OF THE
IMPORTANCE
OF
RELIGIOUS OPINIONS.
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH
OF
MR. NECKER.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, N^o 72, ST. PAUL’S CHURCH-YARD.
M.DCC.LXXXVIII.
ADVERTISEMENT.
_In rendering this Work into English some Liberties have been taken by
the Translator, which seemed necessary to preserve the Spirit of the
Original._
CONTENTS.
CHAP. I.
_On the Connection of Religious Principles with public Order_ Page 1
CHAP. II.
_The same Subject continued. A Parallel and of Laws and
Opinions_ 48
CHAP. III.
_An Objection drawn from our natural Dispositions to Goodness_ 98
CHAP. IV.
_An Objection drawn from the good Conduct of many irreligious
Men_ 104
CHAP. V.
_The Influence of Religious Principles on our Happiness_ 118
CHAP. VI.
_The same Subject continued. The Influence of Virtue on
Happiness_ 149
CHAP. VII.
_On Religious Opinions, in their Relation with Sovereigns_ 169
CHAP. VIII.
_An Objection drawn from the Wars and from the Commotions which
Religion has given Rise to_ 189
CHAP. IX.
_Another Objection examined. The Sabbath_ 196
CHAP. X.
_An Observation on a particular Circumstance of public Worship_ 206
CHAP. XI.
_That the single Idea of a God is a sufficient Support of
Morality_ 210
CHAP. XII.
_That there is a God_ 278
CHAP. XIII.
_The same Subject continued_ 296
CHAP. XIV.
_The same Subject continued_ 316
CHAP. XV.
_On the Respect that is due from true Philosophy to Religion_ 382
CHAP. XVI.
_The same Subject continued. Reflections on Intolerance_ 399
CHAP. XVII.
_Reflections on the Morality of the Christian Religion_ 417
CHAP. XVIII.
_Conclusion_ 446
INTRODUCTION.
My thoughts having been detached from the study and disquisition of
those truths which have the political good of the state for their
object; and being no longer obliged to fix any attention on those
particular arrangements of the public interest, which are necessarily
connected with the operations of government; I found myself abandoned,
as it were, by all the important concerns of life. Restless and
wandering in this kind of void, my soul, still active, felt the want of
employment. I sometimes formed the design of tracing my ideas of men and
characters; I imagined that long experience in the midst of those active
scenes which discover the passions, had taught me to know them well; but
elevating my views, my heart was filled with a different ambition, and a
desire to reconcile the sublimest thoughts with those meditations from
which I was constrained to withdraw myself. Guided by this sentiment, I
remarked, with satisfaction, that there existed a natural connection
between the different truths which contribute to the happiness of
mankind. Our prejudices and our passions frequently attempt to disunite
them; but to the eye of an attentive observer, they have all one common
origin. From a similar affinity, the general views of administration,
the spirit of laws, morality, and religious opinions, are closely
connected; and it is by carefully preserving an alliance so beautiful,
that we raise a rampart round those works, which are destined for the
prosperity of states and the tranquillity of nations.
One could not have taken an active part in the administration of public
affairs; or made it the object of stedfast attention; one could not have
compared the several relations of this great whole, with the natural
dispositions of minds and characters; nor indeed observed men in a
perpetual state of rivalry and competition, without perceiving, how much
the wisest governments need support from the influence of that invisible
spring which acts in secret on the consciences of individuals. Thus
whilst I am endeavouring to form some reflections on the importance of
religious opinions, I am not so far removed from my former habit of
thinking as may, at the first glance, be imagined; and as in writing on
the management of finances, I omitted no argument to prove that there is
an intimate connexion between the efficacy of governments, and the
wisdom with which they are conducted; between the virtue of princes, and
the confidence of their subjects, I think I am still proceeding in the
same train of sentiment and reflection, when struck with that spirit of
indifference which is so general, I endeavour to refer the duties of men
to those principles which afford them the most natural support.
After having studied the interests of a great nation, and run over the
circle of our political societies, we approach nearer perhaps to those
sublime ideas which bind the general structure of mankind to that
infinite and Almighty Being, who is the first grand cause of all, and
universal mover of the universe. In the rapid course of an active
administration, indeed one cannot indulge similar reflections; but they
are forming and preparing themselves in the midst of the tumult of
business, and the tranquillity of retirement enables us to strengthen
and extend them.
