Perhaps no subject has, in this age, elicited more patient research,
and critical investigation of original, constituent principles,
formations, and combinations, than the English language. The
legitimate province of philology, however, as I humbly conceive,
has, in some instances, been made to yield to that of philosophy, so
far as to divert the attention from the combinations of our language
which refinement has introduced, to radical elements and
associations which no way concern the progress of literature, or the
essential use for which language was intended. Were this
retrogressive mode of investigating and applying principles, to
obtain, among philologists, the ascendency over that which
accommodates the use of language to progressive refinement, it is
easy to conceive the state of barbarism to which society would, in a
short time, be reduced. Moreover, if what some call the philosophy
of language, were to supersede, altogether, the province of
philology as it applies to the present, progressive and refined
state of English literature, the great object contemplated by the
learned, in all ages, namely, the approximation of language, in
common with every thing else, to that point of perfection at which
it is the object of correct philology to arrive, would be
frustrated.
The dubious and wildering track struck out by those innovators and
visionaries who absurdly endeavor to teach modern English, by
rejecting the authority and sanction of custom, and by conducting
the learner back to the original combinations, and the detached,
disjointed, and barbarous constructions of our progenitors, both
prudence and reason, as well as a due regard for correct philology,
impel me to shun. Those modest writers who, by bringing to their aid
a little sophistry, much duplicity, and a wholesale traffic in the
swelling phrases, "philosophy, reason, and common sense," attempt to
overthrow the wisdom of former ages, and show that the result of all
the labors of those distinguished philologists who had previously
occupied the field of grammatical science, is nothing but error and
folly, will doubtless meet the neglect and contempt justly merited
by such consummate vanity and unblushing pedantry. Fortunately for
those who employ our language as their vehicle of mental conference,
custom will not yield to the speculative theories of the visionary.
If it would, improvement in English literature would soon be at an
end, and we should be tamely conducted back to the Vandalic age.
As the use of what is commonly called the philosophy of language, is
evidently misapplied by those who make it the test of _grammatical
certainty_, it may not be amiss to offer a few considerations with a
view to expose the fallacy of so vague a criterion.
All reasoning and investigation which depend on the philosophy of
language for an ultimate result, must be conducted _a posteriori_.
Its office, according to the ordinary mode of treating the subject,
is to trace language to its origin, not for the purpose of
determining and fixing grammatical associations and dependances,
such as the agreement, government, and mutual relations of words,
but in order to analyze combinations with a view to develop the
first principles of the language, and arrive at the primitive
meaning of words. Now, it is presumed, that no one who has paid
critical attention to the subject, will contend, that the original
import of single words, has any relation to the syntactical
dependances and connexions of words in general;--to gain a knowledge
of which, is the leading object of the student in grammar. And,
furthermore, I challenge those who have indulged in such useless
vagaries, to show by what process, with their own systems, they can
communicate a practical knowledge of grammar. I venture to predict,
that, if they make the attempt, they will find their systems more
splendid in theory, than useful in practice.
Again, it cannot rationally be contended, that the radical meaning
has any efficiency in controlling the signification which, by the
power of association, custom has assigned to many words;--a
signification _essentially different_ from the original import. Were
this the case, and were the language now to be taught and understood
in compliance with the original import of words, it would have to
undergo a thorough change; to be analyzed, divided, and sub-divided,
almost _ad infinitum_. Indeed, there is the same propriety in
asserting that the Gothic, Danish, and Anglo-Saxon elements in our
language, ought to be pronounced separately, to enable us to
understand our vernacular tongue, that there is in contending, that
their primitive meaning has an ascendency over the influence of the
principle of association in changing, and the power of custom in
determining, the import of words. Many of our words are derived from
the Greek, Roman, French, Spanish, Italian, and German languages;
and the only use we can make of their originals, is to render them
subservient to the force of custom in cases in which general usage
has not varied from the primitive signification. Moreover, let the
advocates of a mere philosophical investigation of the language,
extend their system as far as a radical analysis will warrant them,
and, with Horne Tooke, not only consider adverbs, prepositions,
conjunctions, and interjections, as abbreviations of nouns and
verbs, but, on their own responsibility, apply them, in teaching the
language, _in compliance with their radical import_, and what would
such a course avail them against the power of custom, and the
influence of association and refinement? Let them show me one
grammarian, produced by such a course of instruction, and they will
exhibit a "philosophical" miracle. They might as well undertake to
teach architecture, by having recourse to its origin, as
represented by booths and tents. In addition to this, when we
consider the great number of obsolete words, from which many now in
use are derived, the original meaning of which cannot be
ascertained, and, also, the multitude whose signification has been
changed by the principle of association, it is preposterous to
think, that a mere philosophical mode of investigating and teaching
the language, is the one by which its significancy can be enforced,
its correctness determined, its use comprehended, and its
improvement extended. Before what commonly passes for a
philosophical manner of developing the language can successfully be
made the medium through which it can be comprehended, in all its
present combinations, relations, and dependances, it must undergo a
thorough retrogressive change, in all those combinations, relations,
and dependances, even to the last letter of the alphabet. And before
we can consent to this radical modification and retrograde ratio of
the English language, we must agree to revive the customs, the
habits, and the precise language of our progenitors, the Goths and
Vandals. Were all the advocates for the introduction of such
philosophical grammars into common schools, at once to enter on
their pilgrimage, and recede into the native obscurity and barbarity
of the ancient Britons, Picts, and Vandals, it is believed, that the
cause of learning and refinement would not suffer greatly by their
loss, and that the good sense of the present age, would not allow
many of our best teachers to be of the party.
The last consideration which I shall give a philosophical manner of
investigating and enforcing the English language, is, that by this
mode of analyzing and reducing it to practice, _it cannot, in this
age, be comprehended_ as the medium of thought. Were this method to
prevail, our present literal language would become a dead letter. Of
what avail is language, if it can not be understood? And how can it
be accommodated to the understanding, unless it receive the sanction
of common consent? Even if we admit that such a manner of unfolding
the principles of our language, is more rational and correct than
the ordinary, practical method, I think it is clear that such a mode
of investigation and development, does not meet the necessities and
convenience of ordinary learners in school. To be consistent, that
system which instructs by tracing a few of our words to their
origin, must unfold the whole in the same manner. But the student in
common schools and academies, cannot afford time to stem the tide of
language up to its source, and there dive to the bottom of the
fountain for knowledge. Such labor ought not to be required of him.
His object is to become, not a philosophical antiquarian, but a
practical grammarian. If I comprehend the design (if they have any)
of our modern philosophical writers on this subject, it is to make
grammarians by inculcating a few general principles, arising out of
the genius of the language, and the nature of things, which the
learner, by the exercise of his _reasoning powers_, must reduce to
practice. His own judgment, _independent of grammar rules_, is to be
his guide in speaking and writing correctly. Hence, many of them
exclude from their systems, all exercises in what is called _false
Syntax_. But these profound philological dictators appear to have
overlooked the important consideration, that the great mass of
mankind, and especially of boys and girls in common schools, _can
never become philosophers;_ and, consequently, can never comprehend
and reduce to practice their metaphysical and obscure systems of
grammar. I wish to see children treated as _reasoning_ beings. But
there should be a medium in all things. It is, therefore, absurd to
instruct children as if they were already profound philosophers and
logicians.
To demonstrate the utility, and enforce the necessity, of exercising
the learner in correcting _false Syntax_, I need no other argument
than the interesting and undeniable fact, that Mr. Murray's labors,
in this department, have effected a complete revolution in the
English language, in point of verbal accuracy. Who does not know,
that the best writers of this day, are not guilty of _one_
grammatical inaccuracy, where those authors who wrote before Mr.
Murray flourished, are guilty of _five_? And what has produced this
important change for the better? Ask the hundreds of thousands who
have studied "Mr. Murray's exercises in FALSE SYNTAX." If, then,
this view of the subject is correct, it follows, that the greater
portion of our philosophical grammars, are far more worthy the
attention of literary connoisseurs, than of the great mass of
learners.
Knowing that a strong predilection for philosophical grammars,
exists in the minds of some teachers of this science, I have thought
proper, for the gratification of such, to intersperse through the
pages of this work under the head of "PHILOSOPHICAL NOTES," an
entire system of grammatical principles as deduced from what appears
to me to be the most rational and consistent philosophical
investigations. They who prefer this theory to that exhibited in the
body of the work, are, of course, at liberty to adopt it.
_In general, a philosophical theory of grammar will be found to
accord with the practical theory embraced in the body of this work.
Wherever such agreement exists, the system contained in these NOTES
will be deficient, and this deficiency may be supplied by adopting
the principles contained in the other parts of the work_.
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