offset our own blunders. Many a naval officer, when with improvised
craft of small real worth he was trying to guard our battleships
against the terrible possibilities of an attack by torpedo-boat
destroyers in the darkness, must have thought with bitterness how
a year before, when Senator Lodge and those who thought like him
were striving to secure an adequate support of large, high-class
torpedo-boats, the majority of the Senate followed the lead of
Senator Gorman in opposition. So in the future, if what we all most
earnestly hope will not happen does happen, and we are engaged in war
with some formidable sea power, any failure of our arms resulting
from an inadequate number of battleships, or imperfectly prepared
battleships, will have to be credited to those members of Congress who
opposed increasing the number of ships, or opposed giving them proper
armament, for no matter what reason. On the other hand, the national
consciousness of capacity to vindicate national honor must be due
mainly to the action of those Congressmen who have in fact built up our
fleet.
Secretary Chandler was succeeded by a line of men, each of whom,
however he might differ from the others politically and personally,
sincerely desired and strove hard for the upbuilding of the navy. Under
Messrs. Whitney, Tracy, Herbert, and Long the work has gone steadily
forward, thanks, of course, to the fact that successive Congresses,
Democratic and Republican alike, have permitted it to go forward.
But the appropriation of money and the building of ships were not
enough. We must keep steadily in mind that not only was it necessary to
build the navy, but it was equally necessary to train our officers and
men aboard it by actual practice. If in 1883 we had been able suddenly
to purchase our present battleships, cruisers, and torpedo-boats,
they could not have been handled with any degree of efficiency by our
officers and crews as they then were. Still less would it be possible
to handle them by improvised crews. In an emergency bodies of men like
our naval militia can do special bits of work excellently, and, thanks
to their high average of character and intellect, they are remarkably
good makeshifts, but it would be folly to expect from them all that is
expected from a veteran crew of trained man-of-war’s-men. And if we are
ever pitted ship for ship on equal terms against the first-class navy
of a first-class power, we shall need our best captains and our best
crews if we are to win.
As fast as the new navy was built we had to break in the men to
handle it. The young officers who first took hold and developed the
possibilities of our torpedo-boats, for instance, really deserve as
much credit as their successors have rightly received for handling
them with dash and skill during the war. The admirals who first
exercised the new ships in squadrons were giving the training without
which Dewey and Sampson would have found their tasks incomparably
more difficult. As for the ordinary officers and seamen, of course
it was their incessant practice in handling the ships and the guns
at sea, in all kinds of weather, both alone and in company, year in
and year out, that made them able to keep up the never-relaxing night
blockade at Santiago, to steam into Manila Bay in the darkness, to
prevent breakdowns and make repairs of the machinery, and finally to
hit what they aimed at when the battle was on. In the naval bureaus
the great bulk of what in the army would be called staff places are
held by line officers. The men who made ready the guns were the same
men who afterward used them. In the Engineering Bureau were the men
who had handled or were to handle the engines in action. The Bureau of
Navigation, the Bureau of Equipment, the Bureau of Information, were
held by men who had commanded ships in actual service, or who were
thus to command them against the Spaniards. The head of the Bureau of
Navigation is the chief of staff, and he has always been an officer of
distinction, detailed, like all of the other bureau chiefs, for special
service. From the highest to the lowest officer, every naval man had
seen and taken part, during time of peace, in the work which he would
have to do in time of war. The commodores and captains who took active
part in the war had commanded fleets in sea service, or at the least
had been in command of single ships in these fleets. There was not one
thing they were to do in war which they had not done in peace, save
actually receive the enemy’s fire.
Contrast this with the army. The material in the army is exactly as
good as that in the navy, and in the lower ranks the excellence is as
great. In no service, ashore or afloat, in the world could better men
of their grade be found than the lieutenants, and indeed the captains,
of the infantry and dismounted cavalry at Santiago. But in the army
the staff bureaus are permanent positions, instead of being held, as
of course they should be, by officers detailed from the line, with the
needs of the line and experiences of actual service fresh in their
minds.
The artillery had for thirty-five years had no field-practice that was
in the slightest degree adequate to its needs, or that compared in any
way with the practice received by the different companies and troops
of the infantry and cavalry. The bureaus in Washington were absolutely
enmeshed in red tape, and were held for the most part by elderly men,
of fine records in the past, who were no longer fit to break through
routine and to show the extraordinary energy, business capacity,
initiative, and willingness to accept responsibility which were needed.
Finally, the higher officers had been absolutely denied that chance to
practice their profession to which the higher officers of the navy had
long been accustomed. Every time a warship goes to sea and cruises
around the world, its captain has just such an experience as the
colonel of a regiment would have if sent off for a six or eight months’
march, and if during those six or eight months he incessantly practiced
his regiment in every item of duty which it would have to perform in
battle. Every warship in the American navy, and not a single regiment
in the American army, had had this experience.