The calm which succeeds hurry and confusion, seems the reason most
favourable to meditation; and if any remembrance, or retrospective views
of what is past should inspire you with a kind of melancholy, you will
be involuntarily led back to contemplations which border on those ideas
with which you have been long conversant. It is thus the mariner, after
having renounced the dangers of the sea, sometimes seats himself on the
beach, and there, a more tranquil observer, considers attentively the
boundless ocean, the regular succession of the waves, the impression of
the winds, the flux and reflux of the tide, and that magnificent
firmament, where, during the night, among lights innumerable, he
distinguishes the lucid point, which serves as a guide to the
navigators.
It is in vain, in those high stations under government, to interest
yourself about the happiness of mankind in general; it is in vain, that,
penetrated with a just respect for the important duties of office, a
public character shall dare to take in hand the cause of the people, and
incessantly apply himself to the defence of the weak, in opposition to
the attacks of the powerful; he soon perceives how bounded are his
abilities, and how limited are those, even of sovereignty itself. Pity
for the distresses of the individual is checked by the law of civil
rights; benevolence by justice; and liberty by its own abuses: you
perpetually behold merit struggling with patronage, honour with fortune,
and patriotism with the interest of the individual. There is no such
thing as real disinterestedness in the passions, only by fits and
starts; unless great circumstances, or vigorous virtue in an
administration, forcibly renewed the idea of public good, a general
langour would take place in every mind, and society itself would appear
one confused mass of opposite interests, which the supreme authority
keeps within bounds for the maintenance of peace, without any inquietude
about real harmony, or any revolution favourable to the manners or
happiness of the public.
From the midst of these clashings and contradictions, continually
recurring, a minister, possessed of a reflecting mind, is incessantly
called back to the idea of imperfection; he will, undoubtedly, be sorry,
when he sees the great disproportion which exists between his duty and
his powers; and he will sometimes grieve and be discouraged, at
perceiving the obstacles he must surmount, and the difficulties he must
overcome: he raises, with labour and care, banks on the strand, the
waters swell, their course becomes more rapid, and the first precautions
rendered insufficient, oblige him to have recourse to new works, which,
thrown down in their turn, hurry on a continued succession of fruitless
toil and useless attempts. What then would be the consequence, if once
the salutary chain of religious sentiments were broken? What would be
the event, if the action of that powerful spring were ever entirely
destroyed? You would soon see every part of the social structure tremble
from its foundation, and the hand of government unable to sustain the
vast and tottering edifice.
The sovereign, and the laws which are the interpreters of his wisdom,
should have two grand objects, the maintenance of public order, and the
increase of private happiness. But to accomplish both, the aid of
religion is absolutely necessary. The sovereign cannot influence the
happiness of individuals, but by a general solicitude; because the
sentiments which spring from the different characters of men, or merely
from the circumstances of their respective situations, are independent
of him. Neither can he ensure the preservation of public order, but by
rules and institutions, which are only applicable to actions, and to
those actions positively proved. It is necessary also that the laws
should extend their influence to society in a uniform manner; they
should always have a tendency to diminish the number of distinctions,
shades, and modifications, that are to be found in the actions of men;
in short, to prevent those abuses inseparably attendant on arbitrary
decisions.
Such are the bounds of sovereign authority, and such the necessary
developement of its means and powers. Religion, to attain the same ends,
employs other motives essentially different: first, it is not in a vague
and general manner, that she influences the happiness of mankind; it is
by addressing all men individually; by penetrating the heart of every
human being, and pouring into it consolation and hope; by presenting to
the imagination every thing that can insensibly lead it captive; by
taking possession of men’s sentiments; by occupying their thoughts; and
by availing herself of this dominion over them, to sustain their
courage, and to afford them comfort under their afflictions and
disappointments. In this manner religion concurs to maintain good order,
by means absolutely distinct from those of government; for she not only
governs our actions, but even our sentiments: it is with the errors and
inclinations of each man in particular, that she seeks to combat.
Religion, in demonstrating the presence of the Deity, on all occasions,
however secret, exercises an habitual authority over the consciences of
men; she seems to assist them under the perturbations of fear, and yet
attends them in their flight; she equally notices their intentions,
projects, and repentance; and in the method which she takes, seems as
undulating and flexible in all her motions, as the empire of the law
appears immoveable and constrained.
I should not, at present, extend these reflections any further; but, if
religion, in some measure, completes the imperfect work of legislation;
if it ought to supply the insufficiency of those means which government
is under the necessity of adopting, the subject I propose to treat of
seems not foreign to those objects of meditation, which the study of
administration ought to comprehend.
I well know, that it is impossible to explain the importance of
religion, without, at the same time, fixing the attention on the grand
truths on which it depends; and you must also frequently touch on many
subjects that are closely connected with the deepest metaphysics. We
are, at least, obliged to seek for a defence against those arguments
which sap the foundation of the most necessary opinions; by which the
most impassioned sentiments have been discouraged; by which some would
reduce man to a vegetable, make the universe the result of chance, and
morality a state trick.
As soon as I discovered how far my subject was likely to lead me, I felt
myself intimidated; but I could not allow this to be a sufficient reason
for relinquishing my undertaking; and since the greater part of the
philosophers of the present age are united in opposition to those
opinions, which the light of nature seems to have rendered sacred, it is
become indispensably necessary, to admit to the combat all that offer;
nay, even to select a champion from the main body of the army, when all
the strong ones are already gone over to the camp of the enemy.
There is nothing which seems to engross the attention of mankind more
than metaphysical enquiries, for it is by thinking alone they can be
fathomed; the light gained by acquired knowledge is, in some measure,
lost in those obscure depths which it is necessary to sound, and that
immense space which it is necessary to traverse. Thus, it were better,
perhaps, that each should enter by chance into these labyrinths, where
the paths, already traced, lead to no one determined point. I have,
besides, often observed, that, even for those researches, where the
helps of science are most useful, we ought to set a certain value on the
particular excursion of each genius, which seeks out for itself a way,
and which, indebted to nature alone for its peculiar formation,
preserves in its progress a character of its own; it is then, and then
only, that we are not invested with the distinguishing marks of
slavishness of thinking; but when, by devoting ourselves to reflection,
we coincide with the opinions of others, this conformity has nothing of
servility in it, and the marks of imitation are not even recognized.
In vain would man resist the impression of truth; in vain would he
defend himself by a ridiculous indifference for ancient opinions; there
never could be an idea more worthy to occupy our meditations, there
never could be an idea, on which we might be more fully permitted to
expatiate, according to our knowledge and penetration, than that sublime
one of a Supreme Being, and the relation we bear to him: an idea, which
though far removed from us by its immensity, every moment strikes the
soul with admiration, and inspires the heart with hope.
It appears to me, that there are interests which may be considered as
patriotic by intelligent and feeling beings; and while the inhabitants
of the same country, and the subjects of the same prince, employ
themselves diligently in one common plan of defence, the citizens of the
world ought to be incessantly anxious to give every new and possible
support to those exalted opinions on which the true greatness of their
existence is founded, which preserves the imagination from that
frightful spectacle of an existence without origin, of action without
liberty, and futurity without hope. Thus after having, as I think,
proved myself a citizen of France, by my administration, as well as my
writings, I wish to unite myself to a fraternity still more
extended—that of the whole human race: it is thus, without dispersing
our sentiments, we may be able nevertheless to communicate ourselves a
great way off, and enlarge in some measure the limits of our circle:
glory be to our thinking faculties for it! To that spiritual portion of
ourselves which can take in the past, dart into futurity, and intimately
associate itself with the destiny of men of all countries, and of all
ages. Without doubt, a veil is thrown over the greater part of those
truths, to which our curiosity would willingly attain; but those which a
beneficent God has permitted us to see, are amply sufficient for our
guide and instruction; and we cannot, for a continuance divert our
attention without a species of slothful negligence, and a total
indifference to the superior interests of man. How little is every thing
indeed, when put in competition with those meditations, which give to
our existence a new extent, and which, in detaching us from the dust of
the earth, seem to unite our souls to an infinity of space, and our
duration of a day to the eternity of time! Above all, it is for you to
determine, who have sensibility—who feel the want of a Supreme Being,
and who seek to find in him that support so necessary to your weakness,
that defender and that assurance, without which painful inquietude will
be perpetually tormenting you, and troubling those soft, tender
affections which constitute your happiness.
However, I must say, there never perhaps was a period, when it was more
essentially necessary to recal to the minds of men, the importance of
religious sentiments; at present they are but prejudices, if we may
credit the spirit of licentiousness and levity; the laws dictated by
fashion; and more particularly essential since we have had philosophical
instructions, which excite the various deviations of vanity, and rally
the wanderings of the imagination.
There is not any form of religion, undoubtedly, to which ideas more or
less mystical have not been annexed; and of which the evidence has not
been in proportion to the dictatorial language, and authoritative tone,
which has been made use of in teaching and defending it; as such, one
might at any given period have been tempted to dispute about particular
parts of worship, which different nations have adopted; but it is
principally in the present age, that a certain class of men has sprung
up, distinguished for their wit and talents; and who, intoxicated by the
facility with which they have gained a victory, have extended their
ambition, and had the daring courage to attack the reserved body of that
army of which the front ranks had already given way.
This struggle between persons, one of whom would imperiously rule by
faith alone, whilst the other thinks he has a right to reject with
disdain every thing that has not been demonstrated, will always be a
fruitless combat; and only serve to nourish blind aversion and unjust
contempt. Some seek to wound their adversaries, others to humble them;
in the mean time the good of mankind, and the true benefit of society,
are absolutely lost sight of; yes, the real love of useful truths, the
impartial search after them, and the desire of pointing them out, these
sentiments, so amiable and so truly laudable, seem to be entirely
unknown. I see, permit me to say it, I see at the two extremities of the
arena, the savage inquisitor, and the inconsiderate philosopher; but
neither the faggots lighted by the one, nor the derisions of the other,
will ever diffuse any salutary instruction; and in the eyes of a
rational man, the intolerance of monks adds no more to the dominion of
true religious sentiments, than the jests of a few licentious wits have
effected a triumph in favour of philosophy.
It is between these opposite opinions, and in the midst of wanderings
equally dangerous, that we must attempt to mark out our way; but as all
the opinions of men are subject to change; at present, when their minds
are more averse to the maxims of intolerance, it is religion itself that
principally needs support; and such is the daily diminution of it, that
means supplying the deficiency seem to be already publicly preparing.
For some time past we have heard of nothing but the necessity of
composing a moral catechism, in which religious principles should not be
introduced, as resources that are now out of date, and when it is time
they were discarded. Without doubt these principles might be more
effectually attacked, could they ever be represented as totally useless
for the maintenance of public order; and if the cold lessons of a
political philosophy could be substituted for those sublime ideas,
which, by the spiritual tie of religion, binds the heart and mind to the
purest morality. Let us now examine if we should gain any thing by the
exchange; let us see, if the means they propose to employ can be put in
competition with those which ought to be made use of; and, if they are
more solid, and more efficacious; let us see, if this new doctrine,
which is recommended, will produce in the soul the same degree of
consolation; if it is calculated for those hearts which are possessed of
sensibility; and, above all, let us attentively consider, if it can be
suitable to the measure of intelligence, and the social situation of the
greater part of mankind. In short, in considering the various questions,
which in any manner, relate to the important subject we have undertaken
to treat, let us not be afraid to resist, as well as we can, the foolish
ambition of those, who, availing themselves of the superiority of their
understanding, wish to deprive man of his dignity, to place him on a
level with the dust under his feet, and make his foresight a
punishment:—melancholy and deplorable destiny! from which, however, we
are permitted to seek to defend ourselves; cruel and disastrous opinion!
which tears up by the roots every thing which surrounds it, which
relaxes the most necessary bands, and, in an instant, destroys the most
delightful charm of life.
O thou God unknown!——but whose beneficent idea has ever filled my soul,
if thou ever throwest a look on those efforts which man makes to
approach thee, sustain my resolution, enlighten my understanding, raise
my thoughts, and reject not the desire I have to unite still more, if
possible, the order and happiness of society, with the intimate and
perfect conception of thy divinity, and the lively idea of thy sublime
existence.
OF THE
IMPORTANCE
OF
RELIGIOUS OPINIONS.
CHAP. I.
_On the Connection of Religious Principles with public Order._
We know not distinctly the origin of most political societies; but as
soon as history exhibits men united in a national body, we perceive, at
the same time, the establishment of public worship, and the application
of religious sentiments, to the maintenance of good order and
subordination. Religious sentiments, by the sanction of an oath, bind
the people to the magistrates, and the magistrates to their engagements;
they inspire a reverential respect for the obligations contracted
between sovereigns; and these sentiments, still more authoritative than
discipline, attach the soldier to his commander; in short, religious
opinions, by their influence on the manners of individuals, have
produced an infinite number of illustrious actions and instances of
heroical disinterestedness, of which history has transmitted us the
remembrance. But as we have seen a philosophy spring up among nations
the most enlightened, anxiously employed in depriving religion of all
that merited respect, dissertations on times far removed from us, and
the various systems that they would endeavour violently to associate
with religion, would become an endless source of controversy. It is
then, by reasoning alone, by that exercise of the mind, which belongs
equally to all countries and all ages, that we can support the cause
which we have taken in hand to defend. There is, perhaps, something weak
and servile in our wishing to draw assistance from ancient opinions;
reason ought not, like vanity, to adorn herself with old parchments, and
the display of a genealogical tree; more dignified in her proceeding,
and proud of her immortal nature, she ought to derive every thing from
herself; she should disregard past times, and be, if I may use the
phrase, the contemporary of all ages.
It was reserved, particularly for some writers of our age, to attack
even the utility of religion; and to seek to substitute, instead of its
active influence, the inanimate instruction of a political philosophy.
Religion, say they, is a scaffold fallen into ruins, and it is high time
to give to morality a more solid support. But what support will that be?
we must, in order to discover, and form a just idea of it; distinctly
consider the different motives of action on which depend the relations
that subsist between men; and it will be necessary to estimate,
afterwards, the kind and degree of assistance which we may reasonably
expect from a like support.
It appears to me, that in renouncing the efficacious aid of religion, we
may easily form an idea of the means that they will endeavour to make
use of to attach men to the observance of the rules of morality, and to
restrain the dangerous excesses of their passions. They would,
undoubtedly, place a proper value on the connection which subsists
between private and general interest; they would avail themselves of the
authority of laws, and the fear of punishment; and they would confide
still more in the ascendency of public opinion, and the ambition, that
every one ought to have, of gaining the esteem and confidence of his
fellow-creatures.
Let us examine separately these different motives; and first,
attentively considering the union of private with public interest, let
us see if this union is real, and if we can deduce from such a principle
any moral instruction truly efficacious.
Society is very far from being a perfect work; we ought not to consider
as an harmonious composition the different relations of which we are
witnesses, and particularly the habitual contrast of power and weakness,
of slavery and authority, riches and poverty, of luxury and misery; so
much inequality; such a motly piece could not form an edifice
respectable for the justness of its proportions.
Civil and political order is not then excellent by its nature, and we
cannot perceive its agreement, till we have deeply studied, and formed
to ourselves those reflections which legislators had to make, and the
difficulties that they had to surmount. It is then only, with the
assistance of the most attentive meditation, that we discover how those
particular relations, which are established by social laws, form,
nevertheless, that system of equilibrium, which is most proper to bind
together an immense diversity of interests; but a great obstacle to the
influence of political morality is, the necessity of giving, for the
basis of the love of order, an abstract and complicated idea. What
effect on vulgar minds would the scientific harmony of the whole have,
opposed daily to the sentiment of injustice and inequality, which arises
from the aspect of every part of the social constitution, when we
acquire the knowledge of it, in a manner solitary and circumscribed; and
how limited is the number of those, who can continually draw together
all the scattered links of this vast chain!
It could not be avoided, in the best regulated societies, that some
should enjoy, without labour or difficulty, all the conveniencies of
life; and that others, and far the greater number, should be obliged to
earn, by the sweat of their brow, a subsistence the most scanty, and a
recompense the most confined. It is not to be prevented, that some will
find, when oppressed by sickness, all the assistance which officious
tenderness and skill can afford; whilst others are reduced to partake,
in public hospitals, the bare relief that humanity has provided for the
indigent. We cannot prevent some from being in a situation to lavish on
their families all the advantages of a complete education; whilst
others, impatient to free themselves from a charge so heavy, are
constrained to watch eagerly for the first appearance of natural
strength, to make their children apply to some profitable labour. In
short, we cannot avoid perpetually contrasting the splendour of
magnificence with the tatters which misery displays. Such are the
effects, inseparable from the laws, respecting property. These are
truths, the principles of which I have had occasion to discuss in the
work which I composed on administration and political œconomy; but I
ought to repeat them here, since they are found closely connected with
other general views. The eminent power of property is one of the social
institutions, the influence of which has the greatest extent; this
consideration was applicable to the commerce of grain; it ought to be
present to the mind, in disquisitions on the duties of administration;
and it is still more important, when the question is to be examined,
what kind of moral instruction may be proper for mankind?
In effect, if it appertains to the essence of the laws of right,
constantly to introduce and maintain an immense disparity in the
distribution of property; were it an essential part of these laws, to
reduce the most numerous class of citizens, to that which is simply the
most necessary; the inevitable result of such a constitution would be,
to nourish, amongst men, a sentiment of habitual envy and jealousy.
Vainly would you demonstrate, that these laws are the only ones capable
of exciting labour, animating industry, preventing disorder, and
opposing obstacles to arbitrary acts of authority; all these
considerations sufficient, we grant, to fix the opinion and the will of
the legislator, would not strike in the same manner the man thrown on
the earth, without property, without resources, and without hopes; and
he will never render free homage to the beauty of the whole, when there
is nothing for him but deformity, abjectness, and contempt.
Men, in most of their political reasonings, are deceived by resemblances
and analogies: the interest of society is certainly composed of the
interests of all its members; but it does not follow from this
explication, that there is an immediate and constant correspondence
between the general and private interest; such an approximation, could
only be applicable to an imaginary social state; and which we might
represent as divided into many parts, of which the rich would be the
head, and the poor the feet and hands: but political society is not one
and the same body, except under certain relations, whilst, relatively to
other interests, it partakes in as many ramifications of them as there
are individuals.
Those considerations, to which we annex an idea of general interest,
would be very often susceptible of numberless observations; but the
principles, we are accustomed to receive and transmit, in their most
common acceptation; and we discover not the mixt ideas which compose
them, but at the moment when we analyze the principles, in order to draw
consequences from them, in like manner as we perceive not the variety of
colours in a ray of light, till the moment we divide them by means of a
prism.
The formation of social laws, with reason, ought to appear one of our
most admirable conceptions; but this system is not so united in all its
parts, that a striking disorder would always be the necessary effect of
some irregular movement: thus the man, who violates the laws, does not
quickly discover the relation of his actions with the interest of
society; but at the instant enjoys, or thinks to joy, the fruit of his
usurpations.
Should a theatre be on fire, it is certainly the interest of the
assembly that every one go out with order; but if the people, most
distant from the entrance, believed they should be able to escape sooner
from the danger, by forcing their way through the crowd which surrounds
them, they would assuredly determine on this violence, unless a coercive
power prevented them; yet the common utility of restricting ourselves to
order in such circumstances, would appear an idea more simple, and more
distinct, than is the universal importance of maintaining civil order in
society.
The only natural defence of this order, is government; its function
obliges it ever to consider the whole; but the need which it has of
power to carry its decrees into execution, proves evidently, that it is
the adversary of many, even when acting in the name of all.
We are then under a great illusion, if we hope to be able to found
morality on the connection of private interest with that of the public;
and if we imagine, that the empire of social laws can be separated from
the support of religion. The authority of these laws has nothing
decisive for those who have not assisted to establish them; and were we
to give to the hereditary distinctions of property an origin the most
remote, it is no less true, on this account that the poor succeeding
inhabitants of the earth, struck with the unequal division of its rich
domains, and not perceiving the limits and lines of separation traced by
nature, would have some right to say; these compacts, these partitions,
this diversity of lots, which procures to some abundance and repose; to
others, poverty and labour; all this legislation, in short, is only
advantageous to a small number of privileged men; and we will not
subscribe to it, unless compelled by the fear of personal danger. What
are then, they would add, these ideas of right and wrong, with which we
are entertained? What are these dissertations on the necessity of
adopting some order in society, and of observing rules? Our mind bends
not to those principles, which, general in theory, become particular in
practice. We find some satisfaction and compensation, when the idea of
virtue, of submission, and of sacrifice, are united to religious
sentiments; when we believe we shall render an account of our actions to
a Supreme Being, whose laws and will we adore, and from whom we have
received every thing, and whose approbation presents itself to our eyes,
as a motive of emulation, and an object of recompense: but if the
contracted bounds of life limit the narrow circle in which all our
interest ought to confine itself, where all our speculations and our
hopes terminate, what respect owe we then to those whom nature has
formed our equals? To those men sprung from lifeless clay, to return to
it again with us, and to be lost for ever in the same dust? They have
only invented these laws of justice, to be more tranquil usurpers. Let
them descend from their exalted rank, that they may be put on our level,
or, at least, present us with a partition less unequal, and we shall
then be able to conceive, that the observance of the laws of right is of
importance to us; till then, we shall have just motives for being the
enemies of civil order, which we find so disadvantageous; and we do not
comprehend how, in the midst of so many gratifications which excite our
envy, it is, in the name of our own interest, that we ought to renounce
them.
Such is the secret language which men, overwhelmed with the distress of
their situation, would not fail to use; or those who, merely in a state
of habitual inferiority, found themselves continually hurt by the
splendid sight of luxury and magnificence.
It would not be an easy task to combat these sentiments, by endeavouring
to paint forcibly the vanity of pleasure in general, and the illusion of
most of those objects which captivate our ambition, and the apathy which
follows in their train. These reflections, without doubt, have their
weight and efficacy; but if we attentively consider the subject, every
thing that deserves the name of consolation in this world, cannot be
addressed with any advantage; but to minds prepared for mild sentiments,
by an idea of religion and of piety, more or less distinct; we cannot,
in the same manner, relieve the barren and ferocious despondency of an
unhappy and envious man, who has thrown far behind him all hope.
Concentred in the bare interests of a life, which is for him eternity,
and the universe itself; it is the passion of the moment which enslaves
him, and nothing can disengage him from it; he has not the means to
catch any vague idea, nor of being content; and as even reason has need,
every instant, of the aid of the imagination, he cannot be encouraged,
either by the discourse of his friends, or his own reflections.
Besides, if we can maintain, in general, that the allotments of
happiness and misery are more equal than we imagine; if we can
reasonably advance, that labour is preferable to idleness; if we can
say, with truth, that embarrassments and inquietudes often accompany
wealth, and that contentment of mind appears to be the portion of the
middle state of life; we ought to acknowledge, at the same time, that
these axioms are only perfectly just in the eyes of the moralist, who
considers man in a comprehensive point of view, and who makes his
calculation upon a whole life: but, in the recurrence of our daily
desires and hopes, it is impossible to excite to labour by the
expectation of fortune, and detract, at the same time, this fortune, in
decrying the pleasures and conveniences that it procures. These subtle
ideas, without excepting those which may be defended, can never be
applicable to real circumstances; and if we sometimes use with success
such kind of reflections to alleviate unavailing sorrow and regret, it
is when we have only shadows to cope with.
In short, when we have reduced to precept, all the well known
reflections, on the apparent, but delusive advantages of rank and
fortune, we cannot prevent uncultivated minds from being continually
struck with the extreme inequality of the different contracts which the
rich make with the poor; it might be said, in those moments, that one
portion of mankind was formed only for the convenience of another; the
poor man sacrifices his time and his strength to multiply round the rich
gratifications of every kind; and he, when he gives in exchange the most
scanty subsistence, does not deprive himself of any thing; since the
extent of his physical wants is bounded by the laws of nature: equality
then is only re-established by the lassitude and apathy which the
enjoyment even of pleasure produces. But these disgusts compose the back
ground in the picture of life; the people perceive them not; and as they
have only been acquainted with want, they cannot form any idea of the
langour attendant on satiety.
Will any one imprudently say, that if the distinctions of property are
an obstacle to the establishment of a political system of morality, we
ought, therefore, to labour to destroy them? But if in past ages, when
the different degrees of talents and knowledge were not so unequal, men
were not able to preserve a community of possessions, can you imagine,
that these primitive relations could be re-established at a time when
the superiority of rank and power is enforced by the immoveable strength
of disciplined armies?
Besides, when even in the composition of an ideal world, we should have
introduced the most exact division of the various possessions esteemed
by men, it would still be necessary, to preserve a system of real
equality, that every one should execute faithfully the duties imposed on
him by universal morality; since this is incumbent on every individual,
for the sacrifice that all the members of society have made; which
society ought to recompense every citizen in particular, for the
restriction to which he submits himself.
It is essential to observe still further, that it is not only personal
interest, when clearly understood, which ought to be annexed to the idea
of public order; it is the same interest when led astray by the
passions, then a mere guide is no longer sufficient; a yoke must be
imposed; a check always acting, which must be used absolutely. Nothing
can be more chimerical than to pretend to restrain a man, hurried on by
an impetuous imagination, by endeavouring to recal to his remembrance
some principles and instructions, which, in the terms of an academic
thesis[1], ought to be the _result of analysis, of methodizing, of the
art of dividing, of developing, and circumscribing ideas_.
It would be, at present, a hardy enterprize, to attempt to conduct men
by reason alone, since the first thing that reason discovers is its own
weakness; but when we want to rest on maxims which admit of controversy;
when we wish to oppose to the strong motive of personal interest, a
moral consideration which cannot act but with the concurrence of
profound reflection; we recollect the doctrine of the first œconomists,
who, in establishing the extravagant principles respecting an exclusive
right of exporting or monopolizing grain, put off the care of preventing
popular commotions till they should happen.
It appears to me, that false reasoning, on the union of private with
public interest, arises from applying to the present state of society,
the principles which have served as the base for their formation; this
very natural confusion is one grand source of error. Let us try to
render clear a proposition, which, at first, appears difficult to
comprehend; and in this light we will suppose, for a moment the future
generation assembled in idea, in an imaginary world, and ignorant before
they inhabit the earth, who those individuals are that shall be born of
parents loaded with the gifts of fortune, and those who are beset with
misery from their cradle. They are instructed in the principles of civil
rights, and the convenience of the laws of order, has been represented
to them, and a sketch is drawn of the disorder, which would be the
inevitable consequence of a continual variation in the division of
property; then all those who are to compose the new generation, equally
uncertain of the lot that the chance of birth reserves for them,
subscribe unanimously to those events which await them; and at the very
moment in which the relations of society exist only in speculation, it
might be truly said, that the personal interest is lost in the public;
but this identity ceases, when each, arrived on the earth, has taken
possession of his lot; it is then no longer possible, that the various
personal interests should concur to the maintenance of these prodigious
gradations of rank and fortune, which are derived from the chance of
birth; and those to whom cares and wants have fallen, will not be
resigned to the inferiority of their condition, but by a grand religious
principle alone, which can make them perceive an eternal justice, and
place them in imagination before time, and before the laws.
There is nothing so easy, as the establishment of conventions, and
making rules to be observed, till the moment of the drawing of a
lottery; every one then, at the same point of view, finds all good, all
just, and well contrived, and peace reigns by common agreement; but as
soon as the blanks and prizes are known, the mind changes, the temper
grows sour; and without the check of authority, it would become
unmanageable, envious, quarrelsome, and sometimes unjust and violent.
We see, however, the consequence to be drawn from the preceding
reflections; that political societies in contemplation, and in reality,
present to our observation two different periods; and as these periods
are not separated by any apparent limits, they are almost always
confounded in the mind of the political moralist. He who believes in the
union of private interest with that of the public, and who celebrates
this harmony, has only considered society in its general and primitive
plan; he who thinks, on the contrary, that the whole is wrong and
discordant, because there is a great difference of power and fortune,
has considered it only under its actual vicissitudes. Both these
mistakes have received a sanction from celebrated writers. The man
hurried away by a lively imagination, and strongly impressed by present
objects, has been struck by the inequality of conditions; and the
philosopher, who, transported by his abstractions beyond the circle of
human society, has only perceived those relations and principles which
led men to form the first institution of civil laws. Thus, every where
we see, that most disputes relate to mere difference of positions, and
to the various points of view in which the same subject is considered;
there are so many stations in the moral world, that, according to that
which we choose, the picture changes entirely.
Hitherto we have endeavoured to understand the effect which we might
expect from a system of morality, by applying this kind of instruction
only to private interest, when most clearly ascertained. It remains now
to show, that every species of education, which demands time and
reflection, cannot belong, in any manner, to the class of men most
numerous; and to be sensible of this truth, it is sufficient to turn our
attention on the social state of those who are destitute of property,
and talents which might supply its place; obliged to have recourse to
hard labour, where nothing is required but to employ their bodily
strength, their concurrence, and the power of riches reduce the wages of
this numerous class to what is absolutely necessary; they cannot without
difficulty support their children, and they may well be impatient of
qualifying them for useful occupations to relieve themselves; and this
prevents their being sent to public schools, except during their
infancy: thus, ignorance and poverty are in the midst of our societies,
and the hereditary lot of the greater part of the citizens; there is
only to be found an alleviation of this general law, in those countries
where the constitution of the government encourages the high price of
labour, and gives the poor some means of resisting the despotism of
fortune. However, if such is the inevitable effect of our civil and
political legislation, how shall we be able to bind men without
distinction, to the maintenance of public order, by any instruction, I
do not say complicated, but to which the exercise of long reasoning
forms only a necessary introduction? It would not be sufficient to endow
institutions; it would be still more necessary to pay the scholars for
their time; since, for the lower class, time is, even very early in
life, their only means of subsistence.
Nevertheless, morality is not, like other human sciences, a knowledge,
that we may be at liberty to acquire at our leisure; the quickest
instruction is still too slow, since man has a natural power of doing
evil before his mind is in a state to apply to reflection, and connect
the most simple ideas.
It is not then a political catechism which would be proper for the
instruction of the people; it is not a course of precepts founded on the
union of public and private interest, which can suit with the measure of
their understanding; when a doctrine of that kind would appear as just
as it seems to me liable to be disputed, they will never be able to
render the principles of it distinct enough, to apply them to the
purposes of instructing those whose education continues for so short a
time. Morality, founded on religion, by its active influence, is
precisely adapted to the particular situation of the greater number of
men; and this agreement is so perfect, that it seems one of the
remarkable features of universal harmony. Religion alone has power to
persuade with celerity, because it excites passion, whilst it informs
the understanding, because it alone has the means of rendering obvious
what it recommends; because it speaks in the name of God, and it is easy
to inspire respect for him, whose power is every where evident to the
eyes of the simple and skilful, to the eyes of children, and men
advanced to maturity.