A drouth in the wheat belt naturally causes an advance in the price of

flour. Past experience has proved this to be the case, and, furthermore,

the cause is adequate to produce the alleged effect. Nevertheless, a

lowering of the duty on wheat might permit wheat from foreign countries

to be imported in such quantities that there would be no rise in the

price of flour. The lowering of the duty on wheat would be another force

intervening to prevent the observed cause (the drouth in the wheat belt)

from producing the alleged effect (the rise in the price of flour).

Therefore we must always examine the circumstances of each case to

determine whether there are any forces at work which will prevent the

observed cause from producing the alleged effect.

_4. The conclusion established should be verified by positive evidence

wherever possible._

After all the other tests have been satisfied the argument from cause to

effect may be established or overthrown by the production of positive

evidence. A disappears and B is accused of his murder. A perfect case is

made out and B is convicted and sentenced to death. Then A suddenly

appears. The innocence of B is effectively established. Cases of this

kind are not unknown to the criminal law, though unfortunately the

missing man is usually discovered after his supposed murderer has been

put to death. This illustration suggests that too much care cannot be

exercised in substantiating an argument from cause to effect.

The argument from cause to effect is most frequently employed in

criminal trials. In such cases the motive for committing the crime is

regarded as the cause and the crime as the effect. The argument is

usually begun by proving the existence of strong motives such as an

abnormal desire to acquire more money or property, to work revenge on

bitter enemies, or to avert financial or domestic disaster. With these

strong motives shown it is easy to connect them with the crime. This is

the method of argument from cause to effect which is used by Daniel

Webster in the White murder trial. He showed clearly that the Knapps

believed that they could obtain the fortune of White by destroying his

last will and murdering him. He argued that this was the cause which

produced the effect of murder. The following extract from Webster’s

speech before the jury will show the application made of the argument

from cause to effect.

“When we look back, then, to the state of things immediately on the

discovery of the murder, we see that suspicion would naturally turn at

once, not to the heirs at law, but to those principally benefited by the

will. They, and they alone, would be supposed to have a direct object

for wishing Mr. White’s life terminated. And, strange as it may seem, we

find counsel now insisting, that, if no apology, it is yet mitigation of

the atrocity of the Knapps’ conduct in attempting to charge this foul

murder on Mr. White, the nephew and principal devisee, that public

suspicion was already so directed. As if assassination of character were

excusable in proportion as circumstances may render it easy. Their

endeavors, when they knew they were suspected themselves, to fix the

charge on others, by foul means and by falsehood, are fair and strong

proof of their own guilt.

“The counsel say that they might safely admit that Richard

Crowninshield, Jr., was the perpetrator of this murder.

“But how could they safely admit that? If that were admitted everything

else would follow. For why should Richard Crowninshield, Jr., kill Mr.

White? He was not his heir; nor was he his devisee; nor his enemy. What

could be his motive? If Richard Crowninshield, Jr., killed Mr. White he

did it at some one’s procurement who himself had a motive. And who

having any motive, is shown to have had any intercourse with Richard

Crowninshield, Jr., but Joseph Knapp and this principally through the

agency of the prisoner at the bar? It is the infirmity, the distressing

difficulty of the prisoner’s case, that his counsel cannot and dare not

admit what they yet cannot disprove, and what all must believe. He who

believes, on this evidence, that Richard Crowninshield, Jr., was the

immediate murderer cannot doubt that both the Knapps were conspirators

in that murder.”

=III. Argument from effect to effect.=

An argument from effect to effect is one in which an argument from

effect to cause is combined with an argument from cause to effect. To

illustrate this kind of argument we may explain a simple example

frequently used in this connection. A boy announces that there is

skating this morning because the thermometer registers below zero. Now

the thermometer registering below zero is not the cause of the skating.

Both the registering of the thermometer and the skating are the effects

of a common cause, viz.—low temperature. The boy has observed one of the

effects and at once concludes that the other effect must exist. His is

an argument from effect to effect, or to be more exact, an argument from

one effect of a cause to another effect of the same cause. The whole

process of reasoning involved as well as the relation between the two

parts of an argument from effect to effect may be represented by the

following tabulation:

_A. Argument from effect to cause._

1. All times when the thermometer registers below zero are times when

the temperature is far below freezing.

2. This is a time when the thermometer registers below zero.

3. Therefore this is a time when the temperature is far below freezing.

_B. Argument from cause to effect._

1. All times when the temperature is far below freezing are times when

skating ice is formed.

2. This is a time when the temperature is far below freezing.

3. Therefore this is a time when skating ice is formed.

The above analysis of the reasoning involved in an argument from effect

to effect will suggest the method of procedure to be employed in testing

its validity. The first step consists of dividing the argument into the

two essential processes employed, viz.—argument from effect to cause,

and argument from cause to effect. The second step consists of applying

the rules already considered in connection with each of these processes

to the parts revealed by the first step. In this way the validity of any

argument from effect to effect may be determined.

SUMMARY OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ARGUMENTS FROM CAUSAL RELATION

I. Arguments from Effect to Cause.

1. The alleged cause must be sufficient to produce the effect.

2. No other cause must have intervened between the alleged cause

and the effect.

3. The alleged cause must not have been prevented from operating.

II. Argument from Cause to Effect.

1. The observed cause must be sufficient to produce the alleged

effect.

2. When past experience is invoked it must show that the alleged

effect has always followed the observed cause.

3. No other force must intervene to prevent the observed cause

from operating to produce the alleged effect.

4. The conclusion established should be verified by positive

evidence wherever possible.

III. Argument from Effect to Effect.

1. The argument must be resolved into its two parts, the argument

from effect to cause, and the argument from cause to effect,

and the rules under I and II applied.

EXERCISES IN ARGUMENT FROM CAUSAL RELATION

I. State the kind of argument involved in each of the following

passages.

1. If a Socialist president is elected, financial disaster is sure

to overtake our country.

2. This has been the coldest winter ever known in the United

States. The rapid destruction of our forests is directly

responsible for this undesirable change of climate and we are

to reap still further evils from this same cause.

3. Since we have conclusive proof that the savages of the island

have murdered this missionary, we can no longer be in doubt as

to what became of his companions.

4. “Every word uttered by a speaker costs him some physical loss;

and in the strictest sense, he burns that others may have

light—so much eloquence, so much of his body resolved into

carbonic acid, water and urea.”—Huxley.

5. “The Constitution of the United States is so concise and so

general in its terms, that even had America been as slowly

moving a country as China, many questions must have arisen on

the interpretation of the fundamental law which would have

modified its aspect. But America has been the most swiftly

expanding of all countries. Hence the questions that have

presented themselves have often related to matters which the

framers of the Constitution could not have contemplated. Wiser

than Justinian before them or Napoleon after them, they foresaw

that their work would need to be elucidated by a judicial

commentary. But they were far from conjecturing the enormous

strain to which some of their expressions would be subjected in

the effort to apply them to new facts.”—Bryce.

6. “The last cause of this disobedient spirit in the colonies is

hardly less powerful than the rest, as it is not merely moral

but laid deep in the natural constitution of things. Three

thousand miles of ocean lie between you and them. No

contrivance can prevent the effect of this distance in

weakening government. Seas roll and months pass, between the

order and the execution; and the want of a speedy explanation

of a single point is enough to defeat a whole system.”—Burke.

7. “Permit me, Sir, to add another circumstance in our colonies,

which contributes no mean part towards the growth and effect of

this untractable spirit. I mean their education. In no country

perhaps in the world is the law so general a study. The

profession itself is numerous and powerful; and in most

provinces it takes the lead. The greater number of the deputies

sent to the Congress were lawyers. But all who read (and most

do read), endeavor to obtain some smattering in that science. I

have been told by an eminent bookseller, that in no branch of

his business, after tracts of popular devotion, were so many

books as those on the law exported to the plantations. The

colonists have now fallen into the way of printing them for

their own use. I hear that they have sold nearly as many of

Blackstone’s _Commentaries_ in America as in England. General

Gage marks out this disposition very particularly in a letter

on your table. He states that all the people in his government

are lawyers, or smatterers in the law; and that in Boston they

have been enabled, by successful chicane, wholly to evade many

parts of one of your capital penal constitutions. The smartness

of debate will say that this knowledge ought to teach them more

clearly the rights of legislature, their obligation to

obedience, and the penalties of rebellion. All this is mighty

well. But my honorable and learned friend on the floor, who

condescends to mark what I say for animadversion, will disdain

that ground. He has heard, as well as I, that when great honors

and great emoluments do not win over this knowledge to the

service of the State, it is a formidable adversary to

Government. If the spirit be not tamed and broken by these

happy methods, it is stubborn and litigious. _Abeunt studia in

mores._ This study renders men acute, inquisitive, dexterous,

prompt in attack, ready in defence, full of resources. In other

countries, the people, more simple, and of a less mercurial

cast, judge of an ill principle in government only by an actual

grievance; here they anticipate the evil, and judge of the

pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle. They

augur misgovernment at a distance; and snuff the approach of

tyranny in every tainted breeze.”—Burke.

II. Attach definite circumstances to each of the foregoing arguments

and then apply the requirements for validity to each one. State the

results.

III. Point out the kind of reasoning which may be employed in reaching

each of the following conclusions.

1. The record of our debating teams as compared with that of our

opponents shows that we shall win this debate.

2. Harold Small has been put on probation.

3. Under these conditions an inheritance tax should be levied.

4. International arbitration will ultimately take the place of war

as a method of settling disputes between nations.

IV. Analyze completely the reasoning processes employed in Exercise

III. Where they may be reduced to syllogistic form, determine the

validity of the resulting syllogisms.

V. Write an argument from causal relation in support of any

proposition which you wish to discuss. Employ each of the three

classes of argument from causal relation.

CHAPTER IV

ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

Analogy is such a resemblance between some of the known characteristics

of two different things as will lead to the conclusion that they are

alike in other characteristics. For example, an egg and a seed are two

different things but they have many characteristics in common. From the

characteristics in which we know that an egg is like a seed we reason

that they must be alike in other characteristics which we know one to

possess but which we do not know the other to possess. We know that heat

is required to develop an egg and by analogy we may conclude that heat

is required to develop a seed. In this, as in other forms of reasoning,

we proceed from the known to the unknown. The basis of inference is the

general resemblance which one thing bears to another thing. Experience

has led us to expect that when we find two different things alike in

many points we shall find them alike in many other points regarding

which no actual investigation has been made.

