It will thus be seen that the friends of Nikita were altogether wrong in
suggesting that those who voted for the Republicans or Communists were
opposed to the union with Serbia in Yugoslavia. Both Republicans and
(paradoxical though it sounds) the Communists resented this insinuation
very bitterly; and considering that the leaders of both parties are
pronounced antagonists of the old regime, and were indeed severally
condemned to death by Nikita, it would have been strange if they now
supported him. Thus every single programme put forward by the different
parties included, in some form or other, union with Serbia. The
candidates themselves explicitly said so; but Mr. M'Neill knows better,
and informs us how very hostile to the Serbs they really were. He is a
wonderful man, Mr. M'Neill. Standing up in the House of Commons he
directs his penetrating gaze upon the Black Mountain, and with such
effect that he can see in the minds of Montenegrin politicians what they
themselves had never dreamed of. Since we have such a man as Mr. M'Neill
in the country, one would think that the Foreign Office might have saved
itself the expense of sending out Mr. Bryce and Major Ottley.
But since we have it, let us look at Mr. Bryce's very interesting and
detailed report. After explaining that both Republicans and Communists
were in favour of union with Serbia, he tells us how it happened that so
many people voted for these two lists instead of for the orthodox
Radical and Democratic parties. The Communists, according to Mr. Bryce,
were benefited by a party organization, a vigorous canvass and a better
discipline than that of any of their opponents. Their policy won the
support of many ardent and very patriotic Nationalists, who voted in
many cases for Communism on the ground that it was the Russian
policy--out of gratitude for what the Tzars had done for Montenegro in
the past! Major Temperley, assistant military attache, in another report
(Command Paper I., 123) observes that some local discontent had arisen
in Montenegro because the native does not understand, and has never
experienced before, a really efficient system of government, and
because the introduction of conscription was not well adapted to the
national tradition of lawless and untrained vigour. Major Temperley
testifies that the Republican party gained the suffrages of numerous
returned emigrants who admired the state of things in America. He shares
Mr. Bryce's opinion as to the insignificance of the pro-Nikita party.
"Even making large allowances," says he, "there seemed to me to be no
doubt that the pro-Nicholas party were the weakest in Montenegro."
Certain of his devotees were simply brigands who, like the Neapolitan
miscreants after 1860, sought to cast a glamour over their depredations
by affecting to be in arms on behalf of their former King. This
personage himself was so well aware of his unpopularity that he was
prudent enough to tell his supporters to abstain from voting. Those who
did abstain were altogether only 32.69 per cent. of the electors, though
one would have been justified in expecting a much higher proportion,
since the people have not yet fully grasped their rights and duties with
respect to the franchise; the distances to the booths were often very
great, and the peasants were often indifferent as to whether one
candidate or another with a very similar programme should be elected.
The tribal or family system is still so prevalent in the villages that
one member of a family would be sent to express the considered views of
his fellows. The effect of the elections being held on a Sunday was to
increase rather than diminish the number of abstainers, for although
Sunday is a public holiday the Christian Montenegrin is under no
obligation to hear Mass and for that reason travel to the village. The
churches are practically deserted, for he is accustomed on that day to
remain at home; while the Moslem voters largely declined to vote because
there were no Moslem candidates. That is why it would appear that those
of the 32.69 per cent. who abstained because they were in favour of
Nikita were extremely few. Their simple-mindedness has its limits, while
that of good Mr. M'Neill believes that because France, Great Britain and
America undertook to restore Montenegrin independence, they were still
obliged to do so after they perceived at the conclusion of the War that
an overwhelming majority of Montenegrins did not desire it. This
majority dethroned its traitor-king; but Mr. M'Neill maintains that
France and England have dethroned "a monarch who was a friend and an
ally."[64] Because M. Poincare, in the days before the Montenegrins had
rejected Nikita, addressed him as "Very Dear and Great Friend"--the
ordinary form of words for a reigning monarch--Mr. M'Neill actually
seems to think that France was for evermore compelled to clasp Nikita to
her bosom. He clearly admires those who, since the end of the War, have
risen in the cause of their old King; and I suppose that in consequence
he disapproves of the Omladina, the voluntary association of men who
banded themselves together to resist the terrorism of the pro-King
komitadjis. If he had been in Montenegro during the years after the War
he would possibly agree that komitadji is the proper name for the many
lawless elements who have found the traditional fighting life more
congenial than the thankless task of tilling their very barren land. The
moral effect of opposing to these the Montenegrin Omladina instead of
Serbian troops was to destroy all pretence of the movement being a
national Montenegrin insurrection against the union, and the cessation
of assistance from Italy resulted in the complete suppression of the
movement. The few outlaws who still remain at large, said Mr. Bryce in
December 1920, are in no sense political, but are merely bandits. And as
the Omladina has now no _raison d'etre_ they have disbanded themselves.
Much now depends on the Constitution. If it gives them equal rights--and
naturally it will--with the other inhabitants of Yugoslavia the
Montenegrins will be content.
* * * * *
In August 1921 the _Secolo_ of Milan sent a famous correspondent to
Montenegro. He came to much the same conclusions as Messrs. Bryce and
Temperley. Not a single political prisoner was to be found, and not one
of the ex-soldiers who returned from Gaeta had been molested. The
correspondent thought that the Serbs had been ill-advised at the
beginning to employ forcible methods against the pro-Nikita partisans
who were opposed to Yugoslavia; they should, said he, have let the pear
ripen spontaneously and fall into their lap. But now their policy had
become one of conciliation: during the last two and a half years
Montenegro had received from Belgrade for public works, pensions and
subsidies, 93 million dinars, and had paid in taxes only 5 millions.
Secondary education had been increased, and 700 Montenegrin students (of
whom 500 are allotted a monthly grant) frequent Yugoslav universities.
The fertile lands of Yugoslavia were open to Montenegrin emigration. In
fact an isolated, independent Montenegro was no longer needed. With the
disappearance of the Turk from all Serbian territory in 1913 a return to
the union of the Serbs, as in the days of Stephen Du[vs]an, was only
hindered by historical, sentimental and, above all, by dynastic reasons.
It was sad, quoth the correspondent, that the glorious history of
Montenegro should have come to such a tame end, but her historic mission
was closed in 1913, even as that of Scotland in 1707, to the benefit of
both parties. Now the Serbs were leaving them to manage their own
affairs; many ex-Nikita officials had been confirmed in their posts,
while officers were given their old rank in the Yugoslav army. It is
unfortunate for itself that the "Near East" (of London) does not employ
so discerning a correspondent. We should then hear no more of such folly
as that which--to select one occasion out of many--caused it in November
1921 to speak about "the forcible absorption of Montenegro." And the
world may be pardoned if it is more ready to accept the observations
made on the spot by an expert Italian correspondent rather than the
futile remarks sent by the Hon. Aubrey Herbert from the House of
Commons, also in November 1921, to the _Morning Post_. This gentleman
informs us that "it was probably because the Yugoslav Government was
allowed to annex the ancient principality of Montenegro, exile its King,
and subjugate its people, without any interference from the Great
Powers, that M. Pasitch thought that he could do as he liked in
Albania." That is the sort of statement which one may treat with Matthew
Arnold's "patient, deep disdain."