supplement to, and in no sense a substitute for, the duty of our Nation
to prepare its own strength for its own defense. He also explicitly
provides that, among the various peoples who would not be admitted to
the League on an equality with the others, there shall be different
spheres of interest assumed by the different powers who have entered
into the League. For example, the affairs of hither Asia, the Balkan
Peninsula, and of North Africa are of prime concern to the powers of
Europe, and the United States should be under no covenant to go to
war about matters in which its people have no concern and probably
no intelligent interest. On the other hand, the Monroe Doctrine--at
least for all America between the equator and the southern boundary of
the United States--is a vital point of American policy, and must in
no shape or way be interfered with. We do not interfere with existing
conditions, but aside from these no European or Asiatic power is to
have any say-so in the future of Mexico, Central America, and the lands
whose coasts are washed by the Caribbean Sea. The Panama Canal must not
be internationalized. It is our canal; we built it; we fortified it,
and we will protect it, and we will not permit our enemies to use it in
war. In time of peace all nations shall use it alike, but in time of
war our interest at once becomes dominant.
Most wisely Mr. Taft’s plan reserves for each nation certain matters
of such vital national interest that they cannot be put before any
international tribunal. This country must settle its own tariff and
industrial policies, and the question of admitting immigrants to work
or to citizenship, and all similar matters, the exercise of which was
claimed as a right when in 1776 we became an independent Nation. We
will not surrender our independence to a league of nations any more
than to a single nation. Moreover, no international court must be
entrusted with the decision of what is and what is not justiciable.
In the articles of agreement the non-justiciable matters should be as
sharply defined as possible, and until some better plan can be devised,
the Nation itself must reserve to itself the right, as each case
arises, to say what these matters are.
But let us steadily remember that before dealing with schemes such as
the League of Nations, which are necessarily more or less visionary,
we must join in good faith with our allies in securing practical right
and justice at the Peace Conference. We should treat as an enemy to
this country every man who at this time seeks directly or indirectly
to stir up dissension between us and England or France, or any other
of our allies. Side by side we have fought against the hideous twin
terrors of Bolshevism and Kaiserism and we must stand undivided at the
Peace Conference. What the distant future may hold no man can say, and
this is the very reason why I insist that America must prepare its own
strength for its own defense. But our duty at the moment is clear. We
have fought the war through beside the Allies and we must stand with
them with hearty loyalty throughout the peace negotiations. There must
be no division in the face of our enemies. At the very close of the war
we played an honorable and probably decisive part, but we were enabled
to do so only because for the four preceding years England and France
and their associates in defending their own rights had also saved us
from destruction. Our sacrifice is infinitesimal compared to theirs.
We have had a quarter of a million men killed and wounded; England
has had over three million, France nearly four million, and the other
Allies during their time of warfare against the common foe suffered in
proportion. Our loss has been no more than one or two per cent of the
entire loss suffered by the Allied armies and navies.
The immediate cause of bringing the war to an end was the forcing of
unconditional surrender upon Bulgaria and Turkey, with whom we had
shamefully refused to go to war at all. The English navy protected us
exactly as it protected Britain. Under such circumstances it behooves
us to remember that while we at the very end did our duty, yet that
our comrades in arms for over four years performed incalculable feats
and suffered incalculable losses and won the right of gratitude of all
mankind. The American envoys must not sit at the peace table as umpires
between the Allies and the conquered Central Powers, but as loyal
brothers of the Allies, as loyal members of the league of free peoples,
which has brought about peace by overthrowing Turkey, Bulgaria, and
Austria, and beating Germany to her knees.
THE MEN WHOSE LOT HAS BEEN HARDEST
DECEMBER 8, 1918
There recently died of pneumonia in France Major Willard Straight, of
the American army. He was above the draft age, he was a man of large
and many interests, he had a wife and three children. There was every
excuse for him not to have gone to the front, but both he and his wife
had in their souls that touch of heroism which makes it impossible for
generous natures to see others pay with their bodies and not to wish
to do so themselves. The one regret that Major Straight felt--and he
felt it most bitterly--was that he had not been able in spite of all
his efforts to get to the actual firing front. This failure was really
a cause of great anguish of soul to him. In the same way I know of the
four sons of an ex-Cabinet officer, all of whom instantly went into
the army at the outbreak of the war. Two were at the fighting front,
one was in the navy, and the other, because of the special excellence
as an instructor, was kept here, and the gallant young fellow who
left his wife and baby to enlist really feels as if the refusal of
the War Department to permit him to go where he could be shot at had
caused a blight in his life. I know three other men who, because of
their excellence, were kept as instructors at one of our camps, whose
feelings of regret are so bitter that they can hardly bear to look at
their uniforms and the sight of wounded soldiers causes them agonies of
thwarted longing.
