justification of their investigation. They have forced the appointment
of Mr. Stettinius, a trained and capable expert, as head of the war
supplies purchasing department. The fact that the appointment is made
in order to obviate the need of following Senator Chamberlain’s more
thoroughgoing programme does not alter the fact that it represents
a certain advance and that this advance is primarily due to the
investigation by Senator Chamberlain’s committee. It is a striking
tribute to the necessity for and the good results of that investigation.
The investigation has been wholly non-partisan. It has been conducted
with an eye single to the needs of the army and of our country. Senator
Chamberlain is a Democrat, just as Secretary Baker is a Democrat. The
committee has fearlessly exposed very grave abuses and shortcomings
and has taken constructive action to remedy them. Secretary Baker’s
testimony shows that, to use the language of Senator Chamberlain, the
President has been misled as to the facts. His statements as to the
satisfactory condition of things in the camps are not in accord with
the facts. It is, of course, exceedingly difficult to get testimony
from army officers because they have vividly before their eyes the
signal punishment inflicted by the Administration on General Wood
for fearlessly telling the truth, and those of us who have examined
conditions and know how bad they are cannot give our authorities in
many cases because we will not expose good officers to punishment in
order to save ourselves from contradiction.
But certain vitally important facts are easily attainable. At the very
time that Secretary Baker was testifying that the army had enough
rifles, the governor of Mississippi in the public press on January 17
stated that he had been helpless to prevent the burning alive of a
negro because the home guards had no rifles and because “there are over
five hundred national guardsmen at Camp Jackson, but they are equally
helpless because they have no rifles.” Many deficiencies can be covered
up or their existence denied, but some cannot thus be concealed. Any
one can see the wooden cannon and wooden machine guns in the training
camps, every one knows that our army at the front has French cannon
and French machine guns. Will not Secretary Baker state frankly when
our own cannon and machine guns will be ready? After one year of war
we have none. Must we wait another year before getting them? Caspar
Whitney, a responsible man, has stated lamentable shortcomings of our
army at the front. Will not the Secretary advise us what steps he has
taken to investigate this statement and remedy the shortcomings?
The appointment of Mr. Stettinius is a good thing, but it does
not represent even a half step toward bringing order out of the
administrative chaos at Washington. Drastic action is needed to secure
a plan providing for coördination, responsibility and efficiency, and
above all, for securing the right men to administer the plan.
SECRETARY BAKER’S GENERAL DENIAL
FEBRUARY 2, 1918
Secretary Baker’s denial of any serious shortcomings in the
administration of the War Department comes under several heads. Part
of it is prophecy, which we all hope will turn out to be justified.
Part of it is explanation or denials of facts, as to which it is easy
to get first-hand information. With this part I shall deal in my next
editorial. Part of it relates to allegations as to which it is almost
impossible to get first-hand information except from officers whose
names cannot be quoted, because this would probably entail punishment
upon them. It is with this part that I now deal.
General Wood two years ago, before the congressional committee, and
again one year ago, before the congressional committee, set forth in
detail our unpreparedness. Every fact he stated has proved to be true
and to be but a small part of the truth. Yet he has been singled out
for punishment because of thus having told Congress the truth, and this
although we and our allies are now paying dearly for our failure to act
on the truth which he thus told. Under such conditions it is impossible
to make public the names of the officers and enlisted men through
whom we occasionally learn of abuses. Nevertheless, it is imperative
to try to correct the abuses. If the Administration had not punished
General Wood for telling the truth, the complaints would be at once
laid before the department and the wrongs remedied. Under existing
conditions it is imperative to call public attention to them.
A major-general informed me in October that he had one hundred rifles
for twenty thousand men, and most strongly felt that these men should
not have been brought to the camp until the hospitals, barracks,
heating arrangements, clothes, and arms were ready for them. Another
major-general told me, in explanation of the shortage of supplies
abroad, that one shipload of big coast defense guns had to be returned
because when they reached France it was discovered that there were
no carriages for them. Hundreds of officers and non-commissioned
officers have told me of lack of overcoats, of winter under-clothing,
of heavy socks. One quartermaster, being unable otherwise to get
woolen gloves for the men in cold weather, finally got them from the
Red Cross and was officially reprimanded for so doing. Two officers
informed me that when in France there was a shortage of shoes. They
were told it was due to a shipment of coffins, one being told that
they were not regular coffins, but boxes containing grave-clothes.