The argument applies the principle above suggested to the subject-matter

of the discussion. The standard illustration of this form of argument

usually quoted in books of logic and argumentation is found in Reid’s

_Intellectual Powers_. It is as follows:—

“We may observe a very great similitude between this earth which we

inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and

Mercury. They all revolve around the sun, as the earth does, although at

different distances and at different periods. They borrow all their

light from the sun, as the earth does. Several of them are known to

revolve on their axis like the earth, and by that means have like

succession of day and night. Some of them have moons that serve to give

them light in the absence of the sun, as our moon does to us. They are

all in their motions subject to the same law of gravitation as the earth

is. From all this similitude it is not unreasonable to think that these

planets may, like our earth, be the habitation of various orders of

living creatures. There is some probability in this conclusion from

analogy.”

Another frequently quoted illustration of the argument from analogy is

the reply of Abraham Lincoln to those who urged him to carry on the war

more vigorously.

“Gentlemen, I want you to suppose a case for a moment. Suppose that all

the property you were worth was in gold, and you had put it in the hands

of Blondin, the famous rope-walker, to carry across the Niagara Falls on

a tight rope. Would you shake the rope while he was passing over it, or

keep shouting to him, ‘Blondin, stoop a little more! Go a little

faster!’ No, I am sure you would not. You would hold your breath as well

as your tongue, and keep your hands off until he was safely over. Now

the government is in the same situation. It is carrying an immense

weight across a stormy ocean. Untold treasures are in its hands. It is

doing the best it can. Don’t badger it! Just keep still and it will get

you safely over.”

The argument from analogy is most effective when a comparison is made to

something that is plain, ordinary, and commonplace. In this way abstract

arguments may be made simple and concrete. No debater of modern times

has shown more discrimination in the use of material which would make an

analogy strong and convincing than has Lincoln. The strength of the

argument is greatly increased if it is apparent that the analogy is

perfect so far as the point at issue is concerned. In the following

quotation no exercise of the imagination is necessary to bring the two

factors of the analogy together. The argument is presented by David

Dudley Field in favor of the training of homeless children by the state.

“The question of safety is more vital still. Every one of these boys may

be a voter in ten or twenty years hence. His vote will then be as potent

as yours or mine. In countries where the sovereign is a prince it has

ever been thought prudent to bestow especial care upon the training of

an heir to the throne.—Here the people are sovereign, and the little

boy, now wandering about the streets, neglected or led astray, is in one

sense joint heir to the throne. Every dictate of prudence points to his

being fitted to fulfill the duties of his station.”

The foregoing examples with the accompanying explanations will serve to

make plain the meaning of argument from analogy and to suggest the

innumerable circumstances under which it may be used. Seldom is a

situation encountered in which an apt analogy cannot be employed. The

homelier the comparison, the more vivid and lasting will be the

impression conveyed, provided, of course, that the analogy is apt and

appropriate.

The search for an appropriate analogy is best begun by gaining a clear

conception of the universal principle upon which the proposition is

based. The student must be able to see the broadest application of the

reason which he offers in support of any particular contention. Having

grasped this fundamental principle it is easy to see its application in

other things of a more tangible form and which are more familiar to the

average mind. For example, Lincoln saw that it would not do to pursue

the Civil War too vigorously. He realized that the government was in a

very perilous position, that every step must be taken with care and

deliberation and that the least disturbance from those whose interests

were at stake might mean failure and the loss of everything. This was

the principle underlying the situation which he was facing. Now, he must

make this situation plain and its gravity clear to those who were

demanding that he hasten the progress of the war. Therefore he began

looking for the application of this principle in something which was

more familiar and more real and tangible. The newspapers had been full

of the wonderful feats of Blondin, the rope-walker. In this circumstance

Lincoln saw an opportunity to give a tangible exhibition of the

application of the principle under which he was acting.

The argument from analogy which he constructed is a model of

completeness. He compared abstract things which could not be seen and

appreciated with tangible things which could be seen and appreciated. He

compared the Government to Blondin. Blondin, walking on a rope across

Niagara Falls, was in a very dangerous position where it was necessary

that he move slowly and cautiously because the least misstep would dash

him to destruction. The situation of the government was analogous. It

was engaged in a very dangerous undertaking, a great civil war. It had

to move slowly and cautiously because the least misstep would mean

destruction. In order to make the analogy more complete Lincoln supposed

the case of Blondin performing this feat carrying with him all the

worldly possessions of the men who were urging that the war be pushed

more vigorously. The government was carrying out the dearest desire of

the people, the patriotic desire to save the grandest of all nations. If

the government failed it would mean the blighting of their dearest hopes

and to many it would mean financial ruin. Therefore the analogy was

complete in that particular. Now these men were here in Washington doing

the same thing to the government that they would be doing if, under the

above circumstances, they shook the rope or scolded Blondin while he was

walking across Niagara Falls. The forcibleness of the analogy and the

vividness of the impression which it conveyed was an argument powerful

enough to silence those who were demanding more aggressive action on the

part of the government.

An argument from analogy is never conclusive proof of the truth or

falsity of a proposition. At best it creates only a high degree of

probability. Its greatest use is to give force and vividness to an

argument already established by other means. Nevertheless, its probative

value is great provided it is properly constructed. The chance for

error, however, is a constant source of danger to him who relies upon

analogy, for the very facts upon which it is based may constitute the

reason for its falsity. A large oil refining company was recently

organized. People were induced to buy stock in the new enterprise by

means of argument from analogy. It was argued that this company was

similar to the Standard Oil Company. Now it is well known that the

Standard Oil Company pays large dividends. The argument was advanced by

the promoters of the new organization that since it was similar to the

Standard Oil Company and since the latter corporation pays large

dividends, therefore the new corporation would pay large dividends. The

analogy, of course, proved untrustworthy. The companies, though similar

in many ways, were entirely different in one essential particular

effecting the conclusion: the old company had entirely monopolized the

field of activity, while the new company had no territory in which to

work. Thus a false analogy led to the loss of many thousands of dollars.

Instances of unsound arguments from analogy might be multiplied

indefinitely. It is therefore evident that certain requirements exist

which must be strictly complied with if the argument from analogy is to

prove effective. The requirements necessary for a valid argument from

analogy are as follows:

I. The two factors in the analogy must be alike in all particulars which

affect the conclusion.

The two factors in the analogy are the thing about which the analogy is

made and the thing to which it is compared. For example, in the argument

from analogy which we have quoted from Lincoln, the first factor is the

position of the government during the Civil War and the second factor is

the rope-walker. The former is the thing about which the argument is

made; the latter is the thing to which the first factor is compared.

These two parts exist in every argument from analogy and the first

requirement is that they agree in everything which affects the

conclusion. The conclusion Lincoln wished to establish was that the

government must not be disturbed in its action because it was in a

dangerous position. A rope-walker crossing Niagara Falls must not be

disturbed because he is in a dangerous position. These are the facts

which affect the conclusion in each case. The two factors are alike in

this particular.

From the above example it will be seen that the two factors must agree

in the essential particulars. What is essential depends upon the nature

of the conclusion to be reached. In particulars affecting things other

than the conclusion to be established, it matters not whether they agree

or disagree. In comparing an illegal private monopoly to a highwayman

the particular method of robbing the victim is immaterial. The fact that

the two methods are not exactly alike does not weaken the force of the

analogy.

Burke made use of the argument from analogy in defending the policy of

conciliation which he favored. After urging that the colonies be granted

representation in Parliament, he declared that so far as government was

concerned there were four similar cases,—Ireland, Wales, Chester, and

Durham. He urged that the acts of Parliament with regard to these

territories be applied to America. He then proceeded to show that the

analogy was sound by pointing out that the two factors agreed in all

particulars which affected the conclusion. He said,

“Are not the people of America as much Englishmen as the Welsh? The

preamble of the Act of Henry the Eighth says the Welsh speak a language

no way resembling that of his Majesty’s English subjects. Are the

Americans not as numerous? If we may trust the learned and accurate

Judge Barrington’s account of North Wales, and take that as a standard

to measure the rest there is no comparison. The people cannot amount to

above 200,000, not a tenth part of the number in the colonies. Is

America in rebellion? Wales was hardly ever free from it. Have you

attempted to govern America by penal statutes? You made fifteen for

Wales. But your legislative authority is perfect with regard to America.

Was it less perfect in Wales, Chester, and Durham? But America is

virtually represented. What! does the electric force of virtual

representation more easily pass over the Atlantic than pervade Wales,

which lies in your neighborhood—or than Chester and Durham, surrounded

by an abundance of representation that is actual and palpable? But, Sir,

your ancestors thought this sort of virtual representation, however

complete, to be totally insufficient for the freedom of inhabitants of

territories that are so near and comparatively so inconsiderable. How

then can I think it sufficient for those which are infinitely greater

and infinitely more remote?”

It will be observed that there is a slight difference in the analogy

here employed and the one of which Lincoln made use. In the latter the

factors are entirely unlike, in the former they are similar. In all

analogies similar to that employed by Burke the points of similarity in

the two factors must be clearly shown to bear directly upon the

conclusion, whereas if any points of difference exist they must be shown

to have no vital bearing on the question at issue.

A failure to observe this application of the rule was made by a student

who argued that because an income tax had worked well in other countries

it would work well in the United States. His opponent pointed out the

unsoundness of the analogy by showing that the income tax proposed for

the United States was a progressive tax, whereas the income tax in the

foreign countries cited was not a progressive tax. He further revealed

the falsity of the analogy by showing that the proposed income tax for

the United States was to be levied by the national or Federal

government, whereas the income tax in the foreign countries cited was

levied by the states or smaller governmental units of those countries.

The analogy was shown to be false in that the two factors did not agree

in all particulars affecting the conclusion because (1) in one factor

the tax was progressive while in the other it was not, and (2) in one

factor the tax was levied by the national government and in the other it

was not.

