There was thus a certain amount of tension existing between the military
and naval services of the Yugoslavs and those of Italy. Other Yugoslavs
were apprehensive as to whether the Italians would not demand the
enforcement of the Treaty of London. But the United States was not bound
by that agreement, which was so completely at variance with Wilson's
principle of self-determination. One presumed that, pending an
examination of these matters, the disputed territories would be occupied
by troops of all the Allies. But unfortunately this did not turn out to
be the case. France, Britain and America stood by, while the Italians
and the Yugoslavs took whatsoever they could lay their hands on. As the
Yugoslav military forces had to come overland, while the Italians had
command of the sea, it was natural that in most places the Italians got
the better of the scramble; and where they found the Yugoslavs in
possession, as at Rieka, they usually ousted them by diplomatic methods.
And in one way or another they managed to make their holdings tally, as
far as possible, with the Treaty of London, and even to go beyond it.
Baron Sonnino declined to make a comprehensive statement as to the
Italian programme. Of course he desired in the end to exchange
Dalmatia--the seizure of which would entail a war with Yugoslavia--against
Rieka. But as Italian public opinion had scarcely thought of Rieka
during the War, he made it his business to cause them to yearn for that
town. His compatriots were asking why Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points
should be waived for France in the Sarre Basin, for Britain in Ireland
and Egypt, but not for them. And some of his would-be ingenious
compatriots pointed out--their contentions were embodied in the Italian
Memorandum to the Supreme Council on January 10, 1920--that as the
Treaty of London was based on the presumption that Montenegro, Serbia
and Croatia would remain separate States, this instrument had been
altogether upset by the merging of those Southern Slavs into one
country, Yugoslavia; it followed, therefore, that the Treaty which
attributed Rieka to the Croats could no longer be invoked. But the other
parts of the Treaty which gave the Slav mainland and islands to Italy
were absolutely unassailable. The reader will resent being troubled by
this kind of balderdash, but Messrs. Clemenceau, Lloyd-George and Wilson
may have resented it even more.