THE DARDANELLES.......................................... 86
The Tabah incident -- The Dardanelles memorandum of 1906 --
Special steps taken with regard to it by Sir H.
Campbell-Bannerman -- Mr. Churchill first raises the question --
My conference with him in October 1914 -- The naval project
against the Straits -- Its fundamental errors -- Would never have
been carried into effect had there been a conference between the
Naval War Staff and the General Staff -- The bad start -- The
causes of the final failure on the 18th of March -- Lord K.'s
instructions to Sir I. Hamilton -- The question of the packing of
the transports -- Sir I. Hamilton's complaint as to there being
no plan prepared -- The 1906 memorandum -- Sir Ian's complaint
about insufficient information -- How the 1906 memorandum
affected this question -- Misunderstanding as to the difficulty
of obtaining information -- The information not in reality so
defective -- My anxiety at the time of the first landing -- The
plan, a failure by early in May -- Impossibility of sending
reinforcements then -- Question whether the delay in sending out
reinforcements greatly affected the result in August 1915 -- The
Dardanelles Committee -- Its anxiety -- Sir E. Carson and Mr.
Churchill, allies -- The question of clearing out -- My
disinclination to accept the principle before September -- Sir C.
Monro sent out -- The delay of the Government in deciding -- Lord
K. proceeds to the Aegean -- My own experiences -- A trip to
Paris with a special message to the French Government -- Sent on
a fool's errand, thanks to the Cabinet -- A notable State paper
on the subject -- Mr. Lloyd George and the "sanhedrin" --
Decision to evacuate only Anzac and Suvla -- Sir W. Robertson
arrives and orders sent to evacuate Helles -- I give up the
appointment of D.M.O.