The argument from analogy can be made stronger if it is shown that what

is true of the analogous case is much more likely to be true and to be

true in a greater degree, of the case in dispute. The example of analogy

quoted from Burke shows this phase of the process. Some writers call

this process an intensification of the argument from analogy. In logic

it is _a fortiori_ reasoning. The Scriptures abound in this kind of

argument, such as “Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of

them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. Fear ye not

therefore; ye are of more value than many sparrows.” Another passage

illustrating the intensification of the argument from analogy is,

“Consider the ravens; for they neither sow nor reap; which neither have

storehouse nor barn; and God feedeth them; how much more are ye better

than the fowls?”

In a debate on the proposition, “Resolved, that courses of instruction

in the care and training of children should form a part of the

curriculum of every college and university,” a speaker for the

affirmative developed an analogy based upon the similarity between such

a course and the practical courses in the College of Agriculture on the

raising of live stock. He then gave force to his analogy by suggesting

that if it were worth while to give college courses dealing with the

raising of colts, calves, and pigs, it certainly would be much more

worth while to give courses dealing with the raising of children.

=II. The alleged facts upon which the analogy is based must be true.=

The facts alleged to be true in regard to each of the factors in the

analogy must be true as a matter of fact. A deviation from the truth in

either factor will invalidate the conclusion. In arguing in favor of the

municipal ownership and operation of the street railway system in an

eastern city a debater declared that the proposed plan would be

successful because it had been tried in Chicago with great success. He

then spent much time in showing that so far as street railway ownership

was concerned conditions in the two cities were exactly alike. This

argument from analogy, however, was promptly overthrown by the next

speaker, who introduced evidence which proved that the city of Chicago

did not own its street railway system. The analogy was unsound because

one of the alleged facts upon which it was based was not true.

The above example illustrates one of the chief sources of error in the

use of this class of argument. The student must be constantly on his

guard when inspecting his own work and that of his opponent. The

argument from analogy demands extensive and accurate knowledge of both

the factors involved and the result is almost always in favor of him

whose knowledge of the subject-matter is the most comprehensive. The

temptation to color the facts in order to fit the analogy is sometimes

great and to refrain from deceiving one’s self as well as one’s hearers

requires a high degree of intellectual honesty. In no other form of

argument is the demand for absolute impartiality more imperative. An

analogy which extends beyond the sound foundation of real facts is a

constant source of danger both for him who proposes it and for him who

receives it. All the alleged facts upon which this kind of argument is

based must be true.

III. The conclusion established by analogy should be verified by

positive evidence whenever possible.

The suggestion has already been made that no matter how perfect an

analogy may be, it can never amount to absolute proof. At its best

analogy creates only a high degree of probability. In order to

strengthen the conclusion a diligent search should be made for other

lines of reasoning which will fortify it. One of the most important uses

to which analogy may be put is to suggest possible conclusions which may

be substantiated by other processes of reasoning, as induction,

deduction, or causal relation. If two or more lines of reasoning can be

made to support the same conclusion the probability of its truth is

greatly strengthened; hence its argumentative value is increased. Where

all available processes of reasoning may be made to establish one

conclusion the probability of its truth is so strengthened that it

amounts to moral certainty, but no cumulation of probabilities can ever

amount to absolute certainty.

The fact that analogy must be substantiated by other processes of

reasoning should not lead the student to underestimate its importance.

The examples and explanations which have been given should lead him to

appreciate fully the fact that analogy has two well defined uses aside

from its value as proof of the truth or falsity of a conclusion. In the

first place it is a most important agency in suggesting conclusions

which may be verified or discredited by other processes of reasoning. In

the second place it affords a most valuable method of stating a case so

plainly that even the most ignorant may understand. A striking analogy

makes a most vivid impression on the mind and is retained long after

more formal processes of reasoning are forgotten.

SUMMARY OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY

I. The two factors in the analogy must be alike in all particulars

which affect the conclusion.

II. The alleged facts upon which the analogy is based must be true.

III. The conclusion established by analogy should whenever possible be

verified by positive evidence.

EXERCISES IN ANALOGY

I. Apply the requirements for validity to each of the arguments from

analogy quoted in this last chapter.

II. Suggest arguments from analogy in support of each of the following

conclusions:

1. College students should be allowed to select their own courses

of study.

2. A course in public speaking is a necessity for those who expect

to teach.

3. The greatest moral strength is fostered among many temptations.

4. An inheritance tax is an exceedingly just method of taxation.

5. All colleges should be coëducational.

6. Military drill should be compulsory for all college freshmen.

7. The use of clear and correct English is a prerequisite to

success in any profession.

III. Write an argument from analogy in support of one of the

propositions given in the appendix.

CHAPTER V

FALLACIES

A fallacy is an error in the argumentative process. It may arise from a

mistake in the process of reasoning or from a mistake regarding the

facts upon which the reasoning is based. The task of detecting and

eliminating fallacies in his own argument and of detecting and exposing

fallacies in the argument of his opponent is one of the most important

phases of a debater’s work.

Self-evident fallacies are few. A fallacy is almost always concealed

under cover of language which makes it appear in the guise of valid

reasoning. It is usually embedded in an otherwise sound argumentative

structure. To detect and to separate it from that which is entirely

trustworthy is one of the severest tests of argumentative skill. Just as

in a mathematical computation one wrong figure will invalidate the

accuracy of the result though all the other figures be correct, so will

one false statement in an argument produce the same disastrous effect. A

fallacy may occupy but a very small part of the argument and yet be

fatal to the solidity of the entire structure. It may consist of only

one sentence in several pages of printed matter. It may be but a single

statement which makes an unwarranted transition or assumption.

Nevertheless it is as fatal to the argument as though it comprised a

greater part of the entire discussion.

While an opponent may cover up a fallacy with the deliberate intention

to deceive, yet the existence of most fallacies is not suspected by

those who use them. Therefore the use of fallacious arguments is seldom

evidence of dishonesty but is almost always the result of careless

reasoning or inability to detect and remedy such errors. To classify

fallacies into groups for the purpose of discussion is a most difficult

undertaking. Any division that can be made will not prove all inclusive

and all exclusive in practical application. Hard and fast divisions are

sure to overlap, and a particular fallacy may be treated under one

division or another according to the standpoint of the student and the

combination of circumstances under which it exists. For the purpose of

this discussion we shall divide fallacies according to the kind of

argument in which they occur and according to the form in which they are

usually found. This method of division will best serve our practical

object, which is the detecting and eliminating of fallacies.

=I. Fallacies of Induction.=

In a perfect induction a fallacy may be detected by scrutinizing the

conclusion to make sure that it includes only the specific instances

upon which it is based, and then examining each of these specific

instances to see that it is true as a matter of fact. If the conclusion

includes more than the facts warrant or if the alleged facts are false

the perfect induction is fallacious.

In searching for fallacies in an imperfect induction the rules which

have already been pointed out as governing the construction of such an

inductive argument should be applied. In order to make a systematic

search for fallacies in arguments involving this kind of reasoning, the

following steps should be taken.

_1. The number of specific instances relied upon to support the

inductive conclusion should be determined._

It is comparatively easy to determine the number of incidents claimed to

support the conclusion, provided they are all stated in the argument. In

such a case the searcher for fallacies merely counts these incidents and

passes on to the next step in his investigation. Seldom, however, is the

task so easy. In most arguments the writer or speaker extends his

conclusion far beyond the actual facts offered in its support. Often the

speaker states that “hundreds of other cases,” or “incidents too

numerous to mention,” or “thousands of similar cases,” etc., can be

produced to show the validity of the induction. The debater should never

be overawed by such sweeping statements or allow them to cause him to

cease his search for fallacies. He must be insistent in his demand that

the number of incidents upon which the conclusion is based be exactly

stated or at least that the number be shown as large enough to offset

the probability of coincidence. _The fallacy of the induction can then

be shown to exist by pointing out that the number of incidents in

support of the induction is not sufficiently great to warrant its

acceptance._

_2. The class of persons, events, or things about which the induction is

made should be scrutinized with a view to determining whether it is

homogeneous._

The discussion of this requirement for a valid imperfect induction which

has been previously given will make plain the nature of the

investigation under it. A fallacy may be exposed in such an argument by

showing that _the class of persons, events, or things about which the

induction is made is not homogeneous in respect to the particular about

which the conclusion is stated._

_3. Whether or not the specific instances cited in support of the

conclusion are fair examples should be determined._

It is usually easier to detect unfair examples in an opponent’s argument

than in one of the debater’s own construction. The person who uses an

induction is almost always prejudiced in favor of the instances which

support it, but to the unprejudiced mind the fairness of a given example

is not hard to determine. It is therefore important that the

investigator assume an unprejudiced attitude towards the examples

offered as representative of the class about which the induction is

made. _The existence of a fallacy in an argument based upon an imperfect

induction may be repealed by showing that the specific instances cited

in support of the conclusion are not fair examples._

_4. A search should be made for exceptions to the rule stated by the

induction._

One of the most effective ways to overthrow a generalization is to

present exceptions. Even the existence of one exception will greatly

weaken the effect of a conclusion, while several exceptions, clearly

established, will entirely destroy it. To prove the existence of more

exceptions to the rule than there are instances supporting it is to

prove it entirely fallacious. The search for exceptions should be made

by the same means employed in finding instances to support the

induction. _The fallacy of an induction may be shown by proving the

existence of exceptions to the rule which it states._

_5. The induction should be examined with a view to determining its

reasonableness._

An induction which appears on its face to be contrary to usual

experience is not an effective instrument of persuasion. By showing that

it is contrary to natural law or that no process of reasoning other than

induction can be made to uphold it, the student may weaken its force. If

clear proof of its validity can be established in this way it is not

necessary that other methods of showing a fallacy be introduced. _The

fallacy of an induction may be established by clear proof of its

unreasonableness._

=II. Fallacies of deduction.=

A thorough study of the chapter on Deductive Argument has revealed the

fact that such an argument in order to be valid must be constructed

according to certain definite principles. The knowledge of these

principles thus acquired should enable the student to detect fallacies

in this form of argument. Nevertheless, some of the fallacies to which

deduction is liable are so important and so easily concealed that a

separate treatment of them is necessary. Fallacies of deduction may be

divided into two classes, 1. Material fallacies, and 2. Logical

fallacies.

