a harmony between all the parts of our moral nature; and therefore we
cannot deny the existence of our natural inclination towards goodness,
nor consider this inclination as a disposition which has not need of any
religious sentiment to acquire strength, and become a rational conductor
through the rough road of life. The production of salutary fruits
requires, before all things, a favourable soil; but this advantage would
be useless without seed and the labour of the husbandman, and the
fertilizing warmth of the sun: the Author of Nature has thought fit that
a great number of causes should concur continually to renovate the
productions of the earth; and the same intention, the same plan, seems
to have determined the principle and the developement of all the gifts
of the mind: it is necessary, in order to attach intelligent beings to
the love of virtue, and respect for morality, that not only happy
natural dispositions, but still more, a judicious education, good laws,
and, above all, a continual intercourse with the Supreme Being, from
which alone can arise firm resolutions, and every ardent thought, should
concur; but men ambitious of submitting a great number of relations to
their weak comprehension, would wish to confine them to a few causes. We
shall discover, every moment, the truth of this observation; actuated by
a similar motive, many wish to attribute every thing to education;
whilst others pretend, that our natural dispositions are the only source
of our actions and intentions, of our vices and virtues. Perhaps, in
fact, there is, in the universe, but one expedient and spring, one
prolific idea, the root of every other: yet, as it is at the origin of
this idea, and not in its innumerable developements, that its unity can
be perceived, the first grand disposer of nature: only ought to be in
possession of the secret; and we, who see, of the immense mechanism of
the world, but a few wheels, become almost ridiculous, when we make
choice sometimes of one, and sometimes of another, to refer to it
exclusively, the cause of motion, and the simplest properties of the
different parts of the natural or moral world.
CHAP. IV.
_An Objection drawn from the good Conduct of many irreligious Men._
You may think, perhaps, after having read the preceding chapter, that I
have taken little room to treat a question on which so much has been
written; but if it be allowed that I have made some approaches to truth,
I shall not need any excuse. The researches after truth resemble those
circles which we trace sometimes one round another; the furthest from
the centre has necessarily the greatest extent.
I will then endeavour, with the same brevity, to examine the objection
which is to make the subject of this chapter.
Society, some say, is at present filled with persons, who, to borrow the
expression of the times, are absolutely disengaged from every kind of
prejudice, who believe not even the existence of a Supreme Being; and
yet, their conduct appears as regular as that of the most religious men.
Before replying to this objection I ought to make an important
observation. The detractors of a religious spirit habitually confound,
in their discourse, devotion and piety; they attribute besides to
devotion an exaggerated sense, which its natural definition will not
bear; and derive from this misconception a great advantage. Piety,
simple in its sentiments and deportment, commonly escapes the heedless
glance of a man of the world; and the greater part of those who speak of
it, would have some difficulty to delineate it well; devotion, on the
contrary, such as we are accustomed to represent, seems to attach some
value to appearances; it displays itself, it makes a parade of the
austerity of its principles; and often soured by the sacrifices, of the
constraint, which it has imposed on itself as a law, it contracts a
rough and inflexible spirit, which banishes sentiment, amiable and
indulgent: in short, devotion is sometimes mixed with hypocrisy, and
then it is only a despicable assemblage of the most contemptible vices.
It is easy to judge, from these two pictures, that judicious piety,
rational and indulgent, forms the true characteristic of a religious
spirit, considered in its purity. It is then with morality, inspired by
a like spirit, that it is necessary to compare those men, who are guided
only by the principles they frame to themselves; and I believe, that one
of these two systems of morality is far superior to the other; but we
run a risk of deceiving ourselves in our observations, when we do not
extend them beyond the narrow circle, known amongst us by the name of
_society_. Men, in the circumscribed relations which arise from the
communications of idleness and dissipation, require of each other, only
qualities applicable to these kind of relations; their code of laws is
very short, integrity in the commerce of life, constancy in friendship,
or, at least, politeness in our intercourse, a kind of elevation in
their discourse and manner; in short, probity is the grand outline; and
this is all that is required, in order to display ourselves to the best
advantage in the midst of the active scenes which surround us, where we
sometimes form a confederacy proper to serve as a support of the great
virtues; but what they wish for before every thing is, a grant of
indulgence in favour of vices, which do not disturb the order or the
peace of their pleasures, and which only render unhappy parents,
husbands, and creditors, vassals and the commonalty. Far distant,
indeed, from a like tolerance, are those collective obligations which
morality dictates, obligations, of which I made a concise sketch, when I
compared them with those which are imposed by civil laws. It is then
only, after having retraced ourselves the entire system of our duties,
it is only after having compared them with the conventions softened by
fashionable society, that we are in a state to judge, if the conduct of
persons, disengaged from every religious tie, ought to be given as an
example, and if their morality can suffice for all the circumstances of
life.
