THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR[1]

The war against war is going to be no holiday excursion or camping

party. The military feelings are too deeply grounded to abdicate their

place among our ideals until better substitutes are offered than the

glory and shame that come to nations as well as to individuals from the

ups and downs of politics and the vicissitudes of trade. There is

something highly paradoxical in the modern man's relation to war. Ask

all our millions, north and south, whether they would vote now (were

such a thing possible) to have our war for the Union expunged from

history, and the record of a peaceful transition to the present time

substituted for that of its marches and battles, and probably hardly a

handful of eccentrics would say yes. Those ancestors, those efforts,

those memories and legends, are the most ideal part of what we now own

together, a sacred spiritual possession worth more than all the blood

poured out. Yet ask those same people whether they would be willing in

cold blood to start another civil war now to gain another similar

possession, and not one man or women would vote for the proposition.

In modern eyes, precious though wars may be, they must not be waged

solely for the sake of the ideal harvest. Only when forced upon one,

only when an enemy's injustice leaves us no alternative, is a war now

thought permissible.

It was not thus in ancient times. The earlier men were hunting men,

and to hunt a neighboring tribe, kill the males, loot the village and

possess the females, was the most profitable, as well as the most

exciting, way of living. Thus were the more martial tribes selected,

and in chiefs and peoples a pure pugnacity and love of glory came to

mingle with the more fundamental appetite for plunder.

Modern war is so expensive that we feel trade to be a better avenue to

plunder; but modern man inherits all the innate pugnacity and all the

love of glory of his ancestors. Showing war's irrationality and horror

is of no effect upon him. The horrors make the fascination. War is

the _strong_ life; it is life _in extremis_; war-taxes are the only

ones men never hesitate to pay, as the budgets of all nations show us.

History is a bath of blood. The Iliad is one long recital of how

Diomedes and Ajax, Sarpedon and Hector _killed_. No detail of the

wounds they made is spared us, and the Greek mind fed upon the story.

Greek history is a panorama of jingoism and imperialism--war for war's

sake, all the citizens being warriors. It is horrible reading, because

of the irrationality of it all--save for the purpose of making

"history"--and the history is that of the utter ruin of a civilization

in intellectual respects perhaps the highest the earth has ever seen.

Those wars were purely piratical. Pride, gold, women, slaves,

excitement, were their only motives. In the Peloponnesian war for

example, the Athenians ask the inhabitants of Melos (the island where

the "Venus of Milo" was found), hitherto neutral, to own their

lordship. The envoys meet, and hold a debate which Thucydides gives in

full, and which, for sweet reasonableness of form, would have satisfied

Matthew Arnold. "The powerful exact what they can," said the

Athenians, "and the weak grant what they must." When the Meleans say

that sooner than be slaves they will appeal to the gods, the Athenians

reply: "Of the gods we believe and of men we know that, by a law of

their nature, wherever they can rule they will. This law was not made

by us, and we are not the first to have acted upon it; we did but

inherit it, and we know that you and all mankind, if you were as strong

as we are, would do as we do. So much for the gods; we have told you

why we expect to stand as high in their good opinion as you." Well,

the Meleans still refused, and their town was taken. "The Athenians,"

Thucydides quietly says, "thereupon put to death all who were of

military age and made slaves of the women and children. They then

colonized the island, sending thither five hundred settlers of their

own."

Alexander's career was piracy pure and simple, nothing but an orgy of

power and plunder, made romantic by the character of the hero. There

was no rational principle in it, and the moment he died his generals

and governors attacked one another. The cruelty of those times is

incredible. When Rome finally conquered Greece, Paulus Aemilius, was

told by the Roman Senate to reward his soldiers for their toil by

"giving" them the old kingdom of Epirus. They sacked seventy cities

and carried off a hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants as slaves.

How many they killed I know not; but in Etolia they killed all the

senators, five hundred and fifty in number. Brutus was "the noblest

Roman of them all," but to reanimate his soldiers on the eve of

Philippi he similarly promises to give them the cities of Sparta and

Thessalonica to ravage, if they win the fight.

Such was the gory nurse that trained societies to cohesiveness. We

inherit the warlike type; and for most of the capacities of heroism

that the human race is full of we have to thank this cruel history.

Dead men tell no tales, and if there were any tribes of other type than

this they have left no survivors. Our ancestors have bred pugnacity

into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years of peace won't breed

it out of us. The popular imagination fairly fattens on the thought of

wars. Let public opinion once reach a certain fighting pitch, and no

ruler can withstand it. In the Boer war both governments began with

bluff but could n't stay there, the military tension was too much for

them. In 1898 our people had read the word "war" in letters three

inches high for three months in every newspaper. The pliant politician

McKinley was swept away by their eagerness, and our squalid war with

Spain became a necessity.

At the present day, civilized opinion is a curious mental mixture. The

military instincts and ideals are as strong as ever, but are confronted

by reflective criticisms which sorely curb their ancient freedom.

Innumerable writers are showing up the bestial side of military

service. Pure loot and mastery seem no longer morally avowable

motives, and pretexts must be found for attributing them solely to the

enemy. England and we, our army and navy authorities repeat without

ceasing, arm solely for "peace," Germany and Japan it is who are bent

on loot and glory. "Peace" in military mouths to-day is a synonym for

"war expected." The word has become a pure provocative, and no

government wishing peace sincerely should allow it ever to be printed

in a newspaper. Every up-to-date dictionary should say that "peace"

and "war" mean the same thing, now _in posse_, now _in actu_. It may

even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive

_preparation_ for war by the nations _is the real war_, permanent,

unceasing; and that the battles are only a sort of public verification

of the mastery gained during the "peace"-interval.

It is plain that on this subject civilized man has developed a sort of

double personality. If we take European nations, no legitimate

interest of any one of them would seem to justify the tremendous

destructions which a war to compass it would necessarily entail. It

would seem as though common sense and reason ought to find a way to

reach agreement in every conflict of honest interests. I myself think

it our bounden duty to believe in such international rationality as

possible. But, as things stand, I see how desperately hard it is to

bring the peace-party and the war-party together, and I believe that

the difficulty is due to certain deficiencies in the program of

pacificism which set the militarist imagination strongly, and to a

certain extent justifiably, against it. In the whole discussion both

sides are on imaginative and sentimental ground. It is but one utopia

against another, and everything one says must be abstract and

hypothetical. Subject to this criticism and caution, I will try to

characterize in abstract strokes the opposite imaginative forces, and

point out what to my own very fallible mind seems the best Utopian

hypothesis, the most promising line of conciliation.

In my remarks, pacificist though I am, I will refuse to speak of the

bestial side of the war-_régime_ (already done justice to by many

writers) and consider only the higher aspects of militaristic

sentiment. Patriotism no one thinks discreditable; nor does any one

deny that war is the romance of history. But inordinate ambitions are

the soul of every patriotism, and the possibility of violent death the

soul of all romance. The militarily patriotic and romantic-minded

everywhere, and especially the professional military class, refuse to

admit for a moment that war may be a transitory phenomenon in social

evolution. The notion of a sheep's paradise like that revolts, they

say, our higher imagination. Where then would be the steeps of life?

If war had ever stopped, we should have to re-invent it, on this view,

to redeem life from flat degeneration.

Reflective apologists for war at the present day all take it

religiously. It is a sort of sacrament. Its profits are to the

vanquished as well as to the victor; and quite apart from any question

of profit, it is an absolute good, we are told, for it is human nature

at its highest dynamic. Its "horrors" are a cheap price to pay for

rescue from the only alternative supposed, of a world of clerks and

teachers, of co-education and zo-ophily, of "consumer's leagues" and

"associated charities," of industrialism unlimited, and feminism

unabashed. No scorn, no hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a

cattleyard of a planet!

So far as the central essence of this feeling goes, no healthy minded

person, it seems to me, can help to some degree partaking of it.

Militarism is the great preserver of our ideals of hardihood, and human

life with no use for hardihood would be contemptible. Without risks or

prizes for the darer, history would be insipid indeed; and there is a

type of military character which every one feels that the race should

never cease to breed, for every one is sensitive to its superiority.

The duty is incumbent on mankind, of keeping military characters in

stock--of keeping them, if not for use, then as ends in themselves and

as pure pieces of perfection,--so that Roosevelt's weaklings and

mollycoddles may not end by making everything else disappear from the

face of nature.

This natural sort of feeling forms, I think, the innermost soul of

army-writings. Without any exception known to me, militarist authors

take a highly mystical view of their subject, and regard war as a

biological or sociological necessity, uncontrolled by ordinary

psychological checks and motives. When the time of development is ripe

the war must come, reason or no reason, for the justifications pleaded

are invariably fictitious. War is, in short, a permanent human

_obligation_. General Homer Lea, in his recent book "The Valor of

Ignorance," plants himself squarely on this ground. Readiness for war

is for him the essence of nationality, and ability in it the supreme

measure of the health of nations.

Nations, General Lea says, are never stationary--they must necessarily

expand or shrink, according to their vitality or decrepitude. Japan

now is culminating; and by the fatal law in question it is impossible

that her statesmen should not long since have entered, with

extraordinary foresight, upon a vast policy of conquest--the game in

which the first moves were her wars with China and Russia and her

treaty with England, and of which the final objective is the capture of

the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, Alaska, and the whole of our

Coast west of the Sierra Passes. This will give Japan what her

ineluctable vocation as a state absolutely forces her to claim, the

possession of the entire Pacific Ocean; and to oppose these deep

designs we Americans have, according to our author, nothing but our

conceit, our ignorance, our commercialism, our corruption, and our

feminism. General Lea makes a minute technical comparison of the

military strength which we at present could oppose to the strength of

Japan, and concludes that the islands, Alaska, Oregon, and Southern

California, would fall almost without resistance, that San Francisco

must surrender in a fortnight to a Japanese investment, that in three

or four months the war would be over, and our republic, unable to

regain what it had heedlessly neglected to protect sufficiently, would

then "disintegrate," until perhaps some Caesar should arise to weld us

again into a nation.

A dismal forecast indeed! Yet not implausible, if the mentality of

Japan's statesmen be of the Caesarian type of which history shows so

many examples, and which is all that General Lea seems able to imagine.

But there is no reason to think that women can no longer be the mothers

of Napoleonic or Alexandrian characters; and if these come in Japan and

find their opportunity, just such surprises as "The Valor of Ignorance"

paints may lurk in ambush for us. Ignorant as we still are of the

innermost recesses of Japanese mentality, we may be foolhardy to

disregard such possibilities.

Other militarists are more complex and more moral in their

considerations. The "Philosophie des Krieges," by S. R. Steinmetz is a

good example. War, according to this author, is an ordeal instituted

by God, who weighs the nations in its balance. It is the essential

form of the State, and the only function in which peoples can employ

all their powers at once and convergently. No victory is possible save

as the resultant of a totality of virtues, no defeat for which some

vice or weakness is not responsible. Fidelity, cohesiveness, tenacity,

heroism, conscience, education, inventiveness, economy, wealth,

physical health and vigor--there is n't a moral or intellectual point

of superiority that does n't tell, when God holds his assizes and hurls

the peoples upon one another. _Die Weltgeschichte ist das

Weltgericht_; and Dr. Steinmetz does not believe that in the long run

chance and luck play any part in apportioning the issues.

The virtues that prevail, it must be noted, are virtues anyhow,

superiorities that count in peaceful as well as in military

competition; but the strain on them, being infinitely intenser in the

latter case, makes war infinitely more searching as a trial. No ordeal

is comparable to its winnowings. Its dread hammer is the welder of men

into cohesive states, and nowhere but in such states can human nature

adequately develop its capacity. The only alternative is

"degeneration."

Dr. Steinmetz is a conscientious thinker, and his book, short as it is,

takes much into account. Its upshot can, it seems to me, be summed up

in Simon Patten's word, that mankind was nursed in pain and fear, and

that the transition to a "pleasure-economy" may be fatal to a being

wielding no powers of defence against its disintegrative influences.

If we speak of the _fear of emancipation from the fear-régime_, we put

the whole situation into a single phrase; fear regarding ourselves now

taking the place of the ancient fear of the enemy.

Turn the fear over as I will in my mind, it all seems to lead back to

two unwillingnesses of the imagination, one aesthetic, and the other

moral; unwillingness, first to envisage a future in which army-life,

with its many elements of charm, shall be forever impossible, and in

which the destinies of peoples shall nevermore be decided, quickly,

thrillingly, and tragically, by force, but only gradually and insipidly

by "evolution"; and, secondly, unwillingness to see the supreme theatre

of human strenuousness closed, and the splendid military aptitudes of

men doomed to keep always in a state of latency and never show

themselves in action. These insistent unwillingnesses, no less than

other aesthetic and ethical insistencies, have, it seems to me, to be

listened to and respected. One cannot meet them effectively by mere

counter-insistency on war's expensiveness and horror. The horror makes

the thrill; and when the question is of getting the extremest and

supremest out of human nature, talk of expense sounds ignominious. The

weakness of so much merely negative criticism is evident--pacificism

makes no converts from the military party. The military party denies

neither the bestiality nor the horror, nor the expense; it only says

that these things tell but half the story. It only says that war is

_worth_ them; that, taking human nature as a whole, its wars are its

best protection against its weaker and more cowardly self, and that

mankind cannot _afford_ to adopt a peace-economy.

Pacificists ought to enter more deeply into the aesthetical and ethical

point of view of their opponents. Do that first in any controversy,

says J. J. Chapman, then _move the point_, and your opponent will

follow. So long as anti-militarists propose no substitute for war's

disciplinary function, no _moral equivalent_ of war, analogous, as one

might say, to the mechanical equivalent of heat, so long they fail to

realize the full inwardness of the situation. And as a rule they do

fail. The duties, penalties, and sanctions pictured in the Utopias

they paint are all too weak and tame to touch the military-minded.

Tolstoi's pacificism is the only exception to this rule, for it is

profoundly pessimistic as regards all this world's values, and makes

the fear of the Lord furnish the moral spur provided elsewhere by the

fear of the enemy. But our socialistic peace-advocates all believe

absolutely in this world's values; and instead of the fear of the Lord

and the fear of the enemy, the only fear they reckon with is the fear

of poverty if one be lazy. This weakness pervades all the socialistic

literature with which I am acquainted. Even in Lowes Dickinson's

exquisite dialogue,[2] high wages and short hours are the only forces

invoked for overcoming man's distaste for repulsive kinds of labor.

Meanwhile men at large still live as they always have lived, under a

pain-and-fear economy--for those of us who live in an ease-economy are

but an island in the stormy ocean--and the whole atmosphere of

present-day Utopian literature tastes mawkish and dishwatery to people

who still keep a sense for life's more bitter flavors. It suggests, in

truth, ubiquitous inferiority. Inferiority is always with us, and

merciless scorn of it is the keynote of the military temper. "Dogs,

would you live forever?" shouted Frederick the Great. "Yes," say our

Utopians, "let us live forever, and raise our level gradually." The

best thing about our "inferiors" to-day is that they are as tough as

nails, and physically and morally almost as insensitive. Utopianism

would see them soft and squeamish, while militarism would keep their

callousness, but transfigure it into a meritorious characteristic,

needed by "the service," and redeemed by that from the suspicion of

inferiority. All the qualities of a man acquire dignity when he knows

that the service of the collectivity that owns him needs them. If

proud of the collectivity, his own pride rises in proportion. No

collectivity is like an army for nourishing such pride; but it has to

be confessed that the only sentiment which the image of pacific

cosmopolitan industrialism is capable of arousing in countless worthy

breasts is shame at the idea of belonging to _such_ a collectivity. It

is obvious that the United States of America as they exist to-day

impress a mind like General Lea's as so much human blubber. Where is

the sharpness and precipitousness, the contempt for life, whether one's

own, or another's? Where is the savage "yes" and "no," the

unconditional duty? Where is the conscription? Where is the

blood-tax? Where is anything that one feels honored by belonging to?

Having said thus much in preparation, I will now confess my own Utopia.

I devoutly believe in the reign of peace and in the gradual advent of

some sort of a socialistic equilibrium. The fatalistic view of the

war-function is to me nonsense, for I know that war-making is due to

definite motives and subject to prudential checks and reasonable

criticisms, just like any other form of enterprise. And when whole

nations are the armies, and the science of destruction vies in

intellectual refinement with the sciences of production, I see that war

becomes absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity. Extravagant

ambitions will have to be replaced by reasonable claims, and nations

must make common cause against them. I see no reason why all this

should not apply to yellow as well as to white countries, and I look

forward to a future when acts of war shall be formally outlawed as

between civilized peoples.

All these beliefs of mine put me squarely into the anti-militarist

party. But I do not believe that peace either ought to be or will be

permanent on this globe, unless the states pacifically organized

preserve some of the old elements of army-discipline. A permanently

successful peace-economy cannot be a simple pleasure-economy. In the

more or less socialistic future towards which mankind seems drifting we

must still subject ourselves collectively to those severities which

answer to our real position upon this only partly hospitable globe. We

must make new energies and hardihoods continue the manliness to which

the military mind so faithfully clings. Martial virtues must be the

enduring cement; intrepidity, contempt of softness, surrender of

private interest, obedience to command, must still remain the rock upon

which states are built--unless, indeed, we wish for dangerous reactions

against commonwealths fit only for contempt, and liable to invite

attack whenever a centre of crystallization for military-minded

enterprise gets formed anywhere in their neighborhood.

The war-party is assuredly right in affirming and reaffirming that the

martial virtues, although originally gained by the race through war,

are absolute and permanent human goods. Patriotic pride and ambition

in their military form are, after all, only specifications of a more

general competitive passion. They are its first form, but that is no

reason for supposing them to be its last form. Men now are proud of

belonging to a conquering nation, and without a murmur they lay down

their persons and their wealth, if by so doing they may fend off

subjection. But who can be sure that _other aspects of one's country_

may not, with time and education and suggestion enough, come to be

regarded with similarly effective feelings of pride and shame? Why

should men not some day feel that it is worth a blood-tax to belong to

a collectivity superior in _any_ ideal respect? Why should they not

blush with indignant shame if the community that owns them is vile in

any way whatsoever? Individuals, daily more numerous, now feel this

civic passion. It is only a question of blowing on the spark till the

whole population gets incandescent, and on the ruins of the old morals

of military honor, a stable system of morals of civic honor builds

itself up. What the whole community comes to believe in grasps the

individual as in a vise. The war-function has grasped us so far; but

constructive interests may some day seem no less imperative, and impose

on the individual a hardly lighter burden.

Let me illustrate my idea more concretely. There is nothing to make

one indignant in the mere fact that life is hard, that men should toil

and suffer pain. The planetary conditions once for all are such, and

we can stand it. But that so many men, by mere accidents of birth and

opportunity, should have a life of _nothing else_ but toil and pain and

hardness and inferiority imposed upon them, should have no vacation,

while others natively no more deserving never get any taste of this

campaigning life at all,--_this_ is capable of arousing indignation in

reflective minds. It may end by seeming shameful to all of us that

some of us have nothing but campaigning, and others nothing but unmanly

ease. If now--and this is my idea--there were, instead of military

conscription a conscription of the whole youthful population to form

for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against

_Nature_, the injustice would tend to be evened out, and numerous other

goods to the commonwealth would follow. The military ideals of

hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the

people; no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are

blind, to man's relations to the globe he lives on, and to the

permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life. To coal and

iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to

dishwashing, clothes-washing, and window-washing, to road-building and

tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and to the frames of

skyscrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, according to their

choice, to get the childishness knocked out of them, and to come back

into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideas. They would

have paid their blood-tax, done their own part in the immemorial human

warfare against nature; they would tread the earth more proudly, the

women would value them more highly, they would be better fathers and

teachers of the following generation.

Such a conscription, with the state of public opinion that would have

required it, and the many moral fruits it would bear, would preserve in

the midst of a pacific civilization the manly virtues which the

military party is so afraid of seeing disappear in peace. We should

get toughness without callousness, authority with as little criminal

cruelty as possible, and painful work done cheerily because the duty is

temporary, and threatens not, as now, to degrade the whole remainder of

one's life. I spoke of the "moral equivalent" of war. So far, war has

been the only force that can discipline a whole community, and until an

equivalent discipline is organized, I believe that war must have its

way. But I have no serious doubt that the ordinary prides and shames

of social man, once developed to a certain intensity, are capable of

organizing such a moral equivalent as I have sketched, or some other

just as effective for preserving manliness of type. It is but a

question of time, of skilful propagandism, and of opinion-making men

seizing historic opportunities.

The martial type of character can be bred without war. Strenuous honor

and disinterestedness abound elsewhere. Priests and medical men are in

a fashion educated to it and we should all feel some degree of it

imperative if we were conscious of our work as an obligatory service to

the state. We should be owned, as soldiers are by the army, and our

pride would rise accordingly. We could be poor, then, without

humiliation, as army officers now are. The only thing needed

henceforward is to inflame the civic temper as past history has

inflamed the military temper. H. G. Wells, as usual, sees the centre

of the situation. "In many ways," he says, "military organization is

the most peaceful of activities. When the contemporary man steps from

the street, of clamorous insincere advertisement, push, adulteration,

underselling and intermittent employment into the barrack-yard, he

steps on to a higher social plane, into an atmosphere of service and

cooperation and of infinitely more honorable emulations. Here at least

men are not flung out of employment to degenerate because there is no

immediate work for them to do. They are fed and drilled and trained

for better services. Here at least a man is supposed to win promotion

by self-forgetfulness and not by self-seeking. And beside the feeble

and irregular endowment of research by commercialism, its little

short-sighted snatches at profit by innovation and scientific economy,

see how remarkable is the steady and rapid development of method and

appliances in naval and military affairs! Nothing is more striking

than to compare the progress of civil conveniences which has been left

almost entirely to the trader, to the progress in military apparatus

during the last few decades. The house-appliances of to-day for

example, are little better than they were fifty years ago. A house of

to-day is still almost as ill-ventilated, badly heated by wasteful

fires, clumsily arranged and furnished as the house of 1858. Houses a

couple of hundred years old are still satisfactory places of residence,

so little have our standards risen. But the rifle or battleship of

fifty years ago was beyond all comparison inferior to those we possess;

in power, in speed, in convenience alike. No one has a use now for

such superannuated things." [3]

Wells adds[4] that he thinks that the conceptions of order and

discipline, the tradition of service and devotion, of physical fitness,

unstinted exertion, and universal responsibility, which universal

military duty is now teaching European nations, will remain a permanent

acquisition, when the last ammunition has been used in the fireworks

that celebrate the final peace. I believe as he does. It would be

simply preposterous if the only force that could work ideals of honor

and standards of efficiency into English or American natures should be

the fear of being killed by the Germans or the Japanese. Great indeed

is Fear; but it is not, as our military enthusiasts believe and try to

make us believe, the only stimulus known for awakening the higher

ranges of men's spiritual energy. The amount of alteration in public

opinion which my utopia postulates is vastly less than the difference

between the mentality of those black warriors who pursued Stanley's

party on the Congo with their cannibal war-cry of "Meat! Meat!" and

that of the "general-staff" of any civilized nation. History has seen

the latter interval bridged over: the former one can be bridged over

much more easily.

[1] Written for and first published by the Association for

International Conciliation (Leaflet No. 27) and also published in

_McClure's Magazine_, August, 1910, and _The Popular Science Monthly_,

October, 1910.

[2] "Justice and Liberty," N. Y., 1909.

[3] "First and Last Things," 1908, p. 215.

[4] "First and Last Things," 1908, p. 226.

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