared King William I. an outlaw, and The Daily Mail
proclaimed for him the fate of Charles I. The cause of this, however,
was that in London it was looked upon as an interference with English
interests that Bismarck, by his attitude during the Polish
insurrection, had prevented the effectuation of a coalition directed
against Russia. During the war of 1864 over Schleswig-Holstein the
threats were renewed, and even then we began to hear the watchwords
with which public opinion in England for a decade has been mobilized
against us: A Germany organized on a military basis, and with a fleet
at its command besides, indicates that the goal of that State's
policy, even more than in the case of France, is world rule. At that
time, too, however, France and Russia were regarded by English war
makers as the country's real enemies, and this conviction, rather
than ideal considerations of any kind whatsoever, accounts for the
fact that in the years 1870 and 1871 English policy followed a neutral
course. England wished to see France weakened, had not foreseen
Germany's great success, and had reserved for future opportunities the
settlement of accounts with Russia, its very annoying rival in Asia.
In other respects, however, Bismarck was by no means satisfied with
the way in which England pursued its policy of "neutrality." He had
expected, at least, that the English would condemn the war, begun, as
it was, in such a criminal manner, and not that they would carry on
with France a flourishing trade in weapons. "It is a surprising fact,
pregnant with warning," he wrote in May, 1874, "that Mr. Gladstone
succeeded so easily in holding the country to an attitude directly
opposed to the traditional hostility of the English masses toward
France." He had all the more reason to expect a different attitude in
view of the fact that, as was well known in England, it had been out
of regard for England that Bismarck in December, 1870, had refused an
offer of peace from Thiers, which rested on the condition that Belgium
should be united to France under the rule of King Leopold. After the
battle of Sedan Lord Odo Russell and Disraeli aroused the fears of the
English people over the possibility of a German invasion; but
Bismarck, nevertheless, was thinking of an English-German alliance,
which, on account of the blood relationship of the two dynasties, was
by no means impracticable, and which to Queen Victoria would have
seemed a natural combination. Subsequently, in the years 1873 and
1874, Bismarck negotiated with Lord Odo Russell in Berlin regarding a
German-English alliance, and through Münster he also took up the
matter with Disraeli, who denied very emphatically that he had French
sympathies. Nothing, he said, was more incorrect. The two peoples, he
alleged further, who alone could proceed hand in hand, and who must
become more and more cognizant of that fact, were Germany and
England. The power of France, he added, was on the wane, a fact
regarding which the demoralization of the empire, the decrease of
population, and the course of recent events left no room for doubt.
Notwithstanding Disraeli's views, however, the alliance with England,
as is well known, was never formed. The most serious obstacle was
created by the fact that party government in England rendered binding
obligations extraordinarily difficult. Then came all sorts of
pinpricks, as, for instance, Derby's advocacy in the year 1875 of
Gortchakoff's famous rescue campaign. But despite all Bismarck held
fast to the idea of bringing about closer relations with England, and
the formation of the alliance with Austria-Hungary confirmed him in
that purpose. "We shall have to adjust our attitude more and more," he
wrote to Schweinitz in March, 1880, "with the object of increasing the
security of our relations with Austria and England." It was this
political desire that prompted him to reject a Russian proposal to
unite the four Eastern powers in a common protest against England's
isolated procedure in connection with the occupation of Egypt. He
wished to prevent England from being humiliated by a prearranged
coalition. A letter from Bismarck to Salisbury (July 8, 1885) has been
preserved, which is very characteristic of this friendly attitude of
German policy. "As to politics," he writes, "I have not the slightest
doubt that the traditional friendly relations between the two
dynasties, as well as between the two nations, will give sufficient
security for settling every existing or arising question in a
conciliatory way."
With respect to the question of the Egyptian loan that was being
discussed at that time, as well as with respect to the burning Afghan
question, Bismarck adhered tenaciously to this policy, and later on,
too, he was determined to spin the threads further. In the latter part
of the Autumn of 1887 an exchange of letters again took place between
Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck, wherein the latter gave expression
to the idea that Austria and England were the natural allies of
Germany. If they were opposed to an alliance it would be necessary for
Germany to alter its policy entirely and to think about establishing
more intimate relations with Russia. This, properly considered, was an
invitation to enter into negotiations regarding an alliance treaty.
But Salisbury, who hoped for a conflict of the Continental powers
which would insure England's position of power for another generation,
answered evasively, and Bismarck justly regarded his reply as a
rejection. But such a conflict did not arise. The menacing danger
brought about by Alexander III. was overcome by the publication of the
German-Austrian treaty of alliance. Even then, however, Bismarck did
not give up the idea of bringing about closer relations with England.