But in admitting, for a moment, this supposition, we should not have a
right to draw any deduction contrary to the truths, which I have
endeavoured to establish; for all those who free themselves at a certain
age, from the yoke of religion, have been at least prepared by it to
respect virtue. Principles inculcated early in life, have a great
influence on the human heart, a long time even after our understanding
has rejected the reasoning which served as the basis of those
principles: the soul, formed when the reason begins to dawn, to the love
of order, and sustained in this disposition by the force of habit, never
entirely loses this principle. So that, whatever be the opinions adopted
when the judgment is formed, it is slowly, and by degrees, that these
opinions act on the character and direct the conduct. Besides, while
religion maintains amongst the greater number of men, a profound respect
for morality, those who reject these sentiments know, nevertheless, that
probity leads to esteem, and to the various advantages which depend on
it. Of course, a virtuous atheist merely makes us recollect, that he
lives where virtue is respected; and it is not the inefficacy, but, on
the contrary, the indirect influence of religious opinions, which his
conduct demonstrates to me. I think I see, in a beautiful piece of
mechanism, a small part broken off from the chain, and which maintains
its place, by the force still subsisting of general equilibrium.
What! would you have need of religion to be an honest man? Here is an
interrogative, with which they hope to embarrass those who wish to
preserve to morality its best support; and the dread that some have of
not giving an honourable idea of their sentiments, induces them to reply
with quickness, that certainly they should not need the check of
religion, and that the dictates of their heart would always be
sufficient to direct them. This answer is undoubtedly very respectable;
but for my part, I avow, I should merely say, that virtue has so many
charms, when it has been a long time practised, that a truly sensible
man would continue to be just, even when every religious sentiment was
annihilated; but that it is uncertain whether, with a political
education, his principles might have been the same; and I should add
further, that no one, perhaps, could be certain, that he would have
sufficient strength to resist a revolution of ideas similar to those
that we have just supposed, were he to fall at the same time into a
state of misery and dejection, which would make him revolt at the
enjoyments and the triumphs of others. It is always in a like situation,
that it is necessary to place ourselves, to judge properly of certain
questions; for all those who enjoy the favours of fortune, have, in
consequence of this fortunate condition, fewer objects of envy, and are
less subject to temptations; and in the midst of the different comforts,
which peaceably surround them, it is not the principles of others of
which they know the want.
As for philosophical writers, if it were amongst them, that we are to
search for the principal defenders of the new opinions, and if, at the
same time, their moral conduct was cited as an example, we should have
to observe, that a retired life, love of study, and a constant habit of
reflection, ought to spread a kind of calm over their sentiments;
besides, delivered up to abstraction, or preoccupied by general ideas,
they know not all the passions, and they are seldom personally engaged
in those ardent pursuits which stimulate society. They cannot then
determine, with certainty, what would have been the degree of their
resisting force, if without any other defensive arms than their
principles, and no guide but convenience, they had to combat against the
allurements of fortune and ambition, which present themselves in every
step of our worldly career. They have also, like all the inventors and
the propagators of a new system, vanity, which engages them to multiply
the number of their disciples: and how, in fact, could they be able to
flatter themselves with any success, if, in attacking the most
respectable opinions, they had not endeavoured to prove that their
doctrines were not in opposition to morality. Besides, it is very
necessary, after having silently sapped the foundation of our dwelling,
that they support for some time the edifice, were it only while they
have with us a common habitation; were it only during the interval when
we should be able to judge in their presence, of the utility of their
instructions: in short, very often, perhaps, the dupes of their own
heart, they have been induced to believe that, because they were at the
same time irreligious by system, and just by character and habit,
religion and virtue have not a necessary union; and if it is true, that
in the grand interests of life, the slightest doubt has some influence
on our actions, would it be possible, that at the time when they would
seek to shake religious opinions, even when they are ridiculed in
conversation, that they would still endeavour to preserve a secret
connexion with them, by the propriety of their conduct? It is thus that,
in the disputes of princes, or in the quarrels of ministers, the members
of the same family have sometimes the art of dividing themselves, in
order, at all events, that one of their friends should be in each party.
These different reflections ought necessarily to be taken into
consideration, before we give ourselves up to the inferences that they
would wish to draw from the manners of irreligious men; but, to
discredit their arguments, it is sufficient to observe, that we cannot
make any application of them to the most numerous class of men: honest
atheists have never existed among the commonalty, religion comprehends
all their knowledge in morality; and if once they were to lose this
guide, their conduct would be absolutely dependent on chance and
circumstances.
It is still essential to observe, that, according to the motives to
which we can attribute the relaxation of moral principles, there exists
a great difference between the various characters which attend vicious
actions: a depraved man, though religious, does wrong by accident,
through weakness, and according to the successive transports of his
passions; but the wicked atheist has not a fixed time; opportunities do
not surprise him, he searches for them, or waits for them with
impatience; he yields not through the contagion of imitation; but he
takes pleasure in setting an example; he is not a corrupt fruit, he is
himself the tree of evil.
Another objection is raised, but of a very different kind: they point
out the contrast, frequently perceived, between the conduct and the
religious sentiments of the greater part of men; an opposition from
whence they would wish to conclude, that these sentiments are not a
certain safeguard: and they add, to support their argument, that in
examining the belief of all those, whose licentious life is terminated
by an ignomious death, we perceive that the greater number is composed
of people blindly subject to religious opinions.
Undoubtedly, these opinions form not, at all times, a complete
resistance to the different starts of our passions; but it suffices,
that they may be the most efficacious. There has been, and there ever
will be, vicious men in the bosom of society, even where religion has
the greatest influence; for it acts not on us like a mechanical force,
by weights, levers, and springs, of which we can calculate exactly the
power; it is not an arbitrary modification of our nature; but we are
enlightened, guided, and animated, according to our dispositions and
sensibility, and according to the degree of our own efforts in the
numerous conflicts which we have to sustain; it would be then an evident
piece of treachery, to attack religion, by drawing a picture of the
vices and crimes, from which it has not been able to guard society,
instead of fixing our attention on all the disorders which it checks or
prevents.
They would be equally wrong, who represent the general languor of
religion, as a proof that it has, in our time, very little influence on
morality; it would be necessary rather to remark, how great must have
been that power, which even in the decline of its force is still
sufficient to concur to the maintenance of public order; we should be
authorized to say, how valuable is the whole, when we receive so much
advantage from a part?
In short, the consequence that they would wish to draw from the
opinions, and from the faith of wretches sinking under the sword of
justice, in an abuse of reasoning: men termed religious, forming the
major part of the populace, we must among them necessarily meet the
greater number of malefactors; in the same manner that we are sure to
find, in this class, more men of a particular age, stature, or
complexion; but, if they have a right to use such an argument to censure
a religious education, they might, with the same reason, contest the
salubrity of breast milk, alledging, that many sick and dying persons
have received this nourishment. We should never confound a common
circumstance with a general cause; these are two ideas absolutely
distinct.
There are other objections which equally deserve to be discussed; but
they will find a place, with more propriety, after the chapter where, I
shall examine, under different heads, the influence of religious
opinions on our happiness. You have seen, and you will perceive still
more, in the progress of this work, that I do not endeavour to elude
difficulties; for before I determined to defend, according to my
abilities, a cause which I could wish to render dear to mankind, I
carefully studied the means; and after having fortified myself against
the systems opposite to my sentiments, I fear not to examine the motives
which serve to support them.
CHAP. V.
_The Influence of Religious Principles on our Happiness._
As we have shown the close connexion of morality with religious
opinions, we have already pointed out the principal relation of these
opinions with public good, since the repose and interior tranquillity of
society essentially depend on the maintenance of civil order, and the
exact observance of the laws of justice. But a great part of human
happiness does not arise from the community: thus, the benefits religion
imparts would be very imperfect, if they were not extended to our most
intimate sentiments, if they were not useful in those secret conflicts
of different affections which agitate our souls, and which pre-occupy
our thoughts. Religion is very far from deserving this reproach; that
which raises it indeed above every kind of legislation is, that it
influences equally public good and private happiness. We ought to
examine this truth; but to do it philosophically, we must necessarily
contemplate, and pry into our nature, and examine, for a moment, into
the first causes of the enjoyments or the anxieties of our minds.
Men, when they have advanced a few steps in the world, and as soon as
their intellectual faculties begin to open, extend their views, and live
in the future; sensual pleasures and bodily pain only detain them in the
present; but in the long intervals which exist between the renewal of
these sensations, it is by anticipation and memory that they are happy
or miserable; and recollection is only interesting, as it is perceived
to keep up the connexion between the past and future. Undoubtedly, the
influence of the future, on all our moral affections, escapes often our
notice; to cite some examples of this truth, we believe, that only the
present moment produces happiness, when we receive elogiums, obtain some
mark of distinction, or are informed of an unexpected augmentation of
our fortune; and still more, when we are pleased with the sport of our
imagination, or the discoveries of our reason in our closet or in
conversation. These enjoyments, and many others similar, we call present
happiness; though there is not any one of them which does not owe its
value, and even reality, to the single idea of futurity. In fact,
respect, applause, the triumphs of self-love, the forerunners of fame,
and even fame itself, are the acquisitions which education and habit
have rendered precious, in exhibiting always beyond them some other
advantage, of which these first were only the symbols. Often, indeed,
the last object of our ambition is but an enjoyment of opinion, the
confused image of some possession more real. Every where we see vague
hopes hurry away our imagination; we see the expected good, the
immediate end of our meditation, or the obscure motive of the estimation
we annex to the various satisfactions, of which our present happiness is
composed. Thus, indirectly, and almost unknown to ourselves, all is in
perspective in our moral existence; and it is by this reasoning that,
always deluded, we are seldom perfectly deceived. Subjected by long
habit, it is in vain that we would wish to separate the imaginary
advantages of opinion from the delusions of hope which surround them,
and by which we have been seduced all our life.
There is but a small part of the moral system, which we cannot make
agree with this manner of explaining the principal cause of our
pleasures and of our pains. I am very far, however, from wishing to make
the sentiments, which unite men by the charm of friendship, depend on
the same principle; and which have such an essential influence on their
happiness. All is real in these affections, since they are a simple
association of ourselves to others, and them to us; in this view it may
be considered as, in some measure, prolonging our own existence; but
this division, so intimate, of the good and evil of life, does not
destroy their essence. Friendship doubles our pleasures and our
comforts; and it is by the close alliance of two sympathizing souls that
we are fortified against all events; but it is always with the same
passions that it is necessary to combat; thus whether we remain
solitary, or live in others, the future preserves its influence over us.
If such is, however, our moral nature, that the object of our wishes
will always be at some distance; if our thoughts, like the course of the
waves, are ever active, and pressing forward; if our present enjoyments
have a secret tie with the imaginary advantages of opinion, of which the
last term is still a fleeting shadow; in short, if all is future in the
fate of man; with what interest, with what love, with what respect,
ought we not to consider this beautiful system of hope, of which
religious opinions are the majestic foundation! What encouragement they
present! What an end to all other ends! What a grand and precious idea,
by its connexion with the most intimate and general sentiment, the
desire of prolonging our existence! That which men dread most, is the
image of an eternal annihilation; the absolute destruction of all the
faculties which compose their being, is for them the downfall of the
whole universe; and they are anxious to seek for a refuge against this
overwhelming thought.
Undoubtedly, it is according to nature, according to the degree of
strength of their religious opinions, that men seize with more or less
confidence the hopes which they give, and the recompense they promise;
but, doubt and obscurity have a powerful action, while supreme happiness
is the object; for even in the affairs of this life, the grandeur of the
prize offered to our ambition excites still more our ardour, than the
probability of success. But where should we fix, where attach the
slightest hope, if even the idea of a God, this first prop of religion,
was ever destroyed; if, from the infancy of men, we did not present to
their reflection, that worldly considerations are as transient as
themselves; and if, early in life, they were humbled in their own eyes;
if men applied themselves to stifle the internal sentiments, which
inform them of the spirituality of their souls? Discouraged in this
manner, by the first principles of their education, slackened in all the
movements which carry thier reflections into futurity, they would often
take retrospective views: the past recalling an irreparable loss, would
too much captivate their attention; and their minds, in the midst of
time, would no more be in a necessary equilibrium to enjoy the present
moment; in short, this moment, which is not, in reality, but an
imperceptible fraction, would appear almost nothing to our eyes, if it
were not united in our contemplations, to the unknown number of days and
years which are before us. It is then, because that there is nothing
limited in the ideas of happiness and duration, with which religious
sentiments impress us, that our imagination is not forced to recoil on
itself, when it is insensibly lost in the immensity of futurity.
When, in following the course of a noble river, a vast horizon is
presented to our view, we turn not our observation on the sandy banks we
are coasting: but if, changing our situation, or twilight narrowing this
horizon, our attention was turned on the barren flat we are near; then
only we should remark all its dryness and sterility. It is the same in
the career of life: when the grand ideas of infinity elevate our
thoughts and our hopes, we are less affected by the weariness and
difficulties strewed in our path; but, if changing our principles, a
gloomy philosophy were to obscure our perspective, our whole attention
drawn back on the surrounding objects, we should then very distinctly
discover the void and illusion of the satisfactions of which our moral
nature is susceptible.
Let us recollect, then, all the happiness which we owe to religious
sentiments and obvious reflections, which, in attracting us continually
towards the future, seem willing to save from the present moment the
purest part of ourselves; these are, without our perceiving it, the
enchantments of the moral world; if it were possible that, by cold
reasoning, we at length destroyed them, a sad melancholy would ally
itself to most of our reflections; and it would seem as if a
winding-sheet had taken place of that transparent veil, through which
the prospects of life are embellished. Undoubtedly, there would be still
some charm in the days of youth, when the pleasures of the senses press
on us, and fill a considerable time; but when the passions are tempered
by age, when our strength has been broken by years, or prematurely
attacked by sickness; in short, when the time is arrived, when men are
constrained to seek, in the principles of morality, the chief support of
their happiness; what would become of them, if those hopes and opinions
were dissipated, which afford solid comfort and encouragement; and if an
imagination, thus active, were weakened, which enlivens all the objects
that anticipation can reach?