_1. Material Fallacies._

We have already learned that the deductive argument is seldom found in

the form of a syllogism but is mostly encountered in the form of an

enthymeme, which must be reduced to the syllogistic form. The method of

reduction has been explained in the chapter on Deductive Argument and

exercises in the use of that method have been given. It is therefore

assumed that the student is so familiar with this process that he can

readily reduce any argument to the syllogistic form. In the search for

fallacies we may begin at this point. After the argument has been

reduced to syllogistic form our first task is to examine the major and

minor premises for the purpose of discovering any material error, or

error of fact. In constructing our own argument we have been cautioned

to see to it that both of these statements in the syllogism are true.

Now we are examining our own arguments or our opponents’ arguments for

the very purpose of finding out whether they contain any error. A

sophomore urges John Pitt to come out for the class football team by

saying that all sophomores ought to be candidates for places on the

team. Reduced to the syllogistic form the argument would stand as

follows:

1. All sophomores ought to be candidates for the class football team.

2. John Pitt is a sophomore.

3. Therefore John Pitt ought to be a candidate for the class football

team.

Upon examining the major premise we find that it is not true as a matter

of fact, because it is obvious that one who is not physically capable of

taking part in such a game ought not to do so even though he is a

sophomore. The deduction is therefore fallacious. But suppose the major

premise to be sound, the next step in the search for fallacies would be

to examine the minor premise and find out whether it is true as a matter

of fact. An examination of this premise may disclose the fact that John

Pitt is a junior. The deduction is therefore fallacious, because the

minor premise is not true as a matter of fact. _A fallacy in a deductive

argument may be exposed by showing that either the major premise or the

minor premise is not true as a matter of fact._

_2. Logical fallacies._

We now come to the class of fallacies which inhere in deductive

reasoning independent of the truth or falsity of the alleged facts

contained in the premises. These are called logical fallacies. They

consist of many forms of error in reasoning, but we shall concern

ourselves only with those most likely to be encountered. These are four

in number, (1) The undistributed middle, (2) The illicit process, (3)

Irrelevancy of premises, or ignoring the question, and (4) Begging the

question.

(1). _The undistributed middle._

One of the most common errors of deductive argument is called the

fallacy of the undistributed middle. It consists of a defect in the

major premise. This defect is the failure of the major term to include

the middle term. The following syllogism is a typical illustration of

this error:

1. Some college men are successful in business.

2. Henry Winslow is a college man.

3. Therefore Henry Winslow is successful in business.

The student will observe that the major term, “men who are successful in

business,” does not include the middle term, “college men,” but only

includes a part of that class of men. This is true because the middle

term reads “Some college men.” Therefore it is evident that there are

some college men who are not successful in business as well as some who

are. To represent this defect graphically the device of circles employed

in discussing the construction of valid deductions may again be used.

The result is as follows:

[Illustration]

It is thus made plain that some college men are within the class of

those who are successful in business, while some college men are not

within that class. Now, all that we know about Henry Winslow is that he

is a college man. Therefore we cannot tell whether he belongs to that

part of the class of college men who are successful in business, or to

that part of the class of college men which is not included in the class

of men who are successful in business. We may represent the complete

fallacy as follows:

[Illustration]

[Illustration]

In order to eliminate the logical fallacy contained in the foregoing

syllogism it would be necessary to include the middle term in the major

term of the major premise. The relation of the terms of the major

premise would then be represented by the diagram above.

The completed syllogism would then read as follows:

1. All college men are successful in business.

2. Henry Winslow is a college man.

3. Therefore Henry Winslow is successful in business.

The student must not delude himself with the false impression that he

has remedied the defect and that the syllogism may therefore be used as

the basis of a sound argument. On the contrary he must now treat the

result of his efforts as a new syllogism and begin the search for

fallacies all over again. The first step in this process, as we have

already seen, is to inquire into the truth of the facts contained in the

premises. Let us first examine the major premise. Is it true that all

college men are successful in business? A little investigation and

reflection will prove that it is not. Therefore the argument is still as

fallacious as it was in the beginning. We have merely changed the

logical fallacy into a material fallacy. The result of our investigation

has been to disclose the fallacy of an enthymeme which reads, “Henry

Winslow is successful in business because he is a college man.”

Another form in which the fallacy of the undistributed middle appears in

a manner less easy to detect is shown by the following syllogism:

1. All orators are men of great ability.

2. Herbert Lang is a man of great ability.

3. Therefore Herbert Lang is an orator.

Each of the premises in the above syllogism may be perfectly true as a

matter of fact, but it is obvious that there is something wrong with the

syllogism as a whole. The nature of the defect is not apparent until we

begin to apply the rules for constructing a valid syllogism. This

reveals the fact that instead of the major term including the middle

term, the middle includes the major. If we diagram the major premise by

the system of circles previously employed the following result is

obtained:

[Illustration]

If the conclusion to be established had been that Herbert Lang is a man

of great ability and the minor premise had stated that Herbert Lang was

an orator then the major premise as outlined above would have been

perfectly valid. But the conclusion that Herbert Lang is an orator does

not follow from the fact that he is a man of great ability and that all

orators are men of great ability. The only fact that we can draw from

these statements is that some men of great ability are orators. Because

we say that all orators are men of great ability we cannot be sure of

the converse, that is, that all men of great ability are orators. Only

some of them are orators, others may be ministers, doctors, lawyers, or

business men. Therefore all that we can conclude is that, “Some men of

great ability are orators.” It is now plain that when we construct the

completed syllogism from this major premise, the same defect will exist

which was revealed in the preceding illustration.

1. Some men of great ability are orators.

2. Herbert Lang is a man of great ability.

3. Therefore Herbert Lang is an orator.

By examining the facts expressed in the invalid syllogism we have found

that the fallacy consists of an undistributed middle term. This fallacy

becomes obvious in some propositions in which the conclusion shows the

absurdity of the reasoning process. If we could maintain that Herbert

Lang is an orator because he is a man of great ability and all orators

are men of great ability, we could argue with equal reason that he is a

ground hog because he is an animal and all ground hogs are animals.

(2). _The illicit process._

The illicit process of either the major or minor term in the syllogism

consists of one of these terms appearing in the conclusion in a form

essentially different from that in which it appeared in the major or

minor premises. In this fallacy the major term which is in the

affirmative form in the major premise becomes negative in the

conclusion. The following fallacious syllogism illustrates this error:

1. All football men are strong.

2. Amos Buck is not a football man.

3. Therefore Amos Buck is not strong.

The fallacy is evident; the class of football men does not include all

the strong men. There are some men who are not football men that are

strong. The fact that Amos Buck is not included in the class of football

men does not prove that he is not included in the larger class of strong

men. To be more concrete let us again make use of the diagrams.

From the diagram on page 245 it is seen that the fact that all football

men are strong and that Amos Buck is not a football man, does not prove

anything regarding his strength. He may be within the class of strong

men or he may be outside. Hence the syllogism is fallacious. Usually the

fallacy is not so apparent as in the above illustration but by reducing

the statements to syllogistic form in the manner indicated above the

error becomes apparent.

The minor term in a syllogism sometimes appears in the minor premise as

undistributed or particular and then appears in the conclusion as

distributed or universal. This is another form of the illicit process.

The same result follows when the minor term becomes either larger or

smaller or in any way different in the conclusion from what it was in

the minor premise. For example, a business man says, “I will not send my

son to college because some college men are ‘sports’ and I detest

‘sports’.” This error in reasoning results from the failure to phrase

each term in the same form throughout the syllogism. A scrutiny of the

terms of the syllogism will therefore reveal the presence of this

fallacy.

[Illustration]

(3). _Irrelevancy of the premises, or ignoring the question._

This fallacy consists in ignoring the conclusion to be established and

arguing toward some other conclusion. In logic it is called _ignoratio

elenchi_. It is a very important fallacy, because no error is more

common than that of wandering from the real point at issue and

discussing some related but irrelevant matter. The error may arise from

a deliberate attempt on the part of the speaker to deceive his hearers

by taking their attention from the real point at issue, from a failure

to analyze the question properly, or from inability to reason correctly.

In discussing this fallacy the first step is to analyze the argument in

its relation to the point to be proved. It should be reduced to the

syllogistic form, and the irrelevancy between the premises and the

conclusion should be made plain. After the premises are found it becomes

an easy task to determine whether they establish the right conclusion or

some other conclusion.

There are certain ways in which the question may be ignored that are so

common that they demand special attention. Of these the most important

are the following:

_A. The appeal to passion, prejudice, or humor._

Very often the speaker, instead of refuting the arguments of his

opponent, will attempt to cast ridicule upon them and thus by humorous

treatment divert attention from the real point at issue. Very often the

appeal is made to the passion or prejudice of the persons addressed

instead of to their reason.

_B. The personal attack upon an opponent._

A favorite method of the old time lawyer was to “bullyrag” his opponent

in a law suit and thus merge the case at issue into a personal conflict

with the opposing counsel. While this practice has long ago disappeared

from the court room it is very often encountered in other places. A

speaker who has a weak case will sometimes attack the personal character

of his opponent and thus seek to change the issue from a debate on the

proposition to a wrangle over the personal virtues of the participants.

_C. The personal attack upon the person or persons concerned in the

controversy._

We argue beside the point when we infer from the moral character,

position, or conduct of an individual, the truth or falsity of a

particular proposition. If the question is whether or not John Jones

killed John Smith, we make no progress by showing that John Jones

cheated John Doe out of his farm. If we are told that a certain person

advocates prohibition it is no refutation of his arguments to call

attention to the fact that he is a drunkard. The _validity_ of a

drunkard’s arguments in favor of prohibition are not affected by his

conduct, although their influence upon other persons would doubtless be

greatly affected by it. We always argue beside the point when we attempt

to defend or condemn a principle by praising or condemning the person

who advocates it. Neither can we establish the guilt or innocence of an

accused person by praising or condemning traits of his character which

have nothing to do with the charges against him.

_D. The appeal to customs and tradition._

The popular appeal to “let well enough alone,” “what has been should

be,” and other conservative arguments of this class entirely ignore the

question at issue. If the world had followed these precepts we should be

no farther advanced to-day than at the beginning of time. To follow them

now would mean that all progress must cease. A hundred years ago no

argument could have convinced the average individual that man would be

able to travel a mile a minute or that one man could hear another talk

at a distance of one thousand miles, or that a machine could be made

which would talk. Twenty years ago few people could have been convinced

that one could see through solid matter or that a man could fly, or that

a wireless telegraph was a possibility. Nevertheless all of these

seemingly impossible things have come to pass. Similar things are

constantly happening in the less material world of education, politics,

and religion. Therefore small weight attaches to the argument which

relies solely upon an appeal to custom and tradition.

_E. Shifting ground._

This fallacy usually arises from using a word in a double capacity. For

instance, “Every American citizen should be democratic in his conduct;

therefore he should vote the Democratic ticket,” is an example of this

fallacy. Here the term democratic is used in more than one sense. It is

first used to indicate an attitude of kindly sympathy towards one’s

fellow men; then it is used to designate a political party. Likewise we

might argue in an equally fallacious manner that because this country is

a republic, every man should vote the Republican ticket. The cause of

this fallacy is usually a failure on the part of the arguer to define

exactly his own position and to state the meaning of vital words used in

the proposition. An unscrupulous debater will take advantage of this

fallacy as soon as he is cornered by shifting to a different meaning of

the words employed. Whenever a debater begins to prove one proposition

and ends by upholding another proposition he has shifted ground. This

fallacy is usually so concealed in a maze of words that its detection is

difficult.

_F. Refuting an argument which has not been advanced._

This form of ignoring the question may arise from a deliberate attempt

to misrepresent the opposition or from an honest mistake as to just what

argument has been advanced. In either case it ignores the question at

issue and is a useless expenditure of time and effort. Sometimes a

debater cannot refute the arguments advanced by his opponents and he

therefore seeks to occupy his time by arguing against contentions which

he thought would be advanced but which in reality have not been

mentioned. It is far better not to argue at all than to ignore the real

points at issue in this manner.

_G. Arguing on a related proposition._

This is a very common way of ignoring the question. For example, in

support of prohibition, a debater often proves that temperance is a

benefit to the community. The real question is whether prohibition is

advisable as a means of dealing with the liquor traffic. The question as

to whether temperance benefits the community is only related. Therefore

to argue in support of the related question is to ignore the real one.

In a debate on the proposition “Resolved, that the compulsory

arbitration of strikes is practicable in the United States” the

affirmative devoted its efforts to proving that the system would be of

great advantage to the country and that it had worked well in New

Zealand. The question, whether compulsory arbitration is practicable in

the United States, was entirely ignored by its advocates arguing in

support of two related propositions which might be stated as follows:

“Resolved, that the compulsory arbitration of strikes would be of great

advantage to the United States,” and “Resolved, that compulsory

arbitration of strikes has worked well in New Zealand.” The real

question at issue was entirely ignored.

(4). _Begging the question._

To beg the question is to assume its truth or falsity without proof.

This does not mean a direct assumption of truth or falsity but an

indirect assumption reached in a circuitous manner by an appearance of

logical reasoning. In logic this error is called _petitio principi_. It

may appear in many different forms but the following are the most

frequently encountered:

_A. Arguing in a circle._

This error involves more than one syllogism. It begins by assuming the

truth of a premise, next upon this premise a conclusion is built and

then finally this very conclusion is used in an attempt to prove the

premise with which the syllogism was begun. For example, a student is

urged to take the course in corporation law in the Harvard Law School

because it is the best in the country. When the student inquires why it

is the best in the country he is told that it is the best because it is

given in the Harvard Law School. In other words no reason is given but

the statement stripped of its semblance of reasoning is merely that the

Harvard Law School is the best because it is the best.

An excellent example showing the refutation of a circular argument is

found in Percival and Jelliffe’s _Specimens of Exposition and Argument_.

It is taken from the argument of Felix Adler against the evils of child

labor in the United States.

“There is one other argument so un-American and so inhuman that I am

almost ashamed to quote it, and yet it has been used, and I fear is

secretly in the minds of some who would not openly stand for it. A

manufacturer standing near the furnace of a glasshouse and pointing to a

procession of young Slav boys who were carrying the glass on trays,

remarked ‘Look at their faces, and you will see that it is idle to take

them from the glasshouse in order to give them an education; they are

what they are, and will always remain what they are.’ He meant that

there are some human beings—and these Slavs of the number—who are

mentally irredeemable, so fast asleep intellectually that they cannot be

awakened; designed by nature, therefore, to be hewers of wood and

drawers of water. This cruel and wicked thing was said of Slavs; it is

the same thing which has been said from time immemorial by the slave

owners of their slaves. First they degrade human beings by denying them

opportunity to develop their better nature; no schools, no teaching, no

freedom, no outlook; and then, as if in mockery, they point to the

degraded condition of their victims as a reason why they should never be

allowed to escape from it.”

_B. Directly assuming the point at issue._

In directly assuming the truth of the point at issue much language is

employed which tends to conceal the lack of real proof. Stripped of

their wealth of expression such so-called arguments appear as bare

unsupported assertions. The following is a good example of this fallacy:

“Up to the time when the crime was committed, the character of the

prisoner was above reproach, for his conduct was always characterized by

honest respect for law and order.”

Often a single word may directly assume the truth or falsity of the

proposition under discussion. In opposing the proposition “Resolved,

that the boycott is a proper policy for organized labor,” the first

speaker began by saying, “It is our purpose to prove that the _wicked

and pernicious_ system of boycotting is not a proper policy for

organized labor.” This statement begged the whole proposition by

assuming at the outset that boycotting is _wicked and pernicious_. A

subsequent speaker committed the same fallacy by saying, “We contend

that there are ways by which organized labor can accomplish its purpose

that are—unlike the boycott—legitimate and proper.” In some cases such

question-begging words as those employed above are used in defining the

terms of the proposition. This manner of defining terms begs the

question as effectively and directly as any of the other fallacious

practices discussed under this heading.

_C. Indirectly assuming the point at issue._

One of the most common ways of begging the question is to assume the

truth of a broad general proposition which includes the one under

discussion. This does not directly assume the truth of the proposition,

but does it indirectly. For instance, a student declared that “Our

football team will win the championship, because the captain of the team

says we cannot lose it.” This begs the point at issue, namely—whether

our team will win the championship, by assuming the truth of a broader

proposition, namely—that whatever the captain of the team says is true.

The same result follows the assumption of particular truths which the

proposition involves. In supporting the proposition, “Resolved, that the

state should prescribe uniform text-books for the public schools” a

student attempted to prove that public instruction should be uniform

throughout the state. He thus assumed that uniform text-books would

secure uniform public instruction throughout the state. This was a

particular proposition involved in the main proposition, and it was the

duty of the debater to show that uniform text-books would bring about

uniform public instruction.

III. Fallacies of causal relation.

We have already considered the importance of causal relation in

argumentation. A relation clearly established between a cause and an

effect affords a substantial basis for valid reasoning. The failure to

establish such relation results in error. Of course the causal relation

may exist although undiscovered. Nevertheless, the failure to show such

relation should always be considered as a warning to look out for

fallacies.

_1. Fallacies of the argument from effect to cause._

The argument from effect to cause may be shown to contain a fallacy by

proving any one of the following contentions:

1. That the alleged cause was not sufficient to produce the effect.

2. That an independent cause intervened between the alleged cause and

the effect.

3. That the alleged cause was prevented from operating.

In arguing from a known effect to an unknown cause certain fallacies

occur with such frequency that we must give them special attention. Of

these common errors the following are the most important:

(1). _Mistaking coincidence for cause._

Most superstitions are due to this fallacy of mistaking coincidence for

cause. A black cat crosses our path as we are starting out on a journey.

If some misfortune overtakes us before our return our minds immediately

revert to the old superstition that if a black cat crosses our path we

must turn back and make a fresh start if we wish to ward off disaster.

The black cat is regarded by the superstitious as the cause of the

disaster. Obviously there is no causal relation between the appearance

of the black cat and the occurrence of the disaster. It is merely a

coincidence. If we regard it in any other light we are mistaking

coincidence for cause.

Political campaign oratory abounds in this kind of fallacy. One

political party comes into power and a period of industrial prosperity

follows. The party leaders point to their administration as the cause of

the prosperity. On the other hand if a period of depression follows the

election, the opponents of the successful party point to it as the cause

of the disaster. Seldom in such cases is any real causal relation

established. It is more often merely coincidence.

No fallacy is more inexcusable than that which asserts a mere prior

occurrence as a cause. Because it rained last Sunday and to-day I lose

my pocketbook is no reason why I should maintain that last Sunday’s rain

was the cause of my loss. Yet many arguments are advanced based upon a

lack of causal relation as evident as that of the above coincidence. In

an inter-class debate one of the speakers maintained that the large

number of Chinese in a certain city was the cause of the greater amount

of crime which existed in that city as compared with other cities of the

same size. No causal relation was established, but the mere fact of the

presence of the Chinese was set forth as proof that the Chinese were

responsible for the crime. One of the critics of the debate pointed out

that it was just as reasonable to suppose that the unusually cold

weather of the winter just passed was caused by the large number of

Congregationalists in the state.

Even when two events are repeatedly associated so far as time is

concerned we should not regard the repetition as proof of the causal

relation but only as an indication that a causal relation probably

exists. We should not arrive at any definite conclusion until the

existence of the causal relation has been finally established.

(2). _Mistaking an effect for a cause._

The fallacy of mistaking an effect for a cause consists in pointing to

one effect as the cause of another effect when in reality both effects

are the result of one cause. For example, a recent writer attributes the

anarchistic tendency of the masses of Russia to the arrogance of the

soldiery in that country. This reasoning is criticised on the ground

that both the anarchistic tendencies of the masses and the arrogance of

the soldiery are effects of the same cause, viz.—the despotic government

of Russia.

(3). _Mistaking a subsequent cause for a real cause._

This fallacy arises when an effect is observed and in the search for the

cause we accept something which in reality happened after the effect was

observed. A striking example of this fallacy occurred in a recent

municipal election. The increased cost of city government was charged to

the present mayor. His opponents pointed to him as the cause of this

increase in the city’s expenses. The mayor’s friends revealed the

fallacy by showing that the expense had really been incurred under the

former mayor. The acts of the present mayor could not have been the

cause of the increased expense because that expense had been incurred

before he went into office. Therefore those who made the unjust charge

had committed the fallacy of mistaking a subsequent cause for the real

cause.

(4). _Mistaking an insufficient cause for a sufficient cause._

This fallacy differs from those previously discussed in that there

exists some causal relation between the effect and the alleged cause.

The error consists of a failure to recognize the insufficiency of the

cause to produce the effect without the help of some other cause.

In a discussion of the proposition, “Resolved, that department stores

have proved a benefit to municipal communities,” one speaker argued that

such stores were the cause of the low price at which small necessities

such as hardware and dry-goods novelties could be purchased by the

consumer. The next speaker exposed the fallacy of this argument by

admitting that department stores had been a factor in lowering the cost

of such commodities, but that this could not have been done except for

the assistance of another and more powerful cause, viz.,—the invention

of machinery by which such articles could be manufactured in enormous

quantities.

_2. Fallacies of the argument from cause to effect._

Fallacies of the argument from cause to effect may be exposed by showing

1. That the observed cause is insufficient to produce the alleged

effect.

2. That past experience shows that the alleged effect does not always

follow the observed cause.

3. That an independent force has intervened to prevent the observed

cause from operating.

4. That the conclusion established by the argument is overthrown by

positive evidence.

It must be kept in mind that the argument from cause to effect is

subject to errors similar to those discussed in connection with

fallacies of the argument from effect to cause. In his desire to predict

the course of future events man is led to ignore the complex nature of

human affairs. A certain individual believes that if he puts all his

money into a business and then gives all his attention to its management

that that is a sufficient cause for success. Nevertheless, so much

depends upon the nature of the man and of the business that it is

extremely difficult to foretell the effect. The principle underlying

this situation is common to practically every argument from cause to

effect. Unless the fallacy is obvious it requires a broad and

penetrating intellect to fathom it.

_3. Fallacies of the argument from effect to effect._

The fallacies of the argument from effect to effect are discovered by

resolving it into the argument from effect to cause and from cause to

effect, of which it is composed, and examining the validity of each of

these processes.

IV. Fallacies of the argument from analogy.

The chapter on Argument from Analogy treated of the requirements for

validity to which such an argument must conform. We may expose the

fallacy of an argument from analogy by showing—

1. That the two factors in the analogy are not alike in all the

particulars affecting the conclusion.

2. That the alleged facts upon which the analogy is based are not true.

3. That the conclusion established by analogy is disproved by positive

evidence.

No test of an analogy is absolute. Its very nature makes it more

susceptible to fallacy than are the other forms of argument. At its best

it creates only a high degree of probability. As already stated, its

chief use is to give clearness and force to persuasive writing and

speaking. In the search for fallacies, here as well as elsewhere, the

best guarantee of success is an unprejudiced mind equipped with a

thorough working knowledge of all the argumentative processes of

reasoning and of the numerous fallacies to which they are subject.

EXERCISES IN FALLACY

I. Point out clearly the kind of fallacies, if any, involved in the

following arguments.

1. The only people excluded from the privilege of voting are

children, idiots, foreigners, convicts, and women. How much

longer will the civilized nations of the earth permit their

women to be classed with the incompetent and the criminal

classes of society?

2. Political parties are a necessity to free institutions. The

United States is the oldest democracy on earth and in it

political parties have always ruled.

3. The election of a Republican president in 1896 was followed by

a period of prosperity unrivalled in our history. Who can doubt

that had a Democratic president been elected it would have

worked the beginning of a sure decline of our industrial

supremacy?

4. The rapid increase in wages for the past twenty years shows the

superior advantage gained by the organization of the working

men.

5. Is not the Spanish-American war proof of the fact that the

government can meet its expenditures in time of great national

emergencies without resorting to the income tax?

6. England, France, and Germany are the great powers of Europe.

Both England and Germany have signified their willingness to

sign this treaty. We are therefore certain that the great

powers of Europe will become parties to this treaty provided we

give them the opportunity.

7. Soon after the great flood the city of Galveston was grappling

with serious municipal problems. By adopting the commission

form of city government all these difficulties were solved.

Therefore all American cities, oppressed by governmental

difficulties, may secure prompt relief by adopting this plan of

municipal administration.

8. (1) Some Italians are good musicians.

(2) This man is an Italian.

(3) Therefore this man is a good musician.

9. (1) All college students are interested in athletics.

(2) Ira Simpson is not a college student.

(3) Therefore Ira Simpson is not interested in athletics.

10. My opponent must remember that the finger of suspicion has

pointed to him as the one who willfully misrepresented that

great mine disaster. Does he dare to assert that he is now

telling the truth?

11. The capitalistic class has always oppressed the working man.

It has ground into the dust the man who toils for his living.

It has enjoyed its ill-gotten wealth by living in luxury while

the laboring man has earned his bread by the sweat of his brow.

Now, my fellow workmen, shall we cast our vote for one of the

most vicious members of this class?

12. Never in its history has the town of Grogan stooped to borrow

money for public improvements. No one will dare maintain that

this time honored custom, founded upon reason and common sense,

should now be broken.

13. Brown County is overwhelmingly Republican in politics; it is

therefore quite probable that your cousin who lives in that

county is a Republican.

14. The very foundation of this great republic is the idea of

democracy. Why, then, should not every right minded citizen

recognize his duty to support the Democratic party in the

coming election?

15. This climate is very healthful, for if it were not healthful

the people who live here would not be free from disease.

16. There must be a substantial reason back of the opinion that

the tariff should be lowered, for the prevalence of this

opinion throughout the country shows that it has a sound

foundation.

17. The inhuman method of killing murderers by electrocution

should be abolished.

18. It is evident that the recommendations of the Simplified

Spelling Board should be adopted because one of the members of

that board is the most eminent authority on the English

Language in this country.

19. The price of wheat is bound to increase rapidly within the

next few months because the recent flood of the Arkansas River

has destroyed many hundred acres of this crop.

20. James was quite sure that something disagreeable would occur

because only last night he saw the new moon over his left

shoulder.

21. Since this tax has worked well in England there can be no

doubt of its practicability if it is adopted in the United

States.

II. Each student should write out and bring to the class at least one

fallacy which he has found in the conversation of his

fellow-students.

III. Whenever possible use diagrams to show the fallacies in the

specimens under I.

CHAPTER VI

REFUTATION

In discussing the Practice of Argumentation and Debate we have

considered the importance of refutation in both the main argument and in

rebuttal. We have seen that refutation must be introduced into the main

arguments whenever the prominence of opposing arguments makes it

necessary. We have seen that rebuttal consists largely of refutation. In

fact, rebuttal and refutation are used by some writers as synonymous

terms. However, in the chapter on rebuttal a distinction was made by

which that term was used to indicate the practical work of defending an

argument and attacking an opponent. In this chapter on Refutation we

shall consider the theory of the various methods employed in attacking

an opponent’s argument.

Refutation is entirely destructive as distinguished from constructive

argument. While the work of rebuttal includes both a defense of one’s

own argument and an attack upon that of an opponent, refutation consists

of weakening or destroying the arguments of the opposition. From the

destructive nature of refutation it is plain that it must be adapted to

the argument against which it is directed. This involves keen powers of

analysis and adaptation, an exact knowledge of the theory and practice

of argumentation, and a thorough insight into both sides of the

proposition under discussion. The first essential in refutation is that

the writer or speaker make perfectly plain the exact argument that he is

refuting. He must then show just how the refutation which he is making

bears upon that argument. Finally he must show plainly that his

refutation has weakened or destroyed the argument against which it was

directed. These three steps in refutation must be indicated plainly.

In refutation it is proper to establish a contrary proposition or to

refer to the fact that such a contrary proposition has been established.

The actual destructive work may be accomplished in any legitimate

manner. Of the methods employed in refutation the following are the most

important.

I. Revealing a fallacy.

The chapter on fallacies has pointed out the argumentative defects of

reasoning most frequently encountered. The student must not assume that

these errors will always occur in the exact form in which they have been

treated in any text-book. They are sure to appear in many and varied

guises. To identify and expose them requires the keenest qualities of

mind. Each student should pride himself on his ability to detect a

fallacy quickly and should look back with humiliation upon any

occurrence when he has allowed a fallacious argument to pass by

unchallenged.

Familiarity with the valid forms of logical reasoning and with the

errors to which they are subject are prerequisites to success. It is not

sufficient that the student have a vague feeling that there is something

wrong with an argument; he must be able to locate the defect exactly and

to point it out to others in such a way that they will see it. Vagueness

and ambiguity are the very substance of fallacies. Sometimes the student

must use his knowledge of constructive logic to build up a parallel

argument in the way it ought to stand and show more plainly by means of

contrast the defects of the unsound argument. In such cases it often

happens that the evidence points in an opposite direction from that

which is needed to support a valid argument. All of these devices should

be utilized in making plain the existence of fallacies.

II. Reductio ad absurdum.

This method of refutation adopts for the time being the argument of an

opponent and then by carrying out that argument to its logical

conclusion shows that it is absurd. For example, Beecher answered those

who favored the South, during the late Civil War, because they were “the

weaker party,” by reducing their argument to an absurdity. He said,

“Nothing could be more generous than your doctrine that you stand for

the ‘weaker’ party in a controversy, when that weak party stands for its

own legitimate rights against imperious pride and power. But who ever

sympathized with a weak thief, because three constables had got hold of

him? And yet the one thief in three policemen’s hands is the weaker

party. I suppose you would sympathize with him.”

The following quotation from Laycock and Scales’ _Argumentation and

Debate_ still further illustrates this method of refutation.

“This method is effective because of its simplicity and directness. It

also has in it an element of ridicule that is persuasive against an

opponent. William Ellery Channing, in a reply to Henry Clay on the

slavery question, used this method as follows:—

“‘But this property, we are told, is not to be questioned on account of

its long duration. “Two hundred years have sanctioned and _sanctified_

negro slaves as property.” Nothing but respect for the speaker could

repress criticism on this unhappy phraseology. We will trust it escaped

him without thought. But to confine ourselves to the argument from

duration; how obvious the reply! Is injustice changed into justice by

the practice of ages? Is my victim made a righteous prey because I have

bowed him to the earth till he cannot rise? For more than two hundred

years heretics were burned, and not by mobs, not by lynch law, but by

the decrees of councils, at the instigation of theologians, and with the

sanction of the laws and religions of nations; and was this a reason for

keeping up the fires, that they had burned two hundred years? In the

eastern world, successive despots, not for two hundred years, but for

twice two thousand, have claimed the right of life and death over

millions, and with no law but their own will, have beheaded, bowstrung,

starved, tortured unhappy men without number who have incurred their

wrath; and does the lapse of so many centuries sanctify murder and

ferocious power?’

“Again:—‘But the great argument remains. It is said that this property

must not be questioned, because it is established by law. “That is

property which the law declares to be property.” Thus human law is made

supreme, decisive, in a question of morals. Thus the idea of an eternal,

immutable justice is set at naught. Thus the great rule of human life is

made to be the ordinance of interested men. But there is a higher

tribunal, a throne of equal justice, immovable by the conspiracy of all

human legislatures. “That is property which the law declares to be

property.” Then the laws have only to declare you, or me, or Mr. Clay,

to be property, and we become chattels and are bound to bear the yoke!

Does not even man’s moral nature repel this doctrine too intuitively to

leave time or need for argument?’”

III. The dilemma.

The dilemma is one of the most conclusive forms of refutation. It

consists in forcing upon an opponent a choice between two possible

solutions to the question under discussion, and then showing that both

conclusions are unsound. These two conclusions are called the “horns of

the dilemma.” It matters not which of the “horns” an opponent selects;

the result is disastrous. For example, Lincoln used the dilemma against

those who charged that the Republicans stirred up insurrection among the

slaves and pointed to John Brown and his men as a specific example

showing the truth of that charge. Lincoln said, “John Brown was no

Republican; and you have failed to implicate a single Republican in his

Harper’s Ferry enterprise. If any member of our party is guilty in that

matter, you know it or you do not know it. If you do know it, you are

inexcusable for not designating the man and proving the fact. If you do

not know it, you are inexcusable for asserting it, and especially for

persisting in the assertion after you have tried and failed to make the

proof. You need not be told that persisting in a charge which one does

not know to be true, is simply malicious slander.” In effect Lincoln

said, “You know it or you do not know it. If you know it you are

inexcusable. If you do not know it you are inexcusable. Whichever horn

of the dilemma you accept, your conduct is inexcusable.”

In order to be conclusive a dilemma must meet two requirements. First,

there must be only two possibilities in the case; the alternative must

include these exactly. Second, both members of the alternative, or

“horns” of the dilemma must be untenable. To ignore or fail to comply

with either of these requirements is fatal to this method of refutation.

Lincoln, in the following quotation, shows that Douglas has violated the

first of these requirements. He refuses to accept either of the horns of

the dilemma which Douglas has sought to force upon him, by pointing out

a third possibility. On this third possibility, overlooked by Douglas,

he can stand with safety. He says:—

“Judge Douglas finds the Republicans insisting that the Declaration of

Independence includes all men, black as well as white, and forthwith he

boldly denies that it includes negroes at all, and proceeds to argue

gravely that all who contend it does, do so only because they went to

vote, to eat and sleep, and marry with negroes. He will have it that

they cannot be consistent else. Now I protest against this counterfeit

logic which concludes that because I do not want a black woman for a

slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. I need not have her for

either. I can just leave her alone.”

IV. Residues.

The method of residues consists in stating all the possible conclusions

regarding the controverted subject and then destroying all of these

except one which is then regarded as the true conclusion. For example,

there are three possibilities, A, B, and C. A and B are false. Therefore

the presumption is that C is true. It will be seen that this process is

destructive and hence belongs with refutation. This method of refutation

must be used with great care. It is absolutely essential that every

possibility be included in the process. If one possibility is overlooked

the refutation is worthless. This is true because no one can tell

whether the known possibility is the true one or whether the possibility

which has been omitted is the true one. In such a case no conclusion is

reached. Even when it is apparent that the entire field has been

covered, and that every possibility has been stated the residuary part

should be supported by direct positive proof. This will offset the

suspicion, which is otherwise ever present in the minds of those who are

listening to or reading the argument, that perhaps one possibility has

been overlooked.

Foster in his _Argumentation and Debate_ quotes two excellent examples

of this method of refutation. The first of these is taken from Burke’s

_Speech on Conciliation_. After showing that a fierce spirit of liberty

has developed in the American colonies Burke asks what is to be done

with that spirit. Answering his own question he says:—

“‘As far as I am capable of discerning there are but three ways of

proceeding relative to this stubborn spirit which prevails in your

colonies, and disturbs your government. _These are—to change that

spirit, as inconvenient, by removing the cause; to prosecute it as

criminal; or to cope with it as necessary._ I would not be guilty of an

imperfect enumeration; I can think of but these three. Another has

indeed been started,—that of giving up the colonies; but it met so

slight a reception that I do not think myself obliged to dwell a great

while upon it. It is nothing but a little sally of anger, like the

frowardness of peevish children, who when they cannot get all they would

have, are resolved to take nothing.’

“Burke then proceeds to show that the first and second of these plans

are impracticable, and concludes with the following characteristic,

logical summary:—

“‘If, then, the removal of the causes of this spirit of American liberty

be for the greater part, or rather entirely, impracticable; if the ideas

of criminal process be inapplicable—or if applicable, are in the highest

degree inexpedient—what way yet remains? No way is open but the third

and last—to comply with the American spirit as necessary; or, if you

please, to submit to it as a necessary evil.’

“Huxley, in his first lecture on Evolution, presented three hypotheses

regarding the origin of the universe:—

“‘So far as I know, there are only three hypotheses which ever have been

entertained, or which well can be entertained, respecting the past

history of Nature. I will, in the first place, state the hypotheses, and

then I will consider what evidence bearing upon them is in our

possession, and by what light of criticism that evidence is to be

interpreted.

“‘Upon the first hypothesis, the assumption is that phenomena of Nature

similar to those exhibited by the present world have always existed; in

other words, that the universe has existed from all eternity in what may

be broadly termed its present condition.

“‘The second hypothesis is, that the present state of things has had

only a limited duration; and that at some period in the past, a

condition of the world, essentially similar to that which we now know,

came into existence, without any precedent condition from which it could

have naturally proceeded. The assumption that successive states of

Nature have arisen, each without any relation of natural causation to an

antecedent state, is a mere modification of this second hypothesis.

“‘The third hypothesis also assumes that the present state of things has

had but a limited duration; but it supposes that this state has been

evolved by a natural process from an antecedent state, and that from

another, and so on; and on this hypothesis, the attempt to assign any

limit to the series of past changes is usually given up.’

“Huxley thus destroyed the first two hypotheses and left the third—since

called the Theory of Evolution—standing alone. Following this indirect,

destructive method of proof, Huxley offered direct, constructive proof

of the probable soundness of the Theory of Evolution. Such positive

proof should always be offered in corroboration of negative proof, for

the method of residues is, at best, only an indirect argument. The

chances of overlooking a possibility, or of failing completely to

destroy those dealt with, are so great that the result of the indirect

method should be reinforced by direct argument.”

V. Inconsistencies.

When a witness testifies in a court of law he injures his own

credibility as soon as one part of his story contradicts another part.

His entire account of the events about which he has been called to give

testimony must be consistent. Any inconsistency may prove fatal to the

acceptance of his testimony. In like manner any inconsistency in an

argument may prove fatal to its acceptance. The exposure of such

inconsistencies in an opponent’s argument is one of the most important

methods of refutation. In most cases the difficulty of the task is

greatly increased by the form in which such inconsistencies usually

occur. Seldom are they apparent. In most cases the error is revealed

only after the argument has been carefully analyzed and the inconsistent

parts stripped of their covering of confusing language.

The following quotation taken from the argument of Lincoln in one of the

Lincoln-Douglas debates shows the application of this method. Douglas

had maintained that slavery could be lawfully excluded from a territory

in spite of the Dred Scott decision. In refuting this argument by

exposing the inconsistency which it contained, Lincoln said:—

“The Dred Scott Decision expressly gives every citizen of the United

States a right to carry his slaves into the United States Territories.

Now, there was some inconsistency in saying that the decision was right,

and saying, too, that the people of the Territory could lawfully drive

slavery out again. When all the trash, the words, the collateral matter,

was cleared away from it,—all the chaff was fanned out of it,—it was a

bare absurdity: no less than that a thing may be lawfully driven away

from a place where it has a lawful right to be. Clear it of all the

verbiage, and that is the naked truth for his proposition—that a thing

may be lawfully driven from the place where it has a lawful right to

stay.”

VI. Adopting an opponent’s evidence.

This method of refutation consists in taking evidence which an opponent

has introduced in favor of his own argument and showing that in reality

it supports the opposite contention. This method of refutation is so

effective that it should never be neglected when an opportunity to use

it is presented. The opportunity may arise from the failure of an

opponent to grasp the full bearing of the evidence which he offers, or

it may arise from an unexpected turn in the discussion. Evidence may be

introduced in the beginning of a discussion to support a particular

contention by which it favors the writer or speaker who introduces it.

Later this same evidence may be interpreted as supporting a contention

entirely adverse to the writer or speaker who introduced it. An

excellent example of this method of refutation is found in Bouton’s

_Lincoln and Douglas Debates_ in Lincoln’s Cooper Institute Speech,

where he turns the warning of Washington against those who had been

quoting it against him.

“Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against

sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less than

eight years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as President of

the United States, approved and signed an act of Congress enforcing the

prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Territory, which act embodied

the policy of the Government upon that subject up to and at the very

moment he penned that warning; and about one year after he penned it, he

wrote Lafayette that he considered that prohibition a wise measure,

expressing in the same connection his hope that we should at some time

have a confederacy of free states.

“Bearing this in mind, and seeing that sectionalism has since risen upon

this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your hands against us, or

in our hands against you? Could Washington himself speak, would he cast

the blame of that sectionalism upon us who sustain his policy, or upon

you who repudiate it? We respect the warning of Washington, and we

commend it to you, together with his example pointing to the right

application of it.”

We have now considered the important methods of refutation. Their

successful use depends upon the conscientious effort of the student.