All this is most natural, and just what we should expect from
high-minded, gallant fellows. But it is entirely unwarranted. I utterly
abhor the swivel-chair slacker who got some safe job in order to avoid
doing his duty at the front. But for the hundreds of thousands of
young Americans in the ranks or with commissions who did everything
they could to get in the firing lines, and who through no fault of
theirs failed, I have precisely the same feeling that I have for the
men who took part in the most dangerous work. General Leonard Wood,
in his recent capital address, has taught the right lesson to these
men. He was dismissing to their homes the men whom he had trained
with his usual, extraordinary capacity to fit them for work overseas,
and he dwelt to them upon the fact that the all-important point was
that they should remember that it was not the position they achieved,
but the eager readiness to do duty in whatever position they were
given that really counted. General Wood has himself been treated
with the most cruel injustice in this war, yet he has rendered signal
service in bringing before Congress our military needs, and, above
all, in training scores of thousands of our best fighting men. When
he was denied, from the very meanest motives, the chance to fill a
distinguished position, instead of sulking he devoted all of his
energy to doing the best he could in the positions to which he was
assigned. In consequence he comes out of the war as one of those who
most materially helped to win it. What is true of him in a big place
is true of every other soldier, whether in a big or little place. The
hardest task was for the men who were denied the chance of glory, and
if they did this hard task well and served faithfully wherever they
were assigned, they have exactly the same right for pride in their
participation in the Great War as any of the gallant fellows who have
come back maimed or crippled from the front. All alike have made the
rest of us forever their debtors, and to all alike we pay the same meed
of loyal admiration and respect.
THE BRITISH NAVY, THE FRENCH ARMY, AND AMERICAN COMMON SENSE
DECEMBER 17, 1918
The first essential in an alliance is loyalty. The first effort of an
enemy to an alliance is to produce disloyalty to one another among the
Allies. To any man who knows anything of history these facts are of
bromidic triteness. But the Administration, as usual, stands in urgent
need of learning the elements of fair play and common sense.
It was announced from the peace ship that President Wilson was going
to work for the reduction of naval armaments and for a form of naval
agreement which, if it had existed four years ago, would have meant
Germany’s victory and the subjugation of not only Germany’s foes,
but of all neutrals like ourselves. At the same time over here the
representatives of the Administration are demanding a navy bigger than
that of Great Britain. The only possible interpretation of these facts
is that the Administration proposes to threaten Great Britain with
having to get in a neck-and-neck competition with America to build the
greatest navy in the world, and to do this as a bluff so as to make for
Great Britain’s adherence to Mr. Wilson’s exceedingly nebulous ideas.
Under these conditions the American people should, with common sense,
look at what their own needs are and at what the needs of their
allies are. Sooner or later any programme will have to be tested by
its results, and even if the United States started to emulate Great
Britain’s navy, the enthusiasm to do so would vanish when it appeared
that there was no earthly interest of ours to be served by the action.
In winning the present war very many instrumentalities have been
necessary. On the whole the four most important in their order have
been: (1) the French army; (2) the British navy; (3) the British army;
(4) the Italian army. Our own gallant army and navy did exceedingly
well, but came in so late that the part they played, taking the four
and a half years as a whole, does not entitle them to rank with the
instrumentalities given above.
Great Britain is an island, separated from the huge military
commonwealths of Europe by very narrow seas, and separated from her
own greatest colonies by all the greatest oceans. To her, supremacy
in the navy is a matter of life and death. America ought to have a
first-class navy, but if she did not have a ship she might yet secure
herself from any invasion. But Great Britain’s empire would not last
one week, and she could not make herself safe at home one week if her
navy lost its supremacy. Incidentally to saving herself, the British
navy has rendered incalculable service to us during the last four and
one-half years, and for the last thirty years has been a shield to
the United States. Great Britain is not a military power in the sense
that any of the nations of continental Europe, or indeed of Asia, are
military powers. She had almost as much difficulty in developing her
army in this war as we had in developing our army. Her army is no more
of a threat to other peoples than ours is. Therefore, we Americans
find ourselves, as regards the British navy, in this position, that it
is of vital consequence to Great Britain to have the greatest navy in
the world; it is emphatically not of any consequence to us to have as
big a navy as Great Britain, for we are not in the slightest danger
from Great Britain, and under all ordinary circumstances the British
navy can be counted upon as a help to the United States and never as
a menace. Under such circumstances to set ourselves to work to build
a navy in rivalry to Great Britain’s, and above all to do this as a
political bluff, is worse than silly.
Our own navy should be ample to protect our own coasts and to maintain
the Monroe Doctrine. There are in Europe and Asia several great
military commonwealths, each one of which will in all probability
always possess a far more formidable army than ours, even though, as
I earnestly hope, we adopt some development of universal military
training on the lines of the Swiss system. Therefore, it is of the
highest consequence that our navy should be second to that of Great
Britain.
The analogy with the case of the French army is complete. If the French
army had not been able to hold the German army and be the chief factor
in the German military overthrow, the British navy could not have
averted Germany’s complete victory. Great Britain is separated by the
narrow seas from the military powers of continental Europe. We are
separated from them by the width of the ocean. Under the circumstances,
it is sheer impertinence for either American or English statesmen
to tell France, or, for that matter Italy, what ought to be done in
abolishing armaments or abandoning universal service or anything of
the kind. The interest of France and Italy in the matter is vital.
The interest of England and America is partly secondary. If we have
well-thought-out arguments to put before the French, put them before
them, but treat France as having the vital interest in the matter, and
therefore the final say-so as far as we are concerned. And when France
has determined what the needs of the future demand, so far as her
military preparedness is concerned, and when Italy has made a similar
determination, and our other allies likewise, back them up. It is not
the business of America to tell Great Britain what she should do with
her navy. It is not the business of either America or England to tell
France what she should do with her army. The plain American common
sense of the situation is that we should recognize our immense debt
to the British navy and the French army, and stand by Britain in what
she decides her vital needs demand so far as her navy is concerned,
and stand by France in the position she takes as to what the situation
demands so far as her army is concerned.
LET US HAVE STRAIGHTFORWARD SPEAKING
DECEMBER 24, 1918
Senator Lodge in his admirable speech has given the reasons why at
least five of the famous fourteen points should not be considered in
the peace negotiations proper. But the special merit of Senator Lodge’s
statement lies in the fact that it is straightforward and clear. There
is no need of a key to find out what he means. The men who represent,
or assume to represent, the United States at the Peace Conference,
should be equally clear with our allies and our enemies and also with
the American people. Above all things we need some straightforward
statement as to just what is proposed and as to just why it is proposed.
Take, for example, the very extraordinary conflict between that one
of the fourteen points in which the Administration has demanded
practically complete disarmament and the action of the Administration
at the same moment demanding that we shall build the biggest navy in
the world. Either one course or the other must necessarily be improper.
In such a matter we especially need a straightforward statement of
reasons and principles.
The worst thing we could do would be to build a spite navy, a navy
built not to meet our own needs, but to spite some one else. I am
speaking purely as an American. No man in this country who is both
intelligent or informed has the slightest fear that Great Britain will
ever invade us or try to go to war with us. The British navy is not in
the slightest degree a menace to us. I can go a little further than
this. There is in Great Britain a large pacifist and defeatist party
which behaves exactly like our own pacifists, pro-Germans, Germanized
Socialists, defeatists, and Bolsheviki. If this party had its way and
Great Britain abandoned its fleet, I should feel, so far from the
United States being freed from the necessity of building up a fleet,
that it behooved us to build a much stronger one than is at present
necessary. Our need is not as great as that of the vast scattered
British Empire, for our domains are pretty much in a ring fence. We
ought not to undertake the task of policing Europe, Asia, and Northern
Africa. Neither ought we to permit any interference with the Monroe
Doctrine or any attempt by Europe or Asia to police America. Mexico is
our Balkan Peninsula. Some day we will have to deal with it. All the
coasts and islands which in any way approach the Panama Canal must be
dealt with by this Nation, and by this Nation alone, in accordance with
the Monroe Doctrine. With this object in view our navy should be second
to that of Great Britain and superior to that of any other power--and
if Great Britain chooses to abolish its navy it would mean that we
ought to build a larger navy than is now necessary.
A SQUARE DEAL FOR THE MEN AT THE FRONT
DECEMBER 25, 1918
We should show our respect for the men at the front by more than mere
adulation. They are the Americans who have done most and suffered most
for this country. It was announced in the press that in many cases they
and the families they have left behind have not for months received
their full pay. This is an outrage. All civil officials are paid. The
Secretary of War is paid, and he ought not to touch a dollar of his
salary and no high official should touch a dollar of his salary until
the enlisted men and junior officers are paid every cent that is owing
to them, and this payment should be prompt. There is literally no
excuse for even so much as three days’ delay in the payment.
Moreover, these men, at great cost to themselves in paying everything
including, in fifty or sixty thousand cases, their lives, have gone to
the front at a wage from one half to one fifth as great as that their
companions who stayed behind have received during the same period.
They enlisted to do a specific job. They made the sacrifice in order
to do that job. We on our side should see that just as soon as the job
is done the men are taken home, allowed to leave the army, and begin
earning their livelihood and take care of the wives and children that
the married ones among them have left behind.
Recently in the public press there have appeared various artless and
chatty statements from the State, War, and Navy departments that our
men might be kept in Europe to do general police work and might not be
brought back here until the summer of 1920. There are three types of
soldiers on the other side. There are the Regular Army men, who have
entered the Regular Army as a profession, and to whom it is a matter
of indifference whether they stay in Europe, come back here, go to the
Philippines, or do anything else. That is a small proportion of our
force on the other side. The bulk are divided between volunteers, who
enlisted in the National Guard or sometimes in the regular regiments
to fight this war through, and the drafted men who were put into the
army under a law designed to meet this war and this war only. Not
one in ten of the volunteers would have dreamed of volunteering to
do police work in European squabbles. Not ten Congressmen would have
voted for the Draft Law if it was to force selective men to do police
duty after the war was over. All these men went in to fight this war
through to a finish and then to come home. It is not a square deal to
follow any other course as regards them. The minute that peace comes
every American soldier on the other side should be brought home as
speedily as possible save, of course, the regulars who make the Regular
Army their life profession, and any other man who chose to volunteer
to go over, or who can with entire propriety be used for gathering up
the loose ends. The American fighting man at the front has given this
country a square deal during the war. Now let the country give him a
square deal by letting him get out of the army and go to his home as
soon as the war is finished. The Red Cross has done wonderful work in
taking care of the dependents of these men pending settlement by the
Government, but the Government should not be content to rely on any
outside organization to make up its own shortcomings.
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS[2]
JANUARY 13, 1919
It is, of course, a serious misfortune that our people are not getting
a clear idea of what is happening on the other side. For the moment the
point as to which we are foggy is the League of Nations. We all of us
earnestly desire such a league, only we wish to be sure that it will
help and not hinder the cause of world peace and justice. There is not
a young man in this country who has fought, or an old man who has seen
those dear to him fight, who does not wish to minimize the chance of
future war. But there is not a man of sense who does not know that in
any such movement if too much is attempted the result is either failure
or worse than failure.
The trouble with Mr. Wilson’s utterances, so far as they are reported,
and the utterances of acquiescence in them by European statesmen, is
that they are still absolutely in the stage of rhetoric precisely
like the “fourteen points.” Some of the fourteen points will probably
have to be construed as having a mischievous significance, a smaller
number might be construed as being harmless, and one or two even as
beneficial, but nobody knows what Mr. Wilson really means by them,
and so all talk of adopting them as basis for a peace or a league is
nonsense and, if the talker is intelligent, it is insincere nonsense
to boot. So Mr. Wilson’s recent utterances give us absolutely no
clue as to whether he really intends that at this moment we shall
admit Germany, Russia,--with which, incidentally, we are still waging
war,--Turkey, China, and Mexico into the League on full equality with
ourselves. Mr. Taft has recently defined the purposes of the League and
the limitations under which it would act, in a way that enables most of
us to say we very heartily agree in principle with his theory and can,
without doubt, come to an agreement on specific details.
Would it not be well to begin with the League which we actually have
in existence, the League of the Allies who have fought through this
great war? Let us at the peace table see that real justice is done as
among these Allies, and that while the sternest reparation is demanded
from our foes for such horrors as those committed in Belgium, Northern
France, Armenia, and the sinking of the Lusitania, nothing should be
done in the spirit of mere vengeance. Then let us agree to extend the
privileges of the League, as rapidly as their conduct warrants it, to
other nations, doubtless discriminating between those who would have a
guiding part in the League and the weak nations who would be entitled
to the privileges of membership, but who would not be entitled to a
guiding voice in the councils. Let each nation reserve to itself and
for its own decision, and let it clearly set forth questions which
are non-justiciable. Let nothing be done that will interfere with our
preparing for our own defense by introducing a system of universal
obligatory military training modeled on the Swiss plan.
Finally make it perfectly clear that we do not intend to take a
position of international Meddlesome Matty. The American people do
not wish to go into an overseas war unless for a very great cause and
where the issue is absolutely plain. Therefore, we do not wish to
undertake the responsibility of sending our gallant young men to die
in obscure fights in the Balkans or in Central Europe, or in a war
we do not approve of. Moreover, the American people do not intend to
give up the Monroe Doctrine. Let civilized Europe and Asia introduce
some kind of police system in the weak and disorderly countries at
their thresholds. But let the United States treat Mexico as our Balkan
Peninsula and refuse to allow European or Asiatic powers to interfere
on this continent in any way that implies permanent or semi-permanent
possession. Every one of our allies will with delight grant this
request if President Wilson chooses to make it, and it will be a great
misfortune if it is not made.
I believe that such an effort made moderately and sanely, but sincerely
and with utter scorn for words that are not made good by deeds, will be
productive of real and lasting international good.
THE END
FOOTNOTES: