Of course one should not generalize regarding nations, except in vague
or very guarded terms; but possibly it would not be unjust to say that
the Italians, apart from those of northern provinces and of Sardinia,
have too much imagination to make first-class soldiers. And they are too
sensitive, as you could see in an Italian military hospital. Their task
was also not a trifling one--to stand for all those months in territory
so forbidding. And there would have been more sympathy with the Italians
in the autumn of 1918 if they had not had such very crushing triumphs
when the War was practically over. What was the condition of the
Austrian army? About October 15, in one section of the front--35
kilometres separating the extreme points from one another--the following
incidents occurred: the Army Command at St. Vitto issued an order to the
officers invariably to carry a revolver, since the men were now
attacking them; a Magyar regiment revolted and marched away, under the
command of a Second-Lieutenant whom they had elected; at Stino di
Livenza, while the officers were having their evening meal, two hand
grenades were thrown into the mess by soldiers; at Codroipo a regiment
revolted, attacked the officers' mess, and wounded several of the people
there, including the general in command. Such was the Austrian army in
those days; and it was only human if comparisons were made--not making
any allowances for Italy's economic difficulties, her coal, her social
and her religious difficulties--but merely bald comparisons were made
between these wholesale victories against the Austrians as they were in
the autumn of 1918 and the scantier successes of the previous years. In
September 1916 when the eighth or ninth Italian offensive had pierced
the Austrian front and the Italians reached a place called Provachina,
Marshal Boroevi['c] had only one reserve division. The heavy artillery
was withdrawn, the light artillery was packed up, the company commanders
having orders to retire in the night. Only a few rapid-fire batteries
were left with a view to deceiving the enemy. But as the Italians
appeared to the Austrians to have no heart to come on--there may have
been other reasons--the artillery was unpacked and the Austrians
returned to their old front. In May 1917, between Monte Gabriele and
Doberdo, Boroevi['c] had no reserve battalion; his troops, in full
marching kit, had to defend the whole front: they were able to do so by
proceeding now to this sector and now to that. No army is immune from
serious mistakes--"We won in 1871," said Bismarck, "although we made
very many mistakes, because the French made even more"--but the
Yugoslavs in the Austrian army could not forget such incidents as that
connected with the name of Professor Pivko. This gentleman, who is now
living at Maribor, was made the subject of a book, _Der Verrath bei
Carzano_ ("The Treachery near Carzano"), which was published by the
Austrian General Staff. His battalion commander was a certain
Lieut.-Colonel Vidale, who was a first cousin of the C.O., General
Vidale; and when an orderly overheard Pivko, who is a Slovene, and
several Czech officers, discussing a plan which would open the front to
the Italians, he ran all the way to the General's headquarters and gave
the information. The General telephoned to his cousin, who said that the
allegation was absurd and that Pivko was one of his best officers. The
orderly was therefore thrown into prison, and Pivko, having turned off
the electricity from the barbed wires and arranged matters with a
Bosnian regiment, made his way to the Italians. The suggestion is that,
owing to the lie of the land and the weak Austrian forces, it was
possible for the Italians to reach Trent; anyhow the Austrians were
amazed when they ceased to advance and the German regiment which was in
Trent did not have to come out to defend it. Everyone in the Austrian
army recognized that the Italian artillery was pre-eminent and that the
officers were most gallant, especially in the early part of the War,
when one would frequently find an officer lying dead with no men near
him. But such episodes as the above-mentioned--it would be possible, but
wearisome, to describe others--could not but have some effect on the
opposing army, and would be recalled when the Italians sang their final
panegyric. The reasons for the Austrian _debacle_ on the Piave are as
follows: when the Allied troops had reached Rann, Susegana, Ponte di
Piave and Montiena, the Austrian High Command decided on October 24 to
throw against them the 36th Croat division, the 21st Czech, the 44th
Slovene, a German division and the 12th Croat Regiment of Uhlans.
However, the 16th and 116th Croat, the 30th Regiment of Czech Landwehr
and the 71st Slovene Landwehr Regiment declared that they would not
fight against the French and English, and, instead of advancing,
retired. The 78th Croat Regiment, as well as three other Czech
Regiments, abandoned the front, after having made a similar declaration.
At the same time the 96th and 135th Croat Regiments, in agreement with
the Czech detachments, made a breach for the Italians on the left wing
at Stino di Livenza, while Slav marching formations revolted at Udine.
The Austro-Hungarian troops consequently had to retreat.... No one
expects of the Italian army, as a whole, that it will be on a level
with the best, but when the British officers who were with the Serbs on
the Salonica front compare their reminiscences with those of the British
officers on the Italian front, it is improbable that garlands will be
strewn for the Italians. Towards the end of October a plan was adopted
by the British and Italian staffs for capturing the island of Papadopoli
in the Piave; this island, about three miles in length, formed the
outpost line of the Austrian defences. On the night of October 23-24 an
attack was to be made by the 2nd H.A.C., while three companies of the
1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers were to act as reserve. This operation is most
vividly described by the Senior Chaplain of the 7th Division, the Rev.
E. C. Crosse, D.S.O., M.C.;[1] and he says nothing as to what occurred
on that part of the island which was to be seized by the Italians. Well,
nothing had occurred, for the Italians did not get across and when the
water rose they said they could do nothing on that night. These are the
words of Mr. Crosse's footnote: "The obvious question, 'What was going
to be done with the farther half of the island?' we have purposely left
undiscussed here. This half was outside the area of the 7th Division,
and as such it falls outside the scope of this work for the time being.
The subsequent capture of the whole island (on the following night) by
the 7th Division was not part of the original plan." Afterwards, when a
crossing was made to the mainland, the left flank was unsupported, as
the Italians did not cross the river, and thus the 23rd Division had its
flank exposed. A belief is entertained that the Italian cavalry is one
of the best in the world; evidently it is not the best, for on that
Piave front, where thousands of Italian cavalry were available, the only
ones who put in their appearance early in the battle were three hundred
very war-stained Northampton Yeomanry.
"The record of the Italian troops in the field renders unnecessary an
assertion of their courage," says Mr. Anthony Dell;[2] "for reckless
bravery in assault none surpasses them." But when you have said that you
have nearly summed up their military virtues, for discipline is not
their strong suit, and they have little sense of responsibility. On the
other hand, we must remember their admirable patience, but the great
mass of the people have not attained the level of Christianity; they are
savage both in heart and mind, with no outlook wider than that of the
family. It is the Italian proletariat which is judged by the Yugoslavs,
whose otherwise acute discernment has been warped by the unhappy
circumstances of the time. Indifferent to the fact that he himself is a
compound of physical energy and oriental mysticism, the Yugoslav has
become inclined to contemplate merely the physical side of the Italian,
and for the most part that portion of it which has to do with war. The
Italian long-sightedness and prudence and business capacity are ignored
save in so far as they delayed the country's entrance into the Great
War. The sensitiveness and artistic attributes of the Italians, who gaze
with aching hearts upon the glories of a sunset, are but rarely felt by
Serbs, who gather brushwood for the fire that is to roast their
sucking-pig and who sit down to watch the operation, haply with their
backs turned to the sunset. The Yugoslav, especially the Serb, is a man
from the Middle Ages brought suddenly into the twentieth century. With
his heroic heart and his wonderful strength he fails to understand those
people who, on account of one reason or another, have no passion for
war. And as the military deeds of the Italians have had such effect upon
the minds of the Yugoslavs, we have alluded to them at a greater length
than would otherwise have been profitable. The Yugoslavs despise the
Italians. Also the Italians, who concern themselves with diplomacy, are
conscious that their keen wits and their long training in the wiles of
the civilized world, their old traditions and their prestige give them a
considerable advantage over the Yugoslav diplomat, so that this kind of
Italian despises the Yugoslav. He knows very well that the French or
British statesmen do not, amid the smoke of after-dinner cigars, esteem
his case by the same standard as that which they apply to the case which
the ordinary Yugoslav diplomat presents to them in office hours. As for
the wider Italian circles, one must fear that the old hatred of Germany,
because the Germans seemed to despise them, will henceforward colour the
sentiments with which they regard the Yugoslavs. It is a state of things
between these neighbours which other people cannot but view with
apprehension.