In December, 1888, he wrote: "The promotion of common feeling with
England is primo loco to be encouraged." If Bismarck had left behind a
political testament this sentence would in all probability be
contained in it. Such was also the attitude which our Emperor has
consistently maintained from his accession to the throne until the
outbreak of the present war. He was a favorite of the old Queen, and
the treaty signed on July 1, 1890, whereby we obtained possession of
Heligoland by relinquishing our claims to Witu and Zanzibar, was an
outward sign of an honest endeavor on the part of both nations to
bring about closer mutual relations. The mutual limitation of spheres
of interest in East and West Africa in the year 1893, and the friendly
adjustment of the conflict which Article III. of the British Agreement
with the Congo Free State of the year 1894 had threatened to bring
about, might be considered additional symptoms of this general
disposition or tendency.
The year 1896, however, brought disturbances; the telegram which
Emperor William on Jan. 5 sent to President Kruger, after the
predatory invasion of Dr. Jameson had been fortunately repelled, was
received very unfavorably in England, and led to demonstrations on
the part of the British fleet, which, although they had a very
provocative character, remained finally without lasting effect. The
impression was created, however, that public opinion in England was
very easily excited; it saw itself disturbed in the execution of a
thoroughly considered political plan, and, as it were, caught in
flagranti. But the fact that there were still deeper reasons for a
gradually increasing mistrust of Germany is brought to light by
Wilson's book, published in 1896, which, under the title "Made in
Germany," developed a program of battle against Germany's rapidly
growing economic power. Since then all steps taken by Germany in the
pursuit of its internal as well as its external policy have been
viewed with extraordinary disapprobation on the part of England. The
adoption of our Naval bill by the Reichstag on March 28, 1898, the
foundation of the Naval League two days later, the new East-Asiatic
policy of Germany, which in the leasing of Kiao-Chau was exemplified
in a manner not at all to the liking of the English politicians, the
Emperor's trip to the Orient, which led to friendly relations between
Turkey and Germany--all this was looked upon with the more displeasure
in view of the fact that Emperor William in the Summer of 1895 had
emphatically rejected a plan, proposed to him by Lord Salisbury, to
divide up Turkey. In August, 1898, nevertheless, when the Fashoda
crisis had strained the relations of England and France to the utmost,
and when, at the same time, English-Russian relations were becoming
critical in the Far East, an understanding between Germany and
England, which might perhaps have the character of an alliance, seemed
to be quite possible. Secretary of State von Bülow and the English
Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, took up the matter very earnestly,
but it was impossible to secure from England the assurance that the
entire English Government and Parliament would sanction an alliance.
Russia warded off the menacing danger of a war with England by means
of the well-known proposal which on May 18, 1899, led to the holding
of the Disarmament Conference in The Hague, and Delcassé on Jan. 20,
1899, began, with reference to the Fashoda affair, the policy of
retreat, which excluded France from the Nile territory. Then came
England's war against the Boers. It is well known how the German
Government during this war scrupulously maintained its neutrality (not
according to the English method) despite the fact that all the
sympathies of the German people were with the Boers in their struggle
for freedom. It is not so well known, on the other hand, that the
Imperial Government rejected a Russian proposal to form an alliance
against England. That, too, was a service for which England has not
thanked us. Of the tragedy in South Africa it has retained in mind
only one incident, the so-called "Kruger Message," which it regarded
as an interference with its right to do violence to a weaker power,
figuratively speaking, as a slap in the face.
In the course of the war the old Queen died, and Edward VII. entered
upon his fateful reign. Emperor William had gone over to London to
attend the funeral of his grandmother, and Prince Henry had
accompanied him, so that the dynastic relationship was made most
conspicuous. After that the political relations of the two States
seemed about to shape themselves most propitiously. Of the fact that
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded on Jan. 30, 1902, was directed
against Russia, there was never for a moment any doubt; indeed it was
Japan, not England, which took the initiative in bringing it about. On
the other hand, the co-operation of English and German war vessels in
adjusting the difficulties which both powers had with Venezuela was in
complete harmony with the political wishes and convictions of Emperor
William, who, like Bismarck at an earlier date, was of the opinion
that the interests of the two nations could readily be reconciled. But
in England that co-operation resulted in an excited anti-German
campaign on the part of the press. The Times, The National Review, The
Daily News, The Daily Telegraph, The Daily Express, and other
newspapers vehemently attacked the Government for acting conjointly
with us, and there can be no doubt that in so doing they gave
expression, not to the ideas of the Balfour Ministry, but to the
sentiments which, as was well known in those journalistic circles,
were held by King Edward. Balfour, in an address which he delivered in
Liverpool on Feb. 13, 1903, had opposed with great emphasis the
arousing of English public opinion against Germany. "We wish," he
said, "to bear in mind an old ideal, namely, that all the nations
which stand in the front ranks of civilization should learn to work
together in the interest of the whole, and that nothing any longer
stands in the way of the realization of this high ideal save those
national bitternesses, jealousies, and hostilities.... As far as
Venezuela is concerned, that is passing over ... but with respect to
the future it fills me with anxiety when I think how easy it is to
stir up the fire of international jealousy, and how hard it is to
quench it." It was all the harder in view of the fact that the King,
from the very beginning of his reign, adhered tenaciously to the
political idea of using the old French revanche notion as the cardinal
point of English policy.
In April, 1903, the King began a series of political trips to
Portugal, Spain, France, and Austria, while Berlin, very strangely,
was not visited by him. Each one of these visits resulted in political
agreements, into which Vienna alone declined to enter, and which,
after a return visit on the part of Loubet, at that time President of
the French Republic, and after a surprising visit in Paris on the part
of certain members of the English Parliament, led to the significant
English-French agreement of April 8, 1904, a treaty which culminated
in the balancing of Morocco against Egypt and made it possible for the
English Government, as soon as it chose, to regulate the Morocco
question in such a way that it would necessarily bring about a
conflict between France and isolated Germany. The ally of King Edward
was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcassé, who, on the
basis of the agreements made with England, had likewise concluded
treaties with Spain and Italy, which, as he confidently assumed,
insured the pénétration pacifique, i.e., the conquest, unhindered by
Europe, of Morocco. How this plan presently fell through and how
Delcassé was overthrown shall not be related here; on the other hand,
attention should be called to the intimidating efforts to which
England resorted for the purpose of exerting pressure upon Germany.
The first effort of this nature took the form of an address delivered
on Feb. 3, 1905, by Arthur Lee, a Civil Lord of the English Admiralty,
who threatened the German fleet with destruction; the second effort
came after Emperor William had landed in Tangier on March 31 and after
Delcassé had been overthrown, and took the form of an appearance of an
English fleet before Swinemünde, on which occasion it was officially
asserted that the resolution had been adopted back in May, that is, at
a time when the intrigues of Delcassé were culminating and when a war
between Germany and France seemed likely to break out at any time. For
even after Delcassé's overthrow England did not give up the game as
lost; it declined to take part in a conference regarding Morocco and
considered in all seriousness the question of an invasion. England's
naval superiority was so great that the success of such an invasion
could not seem doubtful, and in London it was thought that they could
even do without the support of France. These plans were finally given
up; for some time it was not known very well in London what decisions
had been reached in the meeting between the Czar and Emperor William
at Bjorkö, and there was a feeling of uncertainty. Accordingly,
England also sent delegates to the conference at Algeciras, wherein we
were obliged to deal solely, except for the Austrian delegates, with
friends of the English-French combination.
The result, therefore, could only be a vague understanding, wherein
was concealed the germ of subsequent conflicts. The first consequence,
nevertheless, was a relaxation of German-English relations. In
December, 1905, a Liberal Ministry had taken the helm, and the idea
was conceived of diverting Germany by other means from the pursuit of
a "world policy." Sir Edward Grey championed the contention that more
intimate relations between England and Germany were, to be sure,
desirable, but could only be effected if we swallowed France's Morocco
policy unflinchingly, like bitter medicine. For this event Mr.
Haldane, the new Minister of War, proposed an understanding between us
similar to that which England had reached with France. This
constituted the preliminary step toward an endeavor to effect more
intimate relations, an endeavor which at first had a non-official
character. German Burgomasters visited the City of London and were
cordially received by King Edward himself. This was followed, in
August, 1906, by a meeting between the King and his imperial nephew,
in Homburg vor der Höhe, which, as was to be expected, passed off in a
satisfactory manner. It should, nevertheless, be recalled to mind that
the King expressed himself very ironically on the subject of The Hague
Conference, which, he asserted, was a humbug. And Sir Charles
Hardinge, who entered into negotiations with Secretary of State von
Tschirschky, also voiced the opinion that the conference should offer
no opportunity for serious interference with England's naval policy.
On this point English and German views concurred, though from
different motives. In the following September the English Minister of
War, Mr. Haldane, was our guest. He came for the purpose of studying
German military organization, and every conceivable courtesy was
extended to him. In the addresses which he delivered after his return
to England he referred many times to his sojourn in Berlin. He also
made the assertion that the relations of England to France were closer
and more intimate than ever before, that to Russia they were friendly,
and that to Germany they were better than they recently had been. We
now know--a fact which the Liberté also divulged at that time--that an
English-French military convention had then been signed with reference
to future possibilities. This fact was immediately denied, but it
was merely a question of word quibbling. No convention, to be sure,
was actually signed by the Government, but the "inner circle" of the
Cabinet undoubtedly agreed that "conversations" between the military
authorities of the two nations should take place, and these military
conversations were held regularly, just as if a secret alliance
existed, until the outbreak of the present war. Parallel with these
political preparations were efforts that stood in sharp contrast to
the irritating activities carried on without interruption by the
above-mentioned anti-German press, which we embrace under the name
"Pearson and Harmsworth Press." In England, as well as in Germany,
societies were organized with the object of mitigating and, if
possible, entirely abolishing the differences and antagonisms which
existed between the two nations; these were the so-called "Friendship
Committees." In England the Duke of Argyll and Lord Avebury were at
the head of such a committee, and a visit made to London by
representatives of our press initiated a well-meant movement which
found enthusiastic representatives on both sides. English and German
clergymen traveled back and forth between England and Germany,
representatives of the English press paid a return visit to Germany,
English and German workingmen's representatives endeavored to cement
feelings of friendship by making personal observations and
acquaintances, and in a similar way representatives of the
Parliamentary groups of both countries thought and acted, while the
leaders of science were working together at congresses held in Berlin
and London. In this way were formed a number of valuable personal
relations which led to political friendships and resulted in a
conscious co-operation toward an honest English-German understanding.
These efforts continued until shortly before the month of August,
1914. One may safely say, moreover, that nobody has interceded more
zealously and more constantly for English-German friendship and
co-operation and for the removal of the difficulties that are ever
cropping up anew than our Emperor. The enthusiasm with which Emperor
William was always received in England on occasion of his numerous
visits, especially in November and December, 1907, again in 1910, when
he went to London to attend the funeral of Edward VII., and again in
1911, when he visited King George, would be absolutely inconceivable
hypocrisy, which we regard as out of the question, had it not been the
spontaneous expression of popular sentiment. Official English policy,
however, followed other channels. As early as the year 1907 Sir Edward
Grey had succeeded in securing from Russia an agreement which united
England and Russia in co-operation at the expense of Persia, but
which, indirectly, also affected German interests, the injury to which
was later happily warded off by the Treaty of Potsdam. It soon became
evident, moreover, that England, in concluding the agreement relating
to Persia, was in reality less concerned about protecting its Asiatic
interests than it was about including Russia in that coalition by
means of which it expected to put a stop to the "world policy" of
Germany and to check the further development of the German fleet. This
became very distinctly evident on June 9, 1908, when a meeting took
place at Reval between Edward VII. and Nicholas II. At that time it
was agreed and decided between Hardinge and Iswolski, not officially,
but in an oral exchange of views, that Russia would be ready to
proceed hand in hand with England in European affairs (i.e., in the
policy directed against Germany) as soon as it had sufficiently
recovered from the after-effects of the war with Japan and the
revolution. It was thought that this regeneration of Russia's military
power would take six or eight years. The scope of this agreement is
very obvious. Whereas Germany, during the persistent danger of a war
with France over Morocco, had hitherto considered it highly probable
that England would maintain a neutral attitude, it was obliged, as
soon as England drew nearer to the Dual Alliance, to figure at all
events upon a malevolent neutrality and very likely indeed upon open
hostility. Sir Edward Grey, to be sure, who had not yet escaped from
the anxiety with which English friends of peace were following the
King's trip to Russia, in order to cover up his game, on July 7 had
declared in the lower house, in reply to a question directed to the
Government, that the visit of the King by no means had any diplomatic
significance which might lead to an alliance or to an agreement or to
any kind of a convention; no negotiations were being entered into, he
asserted, for the purpose of concluding a treaty or a convention with
Russia, nor would any such treaty or convention be concluded during
the King's visit. But he went on to say that the visit would have some
political effect, and it was very true that political effect was
desired. "We wish that the visit shall exert a beneficent influence
upon the mutual relations of both empires." Public opinion in England
allowed itself to be satisfied with this equivocal, oracular
statement. In other countries, however, a keener insight was
displayed. THE NEW YORK TIMES judged the situation correctly when it
said: "It is always a mistake to force a warm friend, who is at the
same time a business friend, a blood relative, out of intimate and
useful friendship into bitter antagonism, and this mistake, according
to the judgment of all non-partisan observers of contemporary history,
has been committed by King Edward." When Edward VII. acceded to the
throne, it went on to say, England was a warm friend of Germany and of
the German Emperor, who had given numerous proofs of his friendship,
and was not only willing but anxious to become England's ally; now,
however, the guns of the two nations were, so to speak, pointed at
each other.
[Illustration: H.M. GEORGE V.
King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions Beyond
the Seas, Emperor of India
(_Photo from W. & D. Downey_)]
[Illustration: H.I.M. NICHOLAS II.
Czar of All the Russias, and the Grand Duke Alexis Nicholaievitch, the
Heir Apparent
(_Photo from Underwood & Underwood_)]
Such, indeed, was the actual case; a determined malevolence on the
part of the King, the English statesmen, and that newspaper trust
organized by Pearson and Harmsworth, began to mobilize Europe against
Germany, and to incense, by means of cable and telegraph, the judgment
of the world against our Emperor and against the German policy. No
means seemed too infamous if it served this purpose. Over a private
letter which Emperor William had sent to Admiral Lord Tweedmouth for
the purpose of checking false rumors that were maliciously being
spread abroad regarding our naval policy, The Times made a terrible
fuss in order to disseminate the notion that Emperor William was
interfering with the internal policy of Great Britain with a view to
injuring English military power. The excitement of public opinion in
England was then utilized by the press for the purpose of creating a
sentiment in favor of a concentration of the British fleet in the
North Sea. That, however, was certainly done at the instigation of the
Government, which was fond of attributing resolutions it had already
adopted to the pressure of public opinion throughout the country. The
naval manoeuvres which in July, 1908, were carried out in the North
Sea, close to our coastline, were participated in by a combination of
the canal fleet and the so-called home fleet, and they bore a very
provocative and demonstrative character. At this time, moreover,
appeared that widely read book by Percival A. Hislam, entitled "The
Admiralty of the Atlantic," the expositions of which culminated in the
statement that a war between England and Germany was unavoidable, and
that the sooner it broke out the shorter it would be and the less
money and blood it would cost. All this, however, is rendered easily
intelligible by the fact that the Balkan crisis, in consequence of the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had at that time assumed a very
dangerous aspect, and was threatening to bring on a war between
Austria and Russia and perhaps a world war, wherein England expected
to gain its own particular ends. It was therefore a severe
disappointment to English statesmen that Nicholas II., despite the
vociferous protests of the Serbs, and despite the decidedly warlike
attitude of the Russian people on March 25, 1909, recognized the
annexation. The disappointment was all the more severe for the reason
that shortly before that time, despite the still menacing conflict
over Casablanca, the Morocco difficulties between Germany and France
were also settled. On Feb. 9, 1909, the day on which King Edward made
his first visit in Berlin, a German-French agreement regarding Morocco
was signed, and in the latter part of May the Casablanca conflict was
also adjusted by arbitration to the tolerable satisfaction of both
contestants.
It is not too much to say that King Edward, in so far as he was able,
did his best to bring about another outcome, and in England this was
generally recognized. "There must be a definitive stopping of the
King's interference in foreign politics," declared Mr. Sidebotham,
M.P., in the Reform Club at Manchester during this crisis. His words
were loudly approved by his hearers, but his voice, as well as the
voice of other men in favor of establishing good relations with
Germany, was drowned without effect under the influence of the panic
which from the end of the year 1908 until well on into the Summer of
1909 kept all England in a state of excitement. Watchwords denoting
the necessity of taking immediate action against the German fleet, as
they were published in The Standard, The Morning Post, and in the
great monthly periodicals, The Nineteenth Century, the Fortnightly
Review, and The National Review, were echoed in the negotiations of
Parliament, and they dominated the Maritime Law Conference held in
London. The naval manoeuvres of July, 1909, brought together all three
English fleets, and the plan was conceived of summoning the fleets of
the larger colonies. A meeting of newspaper publishers, called in
London, was designed to carry on propaganda for these ideas, and the
Imperial Defense Conference, also held in London, proposed that
England should be supported by its large colonies, though, to be sure,
with certain reservations. In order to weaken the impression which
Russia's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had
created, the Czar visited the English fleet at Spithead, and for the
same reason, probably, the Russian Army manoeuvres in the Fall were
considered a rehearsal of the measures that would be adopted to check
the advance of an enemy toward St. Petersburg. Finally, on Oct. 23,
agreements were made in Racconigi between Iswolski, who was
accompanying the Czar on a new trip abroad, and Tittoni, which
agreements were to make it possible for Russia, as a Russian newspaper
put it, "to liberate itself from the necessity of friendly relations
with Germany."
During this excitement in the political atmosphere the Imperial
Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, endeavored to bring about a turn for
the better by effecting an understanding with England, in whose
attitude he correctly recognized the real cause of the political
insecurity. At this point attention must be called to the fundamental
difficulty with which all negotiations at that time, and subsequently,
were confronted, and necessarily confronted. In Germany it was seen
very clearly from the start that the probability of a combined
French-Russian attack, for which influential political groups in St.
Petersburg, as well as in Paris, were working, was very slight, so
long as England's entrance into this anti-German combination could be
left out of consideration. What we hoped to insure, therefore, was
England's neutrality in the event of war, inasmuch as a German-English
alliance, which might have definitely insured world peace, could not
be effected. In order to win England over to the idea of neutrality,
the Imperial Chancellor declared his willingness to decrease the rate
at which our war vessels were being constructed. Both nations,
moreover, were to give assurances that neither intended to attack the
other, nor actually would make an attack. A second clause in the
German proposal formulated the neutrality obligation. These
negotiations continued until the Autumn of the year 1909, and were
accompanied by the threatening chorus of the English anti-German
press: "German dreadnoughts must not be built." [Black and White--"The
Writing on the Wall."] The positive refusal on the part of Germany to
abandon the naval program adopted by the Reichstag, and the fixed idea
designedly fostered by the British Government that we were cherishing
the intention of attacking France, gave England a pretext for
rejecting the German efforts to effect an understanding between the
two countries. But it is impossible to believe in the honesty of these
arguments, which were recently defended, in dialectic perversion of
the truth, by Sir Edward Cook in an article entitled "How Britain
Strove for Peace." England's aggressive tendency is clearly shown by
its above-mentioned agreements with France and Russia, which are today
publici juris. Regarding that point there was no self-deception in
those English circles which did not belong to the conspiracy; Edward
Dicey, one of the most eminent of English publicists, expressed it in
point-blank form in February, 1910, when he wrote in The Empire
Review: "If England and Germany are friends, the peace of Europe is
assured; but if the two nations fall apart, it will be a very
unfortunate day for humanity." At that time, when Delcassé tendencies
were again asserting themselves in France and a new political storm
was brewing in the Balkan countries, King Edward died, on May 6. The
hope could now be cherished, the leader of the anti-German policy of
England being gone, that the moment had come when it would be possible
to effect an understanding.
Dicey again began to argue for peace, the English-German Friendship
Committee, the Albert Committee, the Archbishop of Canterbury, The
Manchester Guardian, and The Economist advocated this idea, and Prime
Minister Asquith found it profitable under these circumstances to
strike the note of peace in a report which he submitted to the lower
house regarding the frustrated German-English negotiations. But he
included in this report false and disquieting statements regarding the
German fleet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied to these statements in
the Reichstag, and this led to the resumption of negotiations
regarding a permanent political agreement on the basis of the existing
German naval program, provided we would decrease our rate of building
war vessels, as we had already offered to do. It soon became evident,
however, with what little sincerity these negotiations were entered
into on the part of England. With the direct encouragement of
England, which renewed its promises regarding its attitude in the
event of war, France, in the latter part of April, and in outright
violation of the treaty, began its advance again Fez; and at the same
time, as if it was desired that no doubt should arise regarding the
solidarity of England and France, The Fleet Annual published an
illustration representing the German high sea fleet under full steam,
and under it were printed the words "The Enemy." As a sign of our
disapproval of the French violation of the treaty we sent the Panther
to Agadir, and in place of German-English negotiations German-French
negotiations were commenced. Meanwhile England, cherishing the hope
that a German-French war would now break out with certainty, armed
itself against us in August and September with might and main. This
fact was placed beyond all doubt by the well-known disclosures of
Captain Faber, (before his electors in Andover.) The Times said later
on that the year 1911 had brought three German-English crises, the
first in the third week of July, the second in the week ending on Aug.
19, (that was the time of the enormous and very disillusioning labor
strikes,) and the third in September. It is amazing that Sir Edward
Cook dared to assert under these circumstances that Great Britain had
facilitated the conclusion of the French-German Morocco agreement,
which was ratified on March 12, 1912. In the "Open Letter on Foreign
Policy," which on Nov. 24, 1911, was submitted to the members of the
English Parliament, and was signed with the initials E.D.M. and
F.W.H., (which is to be resolved into Edmund D. Morel and Francis W.
Hirst,) it is expressly stated by these esteemed and honorable
politicians:
"Our attitude was determined exclusively by the ostensible interests
of France, which were directly opposed to the interests of British
commerce and of British enterprise.... From this it follows that
alliances, nay, even political agreements, with Continental powers,
which may coerce us to take steps that are, at a given moment, harmful
to our national interests, should be avoided."
Sir Edward Grey took pains to conceal these facts from the lower house
and passed lightly over the disclosures of Faber--when the Imperial
Chancellor vigorously opposed him--with skillful legerdemain. In the
upper house Grey's policy also met with severe criticism, and from his
declarations, as well as from those of Lloyd George made at the same
time, only one conclusion could be drawn--that official England was
determined to remain steadfast in the form of its political
co-operation with France and Russia. Precisely to this was to be
attributed the insecurity of the European situation. It has not become
publicly known but has been reliably ascertained that the English
Naval Attaché in Rome at that time pointed out that England, in the
event of a war, which he expected to come, would have to occupy either
Belgium or Copenhagen. That, he added, was very brutal, to be sure,
but at the same time was rendered necessary by historic developments
and by circumstances.
In view of all this we cannot deceive ourselves into believing that
the mission which brought Lord Haldane to Berlin in February, 1912,
had any other purpose than that of satisfying the voices in England
which were calling with ever-increasing vigor for an understanding
with Germany. The proposals which he submitted to us, after a
discussion with Sir Edward Grey, were formulated by the English
Cabinet as follows: "Inasmuch as both powers naturally wish to
maintain relations of peace and friendship with each other, England
declares that it will neither make an unprovoked attack upon Germany,
nor support any other power in making such an attack. To attack
Germany is neither the direct nor the indirect object of any treaty,
understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor
will England make itself a party to anything that has such an object."
This carefully excogitated statement embraced in its Machiavellian
wording neither those "oral conversations" at Reval nor the "innocent
discussions" engaged in by the English and French General
Staffs--discussions which were always revived on occasion of every
political crisis. It was only natural, therefore, that we, since these
relations between the General Staffs of the powers belonging to the
Entente were no secret to us, demanded greater security and a
declaration of neutrality on the part of England before consenting to
enter into any general understanding.
This was all the more necessary in view of the fact that Poincaré, the
French President, while the negotiations, commenced by Haldane,
between Berlin and London were being carried on, had undertaken, in
August, 1912, that trip to St. Petersburg, from which he brought back
to France the system of three years' compulsory military service; and
at the same time Hartwig, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade,
organized that Balkan Conference, the purpose of which was, first, to
break the backbone of Turkey, and, secondly, to serve as a tool for
the overthrow of Austria. The introduction and adoption of the German
military program made it evident to all the world that we had
recognized correctly, and betimes, the dangers which threatened the
peace of the world, and in particular the peace of Germany.
Furthermore, in a conversation with Prince Lichnowski, Lord Haldane
said in so many words that England, in the event of a general war,
would have to place itself on the side of France "in order to prevent
Germany from becoming too powerful." We must not neglect to mention
that during this critical year, as well as in the year 1913,
negotiations were again entered into regarding the carrying out of the
treaty concluded between England and Germany in the days of Caprivi
with respect to an economic penetration of the Portuguese colonies in
East and West Africa. The refusal of Sir Edward Grey to give these
negotiations the secure form of a treaty, which could be laid before
the English Parliament and the German Reichstag, here again shows that
he was desirous of effecting only the appearance of an understanding.
