The next thing for the Montenegrins to do was to depose Nikita. By a
futile proclamation that personage had tried in October to resist the
union of the Yugoslavs; he had made a last desperate attempt to save his
crown. "I am ready to do," he said, "what my people desires." He
plaintively protested that all his life had been dedicated to their
service and now he wanted to go back to ascertain precisely what they
wished. "Montenegro," he had said, "belongs to a nation of heroes, who
fought with honour for the highest ideals." But when on November 24 the
Great National Skup[vs]tina met, and when on the 26th it unanimously
deposed him--the old gentleman was wise enough to follow the advice of
some French statesmen and remain where he was. "Here am I amongst you,
dressed in our beautiful national costume," he said at Neuilly to his
supporters, on one of the occasions when he denied that he had been a
traitor or anything so dreadful. But being a prudent old gentleman he
refrained from uttering these words at Podgorica, where the Skup[vs]tina
had met; a better plan was to communicate with the Press Association, in
the hope that many editors would print his words. If it was a final
anti-climax for a mediaeval prince--ah well, what is life but one long
anti-climax? He would protest against the constitution of the
Skup[vs]tina. He had by no means given his approval to the new election
laws; and if, contrary to his own practice, the gendarmes were having
nothing to do with the urns, that was merely in order to curry favour
with the Western Powers. The deputies were chosen by the people
indirectly--that is to say, every ten men elected a representative, and
these in their turn elected the deputies. This was not done by ballot,
for Montenegro, like Hungary, had never known the ballot. An absurd
outcry was raised by Nikita's band of adventurers and their unhappy
dupes in this country; they called the world to witness this most
palpable iniquity on the part of the Serbs, whose armed forces had
rushed across the mountains, and the moment they arrived in Montenegro
had so overawed the population that this pro-Serb, pro-Yugoslav
Skup[vs]tina was duly chosen. Go to! Of course it was a sad
disappointment to Nikita that a Yugoslav instead of an Italian army
should occupy Montenegro. He had telegraphed at the beginning of the War
to Belgrade that: "Serbia may rely on the brotherly and unconditional
support of Montenegro, in this moment on which depends the fate of the
Serbian nation, as well as on any other occasion"; and since he knew,
without any telegram, that Serbia would in her turn support
Montenegro--but not the tiny pro-Nikita faction--he was reduced to the
appalling straits of a plot to force himself upon his own people by
means of a foreign army. Now the composition of the aforementioned
Yugoslav forces should be noted--after more than six years of heroic
fighting against the Turks, the Bulgars, the Austro-Germans, the
Albanian blizzards, and again the Bulgars and the Austro-Germans there
did not survive a very large number of the splendid veterans of Marshal
Mi[vs]i['c], and in Macedonia the ranks were filled by Yugoslav
volunteers from the United States. Many of these Yugoslavs (over half of
them Dalmatians and Bosnians) were included, in the army which entered
Montenegro. The whole force at the time of the National Skup[vs]tina
consisted of about 200 men, ten of whom were Serbs from the old
kingdom--and if anyone maintains that 200 men could impose their will
upon a population of 350,000 which has arms enough and is skilful in the
use of arms, he makes it clear that he knows little of the Montenegrins.