We may look forward to seeing the majority of this frontier population
resolved that the links between themselves and the Yugoslavs shall not
be broken. Very little will they care for the edicts of European
Ambassadors. It would not have been surprising to hear that on the
withdrawal of the Yugoslavs to the prescribed frontier their resourceful
friends beyond it had procured from Serbia a few volunteers to take the
place of the official Serbs. And failing this, that rough-and-ready
people might simply declare themselves to be in Yugoslavia. This time
they will be unable to persuade the Yugoslav Government to move its
excise posts more to the west. But if these tenacious men have made up
their minds to join their brethren on the right bank of the Drin and
enter Yugoslavia, the Ambassadors' Conference would preserve more of
their dignity in accepting with a good grace that which they are
powerless to hinder.... The minority of the border population will go
raiding in Yugoslavia. If they had been consulted they would have drawn
the frontier very much as it is. With large areas lying at their mercy
they will keep the border villages in constant dread. And that is the
other reason which should induce the Ambassadors' Conference to cancel
their unwise decision.
It is better when the politicians do not come with advice to the
battlefield; and in those primitive regions, where part of the people
cannot, as yet, be restrained from perpetual warfare, it would have been
better if the politicians had done nothing but confirm the General's
frontier. Franchet d'Esperey gave it to the Serbs "for the time being,"
and that period should last until there is no longer any military need
to hold it. "No General, however distinguished, could possibly have any
authority whatever to give to any nation the territories of another,
such as can only be transferred and delineated by treaties and
international recognition." So says Mr. H. E. Goad, or Captain Goad as
he has the right to call himself. But it is a pity that he does not
appreciate the difference between that which is temporary and that which
is not.
Italy has been given against the Yugoslavs a purely strategic frontier,
which places under her dominion over 500,000 unwilling Slovenes, whose
culture is admittedly on a higher level than that of their Italian
neighbours. And yet the Ambassadors' Conference (in which Italy plays a
prominent part) has refused to give Yugoslavia a strategic frontier
against a much more turbulent neighbour, which frontier, moreover, would
include of alien subjects only a small fraction of the number which
Italy has obtained. The Albanian frontier now imposed on Yugoslavia is
very much like that which the treaties of 1815 gave to France, when the
passage (_trouee_) of Couvin, often called erroneously the trouee of the
Oise, at a short distance from Paris, was purposely opened. "Formerly,"
says Professor Jean Brunhes,[107] "the sources of the Oise belonged to
France, protected, far back, by the two enclaves of Philippeville and
Marienbourg, both fortified by Vauban." And M. Gabriel Hanotaux[108]
remarks that this opening of the trouee of Couvin was the reason why in
1914 France lost the battle of Charleroi.
The Ambassadors' Conference has committed a grave injustice. "Let us
hope," says M. Justin Godart,[109] a French ex-Under Secretary of
Hygiene, concerning whose very misguided mission to Albania we have
written elsewhere,[110] "let us hope," says he--in my opinion one of the
unjustest men towards Yugoslavia and Greece--"let us hope that
Yugoslavia will understand that it is unworthy of her to contest the
decision of the Ambassadors' Conference." It has given to the Yugoslavs
a frontier that necessitates the presence of a considerable army, and
this is precisely what suits the Italians. Seeing that in Italy there
are men alive who can recall their struggles against the Austrian
oppressor, it is sad that their own country should now be playing this
very same role. The Ambassadors appear to have taken no notice of
Italy's support of the Tirana Government, but to have been very drastic
with respect to Yugoslavia's support of the Mirditi. They have punished
the Yugoslavs by binding their hands in a district part of whose
population long for the help of those hands in gaining some
tranquillity, whereas the other part consists of persons against whom
one must defend oneself.
The politicians have acted as if all the border folk were as peaceful as
they doubtless are themselves. In consequence, there will be panic and
assassination till the politicians--unable to oppose the wishes of the
majority of those who dwell in the frontier zone--proclaim that until
further notice General Franchet d'Esperey's wise and prudent
dispositions shall be honoured.
* * * * *
That is the only method by which an Albania can be brought slowly into
existence. At this moment the cartographers are printing the map of the
Albanians' country in accordance with the Ambassadors' decision. They
might spare themselves the trouble. The decision to recognize an
Albania was as premature a project as, in Mr. Wells' opinion, is the
League of Nations. A free, united Albania has been recognized, and in a
little time the Ambassadors' Conference, perceiving that such a thing
does not exist, will be relieved to see the North and the South taking
the steps to which we have referred. It is wonderful that the
Ambassadors' Conference and the League of Nations should imagine that a
country, most of which is in the social state of the Gallic clans in the
days of Vercingetorix, can suddenly become a modern nation by the simple
contrivance of a parliament, which, as a matter of fact, has been the
caricature of one. In the words of Lord Halsbury, when reversing a
judgment of the Court of Appeal, I am bewildered by the absurdity of
such a suggestion. Albania is in need of organizers, not of orators. A
very competent French traveller,[111] one who believes that a future is
reserved for this unquenchable people, warns the world against undue
haste. After describing the deplorable state or the non-existence of
Albanian schools, roads, ports, the monetary system and the organization
of credit, he says that it is scarcely an exaggeration to assert that
from the point of view of economic arrangement everything has to be
created. This necessitates a Government which knows how to administer
and which has funds at its command. But there is not the least
likelihood of regular taxes being paid to a central Government until you
have security of communication. And even then the native--except if
force is used--will not pay before he sees the benefit which taxes
produce. He who for the most part has never given obedience save to his
village chief will require to see the local benefit. Therefore his whole
outlook must be changed; slowly from being parochial it must become
national.... There can be no greater folly than at this stage to aim at
applying modern usages, equality of taxation, uniformity of judicial
organization, and so forth. It must be a very slow advance, says M.
Jaray, taking local traditions and the feudalism, both domestic and
collective, into account. Even if a central Government had all the
necessary qualifications, yet that would not cause the people to regard
it with gratitude and loyalty. It is too remote. The clans have been
accustomed to look no farther than their own chiefs. Only in serious
circumstances and against an invasion have they united and chosen a
common leader. To expect the Albanians rapidly to throw aside their
clannishness is to prepare for oneself a disappointment. It is in the
clan that they must be made fit for something more extensive. Let the
country be recognized not as a nation, but as a collection of clans, and
let these clans, with any outside assistance they themselves may choose,
come gradually to understand the word "Albania." ... And what are the
chances that this will come to pass? No country is more feudal; yet only
the most thoroughgoing peasant reforms will lay a sure foundation for
the State.
(_b_) THE GREEK FRONTIER
The frontier with Greece has undergone no alteration as a result of the
War. It is inconvenient in certain details; it runs, for example, at
such a very short distance to the south of the town of Ghevgeli that the
prefect has little chance of frustrating those who actively object to
the payment of import duties. Rather a large number of Slavs, some say
300,000, live on the Greek side of the frontier, while a far smaller
number of Greeks live in Monastir. Both the Slavs and the Greeks have
made sundry complaints, which are more or less justified, against the
alien authority which governs them. However, during 1919 and 1920, the
two Governments resolved, in the furtherance of their good
understanding, to raise none of these questions, neither the claims of
the derelict Slavs, who are mostly Exarchists, nor of the Monastir
Greeks, who are mostly hellenized Vlachs. The two countries, while
Venizelos was in power, were acting on the principles of the Serbo-Greek
friendship that used to be advocated by _L'Hellenisme_, the newspaper
which Sir Anastasius Adossides, under Venizelos the enlightened
Governor-General of Salonica, published for several years before the
first Balkan War in Paris. Yugoslavia was to have every facility given
her in Salonica, which course would naturally be the most beneficial to
that place. And among the minor advantages of really amicable relations
would be the impossibility of such a state of things as once prevailed
at Doiran, where the masters of the Greek and Bulgarian schools were
neither of them in a position to chastise their peccant pupils, who
could always have the last word by threatening to transfer themselves to
the rival establishment. It was, I believe, the custom of these young
scoundrels to remain at one or other of the two schools on the
understanding that the teacher gave them a retaining fee of so many
chocolates.... One rather felt, during 1919 and 1920, that the
Yugoslavs, in their willingness to take the hand of Greece, which had so
shamefully refused to act upon its obligations in the first half of the
War, were behaving as if Venizelos would henceforward be retained in
power by his countrymen. Should the Serbs find themselves hampered in
their use of the "Free Zone" at Salonica, a moment might arrive when
they and the Bulgars would, to their mutual advantage, make an
arrangement with regard to Salonica and her hinterland.
(_c_) THE BULGARIAN FRONTIER
There have been various modifications in the frontier line between
Serbia and Bulgaria. The Bulgars acknowledge that in the case of the
Struma salient, of the part near Vranja and of the villages on the bank
of the Timok, it was clearly for the purpose of safeguarding the
railways; and few people would be found to say that Serbia has been
other than modest in her demands. Compare the Italian position on the
Brenner with the Yugoslav frontier against Bulgaria and in the Baranja:
against Bulgars and Magyars the Yugoslavs only secure a sound defensive
frontier, whereas Italy obtains a capacity for the offensive against
Austria.[112] It is rather different with regard to Tsaribrod, on the
main line between Ni[vs] and Sofia. So good a friend of the Yugoslavs as
Dr. Seton-Watson has deplored the cession of this small place, since it
appears likely to imperil a future friendship between Serbia and
Bulgaria. As a matter of fact the Yugoslav Peace Delegates requested,
for strategic purposes, a still more southerly frontier on the Dragoman
Pass, which was denied to them. But Tsaribrod, which is dominated by the
heights of Dragoman, is anyhow a place of minor importance. It is much
to be hoped that the inhabitants will not imitate those of the Pirot
_intelligentsia_ who in 1878 shook off the dust of their town when it
became Serbian and migrated to Sofia, where they never wearied of
anti-Serbian agitation. One must do one's best not to retard the arrival
of that day when it will be almost a matter of indifference as to
whether a village is situated in Serbia or in Bulgaria. Mr.
Stanojevi['c], the deputy for Zaje[vc]a, which is not far from the
frontier, proposed in the Skup[vs]tina that Tsaribrod should be left to
the Bulgars in exchange for a sum of money. This suggestion was opposed
by the Radicals, and the far-seeing Yugoslav statesmen who would gladly
have adopted it were left hoping that the Skup[vs]tina would some day
decide in its favour.... This moderation on the part of the Serbs has
been less in evidence at Bucharest and still less at Athens. The Peace
Conference which felt itself unable to deprive its Ally of southern
Dobrudja, and unable to resist the persuasive eloquence of M. Venizelos,
does not seem to have contributed towards a lasting Balkan peace. A
reviewer in the _Observer_, while approving of Mr. Leland Buxton's hope
of a Serb-Bulgar reconciliation, asks why this should be effected to the
exclusion and obvious detriment of Greece. "Why not a Balkan
Federation?" he asks. In view of the very different races which inhabit
the Balkans, he might just as well ask, "Why not a European Federation?"
And the statesmen of the non-Slav Balkan countries do not seem to have
made serious efforts to prevent the coming of a purely Slav Federation.
It remains to be seen whether, when that comes to pass, the Greek and
Roumanian people will have achieved such statesmanship as to make an
equally small effort to keep under their control their large Slav
territories.... "We should no longer think of Thrace," said M. Venizelos
in the Greek Chamber in 1913, "for it is impossible to include in the
Greek State all those parts where Greeks have lived; we ought to be
modest and contented with what is most righteous and attainable; we
ought not to let ourselves be carried away by our imagination."
(_d_) THE ROUMANIAN FRONTIER