Both he and France were resolved to postpone their action against
Germany until Russia, which was preparing itself with prodigious
exertion, had finished its preparations, which in August, 1913, were
critically inspected by General Joffre, and among which is to be
included the construction of railways to run through Poland to the
Austrian and Prussian frontiers. This consideration also accounts for
England's attitude during the Balkan confusion of 1912 and 1913. At
the London Conference we were able to co-operate with Sir Edward Grey
in settling the great difficulties brought about by the war of the
Balkan nations against Turkey, and subsequently their war inter se and
the overthrow of Bulgaria. Under the impression created by this
political co-operation the peace party in England also seemed to gain
ground. On Feb. 18, 1913, Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit and
assured me with great positiveness that England would under no
circumstances wage war. A Ministry which undertook to make
preparations for war, he said, would at once be deposed. An
inclination to bring about an understanding with Germany, he added,
prevailed in all industrial circles. My impression that such was
actually the case was confirmed during a sojourn in London in the
months of March and April, 1914. On occasion of a political supper à
deux with Lord Haldane the latter gave expression to the view that the
present grouping of the powers offered the best guarantee of peace,
that Sir Edward Grey was holding Russia in check and we were holding
Austria-Hungary in check, in saying which he emphasized the fact that
England had implicit confidence in the German Imperial Chancellor. I
replied, saying that in consequence of the existing combination Paris
and St. Petersburg would certainly count upon England's help in the
event of a war, and would thus bring on the war. We then discussed the
situation between England and Germany, and remarked how the present
plan, adopted by both Governments, of fortifying both sides of the
North Sea was detrimental to the real interests of both. The following
letter, which I received from Lord Haldane in Berlin on April 17, is
an echo of this conversation:
"It was a great pleasure to see you and have had the full and
unreserved talk we had together. My ambition is, like yours, to bring
Germany into relations of ever closer intimacy and friendship. Our two
countries have a common work to do for the world as well as for
themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work special
endowments and qualities. May the co-operation, which I believe to be
now beginning, become closer and closer. Of this I am sure, the more
wide and unselfish the nations and the groups questions make her
supreme purposes of their policies, the more will friction disappear
and the sooner will the relations that are normal and healthy
reappear. Something of this good work has now come into existence
between our two peoples. We must see to it that the chance of growth
is given."[5]
[Footnote 5: This passage from a letter of Lord Haldane is quoted in
the original English by Professor Schiemann and is here copied
verbatim.--TRANSLATOR.]
It is difficult to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments here
expressed, when we consider that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner
circle of the Cabinet and therefore must have known the secret
chess-moves of Grey's policy. Furthermore, he did not resign, as did
three other members of the Cabinet--Lord Morley, Burns, and Charles
Trevelyan--when, on Aug. 4, Sir Edward's false game was shown up and
when treaties grew out of those "conversations" and alliances out of
those ententes, which had until then existed under counterfeit names.
Even as late as June 13 Sir Edward Grey denied that he had entered
into any binding obligations. Six weeks after that, however, England
confronted Germany with the fait accompli of a life-and-death
struggle. Grey had consciously uttered a falsehood before Parliament,
and, as was ascertained from a Russian source, had not only accepted a
Russian proposal to conclude a naval agreement, but had expressly
given his approval that the deliberations regarding the effectuation
of this agreement should be participated in by the Naval Staffs of
both countries. In so doing he expressly counted upon a war between
the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, and upon the complete
alliance of England. England, at the proper time, was to send
merchantmen to Russian ports on the Baltic Sea for the purpose of
landing Russian troops in Pomerania, and to send as many ships to the
Mediterranean Sea as seemed necessary to insure the ascendency of
France. With the help of French money it was intended to overthrow the
Ministry of Rodoslawow in Bulgaria and, with the assistance of the
Russophile, Malinow, to win over that country to the combination,
which was to attack Austria in the rear. All this, which took place
before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, was the political plan of
battle adopted by the conspiring powers, which subsequently found an
excuse for their behavior in the alleged coercion of Serbia. The
hypocrisy with which the intrigue was carried out is without
precedent. The palm rests, probably, on the friendly visit of the
English squadron, under Admiral Beatty, in Kiel. Two days after the
assassination of the Archduke the squadron started on its way home,
through the Emperor William Canal, for the purpose of joining the
concentration of the entire English fleet, which lay, ready for war,
off Spithead. That England afterward made common cause with Russia and
France for the murderers of the Archduke, and with moral indignation
rose against the satisfaction demanded of Serbia by Austria, is all
part of the system of the frivolous use of any pretext which might
bring England closer to its longed-for goal--the deposition of Germany
from her position in the world. Such was England's rôle in the
preparation of this wantonly prearranged war.
Germany Free!
By BEATRICE BARRY.
Deeds that have startled the civilized world
Blot her escutcheon, brand her with shame;
But though the German flag there be unfurled,
Do Germans know what is done in their name?
If not, the final accounting may see--
Germany free!
Germany, free from the canker of self--
Free from the lusting for prestige and power;
Purged of her passion for place and for pelf--
Shall she not rise to great heights in that hour?
God speed its coming, for fain would we see--
Germany free!
Free from the militant few who have ruled
Seventy millions with sabre of steel;
Free from the doctrine in which they are schooled--
"Might shall prevail!" All the rancor we feel
Strikes at that dogma, from which we would see--
Germany free!
Much in her national life we admire,
Much we recoil from, or needs must dispute;
Germany needs her baptism of fire,
But you will find us the first to salute--
(God speed the "Day" the awakening shall be)
Germany FREE!