Just as a boy cannot hope to learn to swim by sitting on the bank of a

stream and reading a book containing directions on how to swim, so can

no student hope to become successful in refutation by a study of the

methods explained and illustrated in this chapter. He must master the

theory of refutation, but it does not become an effective instrument in

his hands until he has applied it in actual practice. Moreover, just as

the boy can better profit by the instructions regarding swimming after

he has actually tried to swim, so can the debater better profit by the

theory of refutation after he has engaged in some real debates.

EXERCISES IN REFUTATION

I. Point out the different methods of refutation employed in the

arguments in Appendix A; Appendix B; Appendix C.

II. Refute the following statements and name the method of refutation

employed in each case.

1. High school courses should be wholly prescribed. No electives

should be offered.

2. So far as political rights are concerned all citizens should

have equal privileges. Therefore women should have the right to

vote.

3. The term of office of the President of the United States should

be extended to eight years because we should not run the risk

of losing the services of an efficient president at the end of

four years.

4. Our government should annex Cuba because we must gain

possession of all territory adjacent to, or not separated by

foreign possessions from, the United States.

5. There is no ground for anticipating an immediate war with Japan

since she has been compelled to come to our terms in the recent

disputes.

III. What methods of refutation are employed by Burke in his Speech on

Conciliation? By Webster in his Reply to Hayne?

IV. In the next class debate point out and name all the methods of

refutation employed by your opponents and yourself.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE AT ALTON 273

APPENDIX B: BRIEF OF THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE AT ALTON 317

APPENDIX C: LINCOLN’S COOPER INSTITUTE SPEECH 324

APPENDIX D: MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR HIGH SCHOOL DEBATING LEAGUE

UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY 342

APPENDIX E: DEBATING AGREEMENT FOR A LEAGUE COMPOSED OF FIVE

INSTITUTIONS 346

APPENDIX F: MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR A TRIANGULAR DEBATING

LEAGUE 352

APPENDIX G: PROPOSITIONS 355

APPENDIX A

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE AT ALTON

[OCTOBER 15, 1858]

SENATOR DOUGLAS’S SPEECH

Ladies and Gentlemen: It is now nearly four months since the canvass

between Mr. Lincoln and myself commenced. On the 16th of June the

Republican Convention assembled at Springfield and nominated Mr. Lincoln

as their candidate for the United States Senate, and he, on that

occasion, delivered a speech in which he laid down what he understood to

be the Republican creed and the platform on which he proposed to stand

during the contest. The principal points in that speech of Mr. Lincoln’s

were: First, that this government could not endure permanently divided

into Free and Slave States, as our fathers made it; that they must all

become free or all become slave; all become one thing, or all become the

other,—otherwise this Union could not continue to exist. I give you his

opinions almost in the identical language he used. His second

proposition was a crusade against the Supreme Court of the United States

because of the Dred Scott decision, urging as an especial reason for his

opposition to that decision that it deprived the negroes of the rights

and benefits of that clause in the Constitution of the United States

which guarantees to the citizens of each State all the rights,

privileges, and immunities of the citizens of the several States. On the

10th of July I returned home, and delivered a speech to the people of

Chicago, in which I announced it to be my purpose to appeal to the

people of Illinois to sustain the course I had pursued in Congress. In

that speech I joined issue with Mr. Lincoln on the points which he had

presented. Thus there was an issue clear and distinct made up between us

on these two propositions laid down in the speech of Mr. Lincoln at

Springfield, and controverted by me in my reply to him at Chicago. On

the next day, the 11th of July, Mr. Lincoln replied to me at Chicago,

explaining at some length and reaffirming the positions which he had

taken in his Springfield speech. In that Chicago speech he even went

further than he had before, and uttered sentiments in regard to the

negro being on an equality with the white man. He adopted in support of

this position the argument which Lovejoy and Codding and other Abolition

lecturers had made familiar in the northern and central portions of the

State; to wit, that the Declaration of Independence having declared all

men free and equal, by divine law, also that negro equality was an

inalienable right, of which they could not be deprived. He insisted, in

that speech, that the Declaration of Independence included the negro in

the clause asserting that all men were created equal, and went so far as

to say that if one man was allowed to take the position that it did not

include the negro, others might take the position that it did not

include other men. He said that all these distinctions between this man

and that man, this race and the other race, must be discarded, and we

must all stand by the Declaration of Independence, declaring that all

men were created equal.

The issue thus being made up between Mr. Lincoln and myself on three

points, we went before the people of the State. During the following

seven weeks, between the Chicago speeches and our first meeting at

Ottawa, he and I addressed large assemblages of the people in many of

the central counties. In my speeches I confined myself closely to those

three positions which he had taken, controverting his proposition that

this Union could not exist as our fathers made it, divided into Free and

Slave States, controverting his proposition of a crusade against the

Supreme Court because of the Dred Scott decision, and controverting his

proposition that the Declaration of Independence included and meant the

negroes as well as the white men, when it declared all men to be created

equal. I supposed at that time that these propositions constituted a

distinct issue between us, and that the opposite positions we had taken

upon them we would be willing to be held to in every part of the State.

I never intended to waver one hair’s breadth from that issue either in

the north or the south or wherever I should address the people of

Illinois. I hold that when the time arrives that I cannot proclaim my

political creed in the same terms, not only in the northern, but in the

southern part of Illinois, not only in the Northern, but the Southern

States, and wherever the American flag waves over American soil, that

then there must be something wrong in that creed; so long as we live

under a common Constitution, so long as we live in a confederacy of

sovereign and equal States, joined together as one for certain purposes,

that any political creed is radically wrong which cannot be proclaimed

in every State and every section of that Union, alike. I took up Mr.

Lincoln’s three propositions in my several speeches, analyzed them, and

pointed out what I believed to be the radical errors contained in them.

First, in regard to his doctrine that this government was in violation

of the law of God, which says that a house divided against itself cannot

stand, I repudiated it as a slander upon the immortal framers of our

Constitution. I then said, I have often repeated, and now again assert,

that in my opinion our government can endure forever, divided into Free

and Slave States as our fathers made it,—each State having the right to

prohibit, abolish, or sustain slavery, just as it pleases. This

government was made upon the great basis of the sovereignty of the

States, the right of each State to regulate its own domestic

institutions to suit itself; and that right was conferred with the

understanding and expectation that inasmuch as each locality had

separate interests, each locality must have different and distinct local

and domestic institutions, corresponding to its wants and interests. Our

fathers knew when they made the government that the laws and

institutions which were well adapted to the Green Mountains of Vermont

were unsuited to the rice plantations of South Carolina. They knew then,

as well as we know now, that the laws and institutions which would be

well adapted to the beautiful prairies of Illinois would not be suited

to the mining regions of California. They knew that in a Republic as

broad as this, having such a variety of soil, climate, and interest,

there must necessarily be a corresponding variety of local laws,—the

policy and institutions of each State adapted to its condition and

wants. For this reason this Union was established on the right of each

State to do as it pleased on the question of slavery, and every other

question; and the various States were not allowed to complain of, much

less interfere with, the policy of their neighbors.

Suppose the doctrine advocated by Mr. Lincoln and the Abolitionists of

this day had prevailed when the Constitution was made, what would have

been the result? Imagine for a moment that Mr. Lincoln had been a member

of the Convention that framed the Constitution of the United States, and

that when its members were about to sign that wonderful document, he had

arisen in that Convention as he did at Springfield this summer, and,

addressing himself to the President, had said, “A house divided against

itself cannot stand; this government, divided into Free and Slave States

cannot endure, they must all be free or all be slave; they must all be

one thing, or all the other,—otherwise, it is a violation of the law of

God, and cannot continue to exist;”—suppose Mr. Lincoln had convinced

that body of sages that that doctrine was sound, what would have been

the result? Remember that the Union was then composed of thirteen

States, twelve of which were slaveholding, and one free. Do you think

that the one Free State would have outvoted the twelve slaveholding

States, and thus have secured the abolition of slavery? On the other

hand, would not the twelve slaveholding States have outvoted the one

free State, and thus have fastened slavery, by a constitutional

provision, on every foot of the American Republic forever? You see that

if this Abolition doctrine of Mr. Lincoln had prevailed when the

government was made, it would have established slavery as a permanent

institution in all the States, whether they wanted it or not; and the

question for us to determine in Illinois now, as one of the Free States,

is whether or not we are willing, having become the majority section, to

enforce a doctrine on the minority which we would have resisted with our

heart’s blood had it been attempted on us when we were in a minority.

How has the South lost her power as the majority section in this Union,

and how have the Free States gained it, except under the operation of

that principle which declares the right of the people of each State and

each Territory to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their

own way? It was under that principle that slavery was abolished in New

Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and

Pennsylvania; it was under that principle that one-half of the

slaveholding States became free; it was under that principle that the

number of Free States increased until, from being one out of twelve

States, we have grown to be the majority of States of the whole Union,

with the power to control the House of Representatives and Senate, and

the power, consequently, to elect a President by Northern votes, without

the aid of a Southern State. Having obtained this power under the

operation of that great principle, are you now prepared to abandon the

principle and declare that merely because we have the power you will

wage a war against the Southern States and their institutions until you

force them to abolish slavery everywhere?

After having pressed these arguments home on Mr. Lincoln for seven

weeks, publishing a number of my speeches, we met at Ottawa in joint

discussion, and he then began to crawfish a little, and let himself

down. I there propounded certain questions to him. Amongst others, I

asked him whether he would vote for the admission of any more Slave

States, in the event the people wanted them. He would not answer. I then

told him that if he did not answer the question there, I would renew it

at Freeport, and would then trot him down into Egypt, and again put it

to him. Well, at Freeport, knowing that the next joint discussion took

place in Egypt, and being in dread of it, he did answer my question in

regard to no more Slave States in a mode which he hoped would be

satisfactory to me, and accomplish the object he had in view. I will

show you what his answer was. After saying that he was not pledged to

the Republican doctrine of “no more Slave States,” he declared:

“I state to you freely, frankly, that I should be exceedingly sorry to

ever be put in the position of having to pass upon that question. I

should be exceedingly glad to know that there never would be another

Slave State admitted into this Union.”

Here permit me to remark, that I do not think the people will ever force

him into a position against his will. He went on to say: