[The First and Second German Notes.]
Washington, June 12, 1915.
My attention has been called to a number of newspaper editorials and
articles which, in varying language, asks the question, "Why did Mr.
Bryan sign the first note to Germany, and then refuse to sign the
second?" The argument presented in the question is based on the
supposition that the two notes were substantially the same and that
the second note simply reiterates the demands contained in the first.
They then declare it inconsistent to sign one and refuse to sign the
other. The difference between the two cases would seem obvious enough
to make an answer unnecessary, but, lest silence on the subject be
taken as an admission of inconsistency, the following explanation is
given:
The notes must be considered in connection with the conditions under
which they were sent. The first note presented the case of this
Government upon such evidence as we then had. It was like the
plaintiff's statement in a case, his claim being based on the facts as
he presents them. I did not agree entirely with the language of the
first note, but the difference was not so material as to justify a
refusal to sign it. Then, too, I was at that time hoping that certain
things would be done which would make it easier for Germany to
acquiesce in our demands.
The three things which I had in mind which, in my judgment, would have
helped the situation were: First, an announcement of a willingness
upon our part to employ the principle of investigation, embodied in
our thirty peace treaties; second, action which would prevent American
citizens from traveling on belligerent ships or on American ships
carrying contraband, especially if that contraband consisted of
ammunition; and, third, further insistence upon our protest against
interference of our trade with neutrals. I thought that these three
things were within the range of possibilities, and that two, or at
least one was probable.
Some weeks have elapsed since the first note was sent, and we have not
only failed to do any of these things hoped for, but Germany has in
the meantime answered and in her answer has not only presented a
number of alleged facts which, in her judgment, justified the
deviation which she has made from the ordinary rules applicable to
prize cases, but she has suggested arbitration. A rejection of the
arguments which she presented and of the allegations made, together
with a reiteration of the original demands, creates a very different
situation from that which existed when the first demand was made.
As I have before stated, my fear has been that, owing to the feeling
existing in Germany, the Government might, upon receipt of such a note
under such circumstances, break off diplomatic relations and thus
create a situation out of which war might come without the intention
of either side. I am sure that the President does not want war and I
am confident that our people do not want war; I have no reason to
believe that either the German Government or the German people desire
war.
But war, a calamity at any time, is especially to be avoided now
because our nation is relied upon by both neutrals and belligerents as
the one nation which can exert most influence toward bringing this war
to an end. If we were, by accident, to be drawn into the conflict, we
would not only surrender the opportunity to act as a mediator, but we
might become responsible for drawing other nations into this contest.
When we see how one nation after another has been dragged into this
war we cannot have confidence in the ability of any one to calculate
with certainty upon the results that might follow if we became
embroiled in the war.
No one would be happier than I if the President's plan results in a
peaceful settlement, but no one was in position to say what effect our
note would have upon Germany, or what results would follow if she, in
anger, broke off diplomatic relations, and I was not only unwilling to
assume the responsibility for the risks incurred--risks which no one
could with any degree of accuracy measure--but I felt that, having
done all I could in the Cabinet, it was my duty to undertake, outside
the Cabinet, the work upon which I have entered.
I have no doubt that the country will unanimously support the
President during the war, if so great a misfortune should overtake
us, but I believe that the chances of war will be lessened in
proportion as the country expresses itself in favor of peace--not
"peace at any price"--but peace in preference to a war waged for the
redress of such grievances as we have against Germany--at least
against war until we have given to Germany the opportunity which we
are pledged to give to Great Britain, France, and Russia--to have
every difference of every character submitted to an international
commission of investigation.
I would contend as earnestly for the application of the treaty
principle to the Allies as I contend for it in the case of Germany. If
the principle is sound, it ought to be applied to every country with
which we have a difference, and if it ought to be applied at all I
think it is better to suggest it in the beginning than to accept it
later after a seeming reluctance to apply it.
I understand that Secretary Lansing has already given out a statement,
correcting an inaccuracy which appeared in this morning's paper. I
appreciate his kindness.
It is true that I saw the final draft of the note just before my
resignation took effect, but it contained an important change. I had
no knowledge of this change at the time my resignation was tendered
and accepted. This change, while very much softening the note, was
not, however, sufficient, in my judgment, to justify me in asking
permission to withdraw my resignation.
As Germany had suggested arbitration, I felt that we could not do less
than reply to this offer by expressing a willingness to apply the
principle of the peace treaties to the case. These treaties, while
providing for investigation of all questions, leave the nations free
to act independently after the international commission has concluded
the investigation.