Every naval captain had exercised command for long periods, under
conditions which made up nine tenths of what he would have to encounter
in war. Hardly a colonel had such an experience to his credit. The
regiments were not even assembled, but were scattered by companies
here and there. After a man ceased being a junior captain he usually
had hardly any chance for field-service; it was the lieutenants and
junior captains who did most of the field work in the West of recent
years. Of course there were exceptions; even at Santiago there were
generals and colonels who showed themselves not only good fighters,
but masters of their profession; and in the Philippines the war has
developed admirable leaders, so that now we have ready the right man;
but the general rule remains true. The best man alive, if allowed to
rust at a three-company post, or in a garrison near some big city, for
ten or fifteen years, will find himself in straits if suddenly called
to command a division, or mayhap even an army-corps, on a foreign
expedition, especially when not one of his important subordinates has
ever so much as seen five thousand troops gathered, fed, sheltered,
manœuvred, and shipped. The marvel is, not that there was blundering,
but that there was so little, in the late war with Spain.
Captain (now Colonel) John Bigelow, Jr., in his account of his personal
experiences in command of a troop of cavalry during the Santiago
campaign, has pictured the welter of confusion during that campaign,
and the utter lack of organization, and of that skilled leadership
which can come only through practice. His book should be studied by
every man who wishes to see our army made what it should be. In the
Santiago campaign the army was more than once uncomfortably near grave
disaster, from which it was saved by the remarkable fighting qualities
of its individual fractions, and, above all, by the incompetency of its
foes. To go against a well-organized, well-handled, well-led foreign
foe under such conditions would inevitably have meant failure and
humiliation. Of course party demagogues and the thoughtless generally
are sure to credit these disasters to the people under whom they occur,
to the Secretary, or to the commander of the army.
As a matter of fact, the blame must rest in all such cases far less
with them than with those responsible for the existence of the system.
Even if we had the best Secretary of War the country could supply
and the best general the army could furnish, it would be impossible
for them offhand to get good results if the nation, through its
representatives, had failed to make adequate provision for a proper
army, and to provide for the reorganization of the army and for its
practice in time of peace. The whole staff system, and much else,
should be remodeled. Above all, the army should be practiced in mass
in the actual work of marching and camping. Only thus will it be
possible to train the commanders, the quartermasters, the commissaries,
the doctors, so that they may by actual experience learn to do their
duties, as naval officers by actual experience have learned to do
theirs. Only thus can we do full justice to as splendid and gallant a
body of men as any nation ever had the good luck to include among its
armed defenders.
ADMIRAL DEWEY
PUBLISHED IN “McCLURE’S MAGAZINE,” OCTOBER, 1899
Admiral Dewey has done more than add a glorious page to our history;
more even than do a deed the memory of which will always be an
inspiration to his countrymen, and especially his countrymen of his own
profession. He has also taught us a lesson which should have profound
practical effects, if only we are willing to learn it aright.
In the first place, he partly grasped and partly made his opportunity.
Of course, in a certain sense, no man can absolutely make an
opportunity. There were a number of admirals who, during the dozen
years preceding the Spanish War, were retired without the opportunity
of ever coming where it was possible to distinguish themselves; and it
may be that some of these lacked nothing but the chance. Nevertheless,
when the chance does come, only the great man can see it instantly
and use it aright. In the second place, it must always be remembered
that the power of using the chance aright comes only to the man who
has faithfully and for long years made ready himself and his weapons
for the possible need. Finally, and most important of all, it should
ever be kept in mind that the man who does a great work must almost
invariably owe the possibility of doing it to the faithful work of
other men, either at the time or long before. Without his brilliancy
their labor might be wasted, but without their labor his brilliancy
would be of no avail.
It has been said that it was a mere accident that Dewey happened to be
in command of the Asiatic Squadron when the war with Spain broke out.
This is not the fact. He was sent to command it in the fall of 1897,
because, to use the very language employed at the time, it was deemed
wise to have there a man “who could go into Manila if necessary.” He
owed the appointment to the high professional reputation he enjoyed,
and to the character he had established for willingness to accept
responsibility, for sound judgment, and for entire fearlessness.
Probably the best way (although no way is infallible) to tell the worth
of a naval commander as yet untried in war is to get at the estimate
in which he is held by the best fighting men who would have to serve
under him. In the summer of 1897 there were in Washington captains and
commanders who later won honor for themselves and their country in the
war with Spain, and who were already known for the dash and skill with
which they handled their ships, the excellence of their gun practice,
the good discipline of their crews, and their eager desire to win
honorable renown. All these men were a unit in their faith in the then
Commodore Dewey, in their desire to serve under him, should the chance
arise, and in their unquestioning belief that he was the man to meet an
emergency in a way that would do credit to the flag.
An excellent test is afforded by the readiness which the man has shown
to take responsibility in any emergency in the past. One factor in
Admiral Dewey’s appointment—of which he is very possibly ignorant—was
the way in which he had taken responsibility in purchasing coal for the
squadron that was to have been used against Chile, if war with Chile
had broken out, at the time General Harrison was President. A service
will do well or ill at the outbreak of war very much in proportion to
the way it has been prepared to meet the outbreak during the preceding
months. Now, it is often impossible to say whether the symptoms that
seem to forbode war will or will not be followed by war. At one time,
under President Harrison, we seemed as near war with Chile as ever we
seemed to war with Spain under President McKinley. Therefore, when war
threatens, preparations must be made in any event; for the evil of
what proves to be the needless expenditure of money in one instance
is not to be weighed for a moment against the failure to prepare in
the other. But only a limited number of men have the moral courage to
make these preparations, because there is always risk to the individual
making them. Laws and regulations must be stretched when an emergency
arises, and yet there is always some danger to the person who stretches
them; and, moreover, in time of sudden need, some indispensable article
can very possibly only be obtained at an altogether exorbitant price.
If war comes, and the article, whether it be a cargo of coal, or a
collier, or an auxiliary naval vessel, proves its usefulness, no
complaint is ever made. But if the war does not come, then some small
demagogue, some cheap economist, or some undersized superior who is
afraid of taking the responsibility himself, may blame the man who
bought the article and say that he exceeded his authority; that he
showed more zeal than discretion in not waiting for a few days, etc.
These are the risks which must be taken, and the men who take them
should be singled out for reward and for duty. Admiral Dewey’s whole
action in connection with the question of coal-supply for our fleet
during the Chilean scare marked him as one of these men.
No one who has not some knowledge of the army and navy will appreciate
how much this means. It is necessary to have a complete system of
checks upon the actions, and especially upon the expenditures, of
the army and navy; but the present system is at times altogether too
complete, especially in war. The efficiency of the quartermasters
and commissary officers of the army in the war with Spain was very
seriously marred by their perfectly justifiable fear that the slightest
departure from the requirements of the red-tape regulations of peace
would result in the docking of their own pay by men more concerned in
enforcing the letter of the law than in seeing the army clothed and
fed. In the navy, before the passage of the Personnel Bill, a positive
premium was put on a man’s doing nothing but keep out of trouble; for
if only he could avoid a court-martial, his promotions would take
care of themselves, so that from the selfish standpoint no possible
good could come to him from taking risks, while they might cause him
very great harm. The best officers in the service recognized the
menace that this state of affairs meant to the service, and strove to
counterbalance it in every way. No small part of the good done by the
admirable War College, under Captains Mahan, Taylor, and Goodrich, lay
in their insistence upon the need of the naval officer’s instantly
accepting responsibility in any crisis, and doing what was best for the
flag, even though it was probable the action might be disavowed by his
immediate superiors, and though it might result in his own personal
inconvenience and detriment. This was taught not merely as an abstract
theory, but with direct reference to concrete cases; for instance,
with reference to taking possession of Hawaii, if a revolution should
by chance break out there during the presence of an American warship,
or if the warship of a foreign power attempted to interfere with the
affairs of the island.
For the work which Dewey had to do willingness to accept responsibility
was a prime requisite. A man afraid to vary in times of emergency from
the regulations laid down in time of peace would never even have got
the coal with which to steam to Manila from Hong Kong the instant the
crisis came. We were peculiarly fortunate in our Secretary of the Navy,
Mr. Long; but the best Secretary that ever held the navy portfolio
could not successfully direct operations on the other side of the
world. All that he could do was to choose a good man, give him the
largest possible liberty of action, and back him up in every way; and
this Secretary Long did. But if the man chosen had been timid about
taking risks, nothing that could be done for him would have availed.
Such a man would not have disobeyed orders. The danger would have been
of precisely the contrary character. He would scrupulously have done
just whatever he was told to do, and then would have sat down and
waited for further instructions, so as to protect himself if something
happened to go wrong. An infinity of excuses can always be found for
non-action.
Admiral Dewey was sent to command the fleet on the Asiatic station
primarily because he had such a record in the past that the best
officers in the navy believed him to be peculiarly a man of the
fighting temperament and fit to meet emergencies, and because he had
shown his willingness to assume heavy responsibilities. How amply he
justified his choice it is not necessary to say. On our roll of naval
heroes his name will stand second to that of Farragut alone, and no
man since the Civil War, whether soldier or civilian, has added so
much to the honorable renown of the nation or has deserved so well of
it. For our own sakes, and in particular for the sake of any naval
officer who in the future may be called upon to do such a piece of
work as Dewey did, let us keep in mind the further fact that he could
not have accomplished his feat if he had not had first-class vessels
and excellently trained men; if his warships had not been so good, and
his captains and crews such thorough masters of their art. A man of
less daring courage than Dewey would never have done what he did; but
the courage itself was not enough. The Spaniards, too, had courage.
What they lacked was energy, training, forethought. They fought their
vessels until they burned or sank; but their gunnery was so poor that
they did not kill a man in the American fleet. Even Dewey’s splendid
capacity would not have enabled him to win the battle of Manila Bay
had it not been for the traditional energy and seamanship of our
naval service, so well illustrated in his captains, and the excellent
gun-practice of the crews, the result of years of steady training.
Furthermore, even this excellence in the personnel would not have
availed if under a succession of Secretaries of the Navy, and through
the wisdom of a succession of Congresses, the material of the navy had
not been built up as it actually was.
If war with Spain had broken out fifteen years before it did,—that
is, in the year 1883, before our new navy was built,—it would have
been physically impossible to get the results we actually did get. At
that time our navy consisted of a collection of rusty monitors and
antiquated wooden ships left over from the Civil War, which could
not possibly have been matched against even the navy of Spain. Every
proposal to increase the navy was then violently opposed with exactly
the same arguments used nowadays by the men who oppose building up our
army. The Congressmen who rallied to the support of Senator Gorman in
his refusal to furnish an adequate army to take care of the Philippines
and meet the new national needs, or who defeated the proposition to
buy armor-plate for the new ships, assumed precisely the ground that
was taken by the men who, prior to 1883, had succeeded in preventing
the rebuilding of the navy. Both alike did all they could to prevent
the upholding of the national honor in times of emergency. There were
the usual arguments: that we were a great peaceful people, and would
never have to go to war; that if we had a navy or army we should
be tempted to use it and therefore embark in a career of military
conquest; that there was no need of regulars anyhow, because we could
always raise volunteers to do anything; that war was a barbarous method
of settling disputes, and too expensive to undertake even to avoid
national disgrace, and so on.
But fortunately the men of sturdy common sense and sound patriotism
proved victors, and the new navy was begun. Its upbuilding was not a
party matter. The first ships were laid down under Secretary Chandler;
Secretary Whitney continued the work; Secretary Tracy carried it still
further; so did Secretary Herbert, and then Secretary Long. Congress
after Congress voted the necessary money. We have never had as many
ships as a nation of such size and such vast interests really needs;
but still by degrees we have acquired a small fleet of battleships,
cruisers, gunboats, and torpedo-boats, all excellent of their class.
The squadron with which Dewey entered Manila Bay included ships laid
down or launched under Secretaries Chandler, Whitney, Tracy, and
Herbert; and all four of these Secretaries, their naval architects,
the chiefs of bureaus, the young engineers and constructors, the
outside contractors, the shipyard men like Roach, Cramp, and Scott,
and, finally and emphatically, the Congressmen who during these fifteen
years voted the supplies, are entitled to take a just pride in their
share of the glory of the achievement. Every man in Congress whose
vote made possible the building of the _Olympia_, the _Baltimore_,
the _Raleigh_, or the putting aboard them and their sister ships the
modern eight-inch or rapid-fire five-inch guns, or the giving them the
best engines and the means where with to practice their crews at the
targets—every such man has the right to tell his children that he did
his part in securing Dewey’s victory, and that, save for the action of
him and his fellows, it could not have been won. This is no less true
of the man who planned the ships and of the other men, whether in the
government service or in private employment, who built them, from the
head of the great business concern which put up an armor-plate factory
down to the iron-worker who conscientiously and skilfully did his part
on gun-shield or gun.
So much for the men who furnished the material and the means for
assembling and practicing the personnel. The same praise must be given
the men who actually drilled the personnel, part of which Dewey used.
If our ships had merely been built and then laid up, if officers and
crews had not been exercised season after season in all weathers on
the high seas in handling their ships both separately and in squadron,
and in practicing with the guns, all the excellent material would
have availed us little. Exactly as it is of no use to give an army
the best arms and equipment if it is not also given the chance to
practice with its arms and equipment, so the finest ships and the best
natural sailors and fighters are useless to a navy if the most ample
opportunity for training is not allowed. Only incessant practice will
make a good gunner; though, inasmuch as there are natural marksmen as
well as men who never can become good marksmen, there should always be
the widest intelligence displayed in the choice of gunners. Not only is
it impossible for a man to learn how to handle a ship or do his duty
aboard her save by long cruises at sea, but it is also impossible for a
good single-ship captain to be an efficient unit in a fleet unless he
is accustomed to manœuvre as part of a fleet.