While President Cleveland was successfully asserting his executive
authority, the House of Representatives, too, was trying to assert its
authority; but its choice of means was such that it was badly beaten and
was reduced to a state of humble subordination from which it has never
emerged. Its traditional procedure was arranged on the theory that
Congress ought to propose as well as to enact legislation, and to
receive recommendations from all quarters without preference or
discrimination. Although the Constitution makes it the right and duty of
the President to "recommend to their consideration such measures as
he shall judge necessary and expedient," measures proposed by the
Administration stand on the same footing under the rules as those
proposed by the humblest citizen of the United States. In both cases,
they are allowed to reach Congress only in the form of a bill or
resolution introduced by a member of Congress, and they go on the files
without any distinction as to rank and position except such as pertains
to them from the time and order in which they are introduced. Under
the rules, all measures are distributed among numerous committees, each
having charge of a particular class, with power to report favorably
or adversely. Each committee is constituted as a section of the whole
House, with a distribution of party representation corresponding to that
which exists in the House.
Viewed as an ideal polity, the scheme has attractive features. In
practice, however, it is attended with great disadvantages. Although the
system was originally introduced with the idea that it would give the
House of Representatives control over legislative business, the actual
result has been to reduce this body to an impotence unparalleled among
national representative assemblies in countries having constitutional
government. In a speech delivered on December 10, 1885, William M.
Springer of Illinois complained: "We find ourselves bound hand and foot,
the majority delivering themselves over to the power of the minority
that might oppose any particular measures, so that nothing could be done
in the way of legislation except by unanimous consent or by a two-thirds
vote." As an instance of legislative paralysis, he related that
"during the last Congress a very important bill, that providing for the
presidential succession... was reported from a committee of which I had
the honor to be a member, and was placed on the calendar of the House on
the 21st day of April, 1884; and that bill, which was favored by nearly
the entire House, was permitted to die on the calendar because there
never was a moment, when under the rules as they then existed, the bill
could be reached and passed by the House." During the whole of that
session of Congress, the regular calendar was never reached. "Owing
to the fact that we could not transact business under the rules, all
business was done under unanimous consent or under propositions
to suspend the rules upon the two Mondays in each month on which
suspensions were allowed." As a two-thirds majority was necessary to
suspend the rules, any considerable minority had a veto power.
The standing committees, whose ostensible purpose was to prepare
business for consideration, were characterized as legislative
cemeteries. Charles B. Lore of Delaware, referring to the situation
during the previous session, said: "The committees were formed, they
met in their respective committee rooms day after day, week after week,
working up the business which was committed to them by this House, and
they reported to this House 8290 bills. They came from the respective
committees, and they were consigned to the calendars of this House,
which became for them the tomb of the Capulets; most of them were never
heard of afterward. From the Senate there were 2700 bills.... Nine
tenths of the time of the committees of the Forty-eighth Congress was
wasted. We met week after week, month after month, and labored over the
cases prepared, and reported bills to the House. They were put upon the
calendars and there were buried, to be brought in again and again in
succeeding Congresses."
William D. Kelley of Pennsylvania bluntly declared: "No legislation
can be effectually originated outside the Committee on Appropriations,
unless it be a bill which will command unanimous consent or a stray bill
that may get a two-thirds vote, or a pension bill." He explained that
he excepted pension bills "because we have for several years by special
order remitted the whole subject of pensions to a committee who bring in
their bills at sessions held one night in each week, when ten or fifteen
gentlemen decide what soldiers may have pensions and what soldiers may
not."
The Democratic party found this situation extremely irritating when it
came into power in the House. It was unable to do anything of importance
or even to define its own party policy, and in the session of Congress
beginning in December, 1885, it sought to correct the situation by
amending the rules. In this undertaking it had sympathy and support
on the Republican side. The duress under which the House labored was
pungently described by Thomas B. Reed, who was just about that time
revealing the ability that gained for him the Republican leadership.
In a speech, delivered on December 16, 1885, he declared: "For the last
three Congresses the representatives of the people of the United
States have been in irons. They have been allowed to transact no public
business except at the dictation and by the permission of a small
coterie of gentlemen, who, while they possessed individually more
wisdom than any of the rest of us, did not possess all the wisdom in the
world."
The coterie alluded to by Mr. Reed was that which controlled the
committee on appropriations. Under the system created by the rules of
the House, bills pour in by tens of thousands. A member of the House, of
a statistical turn of mind, once submitted figures to the House showing
that it would take over sixty-six years to go through the calendars of
one session in regular order, allowing an average of one minute for each
member to debate each bill. To get anything done, the House must proceed
by special order, and as it is essential to pass the appropriations to
keep up the government, a precedence was allowed to business reported
by that committee which in effect gave it a position of mastery. O. R.
Singleton of Mississippi, in the course of the same debate, declared
that there was a "grievance which towers above all others as the Alps
tower above the surrounding hills. It is the power resting with said
committee, and oftentimes employed by it, to arrest any legislation
upon any subject which does not meet its approval. A motion to go into
committee of the whole to consider appropriation bills is always in
order, and takes precedence of all other motions as to the order of
business." The practical effect of the rules was that, instead of
remaining the servant of the House, the committee became its master. Not
only could the committee shut off from any consideration any measure to
which it was opposed, but it could also dictate to the House the
shape in which its own bills should be enacted. While the form of full
consideration and amendment is preserved, the terms of a bill are
really decided by a conference committee appointed to adjust differences
between the House and the Senate. John H. Reagan of Texas stated that
"a conference committee, made up of three members of the appropriations
committee, acting in conjunction with a similar conference committee
on the part of the Senate, does substantially our legislation upon this
subject of appropriations." In theory, the House was free to accept or
reject the conference committee's report. Practically the choice lay
between the bill as fixed by the conference committee or no bill at all
during that session. Mr. Reagan stated the case exactly when he said
that it meant "letting six men settle what the terms are to be,
beyond our power of control, unless we consent to a called session of
Congress."
To deal with this situation, the House had refused to adopt the rules of
the preceding Congress; and after electing John G. Carlisle as Speaker
and authorizing the appointment of a committee on rules, it deferred the
appointment of the usual legislative committees until after a new set
of rules had been adopted. The action of the Speaker in constituting the
Rules Committee was scrupulously fair to the contending interests. It
consisted of himself, Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania, and William
R. Morrison of Illinois from the Democratic side of the House; and
of Thomas B. Reed of Maine and Frank Hiscock of New York from the
Republican side. On the 14th of December, the committee made two
reports: a majority report presented by Mr. Morrison and a minority
report presented by Mr. Randall and signed by him alone.
These reports and the debates which followed are most disappointing.
What was needed was a penetrating discussion of the means by which
the House could establish its authority and perform its constitutional
functions. But it is a remarkable circumstance that at no time was any
reference made to the only way in which the House can regain freedom of
action--namely, by having the Administration submit its budget demands
and its legislative proposals directly to the committee of the whole
House. The preparatory stages could then be completed before the opening
of the legislative session. Congress would thus save the months of time
that are now consumed in committee incubation and would almost
certainly be assured of opportunity of considering the public business.
Discrimination in legislative privilege among members of the House would
then be abolished, for every member would belong to the committee on
appropriations. It is universally true in constitutional governments
that power over appropriations involves power over legislation, and the
only possibility of a square deal is to open that power to the entire
membership of the assembly, which is the regular practice in Switzerland
and in all English commonwealths. The House could not have been ignorant
of the existence of this alternative, for the whole subject had been
luminously discussed in the Senate Report of February 4, 1881. It was,
therein, clearly pointed out that such an arrangement would prevent
paralysis or inaction in Congress. With the Administration proposing
its measures directly to Congress, discussion of them and decisions upon
them could not be avoided.
But such a public forum could not be established without sweeping away
many intrenchments of factional interest and private opportunity, and
this was not at all the purpose of the committee on rules. It took its
character and direction from an old feud between Morrison and Randall.
Morrison, as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee in 1876, had
reported a tariff reform measure which was defeated by Randall's
influence. Then Randall, who had succeeded to the Speakership,
transferred Morrison from the chairmanship of the Ways and Means
Committee to the chairmanship of the committee on public lands. But
Morrison was a man who would not submit to defeat. He was a veteran of
the Civil War, and had been severely wounded in leading his regiment at
Fort Donelson. After the war, he figured in Illinois politics and served
as Speaker of the State Legislature. He entered Congress in 1873 and
devoted himself to the study of the tariff with such intelligence and
thoroughness that his speeches are still an indispensable part of the
history of tariff legislation. His habitual manner was so mild
and unassuming that it gave little indication of the force of his
personality, which was full of energy and perseverance.
Randall was more imperious in his mien. He was a party leader of
established renown which he had gained in the struggles over force bills
at the close of the reconstruction period. His position on the tariff
was that of a Pennsylvania protectionist, and upon the tariff reform
issue in 1883, he was defeated for the Speakership. At that time, John
G. Carlisle of Kentucky was raised to that post, while Morrison again
became chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. But Randall, now
appointed chairman of the Appropriations Committee, had so great an
influence that he was able to turn about forty Democratic votes against
the tariff bill reported by the Ways and Means Committee, thus enabling
the Republicans to kill the bill by striking out the enacting clause.
Only this practical aim, then, was in view in the reports presented by
the committee on rules. The principal feature of the majority report was
a proposal to curtail the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee
by transferring to other committees five of the eleven regular
appropriation bills. What, from the constitutional point of view, would
appear to be the main question--the recovery by the House of its freedom
of action--was hardly noticed in the report or in the debates which
followed. Heretofore, the rules had allotted certain periods to general
business; now, the majority report somewhat enlarged these periods and
stipulated that no committee should bring more than one proposal before
the House until all other committees had had their turn. This provision
might have been somewhat more effective had it been accompanied by a
revision of the list of committees such as was proposed by William M.
Springer. He pointed out that there were a number of committees "that
have no business to transact or business so trifling and unimportant as
to make it unnecessary to have standing committees upon such subjects";
he proposed to abolish twenty-one of these committees and to create four
new ones to take their place; he showed that "if we allow these twenty
useless committees to be again put on our list, to be called regularly
in the morning hour... forty-two days will be consumed in calling these
committees"; and, finally, he pointed out that the change would effect a
saving since it would "do away with sixteen committee clerkships."
This saving was, in fact, fatal to the success of Springer's proposal,
since it meant the extinction of so many sinecures bestowed through
congressional favor. In the end, Springer reduced his proposed change to
the creation of one general committee on public expenditures to take the
place of eight committees on departmental expenditures. It was notorious
that such committees did nothing and could do nothing, and their
futility, save as dispensers of patronage, had been demonstrated in a
startling manner by the effect of the Acts of July 12, 1870, and June
20, 1874, requiring all unused appropriations to be paid into the
Treasury. The amounts thus turned into the Treasury aggregated
$174,000,000 and in a single bureau there was an unexpended balance of
$36,000,000, which had accumulated for a quarter of a century because
Congress had not been advised that no appropriation was needed. Mr.
Springer remarked that, during the ten years in which he had been a
member of Congress, he had observed with regard to these committees
"that in nearly all cases, after their appointment, organization, and
the election of a clerk, the committee practically ceased to exist, and
nothing further is done." William R. Morrison at once came to the
rescue of the endangered sinecures and argued that even although these
committees had been inactive in the past they "constituted the eyes, the
ears, and the hands of the House." In consequence, after a short debate
Mr. Springer's motion was rejected without a division.
The arrangements subsequently made to provide time and opportunity
for general legislation, turned out in practice to be quite futile and
indeed they were never more than a mere formal pretense. It was quite
obvious, therefore, that the new rules tended only to make the situation
worse than before. Thomas Ryan of Kansas told the plain truth when he
said: "You do not propose to remedy any of those things of which you
complain by any of the rules you have brought forward. You propose to
clothe eight committees with the same power, with the same temptation
and capacity to abuse it. You multiply eightfold the very evils of which
you complain." James H. Blount of Georgia sought to mitigate the
evils of the situation by giving a number of other committees the same
privilege as the appropriation committees, but this proposal at once
raised a storm, for appropriation committees had leave to report at any
time, and to extend the privilege would prevent expeditious handling
of appropriation bills. Mr. Blount's motion was, therefore, voted down
without a division.
While in the debate, the pretense of facilitating routine business was
ordinarily kept up; occasional intimations of actual ulterior purpose
leaked out, as when John B. Storm of Pennsylvania remarked that it was a
valuable feature of the rules that they did hamper action and "that
the country which is least governed is the best governed, is a maxim in
strict accord with the idea of true civil liberty." William McKinley was
also of the opinion that barriers were needed "against the wild projects
and visionary schemes which will find advocates in this House." Some
years later, when the subject was again up for discussion, Thomas B.
Reed went to the heart of the situation when he declared that the rules
had been devised not to facilitate action but to obstruct it, for "the
whole system of business here for years has been to seek methods of
shirking, not of meeting, the questions which the people present for
the consideration of their representatives. Peculiar circumstances
have caused this. For a long time, one section of the country largely
dominated the other. That section of the country was constantly
apprehensive of danger which might happen at any time by reason of an
institution it was maintaining. Very naturally, all the rules of the
House were bent for the obstruction of action on the part of Congress."
It may be added that these observations apply even more forcibly, to
the rules of the Senate. The privilege of unrestricted debate was not
originally granted by those rules but was introduced as a means
of strengthening the power of sectional resistance to obnoxious
legislation.
The revision of the rules in 1885, then, was not designed really to
facilitate action by the House, but rather to effect a transfer of the
power to rule the House. It was at least clear that under the proposed
changes the chairman of the committee on appropriations would no longer
retain such complete mastery as Randall had wielded, and this was enough
to insure the adoption of the majority report. The minority report
opposed this weakening of control on the ground that it would be
destructive of orderly and responsible management of the public funds.
Everything which Randall said on that point has since been amply
confirmed by much sad experience. Although some leading Republicans,
among whom was Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois, argued strongly in support
of Randall's views, the temper of the House was such that the majority
in favor of the change was overwhelming, and on December 18, 1885, the
Morrison plan was finally adopted without a roll call.
The hope that the change in organization would expedite action on
appropriation bills, was promptly disappointed. Only one of the fourteen
regular appropriation bills became law before the last day of the fiscal
year. The duress to which the House was subject became tighter and
harder than before, and the Speakership entered upon a development
unparalleled in constitutional history. The Speaker was practically in a
position to determine what business the House might consider and what it
might not, and the circumstances were such as to breed a belief that it
was his duty to use his discretion where a choice presented itself. It
is obvious that, when on the floor of the House there are a number of
applicants for recognition, the Speaker must choose between them. All
cannot be allowed to speak at once. There is no chance to apply the shop
rule, "first come first served," for numerous applications for the floor
come at the same time. Shall the Speaker choose at random or according
to some definite principle of selection? In view of the Speaker's
interest in the welfare of the party which raised him to the office, he
would naturally inquire in advance the purpose for which the recognition
of the chair was desired. It was a manifest step towards orderly
procedure in session, however, when instead of crowding around the
clerk's desk bawling for recognition, members applied to the Speaker in
advance. In Speaker Blaine's time, this had become a regular practice
and ever since then, a throng of members at the Speaker's office trying
to arrange with him for recognition has been a daily occurrence during
a legislative session. Samuel W. McCall, in his work on "The Business of
Congress," says that the Speaker "usually scrutinizes the bill and the
committee's report upon it, and in case of doubt he sometimes refers
them to a member in whom he has confidence, for a more careful
examination than he himself has time to give."
Under Speaker Carlisle, this power to censor proposals was made
conspicuous through the factional war in the Democratic party. For
several sessions of Congress, a bill had been pending to repeal the
internal revenue taxes upon tobacco, and it had such support that it
might have passed if it could have been reached for consideration. On
February 5, 1887, a letter was addressed to Speaker Carlisle by three
prominent Democrats: Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania, George D. Wise
of Virginia, and John S. Henderson of North Carolina, saying: "At the
instance of many Democratic members of the House, we appeal to you
earnestly to recognize on Monday next, some Democrat who will move to
suspend the rules for the purpose of giving the House an opportunity
of considering the question of the total repeal of the internal revenue
taxes on tobacco." The letter went on to argue that it would be bad
policy to let a Republican have credit for a proposal, which it was
declared "will command more votes than any other measure pending before
the House looking towards a reduction in taxation; and favorable action
on this proposition will not interfere with other efforts that are being
made to reduce the burden of the people."
Speaker Carlisle, however, refused to allow the House to consider the
matter on the ground that negotiations with Randall and his friends for
concerted party action had so far been fruitless. "Among other things,"
he wrote, "we proposed to submit the entire subject to a caucus of our
political friends, with the understanding that all parties would abide
by the result of its action.... We have received no response to that
communication, and I consider that it would not be proper under the
circumstances for me to agree to a course of action which would present
to the House a simple proposition for the repeal of the internal revenue
tax on tobacco, snuff and cigars, to the exclusion of all other measures
for the reduction of taxation." The letter closed by "sincerely hoping
that some plan may yet be devised which will enable the House to
consider the whole subject of revenue reduction."
No one was less of an autocrat in temper and habit of thought than
Speaker Carlisle, and he assumed this position in deference to
a recognized function of his office, supported by a long line of
precedents. The case was, therefore, a signal illustration of the way
in which the House has impaired its ability to consider legislation by
claiming the exclusive privilege of proposing legislation. If the rules
had allowed the President to propose his measures directly to the House,
then the way would have been opened for a substitute or an amendment. As
it was, the House was able to act only upon matters within the control
of a few persons advantageously posted, and none of the changes of rules
that have been made from time to time have seriously disturbed this
fundamental situation.
Notwithstanding the new rules adopted in December, 1885, nothing of
importance was accomplished by the House. On February 15, 1886, William
R. Morrison introduced a tariff bill making a moderate reduction in
rates of duty, which, after considerable amendment in the committee of
ways and means, was reported to the House on the 12th of April; but no
further action was taken until the 17th of June, when Morrison moved
that the House go into committee of the whole to consider the bill.
Thirty-five Democrats voted with the Republicans against the motion,
which was defeated by 157 nays to 140 yeas. No further attempt was
made to take up the bill during that session, and in the ensuing fall
Morrison was defeated as a candidate for reelection. Before leaving
Congress he tried once more to obtain consideration of his bill but in
vain. Just as that Congress was expiring, John S. Henderson of North
Carolina was at last allowed to move a suspension of the rules in order
to take a vote on a bill to reduce internal revenue taxes, but he failed
to obtain the two-thirds vote required for suspension of the rules.
That the proceedings of the Forty-ninth Congress were not entirely
fruitless, was mainly due to the initiative and address of the Senate.
Some important measures were thus pushed through, among them the
act regulating the presidential succession and the act creating the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The first of these provided for the
succession of the heads of departments in turn, in case of the
removal, death, resignation, or inability of both the President and the
Vice-President.
The most marked legislative achievement of the House was an act
regulating the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine, to which
the Senate assented with some amendment, and which was signed with
reluctance by the President, after a special message to the House
sharply criticizing some of the provisions of the act. A bill providing
for arbitration of differences between common carriers and their
employees was passed by the Senate without a division, but it did not
reach the President until the closing days of the session and failed of
enactment because he did not sign it before the final adjournment. Taken
as a whole, then, the record of the Congress elected in 1884 showed
that while the Democratic party had the Presidency and the House of
Representatives, the Republican party, although defeated at the polls,
still controlled public policy through the agency of the Senate.