The newspaper correspondents repeatedly have told of the shortage of
shoes, one recent statement being that a shipment of clay pigeons,
not coffins, was sent over, while Mr. Caspar Whitney recites that the
surplusage was a large shipment of hospital cots. At any rate, the
shortage of shoes is unquestioned, whether their places were taken by
coffins, clay pigeons, or hospital cots. A leading New York business
man has just written me of the complete lack of hospital and medical
facilities in one camp. The superintendent of a Bible teachers’
training school writes that his son volunteered, leaving a wife and two
little children; that his pay was over a month in arrears, and that at
Christmas time he wrote as follows:
We have not yet received our November pay. At this time of the year
the boys don’t want it for themselves; they want to send some little
thing home to their mothers or wives or sweethearts, and in lots of
cases to their children, to whom just a little something from daddy
means so much. Yet even that little pleasure is denied us. Can you
not bring this to the attention of the people who are supporting this
Government?
I have received many hundreds such appeals. To give the names of
the writers would insure their punishment. To pay no heed to their
appeals means that the abuses go unremedied. Doubtless an occasional
informant is in error in his statement. But Senator Chamberlain’s
speech and the testimony taken before his committee prove that the
important statements I have made during the last few months as to the
shortcomings in our army have been more than warranted by the facts.
LET GEORGE SPEED UP THE WAR
FEBRUARY 3, 1918
In my last editorial I spoke of the things of which Secretary Baker
explicitly or implicitly denies the existence, in justifying the
Administration for the military delay and shortcomings that have
marked our entry into war. But as to the major facts there is no room
for denial. As to these Secretary Baker falls back on the comfortable
doctrine that all our shortcomings are of no consequence because
they are made good anyhow by the efforts of our allies--who, by the
way, with preposterous silliness, are in official circles merely
termed our associates. Secretary Baker explains that, although our
forces in France have no field artillery or auto rifles, this is of
no consequence because the French love to give us artillery and auto
rifles. He explains that the greatest German offensive movement of the
war is about to take place, an offensive movement which, if successful,
means that we have lost the war, and he adds that we can trust England
and France to repel this offensive. This is a naked statement that we
are to let George do it. We are to announce that after being at war
just a year our delays have been so great that we are almost negligible
in the military sense and that we must trust to our allies to speed up
the war.
This verifies the prediction of von Hindenburg and von Tirpitz that
it would take us eighteen months to become a real factor in the war.
Americans laughed at this statement, but the ruthless and brutal and
intelligent Germans were right and our own soft sentimentalities were
their efficient allies. We are in the position of letting George speed
up the war. Are the citizens of a proud and high-spirited Nation to be
content with such a position?
Our major shortcomings can neither be concealed nor denied. In October
I personally saw thousands of infantrymen drilling with sticks. In
December, I still saw artillerymen with sticks instead of rifles.
A month ago most of the cannon in the national army camps, which I
saw, were made of logs or of sections of telegraph poles and all the
machine guns I saw were wooden dummies. The daily press has repeatedly
published photos of these wooden rifles, cannon, and machine guns.
Secretary Baker cannot deny this nor can he deny that in modern war
an army without artillery is helpless. We are now getting a small
number of machine guns. We are turning some heavy coast guns into field
artillery, but as yet gallant General Pershing and his gallant men in
France have to trust to the French for artillery and machine guns and
war planes, and, thanks to our dawdling and indecision, we have an
utterly insufficient number of cargo ships.
We have been at war for a year. In April Congress stated that Germany
had already committed repeated acts of war against us and that our
own declaration of war was formal. It was then too late to undo the
criminal mischief caused by our refusal to prepare during the preceding
two and a half years, but we aggravated the damage immensely by our
delays and follies. If we had exercised reasonable energy we would in
six months have achieved more than we have actually achieved in a year.
The least we can do now is to speed up the war ourselves. Let us insist
that this be the end toward which with all our energy we now strive.
LET UNCLE SAM GET INTO THE GAME
FEBRUARY 5, 1918
No one can tell how long this war will last. It may last three years
more, and we should prepare accordingly. But it may close this year,
and it is unpardonable of us not to act with such speed as to make our
help available in substantial form at once. Uncle Sam must not be put
in the position of the sub, who only gets into the game just before the
whistle blows. Above all, he must not so act as to rouse suspicion that
this attitude is due to deliberate shirking on his part.
The prime aid in getting Uncle Sam into the game has come from the men
who, in order to achieve this object, have truthfully set forth the
unpleasant facts about our delay, military inefficiency, and total
unpreparedness. The critics of these men have been either unwise or
insincere. The most fatuous form of objection to such truth-telling is
the assertion that it tends to prolong the war. It is the only thing
that will shorten the war. Suppression of the truth as the habitual
governmental policy has been successful in preventing our people from
realizing our mistakes and even more successful in preventing their
remedy.
An excellent example of this policy of falsehood is furnished in a
letter from a news agency offering to various newspapers cartoons
assailing me because I had “criticized our unpreparedness and urged
an immediate movement toward universal obligatory military training,”
the cartoonist saying that I had said that I had seen artillerymen
drilling with “wooden guns made from pieces of telegraph poles.” The
writer admitted this, but stated that “these wooden imitations were as
efficient for the purposes of learning as the real guns.” I suppose
that this particular Champion of military inefficiency would believe
that a rifle team could train for a championship match with dummy
rifles of wood.
Every important criticism made of our military unpreparedness and
inefficiency during the past six months, and indeed during the
preceding three years, has been proved true and in no case has there
been correction of the abuse until it was exposed. General Pershing has
just written home a scathing indictment of the military shortcomings of
our higher officers abroad. This is after we have been at war a year,
and it is directly due to the character of both the civilian and the
military control that has been exercised from the swivel chairs of the
War Department during this year.
Our duty is solely to the country and to every official high or low
precisely to the extent to which he loyally, disinterestedly, and
efficiently serves the country. Let us get behind the United States.
Let us think only of our patriotic duty. I care not a rap for politics
at such a time as this. I supported Senator Chamberlain, my political
and to some extent my personal opponent in the past, because on the
great issue now up he served the country. I supported General Crowder,
of whose politics I know nothing and care less, because he served the
country. Stand behind America.
CONSERVATION IS IMPORTANT AND PRODUCTION IS MORE IMPORTANT
FEBRUARY 15, 1918
It is very important that we should conserve many things, but
especially food. It is, however, very much more important that we shall
produce the food in order to conserve it. The governmental attitude
toward production during the past year has been, at points, very
unwise. There has not only been failure to encourage producing the one
thing vitally necessary to this Nation at this time, but there has been
at times, by unwise price-fixing, a direct discouragement of producing.
We have suffered severely during this winter because of this attitude
in the matter of coal production. One of the factors in producing the
misery and discomfort, especially among people of limited means during
the severe weather of the last few months, was the improperly low price
rate established last summer, and the uncertain and contradictory
attitude of the Government on the question of coal production.
But important though all production is, the production of food, the
production which we owe to the farmer, is the most important of all.
This country needs more food. Its allies need more food. Only the
farmer can give the food. It is nonsense to expect him to produce
it unless he can make his livelihood by so doing. The farmer is
thoroughly patriotic; he stands ready now as he has stood ready in
every crisis of the Nation, pledged to do his full duty, and a little
more than his duty. But he makes his livelihood by producing what is
essential to the livelihood of the rest of us. He cannot produce unless
he makes his livelihood. Not a step should be taken that interferes
with his welfare, save after such wise and cautious inquiry as to make
us certain that the step is necessary.
We should do whatever is necessary to help the farmer produce the
maximum of food at this time. Moreover, every step we take should be
conditioned upon securing the farmer’s permanent well-being. The city
man is often utterly ignorant of the work and of the needs of the man
who lives in the open country. The working-man and the business man who
growl about one another are a little apt to join in growling about the
farmer. The city Socialist is more utterly ignorant of the farmer than
any other human being. Last fall the Socialist campaign in New York
had for one of its battle cries the announcement that they intended to
make the farmer give them five-cent milk. Apparently the detail that
the farmer had to feed the cows and take care of them struck them as
unworthy of notice.
The farmer must have labor. But there must be no importation of Chinese
or any other cheap labor, whether permanent or temporary. The emergency
need of farm labor for planting and harvesting can be met at this time
just as the need for the national army was met. The farmer must have
first-class prices for his products. No price-fixing at his expense
must be gone into without the clearest necessity being shown, and above
all there must be no repetition of the folly that marked the dealing
with the fuel situation last summer. The farmer must have what capital
he needs at a rate of interest not excessive, in order to plant and
reap his crop this year. The aid can be given to groups of farmers who
underwrite one another, so to speak, and, of course, if he can be given
it by private means, so much the better. If that is impossible, then
the Government should act. We should profit by the admirable California
example to see that the help is given only to the man who is a real
farmer and can really make use of it, but that it is extended in such a
way as to be of genuine and material benefit.
This is the immediate need, and let us treat meeting this need as the
opening wedge of a policy designed to prevent the growth of tenant
farms at the expense of the farm owner who tills his own soil, and
designed also to put a premium upon the permanent prosperity of the
small farmer as compared with the big landowner.
THE PEOPLE’S WAR
FEBRUARY 26, 1918
It is not agreeable to keep insisting on the need of doing better
than we have done. It is not agreeable to keep pointing out our
shortcomings, but to do so is the only way of remedying them and of
securing better action in the future.
The people, some of them well-meaning, some of them anything but
well-meaning, who denounce criticism and who object to telling the
minimum of truth necessary to correct our faults, are the efficient
allies of Germany and the foes of the United States. Actual events
have shown that fatuous complacency on the part of our officials has
resulted in inefficiency and delay which would have meant overwhelming
disaster to this Nation if we had not been protected by the fleets and
armies of England and France.
For the first eleven months of this war the inefficiency at vital
points in our Government, notably in the matter of shipping and in
the management of the War Department, was worse than anything Russia
herself has ever seen. Nearly thirteen months have now passed since
Germany went to war with us and we broke relations with Germany and
afterwards timidly and helplessly drifted stern foremost into what we
styled a “formal” state of war. The Russo-Japanese War likewise began
before there was any formal declaration of war. It only lasted sixteen
months. We have been accustomed to hold out Russia’s action during that
sixteen months as a miracle of inefficiency, but she showed herself
far less inefficient than we have shown ourselves during the thirteen
months that have just passed, and, of course, there was nothing in her
conduct quite as bad as our criminal folly in utterly failing in any
shape or way to prepare during the two and a half previous years.
There is just one difference between the two cases. Russia did not
have England and France to protect her from the effects of her folly.
That we have been at liberty to indulge in our folly with impunity is
due only to the fact that England and France have protected us with
the blood of their bravest, while we have refused to prepare and then
delayed and blundered and fatuously boasted after the war came on.
Every pro-German, of course, heartily applauds these blunders and
delays and bitterly objects to their being pointed out, but every
American with a particle of patriotism in him, every American proud
of his country, should learn the bitter lesson and should resolve
that never again will we permit our great Nation to be put in such an
ignoble position.
Our worst failure, of course, has been our failure to grapple with
the shipping problem. But there have been many such failures. One was
the failure to equip Pershing’s army. I do not believe a more gallant
little army than Pershing’s was ever sent abroad, but without abundant
artillery, machine guns, and airplanes a modern army is as helpless as
if its men were armed only with stone-headed axes. Pershing’s army has
only the field artillery, machine guns, and airplanes that the French
have given it, and this, although since our troops landed last June,
a longer time has elapsed than covered the whole Franco-Prussian War.
As regards the field artillery, the fault is due to the blind refusal
of the Government to prepare in advance to build the guns. As regards
the machine guns and auto rifles, the fault is due to our Government’s
refusal during the last thirteen months to utilize the Lewis gun.
Steps have been taken to remedy some of the worst of these evils in the
War Department. They have been taken only and purely because of public
criticism of them and because of the fearless exposure of inefficiency
of Senator Chamberlain and his colleagues of the Senate investigating
committee. Until this committee began its labor, the War Department
had striven to conceal and had refused to remedy its inefficiency,
blundering, and delay. There has been some improvement, and this
improvement is due solely to the Senate committee.
This is the people’s war. It is not the President’s war any more than
it is Congress’s war. It is America’s war. We are in honor bound in
conducting it to stand by every official who does well and against
every official who fails to do well. Any other attitude is a servile
attitude. Congress on the whole has done well. Until Congress finally
asserted itself the executive branch of the Government did very badly.
If Congress follows the lead outlined in the Chamberlain Bill, it
will continue to do well; if it follows the lead outlined in Senator
Overman’s Bill, it will condone the inefficiency of the past and put a
premium upon inefficiency in the future. Congress must not shirk its
duty to the people. Let the machinery of the Government be modernized
and above all let this machinery be manned by men of distinguished and
demonstrated ability who will make the governmental conduct efficient
instead of grossly inefficient, as it was during the first year of the
war.
Let us quit being content with feeble mediocrity. Let us demand really
first-class efficiency in both preparation and performance. That is the
only way to do what we must do and see this war through to a triumphant
conclusion.
THE FRUITS OF FIFTY-FIFTY LOYALTY
MARCH 2, 1918
A captain in the regular army of the United States has just been justly
sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment for trying to combine
loyalty to this country with loyalty to Germany. He was born here of
German parents. In Germany, for such an offense, he would have been
instantly shot or hung. And in Germany organizations and newspapers
responsible for causing such action would be instantly suppressed and
their organizers and editors heavily punished.
The unfortunate army officer in question is paying the penalty for
heeding such organizations as the German-American Alliance. Mr.
Gustavus Ohlinger has put before Congress facts concerning the past
actions and activities of this organization which warrant and require
its instant suppression. Its leaders have sometimes been men who
practiced a fifty-fifty loyalty between this country and Germany and
sometimes men all of whose loyalty was for Germany and all whose enmity
was for the nationality, ideals, and language of the American people.
It is an outrage that such an organization should be permitted longer
to exist. Congress should act against it at once and the Department
of Justice should abandon its slack attitude toward German spies and
should so act as to convince our enemies that Uncle Sam is not a timid
and soft-headed fool, and that hereafter German spies, dynamiters, and
murderers who ply their trade here will do so at the risk of their